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DIVERSITY, SPECIFICITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYMAKING: AN INTRODUCTION
JOEL A. MINTz*
The precise beginning of the modem era of environmental law is a mat-
ter of dispute. Some observers believe that period began with the publication
of Rachel Carson's classic work Silent Spring,1 which raised alarms regard-
ing the hazards of the pesticide DDT to the natural environment and human
health. Other experts trace its beginning to the Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Communication case, in which a coalition of
conservationists successfully challenged the federal licensing of a proposed
hydro-electric pumped storage facility that was to be built at Storm King
Mountain in the Hudson River Valley of New York State. Still others main-
tain that the modem environmental ere was born in April, 1970 at the first
Earth Day celebration, a widely publicized event that provided a dramatic
demonstration of the depth of public concern with pollution and environmen-
tal conservation and catalyzed the passage of a host of federal environmental
statutes in the early 1970s.
Whatever the date of its commencement, however, one attribute of the
current regime of environmental law seems beyond dispute: the field has
branched off in a variety of different directions as some longstanding envi-
ronmental problems have been alleviated, new ones have been discovered,
and tides of public opinion have ebbed and flowed across the American po-
litical shoreline. Since its beginnings, environmental law has gained impor-
tance-and grown in complexity-at federal, state and local levels alike.
Moreover, its proliferation has not been limited to new legislation. Envi-
ronmental law also consists of a voluminous body of regulations and case
law. It is now a remarkably intricate, diverse, multi-faceted field, with lin-
gering areas of indeterminacy and numerous sub-specialties.
The four articles that comprise this issue provide a good illustration of
environmental law's rich variation. Professor Richard Grosso's provocative
piece, "The Legality of Carrying Capacity-Based Environmental Land Use
Permitting Decisions," focuses on the approach to Land Use and Environ-
mental Law adopted by the State of Florida. Grosso begins by summarizing
the broad range of federal and state laws that authorize and require planning
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center and Member Scholar,
Center for Progressive Reform.
1. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, HOUGHTON MIFFLIN, 1962.
2. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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and permitting decisions based upon either the limits of ecosystems or the
need for public facilities to accommodate anticipated new development. He
then takes an in-depth look at how Florida's Growth Management Act takes
account of population projections, environmental impacts and the need to
provide ample infrastructure for new development. Finally, Grosso surveys
judicial decisions that have reviewed local limited growth and moratoria
ordinances and that have established standards with regard to scientific and
expert witness testimony in challenges to such ordinances.
Grosso openly advocates "aggressive" use of land use regulation to
stem the ongoing destruction of ecosystems and the conversion of farmlands
to urban uses. Taking account of sustainability concerns and the precautio-
nary principle, he calls for "an honest and frank discussion" regarding Flori-
da's finite amount of land and the state's "financial and practical ability to
sustain unlimited land development." In Professor Grosso's view, current
federal and state laws concerning planning and environmental decisions in
Florida and elsewhere provide governmental officials with "ample authority
to ensure the sustainability of fiscal and ecological resources." What is
needed, he contends, are elected officials who have the political will to "act
boldly to protect the future of the places over which they have jurisdiction."
Valerio Spinaci's piece, "Lessons from BP: Deepwater Oil Drilling Is
An Abnormally Dangerous Activity," addresses a topic that is narrower in
scope, but no less important: the applicability of the common law doctrine of
strict liability in lawsuits arising of the catastrophic BP oil spill blow out of
2010. In Spinaci's view, that doctrine "constitutes the best way to remedy
(the BP oil spill) and to prevent further oil spills from occurring."
Spinaci begins his analysis by contending that the applicable federal
laws do not preempt the application of tort law principles. He examines re-
levant provisions of the federal Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act,
along with pertinent case law, to demonstrate that these statutes allow for the
application of state common law as a supplementary source of liability for oil
spills.
Spinaci then describes the nature and historical development of the doc-
trine of strict liability. He considers its case law origins in the landmark case
of Rylands v. Fletcher, and its evolution in various versions of the American
Law Institute's Restatement of Torts. Spinaci summarizes the state of the
law of Florida with regard to strict liability. Finally, he provides a detailed
discussion of the ways in which deepwater drilling for oil and gas satisfies
the "abnormally dangerous activities test" of §§519 and 520 of the Restate-
ment (2d) of Torts. As Spinaci sees it, judicial application of the doctrine of
strict liability in this context provides an appropriate incentive for oil compa-
nies to take precautions to avoid oil spills. It also rightly requires them to
bear the burden of spills that they do not avoid.
[Vol. 35
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Sidney Ansbacher's essay, "Stop the Beach Renourishment: A Case of
MacGuffins and Legal Fictions," is in part a critique of the Supreme Court of
the United States' decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection.3 More substantially, however,
Ansbacher's piece is a detailed examination of the evolution of the general
law of private property rights in England and the United States, and the his-
torical development of public rights in (and under) water, the public trust
doctrine, and private riparian and littoral rights alongside navigable waters.
Ansbacher's thesis is that, given the number of changes that have oc-
cuffed in the law over time, it is difficult to conclude, as the Supreme Court
did in Stop the Beach Renourishment, that there is any settled law in the State
of Florida regarding "who owns what on the waterfront." He criticizes the
Court for too quickly dismissing what he believes is the most settled body of
Florida law regarding riparian rights, and for choosing to cite and obscure a
decision of a lower state court as the best guide to Florida law in this area.
Like Valerio Spinaci's article, Sidney Ansbacher's detailed essay serves as a
reminder that, while much of the field is relatively new, environmental law is
inextricably bound together with longstanding common law notions and doc-
trines, and that judicial decision-making remains an integral part of environ-
mental law's development.
Finally, Ekateryna Drozd's article focuses on a theme also explored by
Richard Grosso: the critical importance of sound science in the development
of environmental policies. Drozd assays-and defends- a regulation pro-
posed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requir-
ing numerical criteria for water quality standards that address nutrient pollu-
tion. Her analysis begins with an explanation of the nature and causes of
eutrophication that is human generated and that which is naturally occurring,
as well as the environmental impacts of eutrophication. Drozd then de-
scribes the proposed EPA regulation (especially as it may affect the Ever-
glades), its development, and its rationale. Finally, her essay distinguishes
narrative from numerical water quality standards. She argues that numerical
standards provide the certainty needed to minimize the impacts of nutrient
pollution. In Drozd's opinion, EPA's proposed nutrient standards present "a
great way to rectify many years of inaction and delay in attempting to fix the
nutrient pollution problem in Florida and other states."
This varied set of articles is likely to be of interest to readers of various
sorts. Obviously, its individual pieces will interest those who desire to learn
more about certain specific topics such as Florida's approach to growth man-
agement, judicial review of limited growth and moratoria ordinances, the BP
3. 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010).
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oil spill, the applicability of strict liability to oil spills in general, judicial
takings, the history of property rights, riparian and littoral rights, the Clean
Water Act's water quality standards, eutrophication, and the future of the
Everglades. Beyond these narrower concerns, however, articles in this issue
will also be of value to readers with an interest in such broader themes as the
overall importance of environmental regulation, the criticality of sound
science to the development of viable environmental policies, the continuing
role of the common law and judicial decision-making in the evolution of
environmental legal doctrines, the roles of federal, state and local govern-
ments in environmental policy-making, sustainability, the precautionary
principle, and the environmental jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In sum, the articles that follow this introduction not only reflect the ex-
traordinary variation that exists within the environmental law, but also con-
tribute-in a number of ways-to the field's continued growth and vitality.
They merit the time and attention of scholars, students, judges, lawyers, poli-
cymakers, and general readers alike.
[Vol. 35
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STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT: A CASE OF
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to place the Supreme Court of the United States'
decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (STBR),' in context of Florida property law. The
decision juxtaposed Florida's riparian and littoral rights law against the
state's beach renourishment program, all in an attempt to determine whether
the judicial branch can be liable for compensable takings of property rights.
While the Supreme Court held that no judicial taking occurred, it perfuncto-
rily considered the underlying issues. What were the rights of Gulffront
property owners on renourished beaches funded by state and local govern-
ment? The fundamental issues concerned a simple truth: "Water not only
fructifies the soil, but it also delimits the boundaries of land grants."2 Fur-
ther, few battles over property boundaries are as heated, or yet as transitory,
as those on the seashore.
The STBR court split into three blocs regarding the judicial takings is-
sue. All eight of the justices-Justice Stevens, who owns an oceanfront con-
dominium in Florida, recused himself-held no judicial taking occurred in
the case at bar. The court split as follows: Justice Scalia wrote for Chief
Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Alito, and himself in a plurality, opining
that judicial taking is a viable doctrine. They opined that a court effects a
taking if it "declares that what was once an established right of private prop-
erty no longer exists."'3 Justice Kennedy wrote for Justice Sotomayor and
himself in stating that the substantive due process doctrine sufficed to ad-
1. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
2. Hans W. Baade, Roman Law in the Water, Mineral and Public Land Law of the
Southwestern United States, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 865, 867 (1992).
3. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 35
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dress the matter.4 Justice Breyer wrote for Justice Ginsburg and himself to
say that the whole proceeding was unnecessary.5 Needless to say, much
jousting occurred.
In particular, Justice Scalia attacked Justice Kennedy's reliance on the
substantive due process doctrine. He emphasized "that the 'liberties pro-
tected by Substantive Due Process do not include economic liberties. '6 Jus-
tice Scalia accused Justice Kennedy of "Lochner-izing," alleging that Justice
Kennedy applied the due process clause in an unseemingly activist manner.7
Commentators assume Justice Scalia thought he had a fifth vote in Justice
Kennedy for holding that a judicial takings doctrine exists.8 Hence, the an-
tipathy. 9
The Court gave short shrift to the underlying issue. We do not. I write
elsewhere about the STBR decision's impact on landowners' rights to ex-
clude and on public rights of access on Florida's beaches.'0 This article fo-
cuses on the myriad changes over two millennia in the law of waterfront
ownership in questioning the STBR Court's determination that there is any
settled law in Florida regarding who owns what on the waterfront, let alone
the purportedly settled law upon which that court relied. The most recent
and most settled appeared to support the property owner.
This requires an exegesis of how waterfront ownership law developed.
We turn, first, to the development of common law real property rights. From
the Norman Conquest forward, we see a broadening of private property
rights, followed by increasing regulation. Next, the article addresses public
rights in and under navigable waters, before turning to riparian and littoral
4. Id. at 2615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Gary K. Oldehoff, Florida's Beach Res-
toration Program Weathers a Storm in the Courts: Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2010, at 11, 20.
8. Oldehoff, supra note 7, at 19-20.
9. Id. The plurality's failure to gain the fifth vote rendered the underlying, significant
private property and public access issues a "MacGuffin." Alfred Hitchcock explained that a
MacGuffin is the initial object of the central search in the plot. The characters will risk life
and limb to get the MacGuffin. Nonetheless, the MacGuffin ultimately has no significance
except to drive the plot. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD, THE HITCHCOCK MURDERS 10 (2001);
DONALD SPOTO, THE DARK SIDE OF GENIUS: THE LIFE OF ALFRED HITCHCOCK 145 (Da Capo
Press 1999) (1941). Hitchcock would allegedly explain that a MacGuffin was a diversion,
like "an apparatus for trapping lions in the Scottish Highlands." SIDNEY GOTrLIEB, FRAMING
HITCHCOCK 48 (2002).
10. See Sidney F. Ansbacher et al., Stop the Beach Renourishment Stops Private Bea-
chowners' Right to Exclude the Public, 12 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 43 (2010).
2011]
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rights alongside navigable waters, particularly as a category of property law.
While the public trust in navigable waters might have originated as a "legal
fiction," it is well entrenched in modem case law, and, in Florida, its consti-
tution. We turn to property and waterfront rights law in Florida, with partic-
ular emphasis on STBR in the development of Florida's property law. The
article concludes that STBR itself turns on what originated as multiple legal
fictions regarding Roman, English, federal, and Florida law of both public
and private property rights. Nonetheless, the law is binding, regardless of
whether it originated in precedent or in social norms.
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. William the Conqueror Through the Magna Carta
As we know, American real property law derives principally from Eng-
lish Common Law, and that, in turn, from Roman Law. 1 While Rome deli-
11. Jane Ball, The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Law, ELECTRONIC J. COMP.
L., Dec. 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www.ejcl.org/103/artlO3-l.pdf; Charles P. Sherman,
The Romanization of English Law, 23 YALE L.J. 318, 318 (1914). Sherman emphasized two
phases of Roman law in Britain. Rome occupied from the first century, AD, through the last
Roman Legion's withdrawal in 455 AD. Id. Edward Re stated, "Britain was an imperial
province of the first order," which had a garrison totaling 30,000 soldiers. Edward D. Re,
Speech, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law-The Brendan F. Brown Lecture, 39
Loy. L. REv. 295, 300 (1993). Three of the empire's greatest jurists sat in York at one time.
Id. "It was as if the United States Supreme Court were [able] to hold sessions in Alaska."
Sherman, supra, at 318. St. Augustine (that Augustine) founded the primate English See of
Canterbury in 596. Id. A key convert, Ethelbert, King of Kent, required a legal code "'ac-
cording to the Roman mode."' Id. at 318-19 (citation omitted).
Sherman surmised that Augustine and Roman missionaries convinced the King of
Kent of the legal primacy of the recently deceased Justinian. Id. Re explains: "It is well
established that Gregory [Pope Gregory, who sent Augustine to England] knew the Digest of
Justinian." Re, supra, at 302. Regardless, Roman law dominated through the eleventh cen-
tury. Sherman, supra, at 319-20. The Anglo-Saxon reign in England, from Egbert in 827,
followed Roman law. Id. Particularly, Alfred followed Charlemagne's Laws. Charlemagne
sought to impose Roman laws, which influenced England by extension. Id. at 319. Sherman
opined that Canute might have provided the most expansive legal influence when he ruled
Denmark and England. Id. at 319-320. Edward the Confessor left some Roman code behind
from his own restored Anglo-Saxon rule after Canute. Id. at 320.
Nonetheless, Sherman states that the turmoil of the occupations of the British Isles
and the "rudeness of the Saxon invaders" combined to minimize outside influences during that
period. Sherman, supra, at 321. Therefore, had the Norman conquest not occurred, "England
seemed in danger of being lost to the civilizing influence of Roman law." Id. at 32 1.
Professor David Thomas explicates thoroughly the Roman influences on British
property law. See David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments
from a Shared History-Part : The Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143, 149-
[Vol. 35
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neated between public and private law, England addressed both in "the same
set of courts. ' 2 Accordingly, "the public or private status of the land [was]
much less important,"'13 as distinguished from France, where different courts
address public and private property rights.' 4 Nonetheless, "the Crown owns
a quantity of assets," including those held for the common good. 5 Of most
significance in Florida, the Crown presumptively owns all beaches below the
mean high water line.' 6
Supreme Court of Vermont Associate Justice, Denise R. Johnson, ad-
dressed the development of American Property Law in a 2007 article:
The intersection of governmental authority and private owners'
rights is one of the more interesting contexts in which to think
about the viability of the bundle of rights. It is also the context in
which American expectations about liberty and land ownership
have been most seriously challenged.
Property law comes from three sources: the common law, statutes,
and the Constitution. Common law principles are the primary
source of property law. These are principles that have been devel-
oped by judicial decision in the United States, starting with the
adoption of the common law of England at the beginning of our
history. 
17
Professor John Orth tells us that the English real property system has
been a form of "feudal" rights since the Norman invasion of 1066 AD. 8
Even today, "all English owners of freehold have a 'tenure' because, rather
55 (1999). He tells us that Rome introduced the concept of possession of property to the
island. Id. at 15 1. Roman law recognized private ownership, servitudes, mortgages, transfer
of title and testamentary succession. Id. at 150-51. While the Romans "likely" introduced
these concepts, "the extent of their influence there is unknown." Id. at 152.
Thomas tracks Sherman in concluding that property law became entropic as the Sax-
on reign wore on. Id. at 159. While the ancient Celts and Britons, and the first Anglo-Saxon
invaders, had a generally egalitarian society, the advent of Anglo-Saxon royalty formalized a
centralized control of title. Thomas, supra, at 154-55. By 1066, when the Normans invaded,
the serfs were experiencing a "'general drift... from freedom towards servitude."' Id. at 160
(quoting SIR FRANK M. STENTON, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 463 (1943)).
12. Ball, supra note 11, at9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1I.
16. Id.
17. Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 247-48
(2007) (emphasis added).
18. John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 73, 74 (2009).
20111
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confusingly, they are the Queen's tenants in the sense that they hold (from
the Latin 'tenere') property rights under her.' ' 9
The feudal system, after the 1066 Battle of Hastings, divided Saxon
aristocrats' lands among up to 10,000 Normans, in return for an oath of
loyalty to the new king.20 As one commentator states: "To the conquering
Normans nothing was more natural than that English nobles who resisted
them should forfeit their land, and that William should grant it again to
people on whom he could rely."'2' As Justice Bryson summed it up: "[T]he
legal theory of the Normans was that with the Conquest William had become
the owner of all land in England and that he granted it out to his own tenants
in chief, who were in a bond of faith with him."
22
Mark Senn explains the feudal system in his colorfully entitled article,
English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death.23 He says that feudal-
ism creates a land ownership "pyramid with the king at the top beholden to
no one, layers of lords in the middle beholden to their superiors, and serfs at
,,24the bottom beholden to everyone.
The "tenement" was one's land.25 The "tenant" held the land.26 The
"tenure" was the interest that the tenant held in one's tenement.
27
Senn explicates the way the tenure pyramid functioned:
Generally, a consensus on the terminology of land ownership and
social status might be that the king, or crown, was at the top of the
pyramid and owned all the land. Beneath the king were the ba-
rons, more commonly known as tenants-in-chief or tenants-in-
capite, to whom the king granted-or enfeofed-feoffs, foeds,
19. Bali, supra note 11, at 12.
20. Orth, supra note 18, at 74.
21. John Bryson, Justice, Supreme Court of N.S.W., Lecture at the Plantagenet Society of
Australia: Henry 11 and the English Common Law (July 20, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme-Court/ii-sc.nsf/pages/SCO-speech-bryson-
200702).
22. Id. Orth, supra note 18, at 74, stated the same:
The legal theory of the effect of the Conquest of England in 1066 by Duke William of Nor-
mandy, which made him King William I ("the Conqueror"), was that all land belonged to the
king by right of conquest. When William granted out estates to his vassals, he retained his
overlordship, which entitled him and his successors to the land when those estates came to an
end.
Id.
23. Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 507 (2003).
24. Id. at 516.
25. id. at 517.
26. Id.
27. Id.
[Vol. 35
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fiefs, or fees. The tenants-in-chief could either keep their lands or
enfeof parts of them to their knights who held knight's fees suffi-
cient to support their families and owed military service to their
lords.S
While William and his successors owned all the land, some tenant had
to be seised of the tenement at all times.29 Seisin meant possession, which
was "critically important."30 Whoever was seised in the tenement was re-
sponsible to the Crown for that parcel's services or taxes.31 Senn empha-
sized that the greatest seisen granted only long possession.32 Only the Crown
owned the property.33
Justice Bryson noted one of the fundamental flaws of feudalism:
In the logic of feudalism, the person to whom the king has
granted land, who has entered into a bond of homage and fealty, is
the only person who can own [or more properly, possess] that
land; if that person rebels or dies, the king has no tenant and can
keep the land or dispose of it.
34
In application, however, the king often agreed to de facto succession by
heirs who swore fealty. 35 Also, sales to third parties were illegal, as only the
vendor held good title.36 This was the origin of warranty deeds, as the pur-
chaser would require the seller to warrant good title out of the king and to
indemnify the purchaser against loss. 37 Eventually, there were so many "sub-
infeudations" from the tenant in chief down the chain that "the feudal system
was becoming incoherent.
38
The Domesday Book was one of William's greatest achievements. This
was an "inventory of all the wealth of England., 39 Senn cites authorities
variously crediting "avarice, the advancement of royal taxation, or a need to
put in order the made [sic] after the Conquest."40 He wraps up: "In ascribing
28. Senn, supra note 23, at 517 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at518.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Senn, supra note 23, at 518-19.
34. Bryson, supra note 21.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Senn, supra note 23, at 533.
40. Id.
2011]
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a value to the realm, the Domesday Book monetized the feudal exchange of
loyalty for protection and planted the seeds of royal taxation, centralized
government, and a nation-state.,
41
King Henry I first pursued the new style of "administrative kingship"
when he took the throne in 1100.42 At all times, however, tenure remained.
43
The Crown allowed private ownership in return for services, which ranged
from military service to rents and taxes. 4" Henry I "transformed the treasury
from a storehouse to a governmental accounting office that could keep better
track of royal revenues and the activities of royal officials."45 One commen-
tator says: "The main theme of Henry [I's] financial and judicial reforms
was centralization. 46 He initiated broad legal reforms, "which, by virtue of
their routine nature and wide applicability, were the origins of the common
law. 47 Henry I also created the forebear to the common law judicial system.
He was sometimes called the "Lion of Justice" as a result.
48
Henry I's grandson, Henry I, restored order after civil wars marred the
intervening reign of King Stephen. 49 Henry II had to raise taxes for the Cru-
sades.5° Professor Joseph Biancalana says Henry II was adept both as king
and as feudal lord.5'
Due process was granted initially to common fee owners under Henry
H.52 "Novel Disseisin" replaced previously arbitrary rights of nobility to
throw a freeholder off of lands based on the noble's unilateral claim in
Lords' court that the freeholder failed to provide services or rents.53 Henry 11
created a process under Novel Disseisin where: (1) The hearing went to the
royal court; and (2) the defendant enjoyed a presumption of correctness that
the noble had to rebut.
54
41. Id. at534.
42. Joseph Biancalana, For Want of Justice: Legal Reforms of Henry H, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 433,434 (1988).
43. See id.
44. See id.; KENELM EDWARD DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 95-97 (3d ed. 1884).
45. Biancalana, supra note 42, at 434.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Senn, supra note 23, at 537.
49. See id. at 537-38.
50. Senn, supra note 23, at 538.
51. Biancalana, supra note 42, at 434.
52. DIGBY, supra note 44, at 95-97.
53. Id. at 94-95.
54. See id.
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Another major step taken under Henry II was a fuller development of
the fights of inheritance." The limitation on these rights? Estate tax. 6 Ad-
ditional taxes accrued on sales of land. 7 Taxes generally became necessary
as the Crown conveyed more lands and could no longer survive on income
from its own property.58
Justice Bryson noted a major property development under Henry 11:
In some legislative act of which we do not have a record Henry
made the power of the royal court available to everyone with a
dispute about title to freehold land. That is, he made it the busi-
ness of himself and his court to protect allfreehold titles, not only
those held directly of the King.V
King Henry II gave land disputants a theretofore unavailable option-
filing a petition for Writ of Rights.60 The Crown Court heard these dis-
putes.6' Previously, the feudal lords themselves alone addressed disputes
over the lands they had conferred.62 Later, Henry created the Grand Assize,
which was a panel of twelve knights from the area where the land dispute
arose.6 3 The panel took testimony under oath and determined the title. 
6
Of course, the defendant retained the right to settle title disputes by
combat. 65 Exercise of that option became rarer as the Crown Court system
55. AssizE OF NORTHAMPTON (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens trans., 1176),
reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 20, 21 (George Bur-
ton Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., 1914).
56. See JOHN DALRYMPLE, ESSAY TOWARDS A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY IN
GREAT BRITAIN 206-12 (London, A. Miller, 4th ed. 1757) (discussing the origin of estate tax).
57. John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption for Religious Organizations: A Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 521, 529-30 (1991-1992).
58. Id.
59. Bryson, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
60- Id.
61. Id.
62. Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 280, 296 (2006). Tate says that the writ had antecedents back to William, but
Henry 11 formalized it. Id. at 295-96; see also Senn, supra note 23, at 537-38. In addition to
professional judges being less arbitrary than barons or local tribunals loyal to barons, royal
courts had another advantage: "[Tlhey could make new common law instead of repeatedly
enforcing manorial custom." Id. at 538.
63. Tate, supra note 62, at 296.
64. Id. "The origins of the jury system ... go [] back at least to the assizes of Henry I1,
[which were] a means of taking census and collecting taxes." Hugh H. Bownes, Should Trial
by Jury be Eliminated in Complex Cases?, I RISK 75, 75 (1990).
65. Tate, supra note 62, at 296.
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became more commonplace. 66 Trial by combat remained available until
1819.67
We remember King John most notably for the Magna Carta.68 The
forces of Pope Innocent III defeated his soldiers in the battles of Normandy,
Anjou, and Poitou. 69 The "overtaxed and exasperated barons" of England
then presented the Articles of the Barons to him at Runnymede in 1215.70
The final product was the Magna Carta.7'
The Magna Carta established modern English Common Law property
rights.72 By far the most chapters devoted to any subject, thirty-eight of the
total sixty-three, concerned property rights.73 Among the most significant
issues in the Magna Carta were the Crown's covenants that it would not take
tenements arbitrarily against the desire of the freeholder and the Crown could
not encroach against mesne wardships.
Moreover, among the most significant aspects of the Magna Carta that
specifically addressed property were:
a) Section 39, providing, "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseised or any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Sec-
tion 39 thereby provided the template for the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution 575 years later, among other things;
b) Sections 12, 14, and 15, requiring the Crown to obtain consent of its
tenants in the predecessor to Parliament before collecting "scuttage" (fee in
lieu of military service) or "aid" (taxation).74
Senn gets to the heart of the matter:
The unmistakable gravamen of the Magna Carta is the redress
of problems that cost the barons money. One of the lasting results
of the Magna Carta was the principle of no taxation without repre-
sentation; the idea was that a tax could not be levied without a vote
of the tenants-in-chief. The Magna Carta makes evident that the
feudal tenure had been monetized and that the exchange of protec-
tion for loyalty had been lost in spirit, if not in word. The limita-
66. See id. at 297.
67. Senn, supra note 23, at 539.
68. See id. at 534-36.
69. Id. at 534.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 534-35.
72. Senn, supra note 23, at 535.
73. GoTrFRIED DIE'rZ, MAGNA CARTA AND PROPERTY 37 (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1965).
74. See id.
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tion of reliefs to a fixed amount led to inheritability and alienabili-
ty, but reliefs were destined to fall into desuetude [disuse] when
inflation lowered the value of money. The nearest that the Magna
Carta came to a philosophical principle was chapter 39, which may
be the origin of due process: "No free man shall be taken, impri-
soned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor
will We [the Crown] proceed against or prosecute him, except by
the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." 7
B. Lord Coke and His Impact on Our Colonial System
As noted above, King Henry II did far more for the general freeholders
of England than did the Magna Carta. The latter document, in all iterations,
focused on the rights of nobility.
Further, the Magna Carta lay increasingly fallow until Lord Coke used
it in the 17th Century as a basis to challenge the despotism of the Stuart mo-
narchy.76 As the National Archives notes:
Lord Coke's view of the law was particularly relevant to the
American experience for it was during this period that the charters
for the colonies were written. Each included the guarantee that
those sailing for the New World and their heirs would have "all the
rights and immunities of free and natural subjects.', 77
This, combined with the 1689 English Bill of Rights, established the co-
lonists' reasonable expectations of, inter alia, private property rights.
Coke acknowledged that "all the lands in England were originally de-
rived from the crowne of England, and are holden of the same mediately or
immediately. ' 78 Nonetheless, he noted significant protections for subjects.
Coke, significantly, contended that the Magna Carta's rights extended to "all
75. Senn, supra note 23, at 535-36 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). I differ
with his assessment that chapter 39 originated modern due process. Henry II arguably did so
by creating public hearings at royal court with the presumption of correctness in the defendant
under Novel Disseisen.
76. Magna Carta and Its American Legacy, U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featureddocuments/magna-cartalprint.
friendly.html?page=legacy-content.html&title=magnacarta. The disuse of the Magna Carta
for the first several centuries is most evident in Shakespeare's play, King John, which not
once even mentions the document.
77. Id.
78. EDWARD COKE, 4TH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 363 (1641).
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freemen." Accordingly, "[N]o freeman could be deprived of his life, liberty
or property without a fair trial."79
Coke, and the colonists, followed the dictate of seventeenth English phi-
losopher, John Locke: "The reason why men enter into society is the preser-
vation of their property. 8 °
Blackstone oversimplified matters when he stated that property is a
"'sole and despotic' relationship between a person and a thing., 81 He be-
lieved "the only obligation was to do no harm to others in the exercise of
one's [property] rights. '8' Nonetheless, commentators note, accurately, that
a property owner of that era held a much larger bundle of sticks than one
does in today's regulatory regime:
83
Property rights differ from positive rights [conveyed by the
sovereign] in another important way: property rights are indepen-
dent of the state. For example, while the Constitution created the
framework for government, expressly limited the powers of gov-
ernment, and provided safeguards against invasions of certain
rights, the Constitution did not grant us the rights we have as citi-
zens but recognized pre-existing rights.84
C. Development of Property Rights and Vesting Law in American Juri-
sprudence, with an Emphasis on the Contracts Clause
As stated above, the American colonists believed that property rights
were fundamental to free Englishmen. The American Revolution was fought
largely to protect those rights. Locke, and therefore, the founders, contended
that property rights stemmed from natural law.85
79. OFFCE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROP. RIGHTS, About Property Rights, (Oct. 19, 2007,
10:03 AM), www.ct.gov/pro/cwp/view.asp?a=32] otq=396444xpronav=l.
80. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 222 (LIBERAL ARTS PRESS,
1952).
81. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 250.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morris & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use
Planning, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 100 (2000).
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. See Alex Tuckness, Locke's Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, (July 29, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/. See, e.g., Tho-
mas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in Inaugural Address of the Presi-
dents of the United States, S. Doc. No. 101-10, at 22 (1st Sess. 1989). "[OJur wish... is that.
. equality of rights [be] maintained, and that state of property, equal or unequal, which results
to every man from his own industry or that of his father's." Id.
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The Constitution contained numerous provisions related to property.
Chief among them was the Contracts Clause, which barred the states from
passing any laws, "impairing the [o]bligation of contracts. ' 86 This clause
dominated early jurisprudence concerning property rights.
One of the most famous property rights decisions, however, focused on
fundamental private property rights stemming from the natural law as framed
in the Constitution-Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance.87 Justice Patterson
rendered a renowned charge to the jury concerning a Pennsylvania law that
purported to divest property without compensation: The constitution ex-
pressly declares, that "the right of acquiring," possessing, and protecting
property is "natural, inherent, and unalienable. '88 "It is a right not ex gratia
from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution. ' 89
He stated a maxim of statutory construction that we today think of only
when addressing ambiguous ordinances. 9° Nonetheless, this is stated here as
a general maxim of statutes affecting real property: "Every statute, deroga-
tory to the rights of property, or that takes away the estate of a citizen, ought
to be construed strictly."91
The early Supreme Court repeatedly addressed, and mostly struck
down, state acts for violating allegedly vested property and contractual
rights. The more significant decisions are addressed below.
In Calder v. Bull, 92 Justice Chase, in one of four concurring opinions,
noted that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to civil cases. 93 Rather, the
Contracts Clause applied.94 Chase stated, however, in dicta, that state legis-
latures may not "violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or
the right of private property." 95
In Fletcher v. Peck,96 Chief Justice Marshall wrote for a unanimous
Court in holding that Georgia could not rescind any portion of the Yazoo
Land Grant.97 The Court held that the Contracts Clause barred the state from
doing so after title "passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable con-
86. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. I.
87. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304 (1795).
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 311.
90. See id. at 316.
91. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
92. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
93. Id. at 387-88.
94. id.
95. Id. at 388.
96. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
97. Id. at 139.
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sideration."98 This decision was rendered in the face of public outrage over
widespread fraud.99 Most of the Georgia legislature was bribed to allow the
sale of 30 million acres at less than two cents per acre." ° The next legisla-
ture tried to nullify the "sales. ' ... Marshall held the land grant was a contract
and upheld the subsequent sale to Fletcher, who was an innocent purchas-
er. 10
2
Mark Graber reconsidered the significance of Fletcher in 2000.103 He
says that Fletcher "is routinely treated at present as an application of Con-
tracts Clause principles."'"' Graber contends that analysis is only an alterna-
tive rationale for one part of Marshall's opinion.' 05 Marshall emphasizes the
purchaser's acquisition with no knowledge of the initial fraud.' °6 Graber
summarizes that "Fletcher, in Marshall's opinion, concerned the power of a
state to make naked land transfers, to divest any person whose original ac-
quisition of the property in dispute was valid under common law.""1 7 This is
not a Constitutional analysis. This is common law contract law. 0 8 Graber
says that Marshall held that Georgia lost under either the Contracts Clause or
"by general principles which are common to our free institutions," to wit,
natural and common law."° He points to Johnson's concurrence, which
stated that natural law barred Georgia from "revoking its own grants.""
' 0
Johnson stated further that the Contracts Clause did not apply because the
contract terminated upon conveyance.' Graber concludes that Fletcher
allowed a landowner to sue under the Contracts Clause or common law to
challenge expropriation of property."
2
In Barron v. Baltimore,"3 a wharf owner claimed that the city's diver-
sion of streams so lowered the water level in front of his wharves that they
98. Id.
99. See id. at 88-89.
100. Id. at 87-89.
101. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 89-90.
102. Id. at 137, 139.
103. Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development,
53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000).
104. Id. at 79.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 80.
108. Graber, supra note 103, at 80.
109. Id. at 80-81 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139).
110. Id. at 81 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring)).
111. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144.
112. See generally Graber, supra note 103.
113. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
[Vol. 35
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/1
STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT
became economically useless."4  Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in
holding that there was no private cause of action under the Fifth Amend-
ment. ' 5 He opined that the then-extant Bill of Rights restrained only the
federal government, so citizens had to rely on state constitutions to protect
liberty and property against state action."
6
Graber directs us to Stephen Siegel's explication of antebellum consti-
tutional law to understand Barron."7 Siegel makes a key distinction. The
judiciary of the era protected zealously one's possession of property. Con-
versely, the courts did not protect one's value in that same property.
118
The Taney Court substantially limited the then prevalent Contract
Clause protections in West River Bridge Company v. Dix.1 9 The majority
opinion held that a state charter was a contract between the issuing state and
the private party, in this case a bridge company. 20 Nonetheless, the Con-
tracts Clause did not bar states from exercising eminent domain.'
2
'
West River Bridge merits additional assessment. Justice Daniel, writing
for the Court, acknowledged that the Contracts Clause would apply to block
any impairment of contract, but he did not believe that clause applied:
In considering the question propounded in these causes, there
can be no doubt, nor has it been doubted in argument, on either
side of this controversy, that the charter of incorporation granted to
the plaintiffs in 1793, with the rights and privileges it declared or
implied.... under the inhibition in the tenth section of the first ar-
ticle of the Constitution, could have no power to impair. Yet this
proposition, though taken as a postulate on both sides, determines
nothing as to the real merits of these causes.' 22
The majority concluded that the inherent sovereign right of eminent
domain is consistent with the inviolability of contracts.'23
Justice Woodbury's concurring opinion is noteworthy in stating the fol-
lowing:
114. Id. at 243-44.
115. Id. at 250-51.
116. ld. at 248-49.
117. Graber, supra note 103, at 84 (citing Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nine-
teenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Tak-
ings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 87 (1986)).
118. Id. at 87.
119. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848).
120. ld. at531-32.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 532.
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I take the liberty to say, then, as to the cardinal principle in-
volved in this case, that, in my opinion, all the property in a State
is derived from, or protected by, its government, and hence is held
subject to its wants in taxation, and to certain important public
uses, both in war and peace. Some ground this public ight on so-
vereignty. Some, on necessity.124
Stone v. Mississippi 25 started to chip away at the primacy of the Con-
tracts Clause doctrine. 126 In 1867, Mississippi granted a twenty-five year
charter to a private corporation to run a lottery. 2 7 The next year, the state
adopted a new constitution, which barred all lotteries. 128 It contained a re-
troactive clause. 129 Just as the Court had earlier in West River Bridge held
that a state charter or franchise was not impaired by eminent domain, in
Stone, the Court held that Mississippi did not impair the lottery charter.
130
First, the Court held that the charter was a mere license, not a contract.1
3
'
Second, and more significantly, the Court held that the state could not con-
tract away its police power obligation to protect public morals.
132
The Supreme Court turned next increasingly to substantive due process,
in lieu of the Contracts Clause in state matters. The greatest blow to the doc-
trine occurred in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,133 which split the
Court 5-4.I34 The decision is extremely significant during today's "Great
Recession," as it addressed a Minnesota act that authorized debtors to ask
state courts for a stay of foreclosures through no later than May 1, 1935.'
The five-Justice majority upheld the act against the Contracts Clause chal-
lenge. 136 The majority stated that one should not read the clause literally, but
the "question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against
another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic struc-
ture upon which the good of all depends."'137 Justice Sutherland wrote for
124. W. River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 539 (Woodbury, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
125. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
126. See id. at 816.
127. Id. at 817.
128. Id. at 819.
129. See id.
130. Stone, 101 U.S. at 816.
131. Id. at 821.
132. Id. at 817.
133. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
134. Id. at 448.
135. Id. at418.
136. See id. at 447-48.
137. ld. at428,442.
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FDR's hated "Four Horsemen" in stating that the clause meant what it
said. 3 8
While the Contracts Clause remains the core of a body of law, it has
never regained the primacy it enjoyed before Blaisdell. Today, the Court has
a three-prong test: (a) Is there a substantial impairment of contract; (b) Is
there a significant and legitimate public interest served; and (c) Is the law
narrowly tailored?'39 The more highly regulated the matter subject to con-
tract, the less likely the plaintiff is to succeed.
40
D. The Rise and Fall of Substantive Due Process in Federal Courts
The first, notorious, federal opinion to use the term substantive due
process was Chief Justice Taney's 1857 opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford."41
As we all know, Taney refused to acknowledge that Dred Scott, or any black,
was a citizen who had any liberty interests protected by the Constitution.
142
Scott was found not to be a citizen of Missouri. 43 Therefore, the federal
judiciary lacked jurisdiction over Scott's claim.'" Notwithstanding that ju-
risdictional bar, Chief Justice Taney noted in pointed dicta that the Fifth
Amendment barred Minnesota or any free state from attempting to divest
Scott's owner of his rightful property, to wit, Dred Scott. 145 Vehement dis-
sents by Justices argued, first, that the jurisdictional bar precluded any other
substantive work; second, that the Court had no basis to overturn the Mis-
souri Compromise; and third, that blacks were free in many states.146
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, stating in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . . ,,4 The states were now subject to the obli-
gation first set forth by Henry II, and then Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta.
A Stanford publication posits that the substantive due process doctrine
has two prongs:
48
138. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
139. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,411-13 (1983).
140. See id.
141. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
142. Id. at411.
143. Id. at 406.
144. Id. at 427.
145. See id. at 450.
146. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 546-47 (McLean, J., dissenting).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
148. Substantive Due Process, STANFORD UNIV., http://www.stanford.edu/group/psylaw
seminar/Substantive%20Due%20Process.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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(a) First, Federal courts have discretion to decide what rights are pro-
tected, and the extent of the protection.'49 There are two, alternative analys-
es: (i) Substantive incorporation, allowing the Supreme Court to apply se-
lected provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States, and (ii) Fundamental
rights-determination of substantive rights that are couched as fundamental
"liberty" interests.1 50
(b) Second, once the Court decides what rights are covered under Subs-
tantive Due Process, then the Court judicially reviews the state action for
compliance with those rights.'
51
Justice Field initiated use of the substantive due process doctrine under
the Fourteenth Amendment in stinging dissents in the Slaughter-House Cas-
es 52 and Munn v. Illinois.'53 The Slaughter-House Cases upheld a Louisiana
law that created a New Orleans slaughterhouse and mandated that all but-
chering in that city occur there. 15' The Republican Reconstruction legislature
gave wealthy allies the lucrative business in the guise of public health, safety
and welfare.155 Local butchers sued. 56 Eventually, the matters made it to the
Supreme Court.
The bare majority held that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments only protected Black freed men. 157 The majority controversial-
ly held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution did not
address the right to work. 58 That seemingly fundamental right was dele-
gated to the states.
Justice Field's principal dissent contended that the right to work was a
fundamental right that was protected under the Privileges and Immunities
clause. 59 Further, two of the dissenters argued that the act deprived local
butchers of valuable property rights without due process.' 6°
In Munn, the majority upheld Illinois' efforts to protect the Grange by
setting train elevator rates only in Chicago. 161 This was an effort by the
downstate legislators in Springfield to balance the political and business cor-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872).
153. 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1877).
154. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.(16 Wall.) at 59, 82-83.
155. See id. at 64.
156. Id. at 43.
157. See id. at 81.
158. See id. at 80.
159. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 97-98 (Field, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 115-16, 127 (Bradley & Swayne, JJ., dissenting).
161. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123, 154 (1877).
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ruption that set outrageous rates in that city.162 The elevator operators sued
under the Commerce Clause and Substantive Due Process.
6 3
The Supreme Court majority opinion emphasized that grain was a heav-
ily regulated commerce." 4 It concluded that the elevator operators were per-
forming a quasi-public function in which they should have reduced expecta-
tions of vested substantive rights. 165 The majority refused to reweigh what it
saw as a political function.
66
Field's dissent raised an incipient economic substantive due process po-
sition. 67 His view of the majority? "If this be sound law... all property and
all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legisla-
ture."'
168
The first major decision where the majority delineated the Substantive
Due Process test under the Fourteenth Amendment was Mugler v. Kansas.'69
Kansas passed a prohibition statute, which Mugler flouted as he continued to
brew beer. 7 After his arrest, Mugler claimed the statute was so broad that it
barred his brewing for himself or for sale out of state.' 7 ' He asserted that this
took his property rights without due process. 7 2 The state contended, as Mis-
sissippi did in Stone, that it was entitled to bar beer to protect public health,
safety, and morals.'73
While the five Justice majority upheld the prohibition statute, it held
that a court may examine whether there is a police power basis for a state
enactment. 174 Justice Field wrote for the bitter, four Justice dissent, 71 con-
tending that the seizure and prohibition did violate the substantive due
process rights of Mugler.
176
Justice Harlan, for the majority, said that the Court should not settle for
the facial "pretences" of the state. 177 Rather, in examining the "substance of
things," the Court should determine the following:
162. See id. at 132.
163. Id. at 123.
164. Id. at 132.
165. See id. at 131-32.
166. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 133-34.
167. See id. at 139 (Field, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 140 (Field, J., dissenting).
169. 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887).
170. Id. at 655-57.
171. Id. at 660, 634.
172. id. at 660.
173. Id. at 669.
174. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
175. Id. at 675 (Field, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 678.
177. Id. at 661.
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If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the pub-
lic health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts
to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
178
The substantive due process decision that would enjoy the most odious
reputation but for the Dred Scott opinion was Lochner v. New York. 179 The
Lochner Court struck a maximum working hours statute for bakers, distin-
guishing the statute from the Utah miners' and smelters' hours statute it
upheld in Holden v. Hardy,180 as one that was required for regulating a ha-
zardous undertaking. 18' The Lochner majority stated:
[T]here can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and of it-
self, is not an unhealthy one to that degree which would authorize
the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with the right
of free contract on the part of the individual, either as employer or
employee. 1
82
Lawrence Berger states:
[T]he Court in Lochner effectively reserved unto itself the power
to [determine] whether:
(1) the proclaimed end of the statute under review was legitimate;
(2) the proclaimed end was "really" the end of the legislature at
all or there was perhaps another illegitimate purpose animating the
law-making body; and
(3) even if the end was a legitimate one, the means selected were
truly directed toward reaching it.'
8 3
Justice Holmes' spirited dissent stated in most memorable part: "The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics.,, 184
178. Id.
179. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
180. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
181. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64-65; see Holden, 169 U.S. at 396.
182. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
183. Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process, and Takings-An Integra-
tion, 74 NEB. L. REv. 843, 850 (1995).
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The Court retrenched from Lochner in Nebbia v. New York, 85 Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 8 6 and Ferguson v. Skrupa.117 Ferguson
in particular held:
We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of leg-
islation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought."1
88
Thus ended the use of substantive due process as a major tool to chal-
lenge economic legislation.
189
The Supreme Court clarified the "substantially advances" test under
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.'90 It noted that the formula applied to a due
process challenge, but not to a takings claim.' 9' The Court emphasized that a
strict requirement that courts review takings claims under that standard
would lead to the judiciary substituting its judgment for elected legislatures
and expert agencies.
192
J. P. Byrne states that federal courts are far less likely to entertain due
process claims after Lingle.193 He sums up: "How likely is it that landown-
ers will be able to prevail against local governments on substantive due
process claims challenging land use decisions? In federal court, the answer
will-and should-be virtually never."' 94
He concludes "that state court due process review is especially appro-
priate to correct local political distortions."' 95
Byrne quotes noted Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Posner:
"'No one thinks substantive due process should be interpreted so broadly as
to protect landowners against erroneous zoning decisions."' 196
184. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
186. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
187. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
188. Id. at 731-32 (footnotes omitted).
189. Berger, supra note 183, at 851.
190. 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 544.
193. See J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
471,472 (2007).
194. Id.
195. Id.
2011]
27
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
The Eleventh Circuit, in McKinney v. Pate,197 gutted substantive due
process rights in federal courts in its jurisdiction-including Florida.
McKinney held that substantive due process does not apply to administrative
decisions and that property rights are created by the state.198 Therefore, these
are not fundamental constitutional rights. 99 Since McKinney, Florida courts
have held that substantive due process applies only where the state or local
acts "shock the conscience." 2°°
E. Takings Law
Until now, we have focused on police power regulation. The logical ex-
tension, of course, is which acts of police power go so far as to deprive prop-
erty rights. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part: "No person shall be.. . deprived of. . . property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. 2 0' The Fourteenth Amendment, in Section 1, extends
this obligation to the states.2°2 Various state constitutions contain similar
protections. Florida does so at Article I, Section 9, which guarantees due
process, and Article X, Section 6, which requires full compensation for pub-
lic purpose takings.0 3
Two twentieth century Supreme Court decisions combined to establish
the modem body of regulatory taking law: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon2°4 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.20 5
The Pennsylvania Coal Court analyzed a state law that barred mining in
certain locations in order to protect the ground surface and structures. °" The
Court held that two factors determine whether a regulation effects a taking:
First, does the act substantially advance the public interest; and second, does
the regulation "go too far?"' 07
196. Id. at 475 (citing Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
197. 20F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
198. See id. at 1560.
199. Id.
200. See Theodore C. Taub, Vested Rights and Equitable Estoppel, SF08 ALI-ABA 913,
934-35 (2000).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
203. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; art. X, § 6.
204. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
205. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
206. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13.
207. Seeid. at 415-16.
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Penn Central established the following lodestar in determining whether
a regulation effects a taking: The extent to which the government action
20interferes with the property owner's investment-backed expectations. 08 The
Court focused on the actual impact of the governmental action:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into dis-
crete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a partic-
ular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole..
209
The law clearly establishes a cause of action against legislative or ex-
ecutive actions that constitute a taking. STBR presented the prime opportuni-
ty to address whether the judicial branch is subject as well.
HI. VESTED RIGHTS
A. Background of Vested Rights
There are differing views involving the origins of vested rights:
a) Common Law;"'
b) Equity;21'and
c) Constitutional Basis.212
In application, most of the confusion over origin is clarified by deter-
mining whether the private party is claiming vested rights or estoppel.
2 3
B. Summation of Vested Rights
People v. Miller214 states cogently the vested rights doctrine: "[A]
'vested right' in the particular use ... is but another way of saying that the
property interest affected by the particular [governmental act] is too substan-
208. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
209. Id. at 130-31.
210. Terry D. Morgan, Vested Rights Legislation, 34 URB. LAW. 131, 141-51 (2002).
211. Id.
212. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 247, 261 (1914).
213. See infra Ill-B.
214. 106 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1952).
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tial to justify its deprivation in light of the objectives to be achieved by en-
forcement of the provision. '21 5
While the terms are used interchangeably, there is a substantive differ-
ence between "vested rights" and "estoppel."
(a) "Vested rights" are property rights, and as such, are transferable.216
They arise when the property owner has obtained real property rights that the
government cannot repeal or rescind.217
(b) "Equitable estoppel" is based on the equitable principle that it
would be inequitable for government to repudiate its prior actions or inac-
tions, including approvals, upon which the private party has relied in good
faith to its detriment.21 8
The Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby2'9 explained the difficulties in
establishing a rule governing vesting of waterfront property rights adjacent to
tidelands:
[T]he ... laws of the original States show[] that there is no
universal and uniform law upon the subject [of property claims in
submerged lands]; but that each State has dealt with the lands un-
der the tide waters within its borders according to its own views of
justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or
granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether
owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best
interests of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.
220
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RIGHTS IN ANTIQUITY
Hammurabi's Code addressed water rights as a drainage obligation: "If
a man open his canal for irrigation and neglect it, and the water carry away
an adjacent field, he shall measure out grain on the basis of the adjacent
fields. 221
As extensive as his code was, he did not discuss private riparian rights.
The Romans made up for this omission-in earnest.
215. Id. at 35.
216. Taub, supra note 200, at 915.
217. Id. at 916.
218. Id.
219. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
220. Id. at 26.
221. KING OF BABYLONIA HAMMURABI, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 16 (c. 1700 B.C.E.).
[Vol. 35
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/1
STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT
The Emperor Justinian's Code 222 is generally credited for memorializ-
ing the concepts of the public trust doctrine as developed under Roman rule:
Thus, the following things are by the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is
forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habi-
tations, monuments, and buildings, which are not, like the sea, sub-
ject only to the law of nations.
All rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a
port, or in rivers, is common to all men.
The sea-shore extends as far as the greatest winter flood runs
up.
The public use of the banks of a river is part of the law of na-
tions, just as is that of the river itself. All persons therefore are as
much at liberty to bring their vessels to the bank, to fasten ropes to
the trees growing there, and to place any part of their cargo there,
as to navigate the river itself. But the banks of a river are the
property of those whose land they adjoin; and consequently the
trees growing on the [sic] them are also the property of the same
persons.
22 3
Justinian is interpreted by many modern scholars to confirm that the
crown owns water in natural water courses and underlying lands for all of the
people. One commentator stated the following concerning public trust own-
ership in and under navigable waters:
222. c. 534 AD.
223. J. INST. 2.1.1-.4 (Thomas Collet Sandars, trans., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1876).
But see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 7 (2007) ("Justinian... was merely summarizing
the laws of his time .... ), and 10 ("In fact there is no evidence whatsoever that the Roman
concept of jus publicum [law] has even a distant relationship to contemporary concerns for the
environment, nor is there any indication that Roman law had anything resembling the modem
notion of trust, but I digress.").
2011]
31
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
[A]ll systems of water law adopt the elemental idea that running
water while in its natural situation is not owned; that the law regu-
lates the use of it, but that rights of flow and use are what the law
recognizes, and not property in the water itself. The water itself is
"common" or "public juris. ' 224
The public trust was not always observed in the breach. The Roman
Crown regularly conveyed submerged lands to favored citizens.
225
In fact, commentators point to numerous grants to private citizens to as-
sert the public trust was not a remotely absolute rule. For example, Huffman
emphasized: "What are these farms, monuments and buildings that the pub-
lic trust must not harm doing on the seashore? 2 26 Of course, given that we
are discussing the public trust doctrine, multiple champions take up the op-
posite position.
For example, Robert Abrams cites numerous authorities for the proposi-
tion that limited private use of the foreshore actually aided public use.227 Or,
at least, that private use was so limited that it did not impede or impair public
rights. 28 Abrams emphasized various scholars and original sources who
asserted that any structures allowed were temporary huts and other minor
structures:
[W. A.] Hunter, [who was a noted Roman scholar], expanded on
the common use of the shores for fishing, with reference to parallel
provisions of the Digests. For example, he noted a famous rescript
(advisory opinion) issued to the fishermen of Formaie and Capena
who had sought a ruling about use of the foreshore. In setting out
their private rights of use of the foreshore, the commentator Anto-
nius Pius stated that the right to build huts or to place pilings gave
rights for only so long as the sea allowed it, for "when it fell into
ruins, the soil reverted to its former state as a res communis, which
any other person might build upon.
''29
224. Samuel C. Weil, Theories of Water Law, 27 HARv. L. REV. 530, 530 (1914).
225. James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 9 (1997).
226. Huffman, supra note 223, at 14.
227. See Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The
Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 861, 872-74 nn.55-60 (2007).
228. Id. at 872-74 (citing, inter alia, JAMES HADLEY, INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LAW 157
(New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1873)).
229. Id. at 874 (emphasis omitted) (citing HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 310 (J. Cross trans., 4th
ed. 1903)).
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Nonetheless, Huffman's emphasis on the original source's reservation
of rights in "farms" and "buildings" shows that, at worst, there was mixed
evidence as to the extent of private rights in the foreshore. Certainly, there
was no prohibition.
Supporters of private rights focus on the practical realities of urban and
rural Rome. One commentator states:
[Ulnless and until a private person or the state required exclusive
control of the resource, the sea and shore should be open for the
use of all. In light of the vast coastal area of the Roman Mare No-
strum, the generally low population density outside the cities, and
the even lower percentage of the population with sufficient means
to utilize coastal lands, such an attitude was not impractical. How-
ever, to concentrate on this aspect of Roman law to the exclusion
of its complements-state grants of exclusive rights and individual
acquisition of ownership by occupation-is to [misunderstand] the
Roman law and to ignore the economic realities of the time.
230
Justinian delineated between "perennial" rivers and "private" rivers.23'
The former flowed always, while the latter were "torrential. 232 Perennial
rivers were subject to the public trust.23 3 Naturally enough, private rivers
were not subject to public use.234
Wescoat confirms one aspect of Huffman's arguments, even as he antic-
ipates Huffman's critiques of Wescoat's own article, favoring expansive
public trust application.235 He states that Justinian's works acted as text-
books, not as edicts:
The story generally begins with The Digest of Justinian, compiled
at the great law school in Beirut at the order of the emperor Justi-
nian in the 530s C.E. If you studied law during the late Roman era
through that of early modem Europe you would begin with the Di-
gest and textbooks such as the Institutes of Justinian and Gaius,
which distinguished various classes of things and associated
rights-res nullius, things owned by no one; res communes, things
230. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis,
I SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 21-22 (1976) (emphasis added).
231. Baade, supra note 2, at 872.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. James L. Wescoat, Jr., Submerged Landscapes: The Public Trust in Urban Environ-
mental Design, from Chicago to Karachi and Back Again, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 435, 435-36
(2009).
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open to all; res publicae, things held by the state on behalf of citi-
zens; res privatae, things owned by persons; res sacrae, sacred
things; and so on. The denotations and connotations of these cate-
gories, as well as the boundaries and overlaps among them, have
236been subjects of perennial debate.
Nevertheless, Wescoat interprets Justinian's impact differently from
Huffman. He acknowledges that the source material "partially support[s],
but also nuance[s] [Huffman's] arguments. 237 In particular:
The Digest offers diverse jurists' perspectives on public interests in
navigable waters, banks, canals, and shorelands. It notes various
constraints as well as provisions for private actions in public wa-
ters. It addresses public and private interests affected by flooding,
river channel change, engineering works, and private rights adjoin-
ing public waters. These perspectives bear comparison with legal
debates in later periods and places, and serve as antecedents and
analogues, if not formal precedents, for public water law.238
The Institutes of Justinian describe accretion of soils onto private water-
front property:
Moreover, whatever a river adds to your land by alluvial soil
belongs to you under the Law of Nations, for this deposit is an in-
discernible increase; and that which is added in this manner is held
to have been added so gradually that you cannot ascertain how
much is added at any moment of time.
239
Abrams states that awarding accretions to the riparian owner allowed "a
dynamic adjustment to the realities of the shore[s]. 24° This adjusted the
boundaries to preserve "riparian locational advantage and public uses." 241
More to the point: "This form of adjustment of boundaries without disturb-
ing the relative rights of the private riparian and the public has continued
unbroken from the Romans to the present."
242
236. Id. at 445 (citation omitted).
237. Id. at 449.
238. Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added).
239. J. INST. 2.1.20, supra note 223.
240. Abrams, supra note 227, at 877.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citation omitted).
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V. SPANISH WATER LAW
Roman antecedents helped to form Spanish water law.2 43 Spain's water
law standards bore directly on Florida through colonial distribution.2  The
three main sources of Spain's original law of water rights were: 1) Coloni-
al Roman standards in Spain; 2) Roman influences imported from the arid
Middle East; and 3) Islamic water law transmitted across North Africa and
into Spain by the Moors.245
Alfonso the Wise, King of Castile, directed the drafting of Las Siete
Partidas (The Seven Parts) in 1263.246 This edict established Spain's first
civil law containing a formal water code in the Castile region.247 Alfonso
discussed: a) All water belonged to the Crown; b) Individuals could obtain
water rights in the same manner they obtained most property-by grants
from the Crown; and c) As under Roman law, private, de minimus consump-
tion required no permission. 48
Eric Kunkel's seminal law review article on Spanish water law in co-
lonial North America discusses the expansion of Alfonso's edicts in Spain's
colonies.249
[A Royal Decree in c. 1530] provided:
"We order and command that in all causes, suits and litigation
in which the laws of this compilation do not provide for the man-
ner of their decision .... then the laws of this our kingdom of Cas-
tile shall be followed, in conformity with the law of Toro, both
with respect to the procedure to be followed in such cases, suits
and litigations, and with respect to the decisions of the same on the
merits.
25 0
243. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 453-54.
244. Id. at 453.
245. Id.
246. See In re Contests of Loredo, 675 S.W.2d 257,260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See generally Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law of Waters in the United States: From
Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 341 (2000).
250. Id. at 364-65 n.135 (quoting LAS SIETE PARTIDAS liii (Samuel Scott, trans., C.C.H.
1931)).
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This had the effect of extending the Partidas to the Spanish Colo-
nies. 25 1
Most significantly, Kunkel notes that Las Siete Partidas confirmed the
Crown's ownership of all lands.252 Accordingly, "rights to land and water in
New Spain could only be conferred by express grant from the Crown. 253
Charles of Spain authorized the Recopilaci6n de las Leyes de Reinos de
Las Indias (the Compilation of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies) (the
Compilation) in 1520.254 Kunkel recites the lengthy development of frequent
citations to the Compilation. 55 Philip II caused the expansion of the Compi-
lation, and Charles II required its most comprehensive, and final codification,
in 1680.256 The Compilation addressed water rights thoroughly, but focused
on irrigation rights.257 It introduced the concept of "beneficial use," which
weighed water rights by benefit to all.258
The Compilation directed the designation of town sites with great detail:
Having made the selection of the site where the [colonial] town is
to be built, it must, as already stated, be: in an elevated and
healthy location; with means of fortification; fertile soil and with
plenty of land for farming and pasturage; have fuel, timber and re-
sources; [have] fresh water, a native population, ease of transport,
access and exit; [and be] open to the northwind; and, if on the
coast, due consideration should be paid to the quality of the har-
bour and that the sea does not lie to the south or west; and if possi-
ble not near lagoons or marshes in which poisonous animals and
polluted air and water breed. 259
The Seven Parts tracked Justinian's C6de in significant part: "The
things which belong in common to the creatures of this world are ... the air,
251. Id. at 365 n.135 (noted by Judge Lobingier, Judge of the Court of First Instance,
Territory of the Philippines, 1909-1914, in his introduction to Scott's translation of Las Siete
Partidas and quoted by Kunkel, supra note 249, at 364 n.135).
252. Id. at 366.
253. Id.
254. Kunkel, supra note 249, at 366-68.
255. Id. at 366-67 nn.141-53 (especially n.148).
256. Id. at 367.
257. Id. at 368-69.
258. Id. at 363.
259. Axel 1. Mundigo & Dora P. Crouch, The City Planning Ordinances of the Laws of the
Indies Revisited: Part 1: Their Philosophy and Implications, 43 TOWN PLAN. REV. 247, 254
(1977); see In re Contests of Laredo, 675 S.W.2d 257, 263 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Recopilacidn de las Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias, BOOK IV, TIT. 7, LAW 1 (1681)).
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the rainwater, and the sea and its shores. . . .Rivers, harbors, and public
highways belong to all persons in common. 2 60
As the author, together with Florida Department of Environmental Pro-
tection historian Joe Knetsch, has noted, "Spanish settlements were highly
regulated affairs. ' '26' Among other issues, the Crown favored access to river
highways. 62 Common concern for water access for the maximum number of
colonists was reflected by the typical limitation of grants on highways and
navigable waters to depth double the width of the parcel by the highway or
navigable water.263
The Supreme Court of Florida in Apalachicola Land & Development
Co. v. McRae,26 confirmed the sovereign ownership of the navigable waters:
Under the civil law in force in Spain and in its provinces, when not
superseded or modified by ordinances affecting the provinces or
by edict of the crown, the public navigable waters and submerged
and tide lands in the provinces were held in dominion by the
crown .. .and sales and grants of such lands to individuals were
contrary to the general laws and customs of the realm.
By the laws and usages of Spain, the rights of a subject or of other
private ownership in lands bounded on navigable waters derived
from the crown extended only to high-water mark, unless other-
wise specified by an express grant.
265
VI. ENGLISH RIPARIAN LAW
English common law delineated principally between jus publicum,
which was property that the Crown held presumptively for the people, and
jus pritavum, which the Crown could freely convey into private hands.266
260. 3 MEDIEVAL LAW: LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 822 (Robert L. Burns ed. & Samuel P.
Scott trans.)
261. Sidney F. Ansbacher & Joe Knetsch, Negotiating the Maze: Tracing Historical Title
Claims in Spanish Land Grants and Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act, 17 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 351, 368 (2002).
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. 98 So. 505 (Fla. 1923).
265. ld. at 518.
266. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 643 (Fla. 1893) (citing Common-
wealth. v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 65 (1851)). See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Con-
ceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
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The Black River Phosphate Court explained the Crown's interest in jus pub-
licum:
[T]he jus publicum, the royal prerogative by which the king holds
such shores and navigable rivers for the common use and benefit
of all the subjects, and, indeed, of all persons of all nations at
peace with England, who may have occasion for purposes of trade.
This royal right, or jus publicum, is held by the crown in trust for
such common use and benefit, and cannot be transferred to a sub-
ject, or alienated, limited, or restrained, by mere royal grant, with-
out an act of parliament. The King's grant, therefore, although it
may vest the right of soil in a subject, will not justify the grantee in
erecting such permanent structures thereon as to disturb the com-
mon rights of navigation; and such obstruction, notwithstanding
such grant, is held to be a public or private nuisance, as the case
may be.267
As described above, the Magna Carta focused on the nobility's private
property fights. Nonetheless, the document addressed several crucial water
law issues at Chapters 16 and 23.
Chapter 16 states: "No riverbanks shall be placed in defense from hen-
ceforth except such as were so placed in the time of King Henry, our grand-
father, by the same places and the same bounds as they were wont to be in
his time. 268
Huffman states that this clause was a response to the Crown's assertion
of first right to fishing in fresh and salt rivers.269 It was understood at the
time to limit the Crown.27 ° It was ultimately interpreted to prevent the
Crown from granting exclusive fisheries.27'
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 636 n.21 (1986) and accompanying text (citing to numerous
authorities, which cite in turn to the distinctions made by Lord Hale, who is discussed infra).
Lord Hale authored A Treatise DeJure Maris et Brachiorurn Ejusdem, reprinted in STUART A.
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370 (London, Ste-
vens & Haynes 3d ed. 1888). Hale, like Shakespeare, is the icon in this field. Hale, also like
Shakespeare, might not have authored the text with which he is credited. Joseph L. Sax, The
Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 305,
309 n.17 (2010). Moore is the definitive compilation on the subject.
267. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. at 643.
268. See Huffman, supra note 223, at 19 n.95; Magna Carta, Ch. 16, art. 20.
269. Huffman, supra note 223, at 19.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 19-20.
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Chapter 23 stated: "All weirs for the future shall be utterly put [forth]
on the Thames and Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea-
shore.
27 2
Patrick Deveney wrote an exhaustive analysis of English public trust
law that had a limited view of Chapter 23.273 He interpreted the chapter to
bar the Crown from impeding fish passage on the major navigable rivers, so
that the riparian landowners could fish.274
Huffman quotes Lord Hale and others at length to contend that Chapter
23 was limited in intent and scope to the Crown's confirming baronial rights:
Magna Carta Chapters 16 and 23 are very thin reeds upon which to
rest an expansive public trust doctrine. The modem doctrine as
applied to navigable waters relies heavily upon the state's having
title to the submerged lands. But at the time of Magna Carta, and
for many centuries later, there was no concept in England of lands
owned by the King (who, according to [the] modem public trust
theory, was the predecessor in title to the states) as trustee for the
general public.
275
Huffman's position makes sense if we recall the Magna Carta was the
result of barons forcing the Crown to counter the Kings Henry I and II.
Those kings granted expansive rights to commoners and created substantial
taxation systems with the result thereby to undermine the nobility. The
Magna Carta was compelled largely to reclaim noble rights.276
Deveney cites Bracton, who is credited for implementing the Institutes
of Justinian into English water law shortly after the Magna Carta was
signed.277 He states Bracton incorporated Justinian's language regarding the
seashore except that he deleted the phrase, "'the ownership of the beaches is
in no one. ' ' 278  Huffman posits that this is "perhaps because the phrase
272. Id.; Magna Carta, Ch. 23.
273. See supra note 230 for a discussion of Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the
Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA GRANT L. J. 13 (1976).
274. Id. at 40.
275. Huffman, supra note 223, at 21 (quoting F. POLLACK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1952)). See Lazarus, supra note 266, at 635 n. 16 ("The
language of the Magna Carta suggests, however, that originally it had a much more limited
purpose and the current interpretation is most likely the result of a much more generous read-
ing by commentators such as Blackstone, later picked up on by the English courts.").
276. See Section It-A, supra.
277. Deveney, supra note 230, at 36-37. Bracton, like Hale and Shakespeare, might not
have authored everything that is attributed to him.
278. Id. (citing 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40
(Samuel E. Thome trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1569) available at
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seemed inconsistent with the existence of farms and buildings that were not
to be injured by public use of the seashore and because he recognized that
many beaches in England were in fact private.,
27 9
Robert Abrams, a public trust advocate, acknowledges that Bracton had
an expansive view of private rights in the foreshore. 280 He concedes that
Bracton amended the language of the rights in the foreshore, to "tolerate[]
the erection of private structures . . . beyond what [the] Roman[s] ... would
have allowed. 281
Abrams notes a far more extensive modification of Justinian's language
by Bracton than does Deveney. Instead of simply deleting the phrase that the
foreshore is owned by no one, Bracton changed the language barring injury
to houses, monuments, and buildings to accommodate private structures con-
sistent with the practice by nobility in the England of his time:
No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he
keeps away from houses and buildings [built there], for by the jus
gentium shores are not common to all in the sense that the sea is,
but buildings built there, whether in the sea or on the shore, belong
by the jus gentium to those who build them. Thus in this case the
soil cedes to the building, though elsewhere the contrary is true,
the building cedes to the soil.
282
At least one federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) document
notes a laissez faire attitude regarding coastal boundaries in early common
law England:
The original source of land titles in England is a grant from the
Crown. Most titles to land on the English seashore date as far
back as the grants of King John, whose reign ended in 1216. In
those early days in England, the initial grants of coastal lands pre-
sented no great problems, so it is not surprising that the grants
were imprecise and incomplete, particularly in their lack of de-
scription of the seaward boundary. As might have been expected,
the grantee of land along the coast came to look upon his property
as extending down to the sea. Either the Crown acquiesced in that
view or there were matters more pressing and interesting to the
Crown than the use of the barren seacoasts. No challenge was
http://ia6OO403.us.archive.org/l/items/delegibusetconsuO2brac/delegibusetconsuO2brac.pdf;
see also Deveney, supra note 234, at 36-37.
279. Huffman, supra note 223, at 25.
280. See Abrams, supra note 227, at 880.
281. Id.
282. Id. (quoting 2 BRACTON, supra note 278, at 40).
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made to the private use and occupancy of the tidelands until the
latter part of the sixteenth century. Until then it just never oc-
curred to the Crown, or anyone else for that matter to be specific
about seacoast boundaries in conveyances.
2 83
As the BLM states, the Crown's benign neglect of the foreshore ended
with Queen Elizabeth in the latter half of the sixteenth century. MacGrady
credits Thomas Digges with creating this prima facie rule in Digges' treatise
entitled Proof of the Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt
Shores Thereof.2 8 Both Deveney and MacGrady argue that Digges' expan-
sive public trust analysis is neither based on English caselaw nor as expan-
sive as it is cited for being.285 Lazarus states that Digges acted as lawyer to
Queen Elizabeth I in developing the prima facie rule.286 She sought to pre-
vent private coastal ownership from impeding English naval power. Digges,
therefore "developed the theory that without proof of specific grant of the
shorezone (which almost never was found in royal deeds), the Crown was the
283. BLM PUBLIC LANDS SURVEYING CASEBOOK, CHAPTER D, BASIC LAW OF WATER
BOUNDARIES, DI, "HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT" (1975) (2001 revision), www.blm.gov/
cadastral/casebook/basicwater.pdf. One assumes that the BLM has no reason to understate the
public trust. After all, the BLM's purposes are furthered by sovereign control of waterbodies.
284. Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: His-
torical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 559-63 (1975) (describing how the prima facie rule did not redound
originally to the general public). Rather, "title hunters" would seek lands under navigable
waters that had clouded titles or no clear grant, and offer payments to the Crown to obtain
express grants.
285. Abrams, supra note 227, at 882-83 (citing Deveney, supra note 230, and MacGrady,
supra note 284). Moore, in HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE (1888), blasted Digges regarding
Crown title in submerged lands. Moore emphasized that most tidelands had been long held in
private title when Diggs wrote. Id. at 24.
286. Digges was a polymath. He was a royal lawyer, surveyor, and engineer. Yet, he was
not even the most talented Thomas Digges in Elizabethan England. Nor was he the only
Thomas Digges who aided the Queen's navy along the English coast. The other Thomas
Digges was a renaissance man who set precedents in several fields. Among several biogra-
phies of the other Thomas Digges, the most fascinating, and quite thorough, is in Chapter 2 of
STHEPHEN JOHNSTON, MAKING MATHEMATICAL GENTLEMEN, PRACTITIONERS, AND ARTISANS
IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND (1994). http://www.mhs.ox.ac.uk/staff/saj/thesis/digges.
htm#note2. Digges translated Copernicus' DeRevolutionibus into English. He is considered a
major astronomer. Additionally, the "other" Digges was accomplished in mathematics, navi-
gation, surveying, artillery, and military science. Id. (citing inter alia, D. W. WATERS, THE
ART OF NAVIGATION IN ELIZABETHAN AND EARLY STUART TIMES (1958) and A. W. RICHESON,
ENGLISH LAND MEASURING TO 1800: INSTRUMENTS AND PRACTICES (1966)). That Digges was
a Member of the House of Commons and a powerful figure in the Privy Council. Id. at n.41-
45 and accompanying text. Johnston notes: "Digges' participation in the harbour works at
Dover, arguing for their importance in terms of both economic development and national
security, was closely linked to this parliamentary activity." Id. at n.46 and accompanying text.
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prima facie owner of the shore to the high water mark. '287 Lazarus notes that
property owners "resented what they perceived to be the Crown's blatant
confiscation of private property. 288  Nonetheless, the Crown pushed this
theory to "enhance the royal purse," and courts eventually "fell in line. ' '289
Moore's evisceration of Digges is near-total:
By this treatise was first invented and set up the claim of the
Crown to the foreshore, reclaimed land, salt marsh, and derelict
land in right of prerogative Mr. Digges boldly affirms that no one
can make title to the foreshore or lands overflowed by the sea, and
says it is a sure maxim in the common law that "whatsoever land
there is within the King's dominion whereunto no man can justly
make property, it is the King's by prerogative .... "
But it has been decided that Mr. Digges' argument is unsound in
the law. It is now settled that the foreshore may be shown to be
parcel of the manor .... [Y]et we find the officers of the Crown
still at this day persistently asserting Mr. Digges' contention ....
They proceed against him by the arbitrary and unconstitutional
process of information (without any previous inquisition to charge
the land to the Crown), and they make him set out his title ....
[T]hey have it in their power to crush him with costs which he is
helpless to avoid, and this wholly and solely upon an allegation of
a theory, a theory of fact which is untrue, and which was invented
by the ingenuity of Mr. Thomas Digges in the treatise set out be-
low 290
Abrams defends Digges' treatise as another step in the development of
modem public trust law via legal fiction:
Even if these critiques of Digges are apt in pointing out its [his
theory's] lack of support in English law of his time, the critiques
are immaterial in assessing the rule that Digges' presumption plays
in American law as propounded in American courts.291
287. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 635 & n.19 (citing Digges, Arguments proving the
Queen's Majesties Property in the Sea Landes, in S. MooRE, supra note 266, at 185-211)
(emphasis added).
288. id.
289. Id.
290. MOORe, supra note 266, at 182-84 (emphasis added).
291. Abrams, supra note 227, at 883 (emphasizing further that Lord Hale's treatise pro-
vided the primary English source of American jurisprudence on use of the foreshore).
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Digges was not acting solely for his queen. Elizabeth created a com-
mission in 1571 to determine whether she owned certain foreshores. Not
surprisingly, the commission determined that she did. She gave one mem-
ber, Digges, a patent to all of her fee in those shorelands he could obtain title
to within seven years.29
The first, unreported English decision to hold expressly that the Crown
held presumptive title to all lands that were not granted was Attorney-
General v. Philpott.2 93 Philpott held that the Crown held title to all naviga-
ble, tidally influenced waters.294 Huffman states that Philpott "was decided
by a corrupt court doing the king's bidding and was not cited as authority by
an English court for another 164 years. 2 95 More to the point, both Huffman
and Lazarus cite Moore for citing Philpott as one ground for the beheading
of King Charles 1.296
Brent Austin wrote an exhaustive article in 1989 concerning the scope
of sovereign submerged lands. 297 Austin points out a fishing rights decision,
The Royal Fisheries of the Banne.298 The Banne court delineated clearly the
Crown's submerged lands ownership:
There are two kinds of rivers; navigable and not navigable. Every
navigable river, so high as the sea flows and ebbs in it, is a royal
river, and the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and it belongs to the
king by his prerogative; but in every other river not navigable, and
in the fishery of such river, the tenants on each side have interest
of common fight.
299
292. MOORE, supra note 266, at 212-24.
293. See id. at 895-907; Deveney, supra note 230, at 42. Neither Deveney nor Huffman
believed this decision was well reasoned, and MacGrady pointed out the Philpott judges were
corrupt. MacGrady, supra note 284, at 562. No court cited Philpott for over 150 years. Id. at
565.
294. Deveney, supra note 230, at 42-43.
295. Huffman, supra note 223, at 24 (citing Attorney Gen. v. Richards, (1794) 145 Eng.
Rep. 980 (L.R. Exch.) 981.
296. Id.; Lazarus, supra note 266, at 635 n.19 and accompanying text (citing MOORE,
supra note 266, at 310, who in turn cited Art. 26 of Grand Remonstrance Presented to Charles
I ("Taking away of men's rights .... to land between high and low water marks.").
297. See Brent R. Austin, The Public Trust Misapplied: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Missis-
sippi and the Need to Rethink an Ancient Doctrine, 16 EcOLOGY L.Q. 967 (1989).
298. Id. at 983-84 (citing The Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (1604)).
299. The Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. at 541.
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As Abrams notes, Lord Hale's legal treatise is the primary source of
English and American common law on the foreshore.300 Huffman explains at
length Lord Hale's analysis of coastal property in England:
Lord Hale identified three categories of coastal property. The
jus privatum is held by individuals or by the Crown, and, as we
have seen, the king's private interests were not different from the
holdings of other individuals except in amount. Thejus regium he
described as the royal right which was the equivalent of what we
would call the police power today. Finally, the jus publicum are
the rights of the general public.
301
Professor Lynda Butler addresses Hale's departure from Digges in sev-
eral regards.30" While Hale resuscitated the prima facie theory, he differed
from Digges in acknowledging that private parties could obtain foreshore
rights by grant, prescription or other means.30 3
Butler's work focuses on the public commons. She emphasizes that
Hale "further refined his theory, increasingly disagreeing with Digges. ' °
Butler shows that Digges emphasized (not surprisingly) the Crown's inter-
ests, while Hale's splitting of interests burdened even the Crown's sovereign
interest with the rights of the public.
Even though Hale's acceptance of the prima facie rule was a key to the
public trust doctrine's development, Butler concludes he "did not recognize
the concept of the public trust. '305 She states that Hale's failure to conclude
that the Crown held inalienable public trust title demonstrated this point.
31
This is not so. As will be shown below, regarding the American law of the
public trust, the ability of the sovereign to convey such lands as long as the
conveyance does not wholly abrogate the duty to the public is a "soft" public
trust. She does make a significant point in emphasizing the Crown's duty to
protect the jus publicum ariscus from its jus reginum duties.307
300. Abrams, supra note 227, at 883.
301. Huffman, supra note 223, at 26 (citing Matthew Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et
Brachiorum Ejusdem, in MooRE, 369,372-74.
302. Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modem Re-
levance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 859-63 (1982).
303. Id. at 861 n.1 15-18 (citing various parts of Moore's reprinting of Hale's works).
304. Id. at 861.
305. Id. at 862-63.
306. Id.
307. Butler, supra note 302, at 863.
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Butler notes one major limitation on Hale's analysis. It was unformed.
Hale never explained exactly what the jus publicum rights were in the fore-
shore.08 Nonetheless, Hale'sjus publicum was "indestructible." 3°
Huffman, among a myriad other water law scholars, acknowledges
Hale's primacy quite bluntly:
The treatise of Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, has been so often
recognized in this country, and in England, that it has become the
text book, from which, when properly understood, there seems to
be no appeal either by sovereign or subject, upon any question re-
lating to their respective rights, either in the sea, arms of the sea, or
private streams of water. 310
MacGrady bristles at Hale's imprimatur of the prima facie rule.3"' He
says that Hale's acceptance of a doctrine that was created by the Tudors out
of whole cloth shows "[t]he adoption of the prima facie rule is thus an exam-
ple of lawmaking by personal reputation and treatise writing., 31 2 Nonethe-
less, both Huffman and Deveney state that Hale acknowledged that the
Crown could convey, and often did convey, submerged and tidal lands into
private lands.313 Accordingly, Deveney emphasizes that "[n]either the
changes following the beheading of Charles I nor the revolution of 1688 re-
duced in any way the power of the sovereign to alienate the coastal area re-
sources of the kingdom.
' 314
Both Wescoat and Hope Babcock interject real politik in response to
Huffman's pedagogy. Simply stated, their response is: So what? Babcock
discusses at length the use of "legal fictions," such as the public trust doc-
trine, and concludes: "[T]he public trust doctrine [might be] a benign mi-
sreading of its historical provenance or a normative choice to legitimize a
legal rule that has imbedded itself into property law. 315
308. Id. at 862 n.122 (citing multiple commentators opining various and contradictory
rights and limitations).
309. Id. at 863.
310. Huffman, supra note 223, at 25 n.132 (citing Ex Parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518 n.(a)
(N.Y. 1826) (emphasis added).
311. MacGrady, supra note 284, at 567.
312. Id.
313. -Iuffman, supra note, 223, at 79 and accompanying text; Deveney, supra note 230, at
48-49.
314. Deveney, supra note 230, at 49.
315. Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C.
L. REv. 393, 404 (2009).
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Wescoat is blunter: "Once a precedent was applied and upheld, empha-
sis shifted from its historical truth to its consequences. 316
It is important to recall that the English prima facie rule was stated in
terms of public rights, but that was simply not the case in reality. Lazarus
explains that the only lands that were inalienable categorically at common
law were those of the "ancient demesne. 317 As we stated above in Section
1-A, such lands belonged to William the Conqueror by conquest in 1066,
and were registered in the Domesday Book as "permanently annexed to the
kingly office. 318 Lazarus string cites authority establishing that the Crown
could convey sovereign submerged lands with "at most" Parliament's con-
currence. 3'9 English Freeholders own by "tenure" as tenants holding proper-
ty rights under the Crown.320 Accordingly, even today, the fights to the fore-
shore that Digges created in the sixteenth century to benefit Queen Eliza-
beth's navy are properly stated as belonging to the public only derivatively
from the Crown.32'
VII. AMERICAN LAW OF NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE PURPOSES
The original thirteen United States each took title to the submerged so-
vereign lands that the English Crown possessed within their respective boun-
daries. The Supreme Court held in Martin v. Lessee of Waddel322 that each
state took title as sovereign within its borders, subject to the federal naviga-
tional servitude.323 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan324 extended this sovereign
submerged fight to each subsequently admitted state upon statehood.325 The
316. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 452.
317. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 635-36 n.20.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Ball, supra note 11, at 12.
321. See id.
322. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
323. Id. at 410. The earliest public trust opinion in the United States was Arnold v. Mun-
dy. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). Arnold addressed the same issue as did Martin-
whether the state legislature could convey exclusive rights to an oyster bed in the navigable
Raritan Bay. Id. at 60. Both Martin and Illinois Central cited Arnold as persuasive authority,
holding that the law of nature, civil law, and English common law forbade such a grant. Mar-
tin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 417; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,455-56 (1892). Non-
etheless, Lazarus notes that New Jersey "abandoned Arnold's rationale in Gough v. Bell, 22
N.J.L. 441, 458-60, aft'd, 23 N.J.L. 624 (1852). Lazarus, supra note 266, at 637-38 n.28.
Both Lazarus and MacGrady question the historical accuracy of the Arnold court's research.
Id.; MacGrady supra note 284, at 590-91.
324. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
325. Id. at 230.
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Court held the "equal footing doctrine" vested each new state the same rights
as the thirteen original ones.
326
Mark Graber expounds on the significance of Pollard's Lessee. He ex-
plains that Jacksonian lenders believed that "the federal government retained
title (though not jurisdiction) over unappropriated and waste lands" in each
territory. 327 This remained the case even upon statehood.32 8 The federal gov-
ernment conveyed Pollard's family a grant to certain lands in the Mobile Bay
and Mobile River.329 Hagan argued Alabama claimed as state sovereign, and
the state had granted the submerged lands to him. 330 Graber cites a series of
Alabama decisions that had upheld the state's sovereign submerged claims
without their clarifying the basis.331 Graber explains that Pollard's Lessee
declared the federal law authorizing the putative federal grant unconstitu-
tional without using those words.332 The majority decision clarified the
state's sovereignty:
[First], [t]he shores of navigable waters and the soils under them,
were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were
reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, [tIhe new states have
the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as
the original states. 333
The Daniel Ball334 established the standard for determining navigability
for title purposes. 335 MacGrady states four factors from The Daniel Ball in
determining navigability for title purposes:
a. The waterbody needed only to be susceptible, not necessarily used,
for navigation;
b. The waterbody must have been susceptible for navigable use in
commerce;
c. The waterbody must be susceptible to navigation in its natural and
ordinary condition; and
d. Commercial navigation must have been possible by any then custo-
mary mode of trade or travel.336
326. Id.
327. Graber, supra note 103, at 102.
328. Id.
329. 1d.
330. Id.
331. Graber, supra note 103, at 102-03.
332. Id. at 103-04.
333. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 213, 230 (1845) (emphasis added).
334. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
335. Id. at 563.
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Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, the date of determining navigability
for title purposes in a given state is when it entered the Union as a state.337
MacGrady notes that Utah v. United States3 8 confirms this point.339  The
Supreme Court held there that the entirely intrastate Great Salt Lake was
navigable for title purposes based on historical records showing that a ranch-
er transported livestock across it at the time of Utah's statehood.34
The Supreme Court applied the test from The Daniel Ball in United
States v. Holt State Bank.34' The Holt State Bank Court held that federal law
governs navigability for title purposes at statehood.4 2 The Court explicated
what constituted commerce for title purposes:
[N]avigability does not depend on the particular mode in which
[trade or travel on water] is or may be had-whether by steam-
boats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional
difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the
stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for
useful commerce.
34 3
While England limited sovereign ownership to lands under tidal waters,
many states extended navigability for title purposes into non-tidal waters that
were navigable in fact upon statehood.' The states did so to facilitate free
commerce up and down river highways.345 First in the new nation, then un-
der the Equal Footing doctrine, they protected public rights to accommodate
exploration and expansion. 346
States are free to alter sovereign lands boundaries or definitions after
they achieve statehood. In Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co.,347 the Supreme Court confirmed Oregon's right to limit
336. Sidney F. Ansbacher & Joe Knetsch, The Public Trust Doctrine and Sovereignty
Lands in Florida: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 337, 342
(1989) (citing MacGrady, supra note 290, at 592-93).
337. MacGrady, supra note 284, at 593.
338. 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
339. MacGrady, supra note 284, at 593.
340. Utah, 403 U.S. at 11.
341. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
342. Id. at 55-56.
343. Id. at 56; Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 342 n.41 and accompanying text.
344. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,478-79 (1988).
345. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56.
346. See Ansbacher et al., supra note 10, at 48-50 and decisions cited therein.
347. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
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sovereign lands.348 In Barney v. Keokuk,349 the Court held that a state may
select certain sovereign submerged lands to convey to private parties.
350
Barney exemplifies "soft public trust" states, which allow conveyances
to private parties upon certain conditions.5 In that case, the conveyance
was made to facilitate wharfage and attendant commerce where Keokuk,
Iowa faced the Mississippi River.352 Illinois Central v. Illinois353 is cited with
reverence as establishing an overarching and strong public trust doctrine.354
In reality, it represents the paradigmatic "soft public trust" case. The Illinois
Central Court held that a state may convey submerged sovereign lands as
long as the conveyance did "not substantially impair the public interest in the
[submerged sovereign] lands and [overlying] waters remaining. 3 55  The
Court held that Illinois was authorized to repeal legislation conveying much
of Chicago harbor's submerged lands to the Illinois Central Railroad. 6 The
Court concluded that the original grant was an unauthorized abdication of
public ownership of the great harbor.357
Wescoat delineated the long and somewhat inconsistent subsequent de-
velopment of Chicago's lakefront before and since Illinois Central.35 8 He
shows both that Illinois Central is not as simple as portrayed and that it has
not been honored in the breach-even in Chicago.3 59 Daniel Burnham and
Edward Bennett published their Plan of Chicago in 1908, sixteen years after
Illinois Central.360 The Plan envisioned a continuous park along the lake-
front.16 ' Burnham's and Bennett's work was itself a major public effort, as it
reflected a plan developed by the post-fire city's leaders to develop Chicago
348. Id. at 378-80.
349. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
350. Id. at 342.
351. See generally id.
352. Id. at 325.
353. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
354. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. REV. 473, 489 (1970).
355. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 455.
358. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 436.
359. See generally id.
360. See DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNEIr, COMMERCIAL CLUB PLAN OF
CHICAGO (Charles Moore ed., Princeton Architectural Press 1993) (1909).
361. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 437.
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in a coordinated and magnificent manner akin to Paris. 362 The work is consi-
dered the first modern comprehensive municipal plan in the United States.363
The Plan itself culminated a series of acts that envisioned an integrated
railroad access to and public parks along Chicago's lakefront.36 Wescoat
notes the original 1830 plat of the Loop, south of the Chicago River, showed
a public park along the lakefront. 365 The park was named "Lake Park.
366
Maps show the park in the location of today's Grant Park, which is bounded
today on the south end by the Field Museum and the Shedd Aquarium, and
on the north by the area of the Art Institute, Millennium Park, and Daley
Plaza.367
Illinois Central addressed the railroad's access into central Chicago.
The railroad's southern entry into downtown was chosen along the lake-
front.3 68 The 1869 Illinois legislature conveyed a massive, one-mile by one-
mile grant of submerged lands along Lake Michigan to the city, with a legis-
lative directive to the city to then flip the parcel to the railroad.3 69 The rail-
road intended to construct infrastructure to support its activities associated
with the southern entry. The same year, the legislature created three park
commissions in and around Chicago: the South Park Commission in Hyde
Park, which would host the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition; the West-
ern Park Commission, which went out to Oak Park; and the Lincoln Park
Commission, north of the city center.37°
The railroad sued after the 1873 Illinois legislature repealed the grant.
3 71
Douglas Grant's comprehensive public trust article focused on several inter-
esting aspects of the case.372 First, this decision, which has had profound and
sweeping impact on public and private rights, was itself a hotly contested 4-3
split, with two justices recused.373 Second, the massive scale of the grant is
362. CARL SMITH, THE PLAN OF CHICAGO: DANIEL BURNHAM AND THE REMAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CITY 11-13 (2006).
363. See generally id. (telling of the circumstances surrounding the development of the
plan).
364. Id. at 24.
365. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 455 & n. 108-09 and accompanying text.
366. Id.
367. Chicago Downtown-Loop Street and Satellite Map, CHI TRAVELER, http:I/www.
chicagotraveler.comlmaps/chicago-downtown-street-map-.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
368. See BURNHAM & BENNETT, supra note 360, at 5.
369. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 457.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 851-52 (2001).
373. Id. at 860.
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what caused Justice Field in a majority to affirm Illinois' revocation as an
inherent, reserved state power to protect the people of Chicago.374
Kearney and Merrill read the decision as a result of the credo that all
politics are local.31 5 They assert that the decision, while couched as a public
trust matter, resolved local political debates in a de facto dispute resolu-
tion.376 Kearney and Merrill, along with Wescoat, emphasize that each side
received what it wanted: "The railroad obtained a right-of-way for its tracks
that fulfilled its commercial aims and charter, and the city gained riparian
rights to the valuable new public lakefront created by landfill dumped by the
railroad, and by the city itself, after the great fire of 1871." 377
Let us explicate Wescoat's quote. In 1871, two years after the grant to
the railroad, and two years before the repeal, Chicago was overwhelmed by
the "Great Fire. 378 Until the fire, "Lake Michigan lapped right up to the
edge of Michigan Avenue., 379 After the fire, the city dumped much of the
charred rubble "into the shallows of the lake in what is now Streeterville and
Grant Park. 380 While the Illinois legislature in 1873 protected the public
from the railroad's use of one mile along and one mile into Lake Michigan,
the city's fill along the lake front included "an unsightly mess . .. littered
with stables, squatters' shacks, a firehouse, garbage, and debris.
381
As noted above, the Plan of Chicago envisioned a continuous park
along the Lake Michigan shorefront.8 2 Chicago developed, and maintains,
one of the great waterfront park systems in the world. 383 Nonetheless, the
area of Grant Park, which was envisioned in some nineteenth century plats as
"'forever to remain vacant of buildings,"' is today rife with iconic structures,
including massive public buildings.384 Roddewig emphasizes that Burnham's
plan envisioned many of the museums and structures we see today.38 5 Wes-
374. Id. at 861.
375. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 801-03 (2004).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 801, cited by Wescoat, supra note 235, at 457-58 & n.125 and accompanying
text.
378. Id.; Richard J. Roddewig, Law as Hidden Architecture: Law, Politics, and Imple-
mentation of the Burnham Plan of Chicago Since 1909, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 375, 402
(2009).
379. Roddewig, supra note 378, at 402.
380. Id.
381. SMITH, supra note 362, at 24.
382. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 437.
383. Id. at 458.
384. Id. at 455 (citing Lois WILLE, FOREVER OPEN, CLEAR AND FREE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CHICAGO'S LAKEFRONT (2d ed. 1991) (1972)).
385. See Roddewig, supra note 378, at 401-02.
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coat lists a "small sample" of the myriad lawsuits and projects associated
with the development of the lakefront at issue in Illinois Central and around
Chicago.386 While some courts strictly applied the decision to block divesti-
ture of public interests, others allowed grants of submerged lands to private
parties.387
Kearney and Merrill sum up the intent and impact of Justice Field's
opinion in Illinois Central thusly:
His public trust doctrine was designed to preserve access to the
lake for commercial vessels at competitive prices, not to preserve
Lake [today Grant] Park or the shoreline from further economic
development. Moreover, Justice Field was not alone in these pre-
ferences among the federal judges who ruled on aspects of the con-
troversy. When the dust finally settled, all of Illinois Central's
massive landfills and improvements had been ratified by the feder-
al courts as being consistent with the nebulous trust identified in Il-
linois Central. Thus, the public trust doctrine, as invoked in the Il-
linois Central litigation, was scarcely an anti-development doc-
trine.388
Not surprisingly, Huffman raises issues aside from the "fable" of Illi-
nois Central.389 He asserts that Justice Field misunderstood the legal back-
ground of the public trust doctrine.39 °
Huffman emphasizes the fable that Field's opinion held that public trust
property cannot be alienated-that Field confirmed the "hard" public trust.
39 1
He counters: "Justice Field expressly states that submerged and coastal lands
affected with a public trust can be alienated., 392 Huffman points to examples
where Field concluded grants of sovereign lands furthered the public interest:
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the
erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose
the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as
386. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 458-60, n.131-43 and accompanying text.
387. Compare Lake Mich. Fed'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 447
(N.D. II1. 1990), with People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (I1l. 1976).
388. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 375, at 924-25.
389. Huffman, supra note 223, at 54-59.
390. Id. at 54-60.
391. Id. at 56.
392. Id. Huffman also extracts numerous portions of Field's text showing a "soft" public
trust doctrine. Id. at 56-57 n.338 and accompanying text.
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their disposition is made for such purpose[s], no valid objection[]
[may] be made to the grants. 393
Huffman concludes that Field did not posit a hard public trust.394 Ra-
ther, a state could alienate sovereign submerged lands for private purposes
that fostered either navigation or commerce, but no grant could interfere with
public navigation, commerce and fishing.395 Field determined that the grant
of a wide swath of Chicago Harbor was simply too expansive to meet the
soft public trust test.396
Huffman added his contention that Field misunderstood the source and
nature of the jus publicum.397 He asserts that the 'jus publicum, properly
understood, existed [under English common law] as an easement in proper-
ties in navigable waters and submerged lands whether held by the state or by
private individuals.398 Huffman denies Field's conclusion that state owner-
ship of the submerged lands necessarily leads to state control of the overly-
ing navigable waters: "[T]he original understanding of the jus publicum de-
nied the truth of this assertion by holding that without regard to ownership of
submerged lands, the public had certain rights in the use-and therefore con-
trol to that extent--of the overlying waters."3 99
Lazarus buttresses this point. He states that Field's rationale that "the
state would be powerless to prevent use of the harbor" if it divested itself of
title "hardly seems plausible." 4° He argues that state police power authoriz-
es the regulation of railroad impacts on the natural resources, and the "navi-
gation[al] servitude would still provide for both maintenance of the naviga-
bility of the resource and public access. ' 0 '
Lazarus adds that the legal fictions both underlying and stemming from
Illinois Central are not necessarily fatal." 2 That includes his anticipation of
Huffman in questioning even the very existence of the public trust doctrine
in antiquity. 4°3 Nonetheless, he quotes Professor Lon Fuller, stating that le-
393. Huffman, supra note 223, at 57 n.339 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452).
394. See id. at 57-59.
395. Id. at 57-58 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452).
396. Id. at 57-58. Permitted grants are under "'a very different doctrine from the one
which would sanction [an] abdication of the general control of the state over lands under the
navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake."' Id. at 58 (quoting Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53).
397. Huffman, supra note 223, at 59.
398. Id. at 59 (citing Hale, supra note 301, at 336) (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 59-60 (citing Hale, supra note 301, at 336).
400. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 639.
401. Id. The navigational servitude is addressed at length, infra, in Section VII.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 633-35, 656-57.
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gal fictions "'are, to a certain extent, simply the growing pains of the lan-
guage of the law."
404
Just two years after Illinois Central came Shively v. Bowlby, °s which a
later Supreme Court public trust majority opinion cited as the "'seminal case
in American public trust jurisprudence.""''1° Shively frames the soft public
trust rule in Illinois Central.47 The Shively decision assumed that the State
of Oregon had authority to convey submerged sovereign lands. 4 8 Shively
addressed the federal government's prior ability to grant submerged sove-
reign lands in the Columbia River when Oregon was a territory.4°
Shively claimed the parcel under a federal patent before Oregon's state-
hood.410 Bowlby and Parker countered that a statutory deed from the state
vested title in them. 41 The unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Supreme
Court of Oregon's holding in favor of the claim deraigned under state sta-
tute.
4 12
The opinion of Justice Gray cited Hale's prima facie rule that a sove-
reign grant of upland oceanfront land is bounded by the high water mark
"unless either the language of the grant, or long usage under it, clearly indi-
cates that such was the intention. ,1 3 Shively held Martin v. Waddell estab-
lished the sovereign ownership of tidelands, which could be granted solely
by express conveyance. 41 4 Shively itself affirmed a key component to sove-
reign lands law in the United States. 41 5 Each of the original thirteen states,
and each successively admitted state, may alter the sovereign boundaries or
404. Id. at 657 (quoting LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 1-22 (1967)).
405. 152 U.S. I (1894).
406. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988) (quoting Petitioner's
Reply Brief at 11 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (No. 86-870)).
407. See id. at 473.
408. See id. at 473-74 (explicating Shively, 152 U.S. at 57).
409. Shively, 152 U.S. at 56.
410. Id. at 2.
411. Id. at 7.
412. Id. at 58.
413. Id. at 13. Nonetheless, the private usage of submerged lands should not vest title or
easement against the sovereign. Shively, 152 U.S. at 14. First, one cannot claim sovereign
lands by prescription. See id. at 11-12. Second the strong legal presumption of owner con-
sent of use undermines the adversity of use necessary to establish prescription. See id. at 12-
14. Therefore, the overwhelming law, discussed throughout this article, and by Justice Gray,
holds that one must deraign title to initially sovereign submerged lands by express and autho-
rized grant from the sovereign. See id. 17-18.
414. Id. at 15-17.
415. Shively, 152 U.S. at 58.
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convey sovereign lands with its jurisdiction, subject only to a soft public
trust.416
Shively explained Illinois Central as confirming:
[T]he settled law of this country [is] that the ownership of and do-
minion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, or na-
vigable lakes, within the limits of the several States, belong to the
respective States within which they are found, with the consequent
right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be
done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in
such waters, and subject to the paramount right of Congress to
control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regula-
tion of commerce.41 7
One must emphasize that this interpretation came but two years after Il-
linois Central, by a Court that retained three of the four justices in the Illinois
Central majority, included Justice Field, who wrote the majority opinion in
Illinois Central. 8 With all due respect to the modem scholars who contend
that Illinois Central established a hard public trust doctrine, one should defer
to the actual author's interpretation of his recent opinion.
Indeed, Professor Joseph Sax's exegesis of Illinois Central in his land-
mark 1970 public trust article addressed the decision from pages 489 through
491.419 This provided scant coverage for what Professor Sax entitled The
Lodestar in American Public Trust Law: Illinois Central Railroad Company
v. Illinois, in a ninety-three page article that is universally regarded as the
source of the modern public trust doctrine.420 While Sax did not explore the
conflicting and myriad issues raised in the case, he did conclude that the am-
plitude of the grant drove the decision.42' Sax stated the decision means that
a sovereign may grant sovereign submerged lands-provided that there is a
public benefit.422
The Supreme Court again faced the public trust in Appleby v. City of
New York.423 The case featured similar issues to Illinois Central. The City
of New York conveyed large portions of New York Harbor to Appleby for
the private filling of submerged lands to facilitate mixed private and public
416. Id.
417. id. at 47.
418. Huffman, supra note 223, at 77 n.464 and accompanying text.
419. See Sax, supra note 354, at 489-91.
420. See id. at 489.
421. Id. at490-91.
422. See id. at 490.
423. 271 U.S. 364, 366 (1926).
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development.4 4 Unlike Illinois, however, the City granted specific tracts for
the purpose.4 5
The State of New York later established a fill control line to protect na-
vigation in the harbor.426 This halved Appleby's available use.427 The City
sought to implement the state program by condemning all of the private
wharf parcels in the harbor.4 2' Even though the City did not acquire Apple-
by's lands, it commenced a dredge operation on his submerged parcels.
429
Appleby sued in state court to enjoin the dredging.430 He claimed the
City was trespassing.431 Appleby won at trial, but the New York Court of
Appeals reversed.432
Appleby petitioned the Supreme Court under the Contacts Clause.433 It
was a decade before the 5-4 majority in Blaisdell undermined the Contracts
Clause. 434 Appleby's theory was that the state contract with him vested
rights that the joint state/city fill prohibition and dredging program evisce-
rated.435
The Supreme Court in Appleby expounded on a key point that it men-
tioned in passing in Illinois Central.4 36 Which body of law controlled? Fed-
eral or State? While the Illinois Central majority opinion "referred vaguely
to the use of sovereign trust language by state courts in their decisions dis-
cussing state ownership of the submerged beds," it failed to cite any relevant
Illinois precedent.437
Charles Wilkinson examines the record in Illinois Central in attempting
to ferret the Court's rationale.438 He notes: "The federal public trust doctrine
announced in Illinois Central . and the varying state-law based trust doc-
424. Id. at 367-68.
425. Id. at 368-69.
426. Id. at 369.
427. Id.
428. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 370.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 371.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 364, 372-73.
433. Appleby, 271 U.S. at 380.
434. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1934).
435. See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 379-80.
436. See id. at 393-395 (citing 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53
(1892)).
437. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 640 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 445).
438. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425 (1989).
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trines total 51 separate public trust doctrines. ' ' 3 Wilkinson contends that the
decision allows each state to develop its own public trust doctrine.
44°
The Appleby Court simplifies the Illinois Central Court's substantive
analysis: What is the substantive basis for the Public Trust doctrine? 4"' Wil-
kinson states that multiple bases could be the "settled law of this country" the
Illinois Central Court holding requires that the "several states" enforce the
public trust.
442
1. Federal common law: "not in favor, and is unlikely to be employed
in light of the more specific available sources. ' 443
2. Guaranty clause: "unlikely that a modem court would look to it as a
basis. ' ' "4
3. Congressional preemption: more likely, to maintain navigability. 44'
4. Commerce Clause: probably most likely to maintain navigability." 6
Lazarus shows the impossible task of a modem scholar, or court, at-
tempting to fathom the legal basis for the Illinois Central holding. He cites
both text in the decision and historical antecedents that indicate the public
trust sounds in property law.447 Lazarus notes that Sax's article from 1970
rejected the property law basis.448 Sax was concerned that property law
would limit the expansion of the public trust doctrine as needed to other pub-
lic purposes. 449 Sax even refers to the property law basis as a "rather dubious
notion. '450 Yet, as stated, infra, Sax has converted to the property law school
of thought. Oddly enough, he did so in his analysis of Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment.451
439. Id. at 425 n. I (citations omitted).
440. See id. at 455-56.
441. SeeAppleby, 271 U.S. at 383-84.
442. Wilkinson, supra note 438, at 455 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435).
443. Id. at 455. But see Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W. NW. J. ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y 113, 162 (2010) (contending that federal common law established a public trust
"floor," thus implementing Equal Footing Doctrine and the phrase "this Union" at art. IV, s.3,
of the Constitution, succeeding English common law's public trust doctrine).
444. Wilkinson, supra note 438, at 456.
445. Id.
446. Id. Wilkinson believes commerce clause analysis most closely aligns with the com-
plementary navigational servitude, which is discussed more fully, infra, in the next section.
447. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 642 n.63 and accompanying text (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-54 (1892).
448. Id. at 642 (discussing Sax, supra note 354, at 478-83).
449. Id. at 642 n.64.
450. Sax, supra note 354, at 484.
451. See infra note 481 and accompanying text.
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So, if one cannot today ferret out exactly what body of law the Illinois
Central Court relied upon, how did the Appleby Court act in its own role as
the Oracle of Delphi? Justice Taft stated that Illinois Central "was necessari-
ly a statement of Illinois law. 45 2 Huffman puzzles over this conclusion.453
Rather, Illinois Central relied on a vague, "settled law" throughout all
states.454 What was that settled law?
Appleby presents a further twist. Today, both proponents and opponents
of a broad public trust doctrine acknowledge that Illinois Central is the se-
minal decision, the "lodestar" in the field.455
This is so principally because Professor Sax told US. 4 56 Most subsequent
writers, including the author of this article, agree. One just wishes Sax gave
us further analysis. Yet, the Appleby Court relegated the Illinois Central
decision to an almost footnote status merely thirty-four years later. Rather,
Taft cited New York law in Appleby for the right of New York City to grant
submerged sovereign lands. He took the inherent authority as a given:
"Upon the American Revolution, all the proprietary rights of the Crown and
Parliament in, and all their dominion over, lands under tidewater vested in
the several states, subject to the powers surrendered to the National Govern-
ment . . .
Frankly, the best analysis is Wilkinson's conclusion that Illinois Central
confirmed a federal general public trust, which each state could modify to
meet the unique needs of its jurisdiction and its people.45 8 The Supreme
Court established this in 1977 as its modem rule in Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co.
4 59
No other major federal decisions addressed the public trust doctrine as
applied to sovereign submerged lands until the doctrine crossed the Rubicon:
the 1970 Sax article.4 ° Most commentators address the doctrine in its pre-
Sax and post-Sax paradigms.461 Professor Sax drafted his article as "part of a
452. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
453. Huffman, supra note 223, at 66-67.
454. See id.; I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892).
455. Sax, supra note 354, at 489.
456. Id. at 489-91.
457. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381(1926).
458. Wilkinson, supra note 438, at 453-55.
459. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 379-82
(1977).
460. See generally Sax, supra note 354.
461. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 266, at 643-44. Lazarus titles one of his sections,
Public Trust Litigation Since 1970. Id. at 643. Lazarus states in his immediately prior section
that "most prominently Professor Joseph Sax ... develop[ed] the modem public trust thesis."
Id. at 641-42. Accordingly, one need not guess whether Sax's 1970 article is the reason be-
hind this divide.
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larger study [he was] making of citizen efforts to use the law in environmen-
tal-quality controversies.' ' 2 He concluded: "Of all the concepts known to
American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and
substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of general applica-
tion for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to re-
source management problems.
463
In other words, he sought to implement an ancient legal doctrine in or-
der to foster litigation to address modern environmental and natural resource
issues. He was on a voyage of exploration, not making a map of known wa-
ters.
Sax cited three requirements to meet "[i]f that doctrine is to provide a
satisfactory tool:"
1. "It must contain some concept of a legal right in the general public;"
2. "[1]t must be enforceable against the government;" and
3. "[I]t must be capable of an interpretation consistent with contempo-
rary concerns for environmental quality. '
As noted above, Sax stated the concept that the public trust sounds in
property law is "dubious. '465 He likewise questioned the strict application of
historical antecedents, even though he did recite Roman and English law on
the topic: "Certainly, the phrase "public trust" does not contain any magic
such that special obligations can be said to arise merely from its incantation;
and only the most manipulative of historical readers could extract much
binding precedent from what happened afew centuries ago in England.' 466
Nonetheless, Sax saw much promise in modern application of the public
trust doctrine: "But that the doctrine contains the seeds of ideas whose im-
portance ... might usefully promote needed legal development, can hardly be
doubted."'46 7
Sax concluded that property law would impede the sovereign's ability
to re-allocate the resource.468 He expressed further concern that treating pub-
lic trust lands as public property rights might subject the government to a
takings claim if the government withdrew the right.46
9
462. Sax, supra note 354, at 473 n.1.
463. Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
464. Id.
465. Id. at 484.
466. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
467. Sax, supra note 354, at 485 (emphasis added).
468. Id. at 482.
469. Id. at 478.
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He explained that the doctrine is not substantive at all.47° Rather, he
contended it is more of a useful tool as several states have used it:
[T]here is a great deal of ingenuity which courts can use .... A
recognition of that potential is important ... because it indicates
that public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards
for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by which
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and
administrative process. The public trust approach [that] has been
developed ... and the exercise in applying that approach to exist-
ing situations ... demonstrate that the public trust concept is, more
than anything else, a medium for democratization.
Thus, the doctrine which a court adopts is not very important; ra-
ther, the court's attitudes and outlook are critical. The "public
trust" has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no
more-and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns
471
about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.
At bottom, Sax's public trust doctrine is not a talisman. Rather, it is but
a tool.
Carol Rose's article entitled Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public
Trust 472 confirms Sax's intent to revive and expand the public trust doctrine:
Until it was revived and re-invented by Sax, the doctrine held that
some resources, particularly lands beneath navigable waters or
washed by the tides, are either inherently the property of the public
at large, or are at least subject to a kind of inherent easement for
certain public purposes. Those purposes are foremost navigation
and travel, to a lesser extent fishing, and lesser still recreation and
public gatherings.473
Rose also explains why Sax would not want the public trust to be ex-
plained as a property interest:
470. See id. at 509.
471. Id.at509,521.
472. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351
(1998).
473. Id. at 351.
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There were good reasons for this, both as a general matter and for
Sax's purposes in particular. First, a trust-based public property
right would mean that the unorganized public could trump its own
legislature's acts, implying that the public trust was some sort of
an informal constitutional right, something certainly outside nor-
mal American legal practice. But for Sax, a second reason may
have been more important: [H]e was most urgently concerned
with extending and improving the public management of diffuse
environmental resources.
4 74
Rose infers that Sax "evidently" thought a property analysis would con-
strain legislative choices. 5 She concludes that he likely wanted the legisla-
tures to have the greatest flexibility in implementing the public trust in a my-
riad of modern scenarios.476
As Lazarus notes, Professor Sax ultimately stated, one decade later, that
the public trust doctrine is based on property law.477 Lazarus emphasizes that
Sax's shift to acknowledging that the public trust doctrine is only sensible.478
"The doctrine is squarely rooted in property law." 479 Lazarus explicates:
"The trust doctrine originated with the notion of sovereign ownership of cer-
tain resources in trust for the sovereign's citizens. Controversies over the
doctrine historically have concerned ownership boundaries and the existence
of public access or easements. The Illinois Central opinion is replete with
references to property law concepts. 48°
Interestingly, Professor Sax wrote an article as STBR was pending that
addressed this very issue in the context of that case.48' Sax stated that the
mean high tide line demarcates the property boundary between beachfront
littoral landowners and "seaward of that line is the state, a public landown-
er., 482 This author did not find the words "public trust" in the recent Sax
article.483 Rather, Sax contends: "The law is well settled that in its proprie-
tary capacity the state is entitled to assert its ownership rights in the same
474. Id. at 357.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Lazarus, supra note 266, at 643 (citing Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 185, 192-93 (1980)).
478. See id.
479. id. at 642.
480. Id. n. 63 (citations omitted). Although, as noted, Illinois Central was replete with
references to numerous legal doctrines, without pinning any one down.
481. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels,
Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, II VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641 (2010).
482. Id. at 641-42.
483. See generally id.
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way, and with the same vigor, as any other owner."'  Sax emphasizes: "As
a proprietor, it should be neither worse off nor better off than any other pro-
prietor. ''485 Nonetheless, Sax notes that only one amicus brief in STBR even
raised the balance between the upland littoral property owner's rights and the
state's property rights of lands seaward of the MHTL.486
As Sax established Illinois Central as the "lodestar" public trust deci-
sion,487 so he turns to a more recent Supreme Court decision to make his
point on behalf of the state as proprietor, United States v. Mission Rock
Co. 488 There, the Court upheld the state's right to convey title lands to a third
party who filled and "thereby cut[ ] off the littoral owner's water access. '"489
The Court held the State could convey its tideland for any purpose for which
it held the submerged parcel, "i.e., 'in aid of commerce.' ' 490 Interestingly,
the Mission Rock Court cited Shively, not Illinois Central, as its principal
authority a decade after the latter two decisions were issued.4 9' Sax ac-
knowledges that the result in Mission Rock was rather extreme.492
Sax points to a scenario that is troubling to a sovereign proprietor, be-
low MHTL (or MHWL, as it is known in Florida):
Another possible state proprietary claim could arise if-as the
Florida Supreme Court found [In Walton County v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment], the earlier loss of beach was caused by avulsion,
and the public/pivate boundary did not move landward. In such
an event, the foreshore between high and low tide (which formerly
had been publicly owned and available for public use) would now
be located entirely on land owned by the littoral proprietor and the
public might not have a legal fight of access to it. 
4 93
Sax suggests that any public restoration could be done "assuming it
could practically be [done] without also filling the littoral owner's sub-
merged land." 494
484. Id. at 643.
485. Id. at 644.
486. id. at 648.
487. Sax, supra note 354, at 489.
488. 189 U.S. 391 (1902); Sax, supra note 481, at 644.
489. Sax, supra note 481, at 644.
490. Id. (quoting United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 406-07 and citing
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
491. See id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 651.
494. Sax, supra note 481, at 651.
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Sax's acknowledgement that property law underlies the public trust
doctrine raises a point mentioned both in his 1970 article and in the Illinois
Central majority decision.495 What are the eminent domain implications
where the state changes its mind? Justice Field mentioned that the state
"ought to pay" for any "expenses incurred in improvements made under such
a grant" that the state later repeals.4 9 6 Sax initially rejected property law un-
derpinnings in part because of takings exposure if the state should change a
public use to another purpose.497 The latter is a highly theoretical and unlike-
ly scenario. The former, however, is not.
James Rasband addressed the takings issue in 1998.498 He argues that
''compensation for [private] improvements is a small equitable price to pay
for reversing the [allegedly] improvident . . . resource grants of the past.' 99
Rasband limits such claims to riparian and littoral uses that are authorized.5°
He cites to Yates v. Milwaukee,5"' which confirmed the common law riparian
or littoral right to "'wharf out' and build piers, wharves and other improve-
ments on tidelands and submerged lands adjacent to [the riparian or littoral]
property. '502 Left unchanged in Illinois Central was Justice Harlan's holding
below (while "riding the circuit") that the railroad could continue to use the
portion of the harbor it had filled pursuant to the grant.503 Any littoral im-
provements could remain, as long as they did not interfere with public navi-
gation.5 4
Rasband states the Supreme Court's direction that the lower court on
remand order removal of any littoral improvements that interfere with navi-
gation was consistent with the 1869 act of conveyance. 50 5 That act barred
obstructions to the harbor or general navigation.5 6 Rasband notes that the
Seventh Circuit on remand found the "piers did not interfere with naviga-
tion."5 7 Accordingly, there was no basis in Illinois Central for equitable
takings compensation, both because the improvements remained and because
495. See 11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 387-464 (1892); Sax, supra note
481, at 652.
496. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455.
497. See Sax, supra note 354, at 478-83.
498. See generally James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings,
69 CoLo. L. REV. 331 (1998).
499. Id. at 405.
500. See id. at 342-43 n.51.
501. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870).
502. Rasband, supra note 498, at 343 n.5 1.
503. Illinois v. 11. Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730, 775-76 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
504. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892).
505. See Rasband, supra note 498, at 342-43 n.5 1.
506. Id. (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 450).
507. Id. (citing Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. 91 F. 955 (7th Cir. 1899)).
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there would have been no compensable good faith reliance if piers were built
in violation of the grant conditions. °8
Rasband notes an additional and related limitation set out in Illinois
Central. Where the grantee or its successor has in good faith so altered the
trust property that it is no longer useful for trust purposes, the trust no longer
burdens the parcel. 509 The parcel vests in the private party free of any public
proprietary claim.5t ° He states this was the correct result in Illinois Central
regarding the piers that the railroad built in good faith "reliance on the 1869
grant. 5
11
The most significant Supreme Court public trust decisions between Ap-
pleby and STBR were Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co. and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.512 We discussed Cor-
vallis above. That decision confirmed the sovereign right of each state to
alter its sovereign lands standards once it achieves statehood.513 Nonetheless,
Illinois Central seems to provide a general backstop. While the state may
convey sovereign lands, it cannot abrogate its public trust obligations.
Phillips Petroleum was a quiet title action that concerned nonnavigable
tidal wetlands several miles upriver of the Gulf Coast.1 4 The case had a bi-
zarre background. It originated in a 1973 Mississippi legislative directive to
the state's marine resources council to map the state-owned wetlands.1 5 The
council staff identified the wetlands at issue, and the state's Mineral Lease
Commission drafted a proposed lease.516 So, the state was in the ironic posi-
tion of asserting title to exploit, rather than to protect the wetlands." 7
The record showed that the parcel was non-navigable, but tidally influ-
enced when Mississippi was granted statehood.518 Phillips asserted the pub-
lic trust extended to all tidally influenced navigable waters and underlying
lands at statehood.519 It claimed that sovereign boundary ended at the mean
508. Id. at 342-43.
509. See Rasband, supra note 498, at 396.
510. Id. at 395 (citing Illinois v. I1. Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730, 775-76 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1888)).
511. See id. at 342-43 n.5 1.
512. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
513. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370
(1977).
514. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 472.
515. Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1986) (en banc) aff'd sub
nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 1018 (1988).
516. Id.; Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 472.
517. Cinque Bambini P'ship, 491 So. 2d at 511.
518. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 472.
519. Id. at 478-79.
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high water line.52° Mississippi countered that it took title to all lands under-
lying all tidally influenced waters that had not been conveyed expressly
when Mississippi become a state in 1817.521 The state's right to the oil lease
income from the wetlands hung in the balance. 22
The Supreme Court cited Shively in holding that the public trust covered
all tidelands. 23 The ebb and flow test was not limited by the mean high wa-
ter line. 24 The majority stated that the English crown owned all tidal waters,
and each of the original thirteen states had the right to claim all tidal lands.525
Some original states' decisions to reduce the scope of sovereign lands only
confirmed their ability to choose their own public trust doctrines. 6 A vigor-
ous dissent countered that this was an issue of first impression.527 The dis-
sent argued that navigability was the limiting factor, as it was the key to all
common law public trust cases and treatises of consequence in England and
the United States.528
Austin explains that the Phillips majority completely misunderstood
Shively. 29 The Shively Court considered title in an entirely navigable area of
the lower Columbia River.530 Therefore, "the Court never alluded to the
trust's role in nonnavigable areas." 53'
Austin notes that the Shively Court stated that "'the title and dominion
in [English] lands flowed by the tide water were in the King for the benefit of
the nation. ' ' 532 The Phillips majority focused on the Shively Court's state-
ment that such tidewater rights "passed to the states. 533 As Austin mentions,
the Phillips majority contended this was a "sweeping" acknowledgment of
the extent of sovereign submerged lands.534
Austin concludes that the Phillips majority misread Shively. 35 The
Shively Court focused on the public trust in terms of waters' use "for high-
ways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose
520. Id. at 472-73.
521. Id. at 472.
522. Id.
523. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 480 n.8.
524. Id. at 480.
525. Id. at 478.
526. Id. at 475-76.
527. Id. at 485 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
528. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
529. Austin, supra note 297, at 967, 995-97.
530. Id. at 995 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 8 (1894)).
531. Id.
532. Id. (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 57).
533. Id.
534. Austin, supra note 297, at 995.
535. Id.
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of fishing by all the King's subjects." '536 Moreover, Shively cited both Gene-
see and the English common law for the proposition that the ebb and flow
test was merely a "convenient" navigability test in coastal jurisdictions.537
Austin helpfully provides a long list of Supreme Court decisions that
support the limitation of the navigability for title test.538 Martin and Barney
were among several pre-Shively decisions.539 Many decisions, including one
the year before Phillips, referred to navigability alone and stated the trust
purpose was to protect navigation, commerce, and fishing.54°
At this point, I want to clarify a point from my own 1989 article on the
public trust doctrine in Florida. The published text states that Phillips "con-
firmed the extent of the state sovereignty title to tidal lands under non-
navigable waters."54 ' That sentence was added in the editing process. An
errata sheet stated that Phillips only provided for the possible maximum ex-
tent of such lands. Florida's Constitution then limited, and still limits, public
trust lands to those lying below the mean high water line. 42 Therefore, Phil-
lips is the Supreme Court's most current statement of the extent of sub-
merged sovereign lands in tidal waters upon statehood. It does not bind for-
ever each state, as we know from Corvallis.543 Further, the Phillips majority
decision is itself contrary to the manifest precedent of the Court.
One further point is necessary to clarify the states' sovereign rights in
coastal waters. The Supreme Court's 1947 decision in United States v. Cali-
fornia,4 settled a debate between the states and the federal government re-
garding who owned the ocean bottom along the coasts. The Court held that
the federal government owned the territorial seas. 5 This undermined the
various coastal states' claims to the first three miles of the coastal waters.
546
Congress undid the 1947 decision by awarding the coastal states ownership
to submerged lands and resources up to three miles offshore in the Sub-
536. Shively, 152 U.S. at 11.
537. Id. at 34.
538. See Austin, supra note 297, at 991-97.
539. Id. at 993 n.238 (citing, inter alia, Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Mar-
tin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 407 (1842)).
540. Austin, supra note 297, at 997 (citing, inter alia, Utah Div. of State Lands v. United
States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987)).
541. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 369.
542. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
543. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co, 429 U.S. 363, 378-80
(1977).
544. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
545. Id. at 41.
546. Id. at 40.
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merged Lands Act of 19 53 .-47 Congress simultaneously passed the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953,548 which codified federal jurisdiction
beyond three miles and established procedures for developing resources in
the federal jurisdiction. 549 Additionally, the state owned lands remain subject
to the federal navigational servitude.550
ViI. NAVIGABILITY FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES
One cannot segregate sovereign submerged lands law from its primary
purpose-protecting the navigational servitude for the public. William Sapp,
et al., drafted a useful outline entitled The Float a Boat Test: How to Use It
to Advantage in This Post-Rapanos World for a 2009 ALI-ABA seminar.
They noted three different lines of federal navigability decisions: 1) Com-
merce Clause; 2) Admiralty; and 3) Submerged Title.52
They further delineated Commerce Clause decisions into: a) Commer-
cial regulation; b) Federal Power Act; c) Rivers and Harbors Act; and d)
Navigational Servitude.553
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to regulate navigable waters.554 Additionally, Congress may
regulate non-navigable waters that affect navigation. 5  Navigable servitude
may be traced back to Rome. We discussed Justinian's 556 and Spain' s
5 17
edicts that navigable or perennial waters were held by the Crown for the pub-
lic use. 558 England differentiated between Crown ownership and public right
of navigation.559 As stated above,56° the predominant strain of English com-
547. Submerged Lands Act, ch.65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (2006)).
548. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2006)).
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. William W. Sapp et al., The Float a Boat Test: How to Use It to Advantage in This
Post-Rapanos World, 38 ENVT'L. L. REP 10439, 10439 (2008).
552. Id. at 10444.
553. Id. at 10444-47.
554. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
555. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But see, MacGrady, supra note 290, at 593 (citing
various decisions holding that the federal authority to regulate navigation is based on the:
Treaty Clause, U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 2; War Powers Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; General
Welfare Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; and Public Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
See also Ansbacher and Knetsch, supra note 336, at 339.
556. J. INST. 2.1, supra note 223.
557. Wescoat, supra note 235, at 453-54 and accompanying text.
558. J. INST. 2.1 supra note 223; Wescoat, supra note 235, at 453-54.
559. See Ball, supra note 11, at 9.
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mon law authority limited Crown ownership to lands underlying navigable,
tidally influenced waters.561
Austin does an admirable job of compiling authority showing that tidal
influence was prima facie evidence establishing a public navigational influ-
ence in common law England.562 Austin cites Mayor of Colchester v.
Brooke:5
63
"It cannot be disputed that the channel of public navigable rivers is
properly described as a common highway ... and there is no one
circumstance which more decisively affixes on a river the charac-
ter of being public and navigable in this sense of a highway than
the flow and reflow of the tide in it.
'564
Austin cites multiple common law decisions where tidal rivers were de-
termined nonnavigable by the public.565 Austin notes a later English decision
that "clarified" that navigable rivers for title purposes-and presumably for
navigation-were tidal.566
The Supreme Court of the United States language in United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co. 5 67 exhibits the sweeping navigational pow-
ers of the federal government:
The state and [private riparian landowners], alike .... hold the
[navigable] waters and the lands under them subject to the power
of Congress to control the waters for the purpose of commerce.
The power flows from the power to regulate, i.e., to "prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed." This includes the
protection of navigable waters in capacity as well as use .... The
Federal Government has domination over the water power inherent
in the flowing stream. It is liable to no one for its use or non-use.
The flow of a navigable stream is in no sense private property;
560. Id. and accompanying text.
561. See HUMPHRY W. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF WATERS: OF THE CROWN
TO THE LAND BETWEEN HIGH AND Low WATER MARK 65 (1853) ("[T]he soil of ancient navig-
able rivers, where there is a flux and reflux of the sea, belongs to the Crown .....
562. See Austin, supra note 297, at 985-86.
563. (1845) 115 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B.), 7 Q.B. 338.
564. Austin, supra note 297, at 985 (quoting Brooke, 115 Eng. Rep. at 533).
565. See id. (discussing Rex v. Montague, (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 1183 (K.B.) 1185, 4
B.&C. 598, 602, which differentiated navigational servitude between "broad and deep" and
"petty streams" affected by the tide).
566. Id. at 986 n.186 (citing Murphy v. Ryan, (1868) 2 Ir. R.-C.L. 143 (1868) (holding that
navigable title required tidal influence). Austin also goes on to note that non-tidal waters are
primafacie private, but can be deemed navigable by prescriptive right. id. at 986.
567. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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"that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of
private ownership is inconceivable." Exclusion of riparian owners
from its benefits without compensation is entirely within the Gov-
ernment's discretion.
568
Gibbons v. Ogden569 was the landmark federal navigational servitude
decision °.5 " Gibbons held that the Commerce Clause regulated interstate
navigation.57 The Court held that the federal navigational servitude man-
dated free navigation:
The power over commerce, including navigation was one of the
primary objects for which the people of America adopted their
government, and must have been contemplated in forming it.
[D]eep streams ... pass through ... almost every State in the Un-
ion, and furnish the means of exercising this right [to regulate
commerce]. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power
must be exercised whenever the subject exists. 5
72
The Gibbons Court therefore upheld a steamboat license that conflicted
with Robert Fulton's (yes-that Robert Fulton)57 3 and Robert Livington's
exclusive, statewide steamboat rights granted by the State of New York.5 7 4
Dayton states: "The monopolistic grants by the states to Fulton and [Living-
ton] did much to delay the introduction of steamboats. 575 The state allowed
them to seize any steamboat that any person attempted to operate without
their exclusive license. 76 The state even allowed them to collect a penalty.
5 71
New Jersey passed responsive protectionistic legislation for its own steam-
568. Id. at 423-24 (citations omitted).
569. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).
570. See id. at 189.
571. Id. at 190.
572. Id. at 190, 195.
573. See Pennsylvania: Robert Fulton 1765-1815, VIRTUALOGY,
http://virtualology.com/nationalstatuaryhall/robertfulton.org/ (last visited Aug. 1,2011).
574. In addition to the various clauses cited by MacGrady, supra note 284, Wilkinson cites
the Tonnage Duty Clause at U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Import-Export Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 2; Ports and Vessels Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6; and the Admiralty
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I. Wilkinson, supra note 438, at 437 n.53.
575. FRED ERVING DAYTON, STEAMBOAT DAYS (1925), available at http://www.ulster.neU
-hrmm/steamboats/dayton/prt-steam3-1m.html.
576. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 232-33 (Johnson, J., concurring).
577. Id. at 238 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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boat operators on the Hudson.578 Gibbons obtained a federal "coasting li-
cense" under which he ran his steamboat back and forth between New Jersey
and New York.579 When New York courts ruled in favor of the monopoly,
the Supreme Court was asked to intercede.5 8° Justice Marshall wrote the
opinion upholding the navigational servitude, adopting much of the argument
of Daniel Webster.581
Austin continues his thorough explication of tidal issues in navigability
in analyzing early American authority concerning the "ebb and flow test.
582
He cites text in the seminal Commentaries on American Law, written in 1832
by James Kent, later published in 1873.583 Quoting Kent, Austin wrote in
turn:
It is a [well] settled principle of the English common law, that
the right of soil owners .. .bounded by the sea, or on navigable
rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, extends to [the] high-water
mark ....
[I]n the common law sense of the term .... [the River Banne] only
[was] deemed navigable in [the portion in] which the tide ebbed
and flowed ....
[N]o rivers are deemed navigable.., except those where the tide
ebbs and flows.
5 84
Kent's restatement of English common law was consistent with early
Supreme Court authority. In The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson,85 the Su-
preme Court held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction in admiralty over a
claim for boatsman wages in the nontidal Missouri River.586 The Court held
578. Id. at 75.
579. Id. at 86.
580. Id. at 186.
581. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 186-236.
582. Austin, supra note 297, at 988.
583. Id. (discussing 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN Law 427 (O.W.
Holmes, Jr. ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 12th ed. 1929) (1828)).
584. Id. (quoting KENT, supra note 583, at 540, 545, 558).
585. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), overruled by The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitz-
huh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
586. Id. at 428.
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that federal maritime law concerned only the open ocean or tidal waters.587
The Court continued its narrow interpretation and ruled similarly in Steam-
boat Orleans v. Phoebus.58
The Court shifted and dramatically expanded course in Propeller Gene-
see Chief v. Fitzhugh.89 Chief Justice Taney pronounced the ebb and flow
test inadequate to the United States.5 90 He stated the test made sense in Eng-
land, where virtually all navigable streams were tidally influenced.5 9' He
concluded that the driving factor was navigability, not ebb and flow:
In England, therefore tide-water and navigable water [were] syn-
onymous terms, and tide-water, with a few small and unimportant
exceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistin-
guished from private ones; and [English courts] took the ebb and
flow of the tide as the test, because it was a convenient one, and
more easily determined the character of the river. Hence the estab-
lished doctrine in England, that the admiralty jurisdiction is con-
fined to the ebb and flow of the tide. In other words, it is confined
to public navigable waters.
592
Accordingly, Genessee extended admiralty-and, practically all navi-
gability tests under federal law to navigable, nontidal waters.
593
The next major decision was Daniel Ball, which addressed a federal ob-
ligation that interstate steamship operators obtain a license to ply their
trade.594 This was the logical extension of Gibbons. A steamship operator
who plied solely between Grand Haven and Grand Rapids, Michigan,
claimed the requirement did not apply to him. 595 The Supreme Court rejected
the argument, and created the susceptibility test for navigation:
[R]ivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
587. Id. at 429.
588. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 175, 184 (1837).
589. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451, 459-60 (1851).
590. Id. at 453, 455-56.
591. Id. at 454-55. But see MacGrady, supra note 284, at 570.
592. Genessee, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 455.
593. Id. at 456-58.
594. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563-66 (1870).
595. Id. at 564-65.
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be conducted in [their] customary modes of trade and travel on wa-
ter.596
The Supreme Court in United States v. Steamer Montello,597 expanded
the navigability test from Daniel Ball.598 The defense in The Montello stated
that a stretch of the Fox River in Wisconsin was so populated with rapids and
waterfalls that it was incapable of interstate commerce. 5" The Court found
that canoes had navigated the river from the time Europeans had been in the
area.6" The Court held that the mode of transport did not affect navigabili-
ty. 6°' Rather, the key was that any transport was possible. 6°
The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a
river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capa-
ble in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no
matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navig-
able in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.
603
Two years after the Montello decision, and five years after the Daniel
Ball decision, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion dis-
cussed above regarding the public trust title in Barney v. Keokuk.60 We
mention Barney here because the Court applied the Genessee test in extend-
ing the public trust far above tidal waters to a port located on the Mississippi,
in the southeastern corner of lowa.6°5
Austin emphasizes the lineage in the following passage:
Since this court [declared in Genesee] that the Great Lakes and
other navigable waters of the country, above as well as below the
tide, are, in the strictest sense, entitled to the denomination of na-
vigable waters, and amenable to admiralty jurisdiction, there
596. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
597. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
598. Id. at 441-42.
599. Id. at 439-40.
600. Id. at 440.
601. Id. at441.
602. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 441.
603. Id. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
604. Austin, supra note 297, at 970-71 (discussing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324
(1876)).
605. Barney 94 U.S. at 338-39; Austin, supra note 297, at 970-71.
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seems to be no sound reason for adhering to the old rule as to the
proprietorship of the beds and shores of such waters.6
Barney followed Genessee's conclusions that navigability drove the
English ebb and flow test.607 Austin cites various earlier Supreme Court de-
cisions that Barney relied upon, all of which "reinforce the view that naviga-
bility is the sole measure of the tidelands trust.
60 8
The navigational servitude is a federal easement that seeks to protect
public waterways.' °9 It has been interpreted to allow federal waterway im-
provements without having to compensate adjacent riparian or littoral owners
under the Takings Clause.610 In Goodman v. City of Crystal River,61' the
Unites States Middle District of Florida held that historic canoe and small
craft traffic established a federal navigational servitude granting public
access to swim with the manatees overlying the Goodmans' privately held
lands at Three Sisters Springs off of the lower Crystal River.61 2
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,6 3 and the companion decision of
Vaughn v. Vermillion Corp.,6t 4 the Supreme Court held that navigability for
public servitude purposes does not flow into waterways that are built on pri-
vate property with private funds.615 The Court noted that a servitude would
be imposed if the waterway had been navigable for title purposes.
616
606. Austin, supra note 297, at 992 n.236.
607. Barney, 94 U.S. at 338; see also Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443, 455 (1851).
608. Austin, supra note 297, at 993 n.238 (citing inter alia, Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 220 (1845), addressing the navigable tidewaters in Mobile Bay and the Mobile
River); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)) ('The Court never men-
tioned tidality, but instead framed its entire analysis in terms of navigability."). Id.
609. See Atlanta Sch. of Kayaking, Inc. v. Douglasville-Douglas Cnty. Water & Sewer
Auth., 981 F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
610. Id. at 1472 n.6 (citing Murphy v. Dep't of Natural Res., 837 F. Supp. 1217, 1221
(S.D. Fla. 1993).
611. 669 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (By way of full disclosure, I represented the
Goodmans at a later time concerning the same body of water and the same parcel.).
612. Id. at 401-02. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 n.3
(1987); J.W. Looney & Steven G. Zraick, Of Cows, Canoes, and Commerce: How the Con-
cept of Navigability Provides an Answer If You Know Which Question to Ask, 25 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 175, 188 (2002) (My favorite title goes to this piece from Dean Looney,
whom I clerked for at the University of Arkansas.); Charles A. Shafer, Public Rights in Mich-
igan's Streams: Toward a Modern Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 9, 22-24
(1999); Russell A. Austin, Jr. & Ralph W. Johnson, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on
Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 14 n.65 (1967).
613. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
614. 444 U.S. 206 (1979) (per curiam).
615. Id. at 208-10; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
616. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 186.
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Wilkinson questions the Court's analysis.617 He contrasts the naviga-
tional servitude, which holds that the federal government owes no takings
compensation when it improves waterways that are navigable by the public,
with the public trust. 618 He notes the public trust "has traditionally been used
to protect the public's right of access to navigable watercourses. '"619
Wilkinson emphasizes that "the opinions have not always precisely dis-
tinguished among the three distinctive rules that apply to watercourses [that
are] navigable for title."620
IX. SOVEREIGN LANDS BOUNDARIES
The navigable for title test combines with the various regulatory navi-
gability standards to mandate a clearly understood boundary of sovereign
lands. While Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. confirmed each state's ability to
alter the definition of, but not abrogate obligations over, sovereign sub-
merged lands, there are currently two separate Supreme Court standards for
the boundaries of sovereign lands when each state achieves statehood.62'
Under Phillips Petroleum Co.'s bare majority decision, sovereign lands ex-
tended under all tidally influenced waters.622 Under Barney, the boundary of
sovereign submerged lands under nontidal waters was delineated by actual
navigability at the time of statehood.623 So let us discuss these categories in
turn.
A. Tidal Boundaries
As stated in section VI, the Supreme Court majority in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. appears to be contrary to the weight of historical authority. Justi-
nian's Code stated that Roman law provided that "[t]he sea-shore extends to
the highest point reached by the waves in winter stormS. ' 6 24 English com-
617. See Wilkinson, supra note 438, at 463 n.162.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id. (citing (1) state right to ownership based on federal trust ownership before state-
hood; (2) public trust doctrine; and (3) navigation servitude). While he distinguishes catego-
ries that differ from Sapp, Wilkinson points out the muddying up of the different standards.
See id. at 463--64 n. 163.
621. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988); Oregon ex rel.
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 377 (1977); Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1877).
622. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476.
623. Barney, 94 U.S. at 338.
624. J. INST. 2.1.3, supra note 223.
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mon law, as early as chapter twenty-three of the Magna Carta625 and Brac-
ton,626 through Digges,62' and onto Hale;62s commentators from multiple deci-
sions show that sovereign tidelands lay under navigable waters.
Austin cites a strain of English common law authority connecting navi-
gability and tidality.629 He notes: "Where [English] authorities did not di-
rectly express a connection between navigability and tidality, they frequently
spoke in terms of navigability alone., 630 He acknowledges that "[i]t is not
clear why the common law linked navigability and tidal influence when deli-
neating submerged bed ownership. 631
Thomas Digges stated generally that the lands that Queen Elizabeth I
claimed as foreshore lay between high and low tides.632 Nonetheless, he did
not explain how to legally measure the tidal boundaries the Queen
claimed.633
Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale's De Jure Maris tried to explicate the
foreshores.634 He stated that the foreshore is overflowed by "[o]rdinary tides
or neap tides, which happen between the full and change of the moon. '"635
Cole states that one knows today that Hale's equating "neap" and "ordinary"
tides was at least ambiguous, and at most incorrect.636 He does not, however,
explain why.637
The neap tide is the weakest tide, which occurs twice per lunar cycle
when gravitational pulls of the sun and moon are at right angles to each oth-
er.638 Neap tides occur at quarter moons.639 Neap tides are the opposite of
625. See Magna Carta ch.23 (William Sharp McKechnie trans., MacMillan 1905) (1225).
626. See BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (George Woodbine ed.,
1259), available at http://ia600403.us.archive.org/Il/items/delegibusetconsuO2brac/delegibuset
consu02brac.pdf.
627. See generally Digges, supra note 287.
628. See generally Hale, supra note 301.
629. Austin, supra note 297, at 983-86; Digges, supra note 87, at 183.
630. Austin, supra note 297, at 984.
631. Id. Austin makes a factual error, however, in stating: "As a matter of policy, the
difference between navigable freshwater and navigable tidewater is difficult to see." Id. Tidal
influence occurs more commonly near the sea, but tides often affect waters well into freshwa-
ter rivers. For example, the St. Johns River in Florida is tidally influenced many miles upriver
of any salt water.
632. George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON L. REV. 165, 165-66 (1990).
633. Id. at 166.
634. Id.; see also Hale, supra note 301.
635. Hale, supra note 301, at 393.
636. Id.
637. See Cole, supra note 663, at 166.
638. All About Oceans and Seas, ENCHANTED LEARNING, http://www.enchantedlearning
.com/subjects/ocean/Tides/shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
639. Id.
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spring tides, which occur when the Earth, sun and moon align. 640 Spring
tides occur during the full moon and the new moon.64 Newton first ex-
plained our modem notion of the lunar tides in his 1687 Principia,642 two
decades too late to be of any use to Hale.
Attorney-General v. Chambers643 is the English common law decision
that is most cited for establishing the sovereign tidal boundary. 644 Nonethe-
less, the decision established a "somewhat imprecise" definition of the boun-
dary at the medium or ordinary high water mark:
645
This point of the shore, therefore, is about four days in every
week-that is, for the most part of the year-reached and covered
by the tides .... [Tihe average of these medium tides, in each
quarter of a lunar revolution during the ... year, gives the limit...
to the rights ....
[T]he line of the medium high tide between the springs and the
neaps; all land below that line is more often than not covered at
high water, and so may justly be said, in the language of LORD
HALE, to be covered by the ordinary flux of the sea. This cannot
be said of any land above that line .... W
Modem surveyors have complained of numerous problems caused by
the amorphous definition established by Philpott, Hale, and Chambers.
McGlashan et al., note that different passages in Chambers recommended
measurements over a week and over a quarter of an annual lunar revolu-
tion.647 This "could result in substantial differences in the tidal heights being
used to define the foreshore boundaries. ' '64
640. Id.
641. See Static Tides-The Equilibrium Theory, VA. INST. OF MARINE SCL,
http://web.vims.edu/physicallresearchfTCTutorial/static.htm?svr=www (last visited Aug. 1,
2011).
642. See generally IsAAc NEWTON, NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA (Percival Frost, M.A., 1863).
643. (1854) 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (ch.), 4 DE G.M. & G. 206.
644. Derek J. McGlashan, et al., Defining the Foreshore: Coastal Geomorphology and
British Law, 62 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 183, 186 (2005).
645. Id. at 187.
646. Chambers, 43 Eng. Rep. at 490-91, quoted in Gov't of S. Austl., Cadastral Survey
Guidelines, Sec. 12.3(a): Mean High Water Mark, available at http://www.landservices.sa.
gov.au/5Publications/Surveying-DraftingManuals andGuidelines/CadastralSurvey_
Guidelines/2012v2sec 12.asp
647. McGlashan, supra note 644, at 186-87.
648. Id. at 187.
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Surprisingly, the courts in the United States did not revisit the topic un-
til 1935. 649 I say surprisingly because of the presumption from the nation's
birth that all lands below the high tide mark are owned by the sovereign.
First the federal government, and then, at statehood, the respective state.
One supposes quite reasonably, that the confusion and debate over tidal
boundaries in Phillips Petroleum would not have occurred had the courts of
the United States addressed the specific tidal boundaries when announcing
repeatedly the primacy of sovereign ownership.
In 1935, the Supreme Court accepted the statistically determined mean
high tide as the modern, substantial equivalent of the ordinary or medium
high water mark:
In view of the definition of the mean high tide, as given by the
United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, that "[m]ean high water
at any place is the average height of all the high waters at that
place over a considerable period of time," and the further observa-
tion that "from theoretical considerations of an astronomical cha-
racter" there should be "a periodic variation in the rise of water
above sea level having a period of 18.6 years," the Court of Ap-
peals directed that in order to ascertain the mean high tide line
with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidel-
ands, such as those here .... We find no error in that instruc-
650tion.
As Cole notes, this remains the general standard in the United States for
determining the mean high tide or medium high water line.65'
Cole states that Spanish and Mexican grants confirmed in the American
State Papers have been held to tidal limits that differ from the medium high
tide or water line:
In Spanish and Mexican grants, for example, it has been held that
the limit of ownership is controlled by old Spanish law contained
in Las Siete Partidas, written in the thirteenth century and tracking
the Roman Institutes of Justinian, written in the sixth century. A
translation of a portion of that code reads as follows: "The sea-
shores, that is, the shore as far as the waves go at the furthest, was
649. See generally Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
650. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
651. Cole, supra note 632, at 167.
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considered to belong to all men.... The sea shore extends as far as
the greatest winter flood runs up." 652
Borax retains great significance in states, such as Florida, which adopt
the mean high water line as the tidal boundary.653 Phillips Petroleum's sur-
prising holding that tidality trumps navigability limits Borax's impact in oth-
er coastal states.654 We should note that a minority of coastal states follow
the Massachusetts rule-that state and several others who follow it still use
the Colonial Ordinance Standard.655 The 1648 Ordinance set the private
boundary at the low water mark but no more than one hundred rods (1650
feet) beyond the high water mark.656 Additionally, Louisiana follows the
Roman civil law by using the "highest winter tide" as the boundary. Louisi-
ana is not limited by navigability. 657 Hawaii's laws are unique. Its upper
reach of the wash of the waves standard is not based on civil law. Rather, it
is allegedly derived by royal patents from King Kamehameha V.
658
B. Non-Tidal Water Boundaries
The sovereign submerged boundaries are often more difficult to deter-
mine in nontidally influenced waters. 659 Borax confirms that the 18.6 year
tidal "epoch" can establish mean high tide or mean high water. 660 At worst,
this requires a surveyor to determine mean high tide by extrapolating from
the two closest tidal datum stations. This becomes trickier in inland tidally
influenced waters, but the surveyor still has the datum stations as some, al-
652. Cole, supra note 632, at 167 (quoting J. INST. 2.1.8, supra note 223) (citing Luttes v.
State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 176 (Tex. 1958)).
653. Cole, supra note 632, at 167-68.
654. Id. at 169-70.
655. Id. at 4.
656. BOOK OF GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES, LIBERTIES COMMON (1648), reprinted in
SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETrS 1641-1691, at 41,
s.2, as cited in M. Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seventeenth Century Colonial Or-
dinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42 MAINE L. REV. 115 (1990).
657. Cole, supra note 632, at 168.
658. Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (citing Keelilikolani v. Robin-
son, 2 Haw. 514 (Haw. 1862)). The upper reach of the waves rule has been declared unconsti-
tutional in at least one federal decision, Sotomura v. Cnty. Of Haw., 460 F.Supp. 473 (D. Haw.
1978), which held that the high water mark was the actual, historical shoreline boundary, but
Hawaii continues to follow it.
659. FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW 707 (1980).
660. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. L.A., 296 U.S. 10, 27 (1935).
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beit attenuated, baseline. Conversely, navigability title in non-tidally influ-
enced waters requires a much trickier analysis66'
The Supreme Court in Howard v. Ingersoll662 addressed the proper loca-
tion of the riverline border between Georgia and Alabama.663 The 1802
Treaty of Cession between the United States and Georgia, and treaty lan-
guage ceding Alabama, stated the border lay along "the western bank of the
Chattahoochee River. ' ' 664 The majority opinion in Howard held that the
"bank" was that water line on the high banks "where the action of the water
has permanently marked itself upon the soil." 665 Justice Curtis' concurring
opinion stated that the bank is neither the high nor low water mark.666 Ra-
ther, it is the clearest line of water on the bank.667 Justice Nelson dissented,
and Justice Grier joined.668 Nelson stated that the higher bank precluded
Alabama's use of the waters of the river for hydraulic purposes. 669 The dis-
sent raised further concerns that high water would extend the river banks by
a mile inland from a low water mark. 60
Even though no other justices joined in Curtis' concurrence, it "has
been the one [test] most frequently cited:" 67'
This line is to be found by examining the bed and banks, and as-
certaining where the presence and action of water are so common
and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark
upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks,
in respect to vegetation, as well as in respect to the nature of the
soil itself. Whether this line ... will be found above or below, or
at a middle stage of water, must depend upon the character of the
stream.
672
661. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 659, at 708.
662. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381 (1851).
663. Id. at 397-98.
664. Id. at413.
665. Id. at 417.
666. Id. at 427 (Curtis, J., concurring).
667. See Howard, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 427 (Curtis, J., concurring).
668. Id. at 419, 426 (Nelson, J. & Grier, J., dissenting).
669. Id. at 423 (Nelson, J., dissenting). David Guest posits that the term "appears to refer
to water-powered mills." David Guest, The Ordinary High Water Boundary on Freshwater
Lakes and Streams: Origin, Theory, and Constitutional Restrictions, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 205, 211 n.31 (1991).
670. Howard, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 419 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
671. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 659, at 709.
672. Howard, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 427 (Curtis, J., concurring).
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While Curtis did not use the term, the non-tidal boundary is called today
the Ordinary High Water Line, or the OHWL.673 Maloney notes that "the
determination of the OHWL is as confused as it is important., 674 Ansbacher
and Knetsch note that non-tidal waters do not flow cyclically, as do tidal
waters.675 Surveyors must use various physical characteristics to determine
the OHWL. 676 These include "water level records, vegetation evidence,
geomorphological evidence, and soil classification. 677
The most common definition used is from the Minnesota Supreme
Court:
[The] high-water mark, as a line between a riparian owner and the
public, is to be determined by examining the bed and banks, and
ascertaining where the presence and action of the water are so
common and usual, and so long-continued in all ordinary years, as
to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of
the banks, in respect to vegetation, as well as respects the nature
of the soil itself.6 7X
One comprehends readily that the Carpenter test works well where
streams are well defined. One comprehends just as readily that the test does
not adapt well in the limpid swamps conditions described by Justice Nelson's
dissent in Howard. We see below, in Section X, that it does not suit well the
conditions of much of inland Florida.
X. RIPARIAN AND LITTrORAL RIGHTS
The property lying alongside a navigable waterbody carries appurtenant
rights to that waterbody. 679 These rights are known as "riparian" when the
water is riverine, and "littoral" when the waterbody is a pond, lake or sea.68 °
Justice Field's majority opinion in Illinois Central described riparian rights:
The riparian proprietor is entitled, among other rights, as held
in Yates v. Milwaukee, to access to the navigable part of the water
on the front of which lies his land, and for that purpose to make a
673. See MALONEY ET AL., supra note 659, at 707.
674. Id.
675. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 362.
676. Id.
677. Id. (citations omitted).
678. Tilden v. Smith, 113 So. 708, 712 (Fla. 1927) (quoting Carpenter v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
58 N.W. 295, 297 (Minn. 1894)).
679. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445 (1892).
680. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018, 1441 (9th ed. 2009).
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landing, wharf or pier for his own use or for the use of the public,
subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may
prescribe for the protection of the rights of the public. In the case
cited the court held that this riparian right was property and valua-
ble; and though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights
of the public, it could not be arbitrarily or capriciously impaired.
681
Justice Peckham stated in St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul
Water Commissioners:
682
The rights which thus belong to ... [a] riparian owner of the abut-
ting premises [are] valuable property rights, of which he could not
be divested without consent, except by due process of law, and, if
for public purposes, upon just compensation. 683
Justice Peckham noted in Weems Steamboat Co. of Baltimore v.
People's Steamboat Co.6" that each state establishes the specific riparian
rights and obligations in its jurisdiction: "The rights of a riparian owner
upon a navigable stream in this country are governed by the law of the State
in which the stream is situated. '685
Nonetheless, "These rights are subject to the paramount public right of
navigation. 6 86  Weems reiterated that a private riparian has "property the
exclusive use of which the owner can only be deprived in accordance with
established law, and if necessary that it or any part of it be taken for the pub-
lic use due compensation must be made.,
687
As stated above, riparian or littoral rights are not unconditional. Justice
Gray stated in Shively that the riparian owner must utilize his or her rights
consistently with the public rights below the high water mark:
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as
settled that the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, be-
low ordinary high water mark, is in the King, except so far as an
individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express
grant, or by prescription or usage ....
681. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 445-46 (citation omitted).
682. 168 U.S. 349 (1897).
683. Id. at 368 (quoting Brisbine v. St. Paul & Sioux City R.R. Co., 23 Minn. 114, 130
(1876)).
684. 214 U.S. 345 (1909).
685. Id. at 355.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 355-56.
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By the law of England, also, every building or wharf erected,
without license, below high water mark, where the soil is the
King's, is a purpresture, and may, at the suit of the King, either be
demolished, or be seized and rented for his benefit, if it is not a
nuisance to navigation.688
We cited multiple early Supreme Court decisions above, in Section II-
C, that held a state cannot impair the obligations of contract by repeal or oth-
er substantial impingement on private rights. This includes a government's
act that impairs vested property rights held under government grant or char-
ter.689 Nonetheless, riparian rights are like any other in being held subject to
the government's policy power and right of eminent domain.
690
XI. OWNERSHIP OF LANDS INFLUENCED BY ACCRETION, AVULSION,
RELICTION, AND EROSION
We discuss accretion in Section IV, above. Rome generally allowed ri-
parian owners to take accretions that were added gradually to their parcels.69 1
Common law is the same today.692 Gradual additions of soils due to such
actions as imperceptible shifting of stream channels vest the additional soils
to the benefited riparian parcel.693 Conversely, erosion changes boundaries
in favor of the sovereign submerged lands.694 Nonetheless, Sax wrote a re-
cent article that explicated thoroughly the development of the law of accre-
tion, together with the law of avulsion.695 Avulsion occurs when sudden or
rapid events cause soils to be deposited on riparian parcels.69 6 Avulsion gen-
erally does not alter boundaries. 697 Sax questions the duality.698 He says it
688. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894).
689. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 90 (1810).
690. See generally Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
691. See generally Deveney, supra note 230.
692. See, e.g., Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376 (1990).
693. Id. at 404.
694. Id.
695. Sax, supra note 266, at 305.
696. Id. at 306 n.2.
697. Id. at 306.
698. Id. at 307.
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does not accord with actual hydrogeological changes. 6' He adds that the
history of law on accretion and avulsion "goes back a long way, and is more
than a little obscure.
' 70°
Modern English common law acknowledges the effects of accretion and
avulsion. For example, Scratton v. Brown7 ' held that the coastal foreshore is
a "moveable freehold. ' '4 The boundary shifts with gradual and impercepti-
ble accretion.7 °3 Conversely, sudden physical shifts do not generally alter the
legal boundary. 70 England delineates the impacts of public and artificial
alterations similarly. Generally, sudden changes do not alter legal bounda-
ries, while gradual and imperceptible changes do so.
701
Sax shows that English law evolved gradually. In an accretive manner,
if you will. Bracton spoke of shoreline changes as he did most of water law.
He lifted his analysis from Justinian:
Alluvion is an imperceptible increment which is added so gradual-
ly that you cannot perceive [what] the increase is from one mo-
ment of time to another. Indeed, though you fix your gaze on it for
a whole day, feebleness of human sight cannot distinguish such
subtle increases as may be seen in a gourd and other such things.
7 0 6
Nonetheless, Sax tells us that Bracton did not affect "the course of the
English law governing shorelines. ''70 7 Rather, the law developed in three
708fourteenth century court decisions.
The Eyre of Nottingham7°9 addressed an inland, apparently nontidal riv-
er. I say apparently so, because one lord had a riparian parcel, and the other,
699. Id. He states, for example, one of the reasons given for avulsion not changing boun-
daries is that it is typically transient. Sax, supra note 266, at 307. Sax counters: "Notably,
sudden changes are by no means always short-term .... " Id.
700. Id. at 308.
701. (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 1140 (KB.) 4 B. & C. 485.
702. Id. at 1141-43.
703. Id. at 1144.
704. See Attorney-Gen. v. Reeve, (1885) 1 T.L.R. 675.
705. See Brighton and Hove Gen. Gas Co. v. Hove Bungalows Ltd., (1924) 1 Ch. 372,
390.
706. 2 BRACTON, supra note 278, at 44. Sax states this parallels JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTE
OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.20, which states: "An alluvial accretion is one which goes on so gradually
that you cannot tell at any one moment what is being added." Sax, supra, note 266, at 311
n.22.
707. Sax, supra note 266, at 314 (citing Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190
(K.B.), which stated that Bracton's passage "plainly appears to have been taken from Justi-
nian" but noted that Bracton was not cited in any reported decision). Id. at 314 n.38.
708. Id. at314.
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a facing riparian parcel and the entire river bottom. The river widened, sub-
merging some of the lands of the first landowner.71° The court held that the
bottom owner's submerged parcel enlarged where the others' riparian parcel
submerged."' The decision was dictated by the imperceptible nature of the
submergence. 12 The court stated in dicta that no legal boundaries would
have shifted if the submergence occurred by a "quick increase."
71 3
Sax asks reasonable questions at this point. First, why did the court dis-
tinguish between avulsion and accretion?714 It appears the court allowed
gradual change to alter the legal boundary because:
[If no one can determine where the original boundary was, there
is no way to ascertain what the asserted loser has lost, and there-
fore the existing water boundary should be taken as the property
line, even though in retrospect it is clear that the river is not where
it once was.715
If we take the Nottingham decision at its face value, then it seems inap-
plicable to modem law. Granted, it is generally more difficult to ascertain
nontidal than tidal boundaries. That concession is made to account for the
likely nontidal water in Nottingham because a private party owned the river
bottom.716 That should not affect the rationale. Regardless, modem parcels
are far more likely to be platted, surveyed, or otherwise delineated. Accor-
dingly, the primary rationale of Nottingham appears inapposite to modem
law.
Sax raises a second question that stems from the first. Why would a
sudden river expansion, such as a flood, not alter the legal boundary?7 .7 He
says that two possibilities present themselves.71 8 First, the suddenness might
make it easier to ascertain the original boundary.719 If so, I raise the same
question as in the prior paragraph. Sax's second possibility is because floods
and storms effect typically transient change.72' Regardless, Sax states: "I
709. Sax, supra note 266, at 357-58 (citing The Eyre of Nottingham Case, (1348) 22 Lib.
Ass. P1. 93).
710. Id. at 358.
711. Id.
712. Id. at 357-58 (citing The Eyre of Nottingham Case, (1348) 22 Lib. Ass. P1. 93).
713. Id. at 358.
714. Sax, supra note 266, at 315-16.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 357-58 (citing The Eyre of Nottingham Case, (1348) 22 Lib. Ass. P1. 93)).
717. Id. at 316.
718. Sax, supra note 266, at 316.
719. Id.
720. Id.
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have found no such expressed justification for the avulsion rule in any of the
early literature."72 '
Sax refers us as well to Blackstone's and Moore's citations of the Abbot
of Ramsey's Case.72 2 The Abbot of Ramsey's decision was in 1371 .723 The
Abbot defended charges that he appropriated submerged lands without per-
mission of the Crown.724 The Abbot defended by saying the lands in dispute
"sometimes shrinks, through the influx of the sea, and at other times is en-
larged by the flowing out of the sea, and so he says he holds [the] marsh in
that manner. 725 The jury agreed.726
The Abbot of Petersborough's Case was filed before Ramsey's, but not
decided until 1373.727 Petersborough argued that "local custom" justified
boundary shifts with the "inflows and outflows of the sea. ' '728 The jury,
again, agreed.72 9
Sax emphasizes that neither reported decision gave any rationale for ap-
plying the rule that accretion alters legal boundaries. 730 He notes that 14th
century lawyers "no doubt were aware" of Justinian, but the reports do not
cite Roman law either.13 ' He points us to Lord Hale's exegis of Petersbo-
rough three centuries later.732 Hale distinguished between the incremental
change here and "sudden reliction. 733  He emphasized further that the
changes were "secret and gradual increases of the land," which "by custom
... becomes a perquisite to the land. 734
Hale's explanation baffles Sax:
Hale's brief comment raised a number of issues that engaged and
puzzled later commentators. Was it important that this was a case
of accretion rather than reliction, or only that it was not a "sudden"
reliction? What is the significance of his mention of prescription,
and does it mean anything other than longstanding use? Why does
721. Id.
722. Id. at 315 n.41, 316-19, 363-67 (full text at Appendix D) (citations omitted).
723. Sax, supra note 266, at 316; MOORE, supra note 266, at 158-59 (citations omitted).
724. MOORE, supra note 266, at 158-59.
725. Sax, supra note 266, at 364.
726. Id. at 366-67.
727. ld. at 316.
728. Id. at 318,359-60.
729. See id. at 361-62.
730. Sax, supra note 266, at 319.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id. at319-20.
734. Id. at 319.
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he speak of the increases as being "secret" as well as gradual?
And what does it take, legally, for accretions to become a "perqui-
site" (what we call an appurtenance) to the adjoining upland?7 31
Sax concludes that it likely "seemed natural" for shorefront owners to
use accretions for grazing, agriculture and other uses.736 He adds that both of
Abbots' arguments regarding the "flux and ebb of the sea" acknowledged
"that their clients were sometimes losers of land as well as gainers."
737
Sax points us to two treatises in the seventeenth century that expounded
on accretion law. 738 Of course, there is Hale.739 First, however, came Robert
Callis' 1622 treatise, which is known as Callis on Sewers.74° Sax says Callis'
analysis is particularly cogent, because he was not writing a treatise.7 4 ' Ra-
ther, he was trying to address inconsistencies in the law because he sought
"to come up with a coherent theory to use in a pending case where he was
counsel. 742
Callis cited decisions that refused to give littoral owners property where
the sea relicted quickly. 74 3 He contrasted these with older cases that were
decided in favor of the landowner.74 Key among the latter was Digges v.
Hamond.745 Sax acknowledged Moore's disdain for Digges:
According to Moore, the Digges case was part of an effort by Eliz-
abeth and later James I-and according to Moore continued into
modem times by the English government-to claim public title to
the foreshore (land between high and low tide). Digges' theory
was that no private title in the foreshore could be obtained except
by explicit grant from the Crown. Moore says that theory was re-
jected in Digges' case, in accord with the precedent set in the Ab-
bot of Ramsey's case. 74 6
735. Sax, supra note 266, at 319-20, except that Sax explains at 320, n.72 that an "appur-
tenance is something that has become part and parcel of the land."
736. Id. at 320.
737. Id.
738. See id. at 321
739. Id.; Hale, supra note 301.
740. Sax, supra note 266, at 321 (citing ROBERT CALLIS, THE READING OF THE FAMOUS
AND LEARNED ROBERT CALLIS, ESQ., UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS, 23 HEN. VIII c.5, I (Wil-
liam John Broderip ed., London, John, Butterworth & Son, 4th ed., 1824) (1622)).
741. Id. at 321.
742. Id. (discussing CALLIS, supra note 740).
743. See id. at 322 (citations omitted).
744. Id. at 322-23.
745. Sax, supra note 266, at 322; see also MOORE, supra note 266, at 218-24.
746. Sax, supra note 266, at 322-23 n.88 (citations omitted).
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Callis cites the following factors that he believed caused the courts to
rule one way or the other in such cases:
[If the decrease of the sea be by little and unperceivable means,
and grown only in long tract of time, whereby some addition is
made to the frontagers' grounds, these ... may be appertain to the
subject; ... but lands left to the shore by great quantities, and by a
sudden occasion and perceivable means, accrue wholly [that is,
remain in the title of] the King.747
Sax reasons that a gradual change did not alter boundaries per se. 748 Ra-
ther, Callis treated that factor as evidence of a prescriptive use. 749 Callis'
contrasting treatment of rapid changes as leaving boundaries unchanged "as-
sured that large tracts of strategic land at the nation's frontier would not be
lost to the sovereign., 750 This, of course, is consistent with Digges' goal of
protecting the shores for mooring and navigation by the Royal Navy. 5
Hale similarly focused on accretion that crept so slowly that one did not
know where the original boundaries lay.752 Hale also followed Digges in
worrying about the impact of shoreline shifts on access for the Crown's na-
val power.753
Sax makes as reasonable an analysis as one can from the doctrine of ac-
cretion through Callis and Lord Hale.754 Except where a shift was so sudden
that it might jeopardize the Crown's strategic interests, one looked at several
factors. 755 Was the original boundary known or knowable? 756 Did the legal
boundary change effectively acknowledge that in the course of time, moved
land attaches to the new parcel?
7 7
The last English authority of note on point before our independence was
Blackstone.7 8 As Sax notes: "Nowadays, one who wants to know about the
747. Id. at 324 (quoting CALLIS, supra note 740, at 65).
748. See id. at 324.
749. Id. at 324-25.
750. Id. at 325.
751. See MOORE, supra note 266, at 635 n. 19.
752. Hale, supra note 301, at 380. Hale distinguished alluvial deposits, which could shift
boundaries, with reliction, which Hale said did not. Id. at 397. Sax says only Hale, and per-
haps Bracton, have made this argument. Sax, supra note 266, at 326-27.
753. Hale, supra note 301, at 397-99.
754. See Sax, supra note 266, at 328-30.
755. See id. at 330.
756. See id. at 329.
757. Id. at 330.
758. See generally WIlLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1825).
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English common law rules that shaped American law looks first to (and often
not much beyond) Blackstone's Commentaries."'759 Sax discusses that Black-
stone over-generalized and was often wrong, or at least misleading, on the
law of alluvial deposits.
76°
Blackstone's Commentaries stated the following regarding alluvial de-
posits:
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the
washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to make terrafirma; or
by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks back below the usual wa-
termark; in these cases the law is held to be, that if this gain be by
little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to
the owner of the land adjoining. (o) For de minimis non curat lex:
and, besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of
the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this is possible gain is there-
fore a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss.
But if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and considerable, in
this case it belongs to the king: for as the king is lord of the sea,
and so owner of the soil while it is covered with water, it is but
reasonable he should have the soil, when the water has left it dry.
(p) So that the quantity of ground gained, and the time during
which it is gaining, are what makes it either the king's, or the sub-
ject's property. In the same manner if a river, running between
two lordships, by degrees gains upon the one, and thereby leaves
the other dry; the owner who loses his ground thus imperceptibly
has no remedy: but if the course of the river be changed by a sud-
den and violent flood, or other hasty means, and thereby a man
loses his ground, he shall have what the river has left in any other
place, as a recompense for this sudden loss. (q) And this law of al-
luvions and derilictions, with regard to the rivers, is nearly the
same in the imperial law; (r) from whence indeed those our deter-
minations seem to have been drawn and adopted: but we our-
selves, as islanders, have applied them to marine increases; and
have given our sovereign the prerogative he enjoys, as well upon
the particular reasons before-mentioned, as upon this other general
ground of prerogative, which was formerly remarked, (s) that
whatever hath no other owner is vested by law in the king.
7 6 1
759. Sax, supra note 266, at 308.
760. See id. at 309-10.
761. Id. at 308-09.
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Sax raises several interesting questions regarding Blackstone's state-
ments. Should the amount of alluvial deposits matter? 762 If so, why? If re-
ciprocality justifies the shifting of boundaries by accretion, why not by avul-
sion?763 Where do rising sea levels fit on the continuum? " The last ques-
tion is a modem one, but the text above in this section shows why Sax
throws up his hands: "The more one thinks about these matters, and about
Blackstone's famous passage, the more curious this little corner of the law
becomes."765
While it arose after American Independence, The King v. Lord Yarbo-
rough766 bears mention. The trial judge held that "imperceptible" change for
purposes of boundary change meant that which was not perceptible as it oc-
curled.767 The de minimus rule would scarcely be applied, as the lands in
dispute totaled over 400 acres.768 On appeal to the House of Lords,769 the
landowner won again. 77' The rationale on appeal was that even a sliver of
upland becomes valuable for agriculture, while the Crown loses nothing of
value. 7
Sax emphasizes a key to historic accretion case law, which Yarborough
exemplifies. He states that the primary value that shoreland had for the upl-
and owner "was as pasturage, not for its water access. ' 772 Access is more of
a modem concern to the littoral or riparian owner.
773
The nineteenth century featured one treatise and significant case law.
Angell's work in 1826 treated gradual and imperceptible accretion and relic-
tion the same. 7 The legal boundary generally shifted.775 Sax notes that An-
gell tracked Yarborough in emphasizing the imperceptibility of change, and
not the lost boundary.776 While Angell adopted Blackstone's avulsion posi-
tion, Sax points out: 1. Angell did not explain why avulsion and accretion
762. Sax, supra note 266, at 310.
763. Id.
764. Id. at310-11.
765. Id. at311.
766. (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 668 (K.B.) 3 B. & C. 91.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Gifford v. Lord Yarborough, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 1024 (H.L.), 5 Bing. 163.
770. Id.
771. Id. at 1025.
772. Sax, supra note 266, at 333 n.148.
773. See id.
774. See generally JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF (Boston, Harrison Gray 1826).
775. See id. at vi.
776. Sax, supra note 266, at 339-41.
2011]
89
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAWREVIEW
should be treated differently; and 2. Why the reciprocity rationale supporting
accretion could, or should, not also apply to avulsion.777
Sax also asks why Angell and others did not discuss the lost boundary
rationale for accretion.778 Sax suggests that they were satisfied by the fair-
ness of adding accretions to littoral or riparian owners, and the general lack
of harm to the sovereign.779 I suggest another possibility. By the nineteenth
century, surveyors were generally able to better delineate boundaries. Even
in the American frontier, government surveyor field notes demonstrate rather
thorough boundary determinations.78°
The nineteenth century Supreme Court handled several matters involv-
ing alluvian deposits. Sax emphasizes a significant trend:
As one turns to the modem era and to the American cases, several
features stand out. First, superficial appearances suggest that the
old rules developed in England (and in the Roman law) are simply
being taken up and applied to contemporary cases. The cases
faithfully cite the standard rationales, such as reciprocity and de
minimis; quote familiar passages from Lord Hale, Bracton, Black-
stone, and Lord Yarborough's case; and duly cite the Institutes of
Justinian and Gaius. But closer examination reveals two striking
departures: the definition of what constitutes accretion, as con-
trasted with avulsion, has dramatically expanded; and a new justi-
fication for applying the accretion rule, maintaining water access
for littoral/riparian owners, has become central.78'
Three nineteenth century decisions combined to reduce dramatically the
scope of avulsion. Parenthetically, this is probably beneficial in large part
due to the long-term unwillingness of authorities to even'address avulsion,
let alone explain why permanent changes wrought by avulsion should be
treated differently from accretion.
Nebraska v. Iowa782 acknowledged that the Missouri River's channels
and banks shifted often, quickly, and dramatically.783 Regardless, the Court
777. Id. at 340. Sax points out that Hall, albeit English, was more thorough than Angell.
id. at 341 (citing MATTHEW HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES
OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM (1830)). Nonetheless, Hall "fails to tackle
the avulsion doctrine." Sax, supra note 266, at 343.
778. Id. at 341.
779. Id.
780. See Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 371-72 n.262-63.
781. Sax, supra note 266, at 343 (emphasis added).
782. 143 U.S. 359 (1892).
783. id. at 367.
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held that accretion applied to such changes in the banks. 784 Jefferis v. East
Omaha Land Co.75 loosened the lost boundary, imperceptibility and de mi-
nimis standards so much in another Missouri River litigation that Sax con-
cludes: "Apparently, only a single sudden event (like a hurricane, or a river
breaking through an oxbow) would now qualify as avulsion.'786 He notes
that the Nebraska and Jefferis decisions focused not on the rapidity of the
shift, but on simply following the soil.
7 87
The most seemingly significant of the three nineteenth century deci-
sions as applied to STBR was County of St. Clair v. Lovingston.788 The St.
Clair Court noted the majority rule that a riparian or littoral owner should not
take title to alluvial deposits where the owner constructed improvements that
caused or aided the accretion.7 89 Nonetheless, the Court held that the accre-
tion attaches to a riparian or littoral parcel where third parties constructed the
improvements or otherwise created the artificial cause leading to the accre-
tion.7 90 The county asserted that alluvial deposits that originated with up-
stream public improvements were not accretion.79' The Supreme Court held
that additions from the river constituted alluvial deposits regardless of their
source.792
Three significant holdings by the Supreme Court in the twentieth cen-
tury addressed alluvial deposits. In the first, Hughes v. Washington,793 the
Court addressed a Washington holding that vested alluvial deposits in the
state.794 The majority held that riparian lands must generally be allowed to
retain water frontage after the banks change because "[a]ny other rule would
leave riparian owners continually in danger of losing the access to water
which is often the most valuable feature of their property. 795
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes became especially sig-
nificant again in STBR:
784. Id. at 369-70.
785. 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
786. Sax, supra note 266, at 345 (emphasis added).
787. Id. at 346 n.229-30 and accompanying text.
788. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
789. Id. at 52.
790. Id. at61-62.
791. Id. at 53.
792. Id. at 65.
793. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
794. Id. at 291 (citing Hughes v. State, 410 P.2d 20 (1966)).
795. Id. at 293. Hughes applied federal law to address accretions on lands conveyed by
the federal government prior to Washington's statehood. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. at 378, calls that portion of the holding into question.
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There can be little doubt about the impact of that change upon
Mrs. Hughes: The beach she had every reason to regard as hers
was declared by the state court to be in the public domain. Of
course the court did not conceive of this action as a taking. As is
so often the case when a State exercises its power to make law, or
to regulate, or to pursue a public project, pre-existing property in-
terests were impaired here without any calculated decision to de-
prive anyone of what he once owned. But the Constitution meas-
ures a taking of property not by what a State says, or by what it in-
tends, but by what it does. Although the State in this case made no
attempt to take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved
the same result by effecting a retroactive transformation of private
into public property-without paying for the privilege of doing so.
Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than
through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended
than when it is deliberate, I join in reversing the judgment.796
The second major decision was Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona.797 The ri-
parian's lands submerged gradually into the Colorado River.798 They became
the state's as a result.799 The lands reemerged rapidly due to rechannelization
resulting from an upstream dam.8°° The Supreme Court applied federal
common law because the riparian's title came by federal grant.80 1 It applied
"just principles" to treat the reemerged land as accretion vesting in the ripa-
rian upland.80 2
The final decision was Corvallis, which we discussed above.80 3 Corval-
lis is significant as to alluvial deposits, because it reversed Bonelli regarding
796. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 297-98 (Stewart, J., concurring);
Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public
that, when they are once decided, they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions
become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change. Legis-
latures may alter or change their laws, without injury, as they affect the future only; but where
courts vacillate, and overrule their own decisions on the construction of statutes affecting the
title to real property, their decisions are retrospective and may affect titles [that were] pur-
chased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once
decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change.
Minnesota Co. v. Nat'l Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 332, 334 (1865).
797. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
798. Id. at316.
799. Id.
800. Id. at 316 n.2.
801. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 325.
802. Id. at 330.
803. See supra Part VI, notes 529, 565, 650 and accompanying text. The BLM also
represents that the modem trends support a strong presumption in favor of accretion. See
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
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the applicable body of law.8°4 As discussed above, Corvallis reestablished
the right of each state to apply its own public trust law after statehood, pro-
vided that the state does not wholly abrogate its public trust obligation.85
Sax supports a strong presumption in favor of accretion.8°6 It preserves
the high water line, which accentuates water access rights for property own-
ers and a predictable public right waterward of the ambulatory boundary.80 7
He concludes:
[The] presumption [in favor of accretion] has largely relegated the
avulsion rule to a minor role, except where there is a shift of a riv-
er into a new channel or the change is temporary and of very short
duration, as with flood waters, in which cases retaining the origi-
nal boundary is appropriate.
808
Sax emphasizes that the beach "is neither wholly public nor wholly pri-
vate," and the distinction between avulsion and accretion does not address
sea level rise.8 °" He believes the primary goal should be "maintaining water
adjacency for riparian/littoral landowners and assuring public use of overly-
ing water (and some part of the foreshore)."' 0 He cites to STBR, as it was
still before the Supreme Court, in suggesting that the identity of the entity or
person causing the change should be a factor.8 '
XII. FLORIDA
An Act of Congress on March 3, 1845, admitted Florida as a state.812
Along, with Iowa, the state was "admitted into the Union on equal footing
with the original states, in all respects whatsoever.' '81 3 One further provision
SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 165 (1973). Its Cadastral Manual con-
tains a section entitled Special Surveys-Water Boundaries, which cites decisions from Pol-
lard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1844), in directing procedures for surveying of shores
and waterbodies. At section 7-73, the manual states: "An avulsive change cannot be assumed
without positive evidence."
804. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 382
(1977).
805. See generally id.
806. Sax, supra note 266, at 350-351.
807. Id.
808. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
809. Id. at 356.
810. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
811. Sax, supra note 266, at 354.
812. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch.75, § 1, 5 Stat. 742, 742.
813. Id.
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of note existed in the Act; section seven stated in pertinent part that the two
states were "admitted into the Union on the express condition that they shall
never interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands lying within
them. 814
A. Colonial Background
Statehood did not begin Florida's long, storied, and tortuous water law
history. We discussed Spanish colonial water law above. Spain first colo-
nized Florida from 1565 to 1763.815 Pedro Menendez de Aviles landed near
St. Augustine with soldiers and colonists.816 After slaughtering Jean Ri-
bault's French force from Fort Caroline (modern Jacksonville), Menendez
established a colonial town in St. Augustine.817 After establishing forts and
missions throughout the region, the Spanish retrenched in the face of disease,
as well as Native American and British pressures.818 (The Native Americans
and British looted and burned most of the Spanish holdings except for the
fort in St. Augustine at one time or another. 81 9) Britain exchanged Havana
for Spanish Florida at the conclusion of those nations Seven Years' War in
1763.820
Great Britain occupied the region from 1763 to 1783.821 The British
split Florida into East and West Florida at the Chatahoochee and Apalachico-
la Rivers.822 The capital of East Florida was St. Augustine.823 The capital of
West Florida was Pensacola.824 The British surveyed the coast and be-
friended Creek natives who moved into the region.825 The British named the
immigrants "Seminoles."826
814. Id. at 743.
815. John Worth, Chronology of Spanish Florida, UNIV. OF W. FLA., http://www.uwf.edu/
jworth/spanfla-chron.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
816. John Worth, The Settlement of Spanish Florida, UNIV. OF W. FLA., http://www.uwf.
edu/jworth/spanfla_settlement.htm (last visited Aug. 1,2011).
817. Id.
818. See Worth, supra note 816.
819. See id.
820. Id.
821. Apalachicola Land & Dev, Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 522 (Fla. 1923).
822. Id. at 522-23.
823. Florida's Historic Places: Tallahassee, EXPLORING FLA., http://fcit.usf.edu/florida/
lessons/tallahassee/tallahassee.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
824. Id.
825. See Philip C. Hawkins, Creek Schism: Seminole Genesis Revisited 8 (Apr. 6, 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of South Florida) available at http://scholar
commons.usf.edu/etd/2004/.
826. Id. at 28.
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British grants during the twenty year reign presented early versions of
Florida's swamp sale regime. For example, the 1763 Treaty of Paris was
implemented by allowing Spanish settlers to stay or to sell and to leave with-
in eighteen months. The Crown disallowed a putative sale of over ten mil-
lion acres from emigrating Spaniards to Jesse Fish and John Gordon. 827 The
British Crown refused to believe that that much land had been in private
Spanish hands.828  After all, the British and their allies, the Creeks, had
pushed the Spanish back from the frontier. The British knew that precious
little Spanish land remained outside of garrisons. For a frame of reference,
modern Florida totals nearly thirty-eight million acres.829
Many British and Tories moved to Florida after the Revolution com-
menced.830 Dr. Andrew Turnbull "established at New Smyrna 1400 Minor-
827. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 261, at 363-64 (quoting 1 The Historical Records
Survey, Div. of Cmty Service Programs, Work Products Administration, Spanish Land Grants
in Florida xxxii (Nov. 1940), http://floridamemory.comcollections/spanishlandgrants/. The
WPA publication contains a thorough analysis of the British Grant system. Id. at xiv-xviii.
Robert Gold wrote an article on Fish that said Fish's claim was "only" 4,500,000 acres on
both sides of the St. Johns River. Robert L. Gold, That Infamous Floridian, Jesse Fish, 52
FLA. HIST. Q. 1, 8 (1973). Gold refers to Fish's, and his partner Gordon's, purchase in quotes,
and quotes one officer who "observed that their titles to the site seemed 'far from indubita-
ble."' Id. Despite Gold's efforts to rehabilitate Fish, Gold states: "Generally, he emerges as a
sinister figure, an insidious schemer [who was] characteristically involved in contraband
commerce, sedition, and illicit land transactions." Id. at 1.
Of all sources, the Catholic Church takes up Fish's cause. See 3 THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 239 (1914). The British took from the Church as
well when it took from Fish. See id. The Church historian stated:
Contrast between Spanish and English Policies-Missionary enterprise was the special
feature of the first Spanish occupation. No attempt was made at industrial advancement. The
secular administration of the province subordinated plans of colonization and commercial de-
velopment to motives of military expediency.... At the cession to England there were but
two small towns: St. Augustine on the Atlantic, and Pensacola, on the Gulf Coast .... As
soon as the English assumed control a new order of things was inaugurated....
But while material prosperity was giving promise of large results, religion was practically
neglected and suffered irreparably. By the articles of cession freedom of worship was granted,
and property rights recognized. Article 20 provides for "the liberty of the Catholic religion...
so far as the laws of Great Britain permit .. "
The [C]hurch property [in St. Augustine] was accordingly conveyed in trust to John Gor-
don and Jesse Fish, British subjects of South Carolina; but, in defiance of the provisions of the
treaty, the English officials entirely disregarded these conveyances, and occupied the property.
Id.
Professor Gold treated the forfeiture as "good for the gander." See Gold, supra note
827, at 7. He stated: "Since the Spanish monarchy enjoyed proprietorship rights in the patro-
nato real relationship of church and state, those same privileges existed for the English mo-
narch, who had assumed sovereignty in Florida." Id.
828. See Gold, supra note 827, at 3-4.
829. WHITFIELD'S NOTES, GOVERNMENTAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF FLORIDA
(1927) reprinted in 3 FLA. STATUTES: HELPFUL AND USEFUL MATTER 215, 230 (1941).
830. WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827.
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cans, Greeks, and Italians, the largest initial American colony in the history
of what was later the United States. '83' The Spanish in 1783 allowed British
colonists the same choice the British had in 1763, stay, or sell and go.
832
Colonists had to pledge loyalty and convert to Catholicism to stay.83 3 Some
stayed, and the Spanish Crown confirmed their title.834 Most, unable to sell,
abandoned their lands, principally to the Catholic Italians and Minorcans.835
The Spanish regained the bulk of Florida in the 1783 Treaty of Paris
and the related Treaty of Versailles, upon the end of the American Revolu-
tion.836 This was Spain's due to its acting as an ally of the French in support
of the Revolution.837 Spain maintained the split between East and West Flor-
ida when that nation resumed sovereignty in 1783.838
Spain opened up Florida in the second colony.839 The WPA summed
up: "Spanish land grants may thus be said to have been based upon three
royal orders: that of 1786 for the English in Florida [as of 1783]; that of
1790 for strangers, of which Spanish subjects also availed themselves; and
that of 1815 for patriotic service." 840
We discussed how the 1790 order invited aliens, regardless of religion.
The order allowed 100 acres to head of household and 50 additional acres for
each member of the family.841 These were called "head rights." 8"2 The head
grant could be increased by up to 1000 more acres if it was capable of culti-
vation.8 43 If maintained and cultivated ten years, the title vested.
84
"
These lands were to be surveyed exactly under the direction of Captain
Pedro Marrot of St. Augustine and his successors. 84 Joe Knetsch, the offi-
cial historian of the Florida Division of State Lands, states adamantly:
"There is ample evidence, however, to conclude that many surveys in East
Florida, specifically those more than fifteen miles outside of St. Augustine or
831. Id.
832. Id.
833. See id. This differs from the British, who allowed freedom of religion. Id. Nonethe-
less, the second Spanish colonial government allowed persons freedom of worship in private.
See WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. See id.
837. See id.
838. WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827.
839. See id.
840. Id.
841. Id.
842. Id.
843. WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827.
844. Id.
845. Id.
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Fernandina, were never performed upon the ground." 6  Conversely, the
WPA History asserts that the first several Spanish colony surveyors general-
ly acquitted themselves well, and Jorge Clarke, appointed in 1811, testified
that he was bound by no rules.' 1 A royal order of 1815 allegedly authorized
grants to militia members who had defended East Florida against incursions
by the United States in 1811-1812 (the "Patriotic War").848
The WPA History tells us that a member of the United States Board of
Commissioners for East Florida, Alexander Hamilton, Jr. (son of the Alex-
ander Hamilton), questioned the authenticity of the documents supporting the
putative 1815 order? 9 Nonetheless, the grants were generally authorized for
processing.850 We discuss the procedure below.
Additionally, the colony authorized grants for future services; those
were for mills and cattle ranchers.8
The Adams-Onis Treaty, dated February 22, 1819, conveyed East and
West Florida to the United States, effective July, 1821.852 Ansbacher and
Knetsch cite the authoritative federal Work Projects Administration publica-
tion on Spanish Land Grants in Florida concerning the impact of the Adams-
Onis Treaty:
By Article VIII of the treaty of February 22, 1819, whereby
Spain Ceded the Floridas to the United States, all Spanish grants of
land made prior to January 25, 1818, the date on which the King of
846. Ansbacher& Knetsch, supra note 261, at 367.
847. WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827.
848. Id.
849. id. Of course, Hamilton would not be a figure in Florida colonial history if he were
not the subject of controversy. The WPA History states that he was one of the three commis-
sioners appointed for East Florida. Id. The burdens of that commission were great. They had
"something like 600" claims to process, which were way too many for the time allotted. Id.
Hamilton added to that and other problems: "And finally there was such a divergence of
opinion between Hamilton and the other commissioners as to procedure that Hamilton refused
to participate in the sessions and bombarded President Monroe, Secretary of State Crawford,
Secretary of State Adams, and the chairman of the house committee on public lands with
serious charges against his colleagues and those in charge of the Public Archives." WPA
History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827. The full scope of Hamilton's complaints
is beyond this piece, but a representative portion is found at xliii-xliv of the WPA History.
Most significantly, he made accusations of alteration, theft, and fraud on various grant
processes. Id. Not surprisingly, Hamilton generated three lawsuits. id.
850. Id.
851. Id.
852. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 523-24 (Fla. 1923) (citing
Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and His Cath-
olic Majesty (Adams-Onis Treaty), U.S.-Spain, art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 [hereinafter
Adams-Onis Treaty]).
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Spain definitely expressed his willingness to negotiate, were to be
'ratified and confirmed.., to the same extent that the said grants
would be valid if the territories had remained under the domain of
his Catholic Majesty.'853
The upshot was that various Acts of Congress implemented the Adams-
Onis Treaty by "ratif[ying] and confirm[ing] [Spanish Land Grants] to the
persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants
would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of
[Spain] .,854
The Adams-Onis Treaty extended the time grantees had to meet the
terms of those grants:
But the owners in possession of such lands, who, by reason of the
recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, and the revolutions in
Europe, have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of
their grants, shall complete them within the terms limited in the
same, respectively, from the date of this treaty.855
Congress passed various acts to facilitate grant confirmation.856
The Supreme Court addressed two major Spanish grants in United
States v. Arredondo857 and Mitchel v. United States.8 8 We discuss the Mit-
chel decision below, regarding its integral relationship with the turnover of
Florida from Spain to the United States. The Alachua County, Florida, web-
site describes the largest Arredondo Grant, which lies in north-central Flori-
da:
Don Fernando de Maza Arredondo, a Spanish merchant and citi-
zen of St. Augustine, had assisted in raising troops in 1811 for the
town's protection and played a significant role in its civic life, ha-
zarding his own fortune to aid the city when public resources
failed. As a compensation for his services in 1817, the King of
Spain granted him 280,000 acres .... 859
853. WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827 (emphasis added).
854. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co., 98 So. at 524 (quoting Adams-Onis Treaty).
855. Id. (citing Adams-Onfs Treaty) (emphasis omitted).
856. Id.
857. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832).
858. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
859. Natural and Historic Sites in Alachua County, HISTORIC PRESERVATION ALACHUA
CoUrNrY, http://www.growth-management.alachua.fl.us/historic/natural.htm (last visited Aug.
1,2011).
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The Arredondo Court held that grants from the Spanish Colonial gov-
ernment and supporting surveys were deemed to be presumptively authorized
by the Crown.8" Ansbacher and Knetsch point to the following language to
support the presumption:
Yet, in [Congress'] whole legislation on the subject (which has all
been examined), there has not been found a solitary law which di-
rects; [sic] that the authority on which a grant has been made under
the Spanish government should be filed by a claimant-recorded
by a public officer, or submitted to any tribunal appointed to adju-
dicate its validity and the title it imparted-[C]ongress has been
content that the rights of the United States, should be surrendered
and confirmed by patent to the claimant, under a grant purporting
to have emanated under all the official forms and sanctions of the
local government. This is deemed evidence of their having been
issued by lawful, proper, and leflitimate authority-when unim-
peached by proof to the contrary.
Graber quotes Baldwin in support of a key component of Arredondo.862
Fletcher held that a state has no right to convey the same parcel twice, effec-
tively annulling the first conveyance.86 3 Arredondo held unanimously that
the Spanish land grant, once confirmed, barred Congress from conveying the
same parcel.864
The procedure for confirmation under the Adams-Onis Treaty and im-
plementing acts of Congress called for application to the federal Board of
Commissioners for East or West Florida, based on predominant grant loca-
tion, if the grant totaled under 3500 acres, then in turn, as appropriate, to
Congress.865 The official records of these grants are found in the American
State Papers.866 These papers summarize the application and list line items
860. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 727-28.
861. Id. at 723 (emphasis added); see also Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 261, at 365.
862. Graber, supra note 103, at 86.
863. id. at 86 n.81 (citing HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 148-49 (1970) (quoting in
turn Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)).
864. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 748-49.
865. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 261, at 364.
866. The Library of Congress American Memory website contains and indexes all of the
American State Papers. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AMERICAN MEMORY, http://memory.loc.
gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsp.html. Numerous other resources are listed by Chris Naylor, Arc-
hives Technician for the National Archives, in Those Elusive Early Americans: Public Lands
and Claims, in the American State Papers, 37 PROLOGUE MAG. (2005), available at
http:/www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/summer/state-papers.html; Ansbacher &
Knetsch, supra note 261, at 364 discusses the procedure in confirming Spanish Land Grants.
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for disposition. 67 The original records often contain supporting surveys as
well .868
Professor Glen Boggs wrote two fascinating articles that bear on the
Adams-Onis Treaty.869 One addresses Florida title chains deraigned to Brit-
ish colonial grants.870 He discusses Arredondo at length.871 While the Court
addressed various issues, including fraud (as alleged by our friend Hamil-
ton), Arredando held for the claimant.872
The other Boggs article dealt with the Spanish records supporting land
transfers in Florida.873 Boggs explains that the Adams-Onis Treaty lopsided-
ly favored the United States. 74 We promised to pay five million dollars in
debts owed by Spain to third parties.875 In return, Spain gave us La Flori-
da.876  Spain withheld or secreted substantial records.877  Additionally, as
Boggs noted, the Americans questioned Spain's honesty regarding the land
records. 78 Article II of the treaty required Spain to deliver all title and sove-
reignty records for the two Floridas. 879 The Crown failed to fully comply, as
it shipped many of the records to Havana.88' Adams dealt with Spain con-
veying as much land as possible to avoid- conveying the parcels to the federal
government.88'
867. See Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 261, at 364.
868. Id.
869. Glenn Boggs, Florida Land Titles and British, Not Just Spanish, Origins, 81 FLA. B.
J. July/Aug. 2007, at 23 [hereinafter Boggs, Florida Land Titles]; Glenn Boggs, The Case of
Florida's Missing Real Estate Records, 77 FLA. B. J. Oct. 2003, at 10 (2003) [hereinafter
Boggs, Missing Real Estate Records].
870. See generally Boggs, Florida Land Titles, supra note 869.
871. Id. at 26-28.
872. id.
873. See generally Boggs, Missing Real Estate Records, supra note 869.
874. Id. at 11.
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. See id. at 11-13 (quoting President Monroe, complaining of Spain's refusal to turn
over title records). This is consistent with similar complaints cited in the definitive WPA
publication. See WPA History of the Spanish Land Grants, supra note 827, at xxv.
878. Boggs, Missing Real Estate Records, supra note 869, at 13.
879. Id. at 11-12.
880. Id. at 13.
881. Id. at 12. Expressing his frustrations, Adams stated:
This day, two years have elapsed since the Florida Treaty was signed .... Let them re-
mark the workings of private interests, of perfidious fraud, of sordid intrigues, of royal trea-
chery, of malignant rivalry, and of envy masked with patriotism, playing to and fro across the
Atlantic into each other's hands, all combined to destroy this treaty between the signature and
the ratification, and let them learn to put their trust in the overruling providence of God. ...
An ambiguity of date, which I had suffered to escape my notice at the signature of the treaty,
amply guarded against by the phraseology of the article, but leaving room to chicanery from a
mere colorable question, was the handle upon which the King of Spain, his rapacious favorites,
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The second major Supreme Court decision addressing Spanish land
grants was Mitchel v. United States.882 Boggs gives us a detailed backsto
883 Mno ett wry. President Monroe sent Colonel James Gant Forbes to Havana with two
goals. 84 First, arrange diplomatic transfer of Florida to Governor Andrew
Jackson.885 Second, recover the substantial cache of title and other records
that Spain had secreted.886
The King of Spain responded to Jackson by order of February 15, 1832,
directing delivery of any remaining records.887 The Secretary of State sent
James Robinson to Cuba to inspect and to retrieve the records.888 Robinson
spent over two years pouring over the records before he died at his post. 89
Boggs tells us that Robinson complained that Colin Mitche1890 stymied his
efforts:
In due course, Robinson developed a decidedly negative atti-
tude with regard to Mr. Mitchel. In fact, one commentator said
Mitchel was, according to Robinson's observations, the powerful
evil force at work to prevent the accomplishment of the archive
mission. A partner in John Forbes & Company, Florida traders,
Mitchel maintained a large trading business in Havana .... When
his overtures to Robinson were coldly rebuffed, he became vindic-
tive, according to Robinson, spread malicious rumors and used his
money and influence to frustrate efforts to secure the Florida pa-
pers. Robinson . . . soon became convinced that Mitchel had
bribed Spanish functionaries to forge and alter records to assist
him in his suit before the [United States Supreme Court]. 89
1
and American swindling land jobbers in conjunction with them, withheld the ratification of the
treaty, while Clay and his admirers here were snickering at the simplicity with which I had
been bamboozled by the crafty Spaniard.
Id. at 12 (quoting George C. Whatley & Sylvia Cook, The East Florida Land Commission: A
Study in Frustration, 50 FLA. HISTORICAL Q. 39 (1971) (which itself quoted John Quincy
Adams' diary notes on February 22, 1821, the day of Senate ratification of the Adams-Onis
Treaty)).
882. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 725 (1835).
883. Boggs, Missing Real Estate Records, supra note 869, at 15-16.
884. Id. at 13-14.
885. Id. at 13.
886. Id. at 14.
887. Id. (citations omitted).
888. Boggs, (which Boggs?) supra note 869, at 14.
889. Id. (citations omitted).
890. The Supreme Court spelled his name with one "l," while Gibbs spells it with two.
See generally Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835). 1 will be consistent with
the reported decision.
891. Boggs, (which Boggs?) supra note 869, at 15.
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The lawsuit, Mitchel v. United States, was pending before the Supreme
Court while Robinson was in Havana.892 Call directed Robinson to find
whatever records he could to undermine the Spanish grant at issue, the John
Forbes & Co. Grant.893 The Forbes Grant totaled 1,250,000 acres in north
Florida-principally in the Panhandle. 894 Robinson allegedly discovered that
Forbes & Co., through its predecessor, the British company of Panton, Leslie
& Company, helped the Spanish supply the Creek nation with arms and sup-
plies that were used to kill frontiersmen. 895 Robinson uncovered evidence
that the company demanded indemnification from the Spanish Government
for losses in the trade with the Native Americans who opposed the United
States.896 Robinson implied that Forbes obtained huge swaths of land by
forgery.8 97 Robinson concluded that widespread collusion existed.898 When
he died abruptly, however, the search ended. 899 The Supreme Court then
affirmed Mitchel's title under his interest in Forbes & Company.9°°
Fletcher might not have availed Mitchel. The earlier Court protected
innocent purchasers from the alleged fraud and bribery between the Georgia
legislature and buyers who in turn sold to them.90' In Fletcher, the private
landowners were innocent of any perfidy that related to the original swin-
dle.9 °2 Mitchel, however, was allegedly in the midst of myriad misdeeds.9 3
Here, Dr. Joe Knetsch disagrees categorically with Professor Boggs. 9°4
Knetsch's job as official state historian for the Florida Division of State
Lands has required him to cull thoroughly through the Forbes records over
the past several decades.95 In a lengthy interview, Dr. Knetsch told the au-
thor that he believes the Mitchel records were substantially legitimate.9 6
Knetsch also emphasizes that both Call and Robinsen were Jacksonian
protdgdes, who would have been colored by Jackson's antipathy toward the
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Id.
895. Id.
896. Boggs, (which Boggs?) supra note 869, at 15.
897. Id. The story of Panton, Leslie & Company, and Forbes & Company is colorful, and
well beyond this piece. Id.
898. Id.
899. Id.
900. Boggs, (which Boggs?) supra note 869, at 15-16.
901. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
902. See id.
903. See Boggs, (which Boggs?) supra note 869, 15-16.
904. Interview with Dr. Joe Knetsch, (Mar. 16, 2011) (notes on file with author).
905. Id.
906. Id.
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private companies and every nation with whom they dealt.97 Additionally,
just as Spain would have wanted its friends to have as much of Florida as
possible, it was even more imperative politically for the United States to
have as much public domain as possible. 90 When one thinks about it, the
American courts' strong presumption in favor of the grants confirmation was
quite remarkable.
Dr. Knetsch is by no means blind to the problems of grants in Florida.
He wrote multiple papers and articles detailing fraud, collusion and inepti-
tude in the grants process.9°9 He noted that the problem in East Florida
stemmed often from overly aggressive grant interpretations, and oftentimes
fictitious surveys that were not run on the ground, by the Spanish Surveyor
General, Jorge Clark.9 ° West Florida records, however, were disproportio-
nately those that were spirited away to Havana, and then unavailable for
United States review.9" Further, for many of the same problems Jesse Fish
faced in East Florida, the British disallowed "practically all of the Spanish
claims around Pensacola." 912
We discuss at Section V above the guidelines and boundaries that Spain
established in its New World colonies, including Florida. Two modern deci-
sions exemplify the significance. Dawson v. Mathews913 addressed a boun-
dary dispute between claimants under Spanish land grant and the Swamp and
Overflowed Lands Act.914 The Dawson court held that water boundaries in a
subsequent federal act could not and did not affect boundaries that the
Adams-Onis Treaty confirmed pursuant to Spanish Grant.9"5 Dumas v. Gar-
nett 916 came to the opposite result-also based on the language of the Span-
ish Land Grant there.917 The grant was bounded on the east by the "zaca-
tel."918 Evidence established that term meant marshgrass in colonial Flori-
907. Id. Knetsch wrote a thorough, two part article on the Forbes Purchase in the Florida
Surveyor Magazine. Joe Knetsch, The Forbes Purchase: A Further Look, FLA. SURVEYOR
MAG. 18 (Oct. 2002) and 10 (Nov. 2002).
908. Interview of Dr. Joe Knetsch, (Mar. 16, 2011) (notes on file with author).
909. See, e.g., JOE KNETSCH, supra note 907; FLA. DEP'T ENVT'L PROT., SPANISH LAND
GRANTS: A PROBLEM FOR SURVEYORS-THE CASE OF GEORGE J. F. CLARKE (2008), available
at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/1ands/files/spanish-Iand-grants.pdf.
910. See, e.g., KNETSCH, supra note 907.
911. Seeid.
912. KNETSCH, supra note 907, at 3.
913. 338 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
914. Id. at 1087; see Swamp and Overflowed Land Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850) (codi-
fied at 48 U.S.C. 982).
915. Dawson, 338 So. 2d at 1087.
916. 13 So. 464 (Fla. 1893).
917. Id. at 467.
918. Id. at464.
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da.919 The court held that the waterfront claimant held title only as far as the
marshline.920
B. Statehood
1. Sovereign Lands, Navigability, and the Public Trust
As stated above, Florida became a state on March 3, 1845.921 The Su-
preme Court of Florida Justice Whitfield drafted "Whitfield' s Notes," which
constitute one of our state's principal repositories of legal analysis. 922 It is
considered roundly to be a lodestar of Florida water boundary law.923 One of
the more subtly stated, yet legally significant, passages in Whitfield's Notes
is this: "The [general] common ... law of England" as modified by statutes
is in "force in this state [except where it is] inconsistent with the constitution
and laws of the United States" or of the State of Florida."94 The problems of
conflicting grant instructions and favoritism renewed in the Second Spanish
colonial period.925
Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae 926 was one of Flori-
da's bellwether sovereign land decisions. The court held that Mitchel's con-
firmed Forbes Purchase did not convey any lands below the high water mark
of the Gulf of Mexico.927 Justice Whitfield proclaimed: "It is settled law in
this state that private ownership of lands bordering on navigable waters ex-
tends only to high-water mark., 928 Whitfield explicated at great length that
Spanish colonial law was the same.929 Whitfield concluded that both the
letter of the Forbes Purchase and the Spanish law dictated a boundary at the
high water mark.93°
Whitfield tells us that Florida land titles deraign through three principal
chains.93' First, there are Spanish land grants that were confirmed pursuant
919. Id. at 465.
920. Id. at 465-66.
921. Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch,75, § 5 Stat. 742 (1845).
922. See generally WHITFIELD'S NOTES, supra note 829.
923. Id. at 231.
924. Id. at 224.
925. See id. at 215-16.
926. 98 So. 505 (Fla. 1923).
927. Id. at 523.
928. Id. at 517.
929. See id. at 517-27.
930. Id. at 528.
931. WHITFIELD'S NOTES, supra note 829, at 230.
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to the Adams-Onis Treaty.932 Second, there are numerous federal patents and
grants.933 Finally, the state granted or conveyed various lands received under
Congressional Acts or, in the case of submerged sovereign lands, pursuant to
the state's sovereignty. 934
Whitfield explained thoroughly his analysis of Florida's sovereign sub-
merged lands. He cited Shively v. Bowlby for the federal government's obli-
gation to "hold the lands under navigable waters and tide lands" in the public
trust until Florida's statehood.935 Clearly, Whitfield interpreted federal water
law to encompass all tidelands in sovereign submerged lands.936 While I
believe the Phillips Petroleum dissent interpreted early federal law more
correctly in limiting sovereign title to navigable waters, Whitfield's broad
scope is consistent with his reputation as Florida's leading public trust pro-
ponent.937
Whitfield stated expressly that Florida "became the owner for the bene-
fit of its inhabitants of all lands under bodies of navigable water and tide
lands within its territorial limits" upon statehood on March 3, 1845.938 We
can understand why Justice Whitfield might have broadly interpreted Shive-
ly. After all, the Court did refer to tidal lands, even though it limited the
scope elsewhere by referring to riparian and littoral lands being bounded by
the "high water mark."
Regardless, the Supreme Court of Florida in Clement v. Watson,9 9 con-
sidered the issue of tidal boundaries.94 ° Whitfield did not cite this already
fifteen-year-old decision in his original 1927 notes. In Clement, the Supreme
Court of Florida expressly rejected the ebb and flow test in favor of a high
water mark boundary in tidal lands.941  Even odder-Justice Whitfield
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. Id. In light of the overarching question over whether Phillips Petroleum decided
properly that nonnavigable tidelands were sovereign at statehood, I feel compelled to note that
the dean of Florida water law stated that "lands under bodies of navigable water or of tide
lands [are] . .. two classes of lands belonging to the state by virtue of its sovereignty upon
being 'admitted into Union on equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoev-
er."' Id.
935. WHITFELD'S NOTES, supra note 829, at 235.
936. Id.
937. Shively, read in context, does not support Whitfield. The Court stated: "The title and
rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark, therefore, are go-
verned by the laws of the several States." Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58.
938. WHITFIELD'S NOTES, supra note 829, at 235.
939. 58So. 25 (Fla. 1912).
940. Id. at 26.
941. See Clement, 58 So. at 27.
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drafted the Clement opinion.942 He stated in Clement: "Waters are not under
our law regarded as navigable merely because they are affected by the
tides. 943
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Miller v. Bay-to-
Gulf,944 just one year before Whitfield's Notes were republished in the Flori-
da laws. Miller held that the Mean High Water Line is "the limit reached by
the daily ebb and flow of the tide, the usual tide, or the neap tide that hap-
pens between the full and change of the moon. 945
Whitfield propounds a soft public trust in Florida:
The use and disposition of [sovereign submerged] lands are within
the regulating province of the legislature, subject only to the fights
of riparian owners under the law of the state and to such rights as
the public may have in the lawful use of the navigable waters and
to the dominant power of congress over the navigable waters. It
has been held that by statute, limited portions of the submerged
lands may be sold to private ownership when substantial fights of
the public in the use of the navigable waters are not unlawfully in-
vaded and the authority of congress as to navigable waters is not
interfered with.946
Even though Whitfield stated that the state took title on March 3, 1845,
to all tidelands, he limits the scope of public trust ownership to navigable
waters.947 Whitfield cited various decisions, including Illinois Central and
Appleby (although, curiously, not Shively) regarding the public trust
"floor." 948 While the state could convey sovereign lands, it could not thereby
wholly abrogate its public trust obligations. 949 He defined the standard obli-
quely: "There are recognized limitations upon the power of the legislature to
pass to private ownership the submerged lands under navigable waters when
the public interests and rights are disregarded so as to produce detriment.
950
942. Id. at 26.
943. Id.
944. 193 So. 425 (Fla. 1940).
945. Miller, 193 So. at 428.
946. WHITFELD'S NoTES, supra note 829, at 235 (emphasis added).
947. Id.
948. Id.
949. Id.
950. Id.
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I want to point out Daniel Peyton's two-part article in the Florida Bar
Journal as thoroughly dissecting the extent of the public trust in Florida.95'
In Sovereignty Lands in Florida: It's All About Navigability, Part I, Peyton
lists most of the major Florida decisions and several articles on the topic. 952
Peyton cites articles by Norwood Gay and Rosanne Gervasi Capeless
that contend Florida's public trust lands extend to all tidal lands. 953 Peyton
responds that Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lee v.
liams954eviscerated the argument. 955 Judge Griffin's opinion in Lee held that
Clement v. Watson binds Florida courts.9 5 6 She wrote in her opinion that the
appellant and amicus the Governor and Cabinet's (sitting as the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund) argument that Phillips
Petroleum Co. controlled "must have been the result of an unexplainable
aberration or the product of some terrible slip of the pen. 957 She concluded
that Phillips Petroleum Co., even if decided correctly, bound the State of
Florida only at the moment of statehood on March 3, 1845.958 Griffin's opi-
nion confirmed that Clement was a sound determination of the extent of Flor-
ida's public trust doctrine, consistent with Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.'s
holding that each state may choose its own public trust doctrine as long as it
does not abrogate public rights entirely.
959
More to the point, Judge Griffin held the court was constrained by Flor-
ida's own state constitution. 90 Article X, section 11 states:
Sovereignty lands.-The title to lands under navigable waters,
within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated,
including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the
951. See generally Daniel W. Peyton, Sovereignty Lands in Florida: It's All About Navi-
gability, Part 1I, 76 FLA. B.J., Feb. 2002 at 46 [hereinafter Peyton II]; Daniel W. Peyton, Sove-
reignty Lands in Florida: It's All About Navigability, Part 1, 76 FLA. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 58.
952. Peyton, supra note 951. I was on the Dean Frank Maloney Award panel of the Flori-
da Bar's Environmental and Land Use Section that received and awarded Mr. Peyton's piece
in 2001.
953. Peyton II, supra note 951, at 62-63 (citing Norwood Gay, Tidelands, 20 STETSON L.
REV. 143 (1990); Rosanne Gervasi Capeless, History of Florida Water Law: Tracing the Ebb
and Flow of Florida's Public Trust Doctrine Through the Opinions of Justice James B. Whit-
field, 9 J. LAND USE& ENvTL. L. 131 (1993)).
954. 711 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
955. Peyton II, supra note 951, at 47-48.
956. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 59, 62.
957. Id. at 60.
958. Id. at 60, 61 n.9.
959. Id. at 60; Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 377 (1977).
960. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 63.
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state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all of the people.
Sale of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not in
the public interest.
961
Even if the Florida common law left open any question of where Flori-
da's sovereign lands lay under tidal waters, the Florida Constitution settled
the issue in 1968. The 1970 amendment clarified the scope of possible sales,
but the state's adoption in 1968 of a constitution that bounds sovereign lands
by "navigable waters" and "mean high water lines" seems dispositive. The
section augments this by stating all such lands are held "in trust for all the
people. '962 The only deviation from this standard is when the state wants to
convey any sovereign lands. The Florida Constitution implicitly bars public
trust sovereign lands claims in Florida above the high water mark. The only
"direction" that article X, section 11 allows the boundary to move is in favor
of limited private grant by the sovereign. The section limits the sovereign
grant to "navigable waters," and buttresses the limitation by express refer-
ence to beach boundaries at the "mean high water lines. 963
No one can say that the Supreme Court of Florida has not ruled in favor
of property owners on this point before. In State v. Florida National Proper-
ties, Inc.,964 the court rejected a statute that fixed certain non-tidal water
boundaries. 965 The court held that statutory deviation from the common law
transitory high water line would constitute a taking that violated the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as article I, sec-
tion 9 of Florida's Constitution.966
The Florida National Properties, Inc. majority's rationale seemingly
bore directly on STBR. Section 253.151 of the Florida Statutes purportedly
fixed the boundary between sovereign lands and private uplands in "naviga-
ble meandered fresh water lakes. 967 The statute distinguished such water
bodies from "tidal" water bodies, but many tidal water bodies are fresh wa-
ter.96s Regardless, the Supreme Court of Florida held section 253.151 un-
constitutional, both facially and as applied. 969
961. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
962. Id.
963. Id.
964. 338 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
965. Id. at 18.
966. See id. at 18-19; see also FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. That section is entitled the "Due
Process" provision of article I, which is entitled "Declaration of Rights." FLA. CONST. art. 1, §
9.
967. Fla. Nat'l Props., 338 So. 2d at 17.
968. Id. at 14.
969. Id. at 16, 18.
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The core holding upheld the trial court, which held that section 253.151
was indistinguishable from the Washington state statute that the Supreme
Court of the United States struck in Hughes v. Washington.97 The lower
court, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that the fixed boundary violated
due process rights under the Federal and Florida Constitutions by fixing a
statutory line in lieu of the vested, common law ambutory high water line.97'
This is particularly acute as to alluvial deposits and reliction.972
As we stated above, Whitfield's Notes confirmed that the British com-
mon law remain in force in Florida except where inconsistent with express
law of the United States or Florida.973 This has long been codified:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general
and not a local nature, [with the exception hereinafter mentioned,]
down to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in
this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not in-
consistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and
the acts of the legislature of this state.974
Accordingly, the common law of riparian and littoral rights has always
applied in Florida, except when and where modified by statute. Farnham
confirmed the relationship of riparian or littoral rights to adjacency of water:
The courts do not fully agree in their enumeration of these rights.
Some concede more than do others; but the principles involved
which will be developed in the course of this and succeeding chap-
ters accord the owner of riparian land the right to have the water
remain in place, and to retain, as nearly as possible, its natural cha-
racter.
975
Florida's common law of littoral and riparian rights follows the English
and general American common law. Such decisions as Broward v. Mabry
976
and Hayes v. Bowman977 confirm riparian and littoral rights available under
970. Id. at 17 (citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967)).
971. Id. at 17, 18.
972. See Fla. Nat'l Props., 338 So. 2d at 17-18.
973. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (2010); WHITFIELD'S NOTES, supra note 829, at 223 (citation omit-
ted); FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1941).
974. WHITFIELD'S NOTES, supra note 829, at 224 (citing FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1941)); see
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (2010).
975. HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 62 (1904).
976. 50 So. 826 (Fla. 1909).
977. 91 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1957).
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Florida law.978 Hayes is the central Florida decision on riparian and littoral
rights. There, the Supreme Court of Florida held that every riparian and lit-
toral owner holds an appurtenant property right of wharfage, access and view
from the parcel's high water line to the navigable channel or waterbody.979
The Supreme Court of Florida more explicitly explained these rights in
Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Lake Islands:980 "Reasonable
[riparian or littoral] access must, of course, be balanced with the public good,
but a substantial diminution or total denial of reasonable access to the prop-
erty owner is a compensable deprivation of a property interest.
' 981
The Supreme Court of Florida in Hayes balanced the appurtenant litto-
ral and private rights with public rights in the Boca Ciega Bay, where the
land at issue lay.982 The parcel was constructed by adding fill into the bay.983
The court emphasized:
[The] power of the State to dispose of submerged tidal lands has
assumed important proportions in recent years. Valuable subdivi-
sions have been built on dredged-in fill. Large areas have been
leased to those who would speculate in drilling for oil. Increased
interest in this type of land bears forebodings of even more com-
plex problems in the future. These lands constitute tremendously
valuable assets. Like any fiduciary asset, however, they must be
administered with due regard to the limitations of the trust with
which they are impressed.984
Even before Hayes, the Supreme Court of Florida held consistently that
a riparian or littoral owner in Florida had "the right of ingress and egress to
and from ... the waters ... unobstructed view over the waters, and in com-
mon with the public the right of navigating, bathing, and fishing. '985 The
Florida legislature codified these rights, first in section 192.61 of the Florida
Statutes, and then in today's section 253.141 of the Florida Statutes.
98 6
Florida's tidal boundaries were first established in Miller v. Bay-to-
Gulf, Inc.987 The Miller Court had the opportunity to adopt a mean high tide
978. Id. at 800-01; Mabry, 50 So. at 829.
979. Id. at 798-800.
980. 407 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1981).
981. Id. at193.
982. Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 802.
983. Id. at 798.
984. Id. at 800.
985. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955) (quoting Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A.
Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 501 (1917)).
986. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 192.61 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 253.141 (2010).
987. 193 So. 425, 428 (Fla. 1940) (per curiam).
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line, as the Supreme Court of the United States did five years before in Bo-
rax.988 Instead of adopting a scientifically based boundary that reflected the
18.6 year lunar epoch, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a rule in Miller
that the tidal boundary reflected the daily ebb and flow of the local tide.989
The 1974 Florida legislature retreated from Miller by adopting a mod-
ified version of the tidal epoch test from Borax.990 Subsection 177.27(14) of
the Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 197499' defines "mean high water" as
"the average height of the high waters over a 19-year period. 992 This rounds
up the 18.6 year, technically correct epoch. Nonetheless, it dramatically im-
proved Miller's standard.
The nontidal boundary is more problematic in Florida. The test in Flor-
ida remains substantially unchanged from the 1927 Supreme Court of Flori-
da's decision in Tilden v. Smith:993
[It] is to be determined by examining the bed and banks, and ascer-
taining where the presence and action of the water are so common
and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark
upon the soil of the bed a character [that is] distinct from that of
the banks, in respect to vegetation, as well as ... [from] the soil it-
self.994
David Guest explains thoroughly the sources of the Minnesota test,
which we discuss above in the context of Howard v. Ingersoll's three Su-
preme Court of the United States tests for the ordinary high water mark on
nontidal waters.
995
While Tilden works where there exist sharply defined banks, the Su-
preme Court of Florida in the same year complained of the difficulty in im-
plementing such a test in Florida's swampier and flatter regions. Martin v.
Busch996 addressed the southwestern shore of Lake Okeechobee in the Moore
Haven area.997 The Martin Court expounded on this problem:
988. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. L.A., 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
989. Miller, 193 So. at 428.
990. Borax Consol., Ltd., 296 U.S. at 26-27.
991. See FLA. STAT. §177.25 (2010).
992. Id. § 177.27(14).
993. 113 So. 708 (Fla. 1927).
994. Id. at 712 (quoting Carpenter v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 58 N.W. 295, 297 (Minn. 1894))
(emphasis omitted).
995. Guest, supra note 669, at 214-15.
996. 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
997. Id. at 277, 280.
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In flat territory or because of peculiar conditions, there may be lit-
tle if any shore to navigable waters, or the elevation may be slight
and the water at the outer edges may be shallow and affected by
vegetable growth or [by] conditions, and the line of ordinary high-
water mark may be difficult of accurate ascertainment; but, when
the duty of determining the line of high-water mark is imposed or
assumed, the best evidence attainable and the best methods availa-
ble should be utilized in determining and establishing the line of
true ordinary high-water mark, whether it is done by general or
special meandering or by particular surveys of adjacent land.
Marks upon the ground or upon local objects that are more or less
permanent may be considered in connection with competent testi-
mony and other evidence in determining the true line of ordinary
high-water mark.
998
2. Background to STBR
a. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act
The 1986 Florida legislature enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act.999 The statutory purpose was to further "the public interest to preserve
and protect [beaches and shores] from imprudent construction which can
jeopardize the stability of the beach-dune system, accelerate erosion, provide
inadequate protection to upland structures, endanger adjacent properties, or
interfere with beach access."' 1  The day-to-day core of the act was estab-
lishment and regulation of coastal construction control lines,' and imple-
menting protection further by establishing thirty-year erosion lines that are
the westward boundary for any state coastal permits.' 2
Chapter 161 authorizes beach restoration projects, which are deemed to
be "in the public interest."' 3 The conditions to obtain state permits for such
projects feature minimizing the adverse effects of erosion." ° To obtain state
funding, the project must further protect listed species and natural resources,
and, of most interest in STBR, provide for public access on the renourished
beach."° 5
998. Id. at 283.
999. See FLA. STAT. § 161.011 (2010).
1000. Id. § 161.053(1)(a).
1001. Id.
1002. id. § 161.053 (5)(b).
1003. Id. § 161.088.
1004. FLA. STAT. § 161.088.
1005. See id. § 161.101(12).
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Core to beach renourishment under chapter 161 is the establishment of
the Erosion Control Line (ECL) as the MHWL for that section of beach.'0° 6
The ECL acts both as the baseline for newly renourished sands and as the
new and permanent property boundary.307  It replaces the ambulatory
MHWL, which would otherwise be set by nineteen-year epochs under chap-
ter 177.' 0"
The state must determine if the currently determined, post-erosion or
avulsion MHWL is where it will locate the ECL.1 9 If engineering of the
proposed project combined with the erosion or avulsion so requires, the state
may select an ECL that lies upland of the MHWL.'0 '0 If the latter occurs, the
state must condemn the strip between MHWL and the ECL. 101
3. The Administrative and Legal Background to STBR
STBR arose when STBR and a second group, Save our Beaches (SOB),
petitioned the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) and
the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund, to challenge FDEP and Trustees issuance of a permit al-
lowing nearly seven miles of Gulf front beach to be renourished in the City
of Destin and in unincorporated Walton County.101 2 Central to the permit
was the Cabinet's adoption of and recordation in County records of the ECL
as determined for the project."° 3 Neither STBR nor SOB owned any of the
littoral property, but STBR's members did so.'1 4 The FDEP referred the
matter to the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) pursuant
to Florida Statutes sections 120.569 and 120.57.1015 The DOAH Administra-
1006. See id. § 161.191(1)-(2).
1007. Id. § 161.191(1).
1008. See id. §§ 161.181, .191; see also Fla. Stat. § 177.27(14) (2010).
1009. FLA. STAT. § 161.141.
1010. Id.
1011. Id. §§ 161.141, .161, .191. See Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and
SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 40-41 (2009), for a good analysis of this portion of the
program, in an article that defends strongly the beach renourishment program. Professor
Christie wrote her article while STBR was pending, and anticipated well the substantive issues
that the Supreme Court addressed.
1012. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50-51 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd by Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
1013. Id.at54.
1014. Id. at55.
1015. See id. at 54-55. Those sections require state agencies to refer matters involving
contested issues of fact to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing. DOAH issues a recommended
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tive Law Judge held that DOAH lacked jurisdiction to address any constitu-
tional issues, which Florida law holds must be preserved at the administra-
tive agency level for review by any court of appeal reviewing the administra-
tive action. 1016 DOAH issued a recommended order finding and holding that
the permit applicants met all applicable administrative standards, and
FDEP's subsequent final order substantially adopted DOAH's reasoning and
conclusions and issuing the permit.'1 7
SOB and STBR appealed the FDEP's final order to Florida's First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. °18 That intermediate appellate court discussed the
DOAH record at length in concluding that the FDEP final order "unconstitu-
tionally applie[d] Part I of Chapter 161, Florida Statutes.' 1° 9 The First Dis-
trict held that the severance of the littoral properties from the open waters of
the Gulf of Mexico by the ECL and fill was both an unreimbursed, unconsti-
tutional deprivation of their littoral rights and a resulting failure by the local
governments to establish their own sufficient upland interest to perform the
permitted renourishment.0 20 The First District emphasized the FDEP's final
order, which it said "expressly recognized" that section 161.191 eliminates
the littoral property's right to accretions and relictions after the ECL is estab-
lished. 10 2
1
The governmental entities appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida.
10 22
The First District certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida for review:
Has Part I of Chapter 161, Florida Statutes (2005), referred to as
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, been unconstitutionally ap-
plied so as to deprive the members of Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, Inc. of their riparian rights without just compensation for the
property taken, so that the exception provided in Florida Adminis-
trative Code Rule 18-21.004(3), exempting satisfactory evidence
of sufficient upland interest if the activities do not unreasonably
infringe on riparian rights, does not apply?
0 23
order to the agency. The recommended order contains recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The agency issues the Final Order, which constitutes final agency action.
1016. Id. at 54 n.3.
1017. Save Our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 51.
1018. Id. at 50.
1019. Id.
1020. Id. at 58.
1021. Id. at 54.
1022. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla.
2008).
1023. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction.'0 24 The court re-
framed the issue as a facial challenge.'025 A facial challenge is far harder to
mount than is an as applied challenge, largely because a facial challenger
must prove that the agency action cannot be constitutional under any cir-
cumstance. 10 26 The Supreme Court of Florida also reframed the issue from
accretion, as discussed expressly by section 161.191(2), to avulsion.1027
The Supreme Court of Florida majority held that the littoral owner's
right to alluvial deposits is contingent, not vested. 10 28 It held further that lit-
toral owners could gain accretions by "a rule of convenience intended to
balance public and private interests by automatically allocating small
amounts of gradually accreted lands to the upland owner without resort to
legal proceedings and without disturbing the upland owner's rights to access
to and use of the water.' 1 29 The majority concluded that the ECL and reten-
tion of access by statute virtually eliminated any risk to the littoral owner,
and the amount of land needed to renourish the beach was not nominal.' 030
The majority stated further that access to the water was a subordinate
littoral right.10 3' The MHWL is based on a nineteen-year epoch, so the phys-
ical shore is sometimes in the water, and sometimes in the sand.0 32 This, the
majority contended, added to retained littoral access by statute to preserve
property rights. 103
3
The majority's last point distinguished Belvedere Development Corpo-
ration v. Department of Transportation, Division of Administration.' 34 Bel-
vedere held that a condemning authority could not sever riparian rights from
a condemned parcel. 0 3' The majority held that Belvedere dealt with distin-
guishable issues such as addressing condemnation of riparian lands. 10 36 The
majority reiterated its alleged irrelevance because Chapter 161, Part I of the
Florida Statutes left the owner with "access, use, and view."' 1 37
1024. Id.
1025. Id.
1026. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla.
2005).
1027. See Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1116.
1028. Id. at 1112.
1029. Id. at 1118.
1030. Id.
1031. Id. at 1112.
1032. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119.
1033. Id. at 1120.
1034. 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985).
1035. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1120 (citing Belvedere Dev. Corp., 467 So. 2d at 653).
1036. Id.
1037. Id.
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Justices Wells and Lewis dissented sharply. Justice Wells stated that
Florida National, Belvedere and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates0 38 controlled.*039 Justice Lewis was
blunter.
Justice Lewis accused the majority of having "butchered" Florida Law
in seeking an equitable result.'O°4 He took offense that the majority sua
sponte reframed the issue from as applied to facial, after all parties and lower
tribunals framed the issue as an as applied matter. 10 ' He string cited Florida
law in stating: "By essential, inherent definition, riparian and littoral proper-
ty is that which is contiguous to, abuts, borders, adjoins, or touches wa-
ter."'0 42 He further cited Judge Hersey's special concurrence in Florida's
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Belvedere Development Corp.
v. Division of Administration:043 "To speak of riparian or littoral rights un-
connected with ownership of the shore is to speak a non sequitur.
'' 04A
Justice Lewis contended that the majority's argument that the ECL and
fill would separate the littoral property from the sea by a short distance
missed a key point:'5 "Under the majority's analysis, this State has ceased
to protect the condition precedent to all other littoral rights: contact with the
sea."' 0 46 He lays out trenchantly his counter to the majority's rationale: "I
suggest that contact with the water by riparian or littoral property is not an-
cillary, independent, or subsidiary to such property but is essential and inhe-
rent to its legal definition and is an indispensible predicate for the private
owners' possession of other associated rights. ' 7
1038. 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987).
1039. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1121 (Wells, J., dissenting).
1040. Id. at 1121 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
1041. Id.
1042. Id. at 1122 (citations omitted).
1043. Id. (citing Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Div. of Admin., 413 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (Hersey, J., specially concurring) quashed by 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985)).
1044. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1122 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Belvedere Dev.
Corp. v. Div. of Admin., 413 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Hersey, J., spe-
cially concurring) quashed by 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985).
1045. Id. at 1126-27.
1046. Id. at 1126.
1047. Id.
[Vol. 35
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/1
STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT
4. STBR's Filing
a. On Judicial Takings
The principal issue STBR laid before the Supreme Court was whether
the Supreme Court of Florida so deviated from Florida riparian and littoral
precedential law that the state court's decision constituted a "judicial tak-
ing."' 1 48 The Supreme Court once stated, in 1897, that the state judiciary
could be liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for compensable takings of
property.'0° 9 Coincidental to our topic, the case addressed a railroad in the
City of Chicago. 15° The City took the railroad's right-of-way to connect
Rockwell Street.' 51 The railroad appealed its eminent domain award of one
dollar. 105
2
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago1053 considered
whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred Illinois state courts from award-
ing a nominal sum to the railroad whose property was taken by the City of
Chicago. 1 54 The first Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the opinion for the
Supreme Court in holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated a
right to compensation for a state actor's taking.0 55 David Sarratt quotes the
following, sweeping passage:
'In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized
by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under
its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured
to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment
by the highest court of the State is a denial by that State of a right
secured to the owner by that instrument.'1056
1048. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2603 (2010).
1049. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
1050. See id. at 230.
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
1054. Id. at 235.
1055. Id. at 241.
1056. W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV.
1487, 1503 (2004) (quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 241).
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Modem courts 57 and commentators'0 58 cite C, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. as the decision that first incorporated the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause against state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pro-
fessor Bradley Karkkainen counters that the decision never cited that pre-
mise. 59 Rather, he contends that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. was decided under substantive due process.' 6°
The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. opinion stated that
"[d]ue process of law ... means ... such process as recognizes the right of
the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and trans-
ferred to the public."' 0 ' The Court upheld the award just the same, because
of instructions and facts in the record supporting the jury award.' 2
Karkkainen concedes that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. opinion cites no authority for the holding that due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment required just compensation for a state taking. °63 He
responds that Munn v. Illinois'°64 supported Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. Dicta in Munn stated that a State could take private property
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendmentj but due process required just
compensation. 1065
Karkkainen emphasizes that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. did not mention Barron,10 66 which limited the takings clause to the Fifth
Amendment.'0 67 He contends:
The historical record is unambiguous: Chicago B & Q was
not understood at the time it was decided, nor for many decades
thereafter, to have extended the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
1057. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994).
1058. See e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA L. REV. 1449, 1463
(1990).
1059. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings "Muddle", 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 844-48 (2006).
1060. See id. at 844.
1061. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 236.
1062. Id. at 235-36.
1063. Karkkainen, supra note 1059, at 848.
1064. 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1877).
1065. Karkkainen, supra note 1059, at 848 (citing 94 U.S. at 145).
1066. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See supra notes 113-118
and accompanying text, which explain that Barron might be best understood by the Supreme
Court's tendency in that era to protect property rights, but not property value.
1067. Id. at 250-51; Karkkainen, supra note 1059, at 852-54.
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to the states. That interpretation of Chicago B & Q is a latter-day
contrivance, at odds with historical understandings. 1
068
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co.'069 first raised the concept
of judicial takings in the context of a state judiciary's reversal of longstand-
ing precedent. 7" While Justice McKenna wrote for a four justice plurality
stating that the state courts could not take property rights by unwarranted
reversal of precedent, he neither cited precedent nor explained why his ob-
servation was not dicta.
0 7
'
The Supreme Court in the 1930s moved away from any judicial takings
rationale.' 72 Nonetheless, Sarratt argues that the Supreme Court left the
door open a crack.1
0 73
As we have discussed above, Justice Stewart's concurrence in the 1967
Hughes decision revived the doctrine-at least in theory. 0 74 Justice Scalia's
dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Stevens v. Cannon
Beach 07 5 made it clear he agreed with Justice Stewart:
As a general matter, the Constitution leaves the law of real proper-
ty to the States. But just as a state may not deny rights protected
under the Federal Constitution through pretextual rulings, neither
may it do so by invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law.
Our opinion in Lucas, for example, would be a nullity if anything
that a state court chooses to denominate "background law"-
regardless of whether it is really such-could eliminate property
rights. "[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process of law by
the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has
taken never existed at all." No more by judicial decree than by
legislative fiat may a State transform private property without
compensation. Since opening private property to public use con-
stitutes a taking, if it cannot fairly be said that an Oregon doctrine
of custom deprived Cannon Beach property owners of their rights
1068. Karkkainen, supra note 1059, at 855.
1069. 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
1070. Id. at 574 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1071. Thompson, supra note 1058, at 1464-65 n.61 (citing Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 572-76).
1072. Thompson's seminal article declares that the doctrine died that decade. Id. at 1467.
1073. See Sarratt, supra note 1056, at 1505-07.
1074. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967).
1075. 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to exclude others from the dry sand, then the decision now before
us has effected an uncompensated taking.
076
Professor Benjamin Barros stated that the Supreme Court's acceptance of
jurisdiction in STBR likely portended the Court's willingness to decide the
issue of a judicial taking in favor of the property owner. 1077 Barros said that
Scalia had passed on "at least" fifteen petitions that argued for certiorari on
the judicial takings issue between Cannon Beach and STBR. 10 78
Justice Scalia provided fertile ground, however, for consideration of the
doctrine. He is the current Court's most zealous proponent of a robust tak-
ings doctrine.' ° 9 One wonders how it comports with constitutional original-
ism, 10 80 but it does further Justice Scalia's efforts to both augment and em-
phasize the takings doctrine 10 8' and to supplant substantive due process.
10 82
In addition to Cannon Beach, Scalia's analysis in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council 83 showed a willingness to address a significant state
takings case. His majority opinion held that a state that deprives an owner of
all economic value of a property must pay just compensation, unless the
owner's use or proposed use violates "restrictions that background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
ship."' 0' STBR presented an ideal synergy of Cannon Beach and Lucas.
Barros expected so, as he predicted a 5-4 victory for the property owners,
with Justice Scalia writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy, with a possible concurrence as well by Justice
1076. Id. at 1211-12 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
1077. D. Benjamin Barros, What's at Stake in Stop the Beach Renourishment, PROPERTY
PROF BioG (July 1, 2009), http:/lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2009/07/whats-at-stake-
in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html.
1078. Id.
1079. Sax emphasized Scalia's categorical analysis in Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1435-37 (1993).
1080. See generally David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Credentials Are No Substitute
for Accuracy: Nathan Kozuskanich, Stephen Halbrook, and the Role of the Historian, 19
WIDENER L.J. 343 (2010); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008) (discussing Scalia's original-
ism).
1081. See, e.g., Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207-14 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
1082. See, e.g., Aaron Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and
Who We Want To Be With the "Equalerty" of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. &
Soc. CHALLENGES 220, 315-16 (2010) (discussing Justice Scalia's disdain for use of substan-
tive due process to protect liberty, citing to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588-92 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
1083. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
1084. Id. at 1029.
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Kennedy on due process grounds.1 85 As it turned out, he was ever so close
on his prediction. As one assumes, so was Justice Scalia.
5. The Oral Argument
My friend Gary Oldehoff wrote an extraordinary amicus brief on the
other side of our amicus brief in STBR. 10 86 His subsequent Florida Bar Jour-
nal article summed up the oral argument quite well: "The parties and their
amici left the oral argument with no clear sense of the likely outcome. The
same was clearly true for the media."10 87
6. The STBR Decision
a. Florida Law
The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 17, 2010.1088 The only
thing the Court agreed upon was that the Supreme Court of Florida majority
did not effect a judicial taking.'0 89 Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous
Court."1°9 The Court held that Florida law does not require a littoral parcel to
maintain direct physical contact with the navigable water to keep the appur-
tenant right of access to that waterbody. °91
This decision upheld the Supreme Court of Florida majority opinion
distinguishing Belvedere Development Corp. v. Florida Department of
Transportation,'°92 cited by the Petitioners and Florida's First District Court
of Appeal.0 93 Belvedere addressed the rights of a condemnee to retain ripa-
rian rights.1094 The Supreme Court of Florida majority opinion in Walton
County limited Belvedere's application to eminent domain.11 95 Belvedere
1085. Barros, supra note 1077.
1086. See generally Brief for Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
1087. Oldehoff, supra note 7, at 18, 21 & n.46 (citing news stories with vote predictions
that, well, crossed the waterfront).
1088. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2592 (2010).
1089. Id. at 2613.
1090. id. at 2592.
1091. Id. at 2598-99.
1092. 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985).
1093. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
1094. See Belvedere Dev. Corp., 476 So. 2d at 650.
1095. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1120 (Fla.
2008).
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was consistent with Crutchfield v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 109 6 which over a
half century before Walton County held that riparian rights are appurtenances
to waterfront parcels and may not be severed from such lands.' °97
The STBR Court upheld the Walton County majority holding that the fill
constituted an avulsive event, not accretion.' °98 As the Supreme Court of
Florida reframed the issue in Walton County, artificial avulsion would not
change preexisting waterfront boundaries.' °99 Nonetheless, this settled law
retains none of the classic rationales for the avulsion-accretion distinction.
We no longer have "lost boundary" conundrums in alluvial settings-at least
we do not in most Gulf coast beaches that are surveyed by the MHWL for
which historic aerial photographs are generally available. Artificial avulsion,
as in renourishment, is nominally more permanent than were the classically
avulsive events described in English common law that distinguished accre-
tion and avulsion. Even Sax, whom all concede is the godfather of the mod-
em public trust doctrine, does not support the blanket distinction. Finally,
the major support of holding the traditional boundary where improvements
cause "artificial" avulsion does not exist where the landowner does not par-
ticipate in the improvements. The landowner does not allegedly benefit from
her own activities in this adding to her physical property.
Justice Scalia stated at footnote 12 that the switch from common law
property rights to those granted by statute did not have any material ef-
fect."l° As Juras, Lincoln, and I point out in our article on the public access
aspects of STBR, l°' the Eleventh Circuit's law on-point is not comforting.11
02
McKinney v. Pate10 3 held that a government may rescind statutory rights as
long as it provides procedural due process-notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' 104
Justice Scalia's opinion concluded that the Walton County decision was
controlled by a decision that the lower court nowhere mentioned:
In Martin v. Busch,10 5 the Florida Supreme Court held that when
the State drained water from a lakebed belonging to the State,
causing land that was formerly below the mean high-water line
1096. 69 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1954).
1097. Id. at 329.
1098. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
1099. Id.
1100. See id. at 2613 n.12.
1101. Ansbacher, et al., supra note 10, at 114-115.
1102. Id. at 213.
1103. 20 F.3d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1994).
1104. Id. at 1567.
1105. 112 So. 274 (1927).
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[sic, as MHWL applies to tidal waters, and OHWL applies in the
non-tidal Lake Okeechobee] to become dry land, that land contin-
ued to belong to the State." 6
This followed Justice Scalia's and Justice Kennedy's questions at oral
argument why Martin was not cited below."O° I discussed this at length in
the ABA Constitutional Law Committee Newsletter.1
0 8
Several major reasons come to mind. First, Martin addressed Swamp
and Overflowed Lands along the shore of Lake Okeechobee."09 The federal
and state government drained the lake through several major canals, for the
"improvement" of the Everglades by large-scale reclamation. "'0 The Busch
parties took title by a patent that expressly reserved to the state the right to
enter their parcel for "canals, cuts, sluiceways, dikes and other work" that the
state deemed appropriate to drain and reclaim."" The deed expressly limited
the parcel by the margins of the lake and its tributaries. " 2 No one under that
chain had a reasonable expectation of unqualified littoral rights." 1 3 In fact, it
was quite the opposite.
Finally, the majority decision in Sand Key expressly reversed, or at least
said that Martin was dicta as related to reliction." 14 Accordingly, it was ap-
propriate and reasonable for littoral property owners after Sand Key to as-
sume that alluvial deposits caused by third party governmental action in-
cuffed to them. It made imminent sense for them to assume Martin was no
longer applied.
b. Judicial Takings
Justice Scalia was unable to get Justice Kennedy to join his four justice
plurality."' 5 While he held that Florida did not take property here, Justice
1106. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2611 (2010).
1107. Transcript of Oral Argument at *26, *53, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151 ).
1108. See generally Sidney F. Ansbacher, What Did You Expect from Swamp Sales, a Hap-
py Ending?, CONST. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 2010 at 11.
1109. Id. at 12.
1110. Id.
til1. Id. at 16 (quoting Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 281 (Fla. 1927)).
1112. Id. (discussing Martin, 112 So. 2d at 280).
1113. Id.
1114. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d
934, 942 (Fla. 1987) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
1115. See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010).
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Scalia opined that the judiciary can be liable for a taking.1116 He concluded
that the standard for a judicial taking was not the one cited by Stewart in
Hughes, and thus relied upon by the Petitioner in STBR. 1117 Rather, Justice
Scalia stated that a state court should be liable where it deprives one of an
established property right." 8 He expounded: "A property right is not estab-
lished if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not
make our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.""' 9
Justice Scalia also discussed the delicate question of whether the reme-
dy for a judicial taking was the same as for a taking by the other two
branches-just compensation." 2 ° He concluded no." 2' Rather, his opinion
stated the remedy was reversal, thus allowing the state legislature to "either
provide compensation or acquiesce in the invalidity of the offending features
of the Act."''1
22
Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, stated that the
due process clause provides the primary method of relief where a court de-
viates from precedent. 123 Only when the due process clause proves inade-
quate should the Supreme Court consider the judicial takings doctrine." 24 He
emphasized that he believed the doctrine is "inconsistent with historical prac-
tice."' 125
One commentary, logically enough, states: "That Justice Kennedy tho-
roughly denounced a judicial takings doctrine for lack of any historical, subs-
tantive, or theoretical backing makes it surprising that he left any door open
to the creation of such a doctrine in the future."
' 1 26
Justice Kennedy's due process analysis is understandable, and consis-
tent with much Supreme Court precedent. 127 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia
blasted him, essentially, for not joining Scalia, and, specifically, for relying
on due process. 1
128
1116. Id. at 2618.
1117. Id. at 2610.
1118. Jd. at 2608.
1119. Id. at 2609-10, n.9.
1120. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., at 2610.
1121. Id. at 2607.
1122. Id.
1123. Id. at 2613-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1124. Id. at 2618.
1125. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., at 2616.
1126. Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
247, 250 (2011) http://yalelawjoumal.org/2011/2/18/mulvaney.html.
1127. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE
L.J. 408 (2010), dissects the history of substantive due process.
1128. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2605-10.
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Justice Scalia's castigation of Justice Kennedy's reliance on substantive
due process was predictable. Constitutional originalists generally view the
doctrine as a catchall with no historical basis. 129 Justice Scalia stated that
the Due Process Clause "places no constraints whatever upon this Court" in
the substantive context." 3
Yet, Justice Scalia joined a plurality in McDonald v. City of Chicago 1131
just eleven days after STBR, which held that the Second Amendment was
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 32 Ilya
Shapiro and Trevor Burrus of the Cato Institute (the former of whom was on
Cato's briefs in both STBR and McDonald) sought to explain why."1 33 They
contend that Scalia will use the Due Process Clause when he must, but refus-
es to do so "either to protect unenumerated rights or, as in [STBR], to super-
sede more historically rooted textual provisions."''
34
One commentator makes a trenchant observation regarding how close
Justice Scalia came to a possible majority in STBR. 135 Professor John Eche-
verria notes that Justice Kennedy's concurrence focused on whether "a judi-
cial ruling upsets 'settled principles"' regarding the state's law."36 While
Kennedy stated that "'owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to
make certain changes in property law,"' a decision that disturbed established
expectations would go too far." 137 The commentator observes that Kennedy's
"settled expectations" standard "seems to have a good deal in common" with
Stewart's judicial takings analysis in Hughes. 138 He suggests that Scalia
might well have lost his majority by hewing to a per se takings test instead of
Stewart' s test. 1
39
Justice Breyer's separate concurrence wondered why the plurality even
needed to address the issue. 140 He expressed concern that federal courts
1129. See, e.g., Jason A. Crook, Exposing the Contradiction: An Originalist's Approach to
Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is a Constitutional Misinterpretation, 10 NEV.
L. J. 1 (2009).
1130. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2608 (emphasis omitted).
1131. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
1132. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
1133. See generally Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial Takings and Scalia's Shifting
Sands, 35 VT. L. REV. 423 (2010).
1134. Id. at 433.
1135. See generally John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary
is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475,478 (2010).
1136. Id.
1137. Id. (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1138. Id. at480.
1139. See id.
1140. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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would be called on to act as a de facto final state appellate court to address
matters that are familiar to the state, but not federal judiciary.11 41
7. STBR's Results
a. Title Coverage
One aspect of STBR remains that received little attention in the decision
or the various articles addressing the decision: title coverage. There is little
doubt that a waterfront home is worth more than a waterview home.
1 42
There is little doubt that an exclusive right of beach access down to the
MHWL is worth more than one shared with the public. Government acts
that deprive one of either water frontage or exclusive access deprive one of
valuable rights.
Nonetheless, it is exceedingly rare that a Floridian can obtain title insur-
ance for such actions as complained of in STBR. One of the most insightful
briefs in the case was an amicus curiae brief of the New Jersey Land Title
Association for the Petitioner.1 143 That brief discussed the key role of title
insurance in "allow[ing] [parties] to invest in real estate with confidence"
that title "is good and free of encumbrances," or that such encumbrances are
at least disclosed sufficiently to allow the user to make an informed deci-
sion. 1" 44 The association emphasizes title insurance's "focus[] more on an
analytical risk-elimination rather than a risk-assumption, such as happens
with casualty insurance." ' 145 The brief summarizes the role of title insurance
in protecting title conveyance as "seamlessly trac[ing] [title] backwards in
time to a point beyond the statute of limitations for claims against that
title."1 146
Nonetheless, one major limitation exists to reasonable investment
backed expectations in beachfront property in Florida. Title policies typical-
1141. Id. at 2619.
1142. See, e.g., FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, THE FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
APPRAISAL GUIDELINES at 2.4.2 p. 8 (Nov. 26, 2002) (bodies of water among four interactive
forces that influence real property value), and addendum (3) at 57 (location of property is a
factor in determining just valuation) (citations omitted).
1143. Brief for N.J. Land Title Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-
1151).
1144. Id. at 2 (citing I JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW, § 1.8 (2008).
1145. Id. at3(citingPALOMAR, supra note 1214, at § 1.15).
1146. Id. (citing I LAWRENCE JOEL FINEBERG, HANDBOOK OF NEW JERSEY TITLE PRACTICE:
A TREATISE CONCERNING THE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE OF REAL ESTATE TITLES IN THE
STATE OF NEw JERSEY, § 803 (3d ed. 2007)).
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ly exclude coverage for riparian and littoral rights appurtenant to the proper-
ty, or for any alluvial deposits to the property.
147
While the exception is typical of those found in many states, it stems
from a long and tortuous chain of case law in Florida. In 1973, Florida's
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Sawyer v. Modrall" 48 stated in dicta that
Florida's Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA) operated to extinguish state
sovereign title."149 Florida enacted MRTA in 1963 to "'[simplify] and facili-
tat[e] land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record title.""' 5 0
MRTA generally clears title to one whose chain deraigns from a "root of
title" that has appeared of record for at least thirty years."5 ' All conflicting
claims are extinguished unless they fall under a MRTA exception."152
Ansbacher and Knetsch cited various authorities undermining the con-
tention that the Florida Bar, who supported MRTA's passage, or the legisla-
ture intended MRTA to extinguish sovereign claims and stated:
The members of the Florida Bar who supported drafting MRTA
did not anticipate that the Act would affect sovereignty land titles.
One commentator stated that the legislature deleted the proposed
exemption of state lands from the MRTA bill when it was intro-
duced only because it knew that the Act could not affect such
state's rights. In Professor Barnett's 1967 review of various state
MRTAs, he cited the Florida act as excepting all interests of the
state from MRTA's operation." 53 In addition, one of the Florida
Bar Association proponents of MRTA wrote a letter to the MRTA
Commission Chairman in 1985 stating: "I did not believe the Act
could affect sovereignty lands unless it said so." 1
154
The Supreme Court of Florida in Odom v. Deltona Corp. " 55 held that
MRTA extinguished sovereign claims to non-meandered waters within the
legal description of a swamp and overflowed lands conveyance once thirty
1147. See, e.g., Homer Duvall, Title Insurance, in FLA. BAR, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE 4-13 (6th ed. 2010).
1148. 286 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
1149. Id. at613.
1150. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 349-50 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 712.10
(2010)).
1151. FLA.STAT. §§ 712.01(2); .02.
1152. Id. § 712.03.
1153. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 351 (citations omitted).
1154. Id. (quoting Letter from Richard W. Ervin, Esq., Tallahassee, Fla., to J. Hyatt Brown,
Chairman, Marketable Record Title Act Study Commission, Daytona Beach, Fla. (Sept. 30,
1985)).
1155. 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
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years passed.'1 56  The state had conveyed the parcel over fifty years be-
fore.'15' The Odom court held further that, as meandering creates a presump-
tion that a waterbody is navigable, the failure to meander creates a presump-
tion of non-navigability. 15 ' An adamant dissent by Justice Sundberg coun-
tered that MRTA is only a curative statute, which cannot per se divest the
state of sovereign lands held in the public trust.
1159
Governor Reuben Askew called a special session of the Florida legisla-
ture to respond to Odom. The body passed into law a bill that excluded
"State title to lands beneath navigable waters [that are] acquired by virtue of
its sovereignty."'" 6 While the statute did not state whether it applied retroac-
tively, its procedural posture indicated that it was intended to do so.
1 161
Courts interpreted the exception to apply prospectively only until 1986.162
The Supreme Court of Florida in Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co."63 addressed 1883 deeds from the Florida Cabinet, sitting as
the Board of Trustees of the then-Internal Improvement Fund of Swamp and
Overflowed Lands that did not expressly reserve the state's sovereign lands
under the navigable Peace River." 64 As was the case in the Phillips Petro-
leum case pending at the same time in Mississippi courts and then the Su-
preme Court of the United States," 65 Coastal addressed disputes over private
mineral rights and state lease fees and taxation." 1
66
1156. Id. at 988-89.
1157. Id. at 980.
1158. Id. at 988-89. Note, however, that government surveyors whose records are in feder-
al Field Notes meandered only waters that crossed government survey section lines. Ans-
bacher & Knetsch, supra note 336, at 371-72 n.263.
1159. Odom, 341 So. 2d at 990 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
1160. Act Effective June 15, 1978, ch. 78-288, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 820, 820 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 712.03(7) (2010)).
1161. David L. Powell, Comment, Unfinished Business-Protecting Public Rights to State
Lands from Being Lost Under Florida's Marketable Title Act, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 599,
613-14 (1985).
1162. Compare State v. Contemporary Land Sales, Inc., 400 So. 2d 488, 492 n.4 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("It will be readily noted that this exception is patently ambiguous as
relating to a case, such as this, involving lands no longer beneath navigable waters. If by this
statute the Legislature intended to correct an oversight, not only did the horse in this case
escape in the hiatus but the barn door is still ajar."), with Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cy-
namid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 344 (Ha. 1986) ("[T]he legislature intended to overturn the well-
established law that prior conveyances to private interests did not convey sovereignty lands
encompassed within swamp and overflowed lands being conveyed.").
1163. 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986).
1164. Id. at 342-43.
1165. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
1166. See generally Coastal Petroleum Co., 492 So. 2d at 339.
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Florida's Second District Court of Appeal held that the Trustees' 1883
conveyance without reservation implicitly determined that the submerged
lands were not sovereign. 1167 Even if they were navigable, the failure to re-
serve estopped the state from so claiming.' 6' Finally, MRTA extinguished
any state claims.169 The appellate court certified all three prongs of its hold-
ing to the Supreme Court of Florida as issues of great statewide signific-
ance."1
70
The Supreme Court of Florida held, first, that the Trustees did not hold
authority to convey sovereign lands in 1883.'171 Second, estoppel did not
apply because a sovereign may convey lands only by clear and express in-
tent." 72 The majority held that the lower court's focus on the failure to re-
serve sovereign title improperly reversed the burden.17 3 Last, MRTA did not
apply because MRTA nowhere stated that it was intended to divest sovereign
title."7 4 Further, and consistent with Illinois Central and Article X, section
11, of the Florida Constitution, the majority stated in dicta that it questioned
whether the Florida legislature had authority to make an ex post facto dives-
ture of sovereign lands.1' 75
Therefore, while an oceanfront owner in STBR had good arguments for
vesting and reasonable, investment backed expectations, the owner almost
certainly lacked title insurance coverage against the state's renourishment
and locking in of a new MHWL. Accordingly, title insurance was almost
certainly unavailable after Coastal.
C. Constitutional Issue
As I noted above, and in the Vermont Environmental Law Journal ar-
ticle, the decision leaves one major issue unaddressed. How does the fixed
ECL comport with Article X, section 11, of the Florida Constitution, which
1167. Coastal Petroleum Co v, An, Cyanamid Co., 454 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
1168. Id. at 9.
1169. Id.
1170. Id. at 9-10.
1171. Coastal Petroleum Co., 492 So. 2d at 342-43. Ansbacher and Knetsch cite the 1913
act authorizing conveyance of tidal lands and 1969 for nontidal submerged sovereign lands to
the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.
Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra, note 336, at 357-58, n.175 and accompanying text. Until then,
the Trustees did not have such lands, let alone the authority to convey them. fd.
1!72. Coastal Petroleum Co., 492 So. 2d at 343.
1173. Id.
1174. Id. at 344.
1175. Id.
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states that Florida holds lands below the MHWL along its beaches, together
with other sovereign lands. This is by all law a transitory, not a static boun-
dary. Consistent with Corvallis, the Constitution allows transfers from the
state. It nowhere says one can transfer more sovereign lands to the state.
XIII. CONCLUSION
STBR dismissed quickly the most established body of Florida law con-
cerning littoral rights. In the stead of that case law, the Supreme Court re-
suscitated a decision that most observers thought had been relegated to the
dustbin. The STBR court stated that a decision that the lower court had not
even cited was the seminal Florida decision supporting the Supreme Court.
Of course, this all seems more logical if one assumes that the entire history
of riparian rights and the public trust is an internally contradictory Rube
Goldberg contraption. 1176 For every putative rule, we see multitudinous ex-
ceptions. If indeed, what we know as a rule is even the rule. Certainly, this
body of the law shifts as policies and needs dictate.
For example, if Sax is correct, and the fill in STBR merely reestablished
the foreshore location that preexisted multiple hurricanes, then the net effect
of two sets of avulsive events would by common law have reestablished the
littoral ownership out to that prior point. A literal reading of Art. X, s. 11 of
Florida's Constitution supports that result. Instead, the STBR Court decided
issues as the Florida Supreme Court reframed them, and no party had pre-
served a record to address.
The state court was entitled to do so. Indeed, one doubts the United
States Supreme Court would have asserted jurisdiction had the issues not
been reframed. Regardless, there is no reason to expect today's Supreme
Court to establish a standard for the ages, any more than the ages have pro-
vided us a standard.
1176. Which seems all the more appropriate when one realizes Rube started out as an engi-
neer with the San Francisco Water and Sewer Department.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As applied to the issue of land use and environmental regulation, this
article does not attempt to precisely define the terms "sustainability" or "car-
rying capacity," but borrows loosely from a variety of available definitions.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation defines carrying capacity as:
"[Tihe ability of a resource to accommodate a user population at a reasona-
ble threshold without the user population negatively affecting the resource
sustainability."'
A prevalent definition emanating from a 1987 U.N. conference (Sus-
tainable developments are those that "[meet] the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs")2 or
that of Rosenbaum, 1993 ("Sustainable means using methods, systems and
materials that won't deplete resources or harm natural cycles") 3 may be most
useful. For purposes of this article, sustainability is viewed as the level of
development and land use impacts that impacted ecosystems can tolerate
without unacceptable impacts. The government has been regulating devel-
opment based on these concepts for decades. Few would argue with the ba-
sic constitutionality of zoning-assuming it does not result in a "taking" of
private property-to prevent undue crowding or incompatible land uses, or
the denial of an environmental permit to prevent an unacceptable impact to
wetlands or endangered species.
As past and current losses and impacts to the nation's ecosystems and
farmlands continue to mount, the need for more aggressive land use and
permitting protection of land becomes apparent. Florida's environmental
laws, and the federal laws commonly impacting the use of land in Florida,
provide the government with the legal tools to protect diminishing natural
and financial resources. Legal authority exists to ensure that development
only proceed to the extent that it is fiscally and environmentally sustainable.
The applicable standards for governmental approval of land use plans
and development permits require the government to prevent scientifically
unacceptable impacts to the state's ecosystems. Agencies can, and should,
exercise their discretion using the precautionary principle as they apply and
implement pre-existing legal authorities and requirements to requests for
planning, zoning, and permitting approval.4 Most, if not all, land use and
1. Protect Lake Pleasant, L.L.C. v. Johnson, No. 07-454 PHX RCB, 2007 WL 1486869,
at *6 n.5 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007).
2. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43 (Oxford University Press 1987).
3. Marc Rosenbaum, Sustainable Design Strategies, SOLAR TODAY (Mar./Apr. 1993).
4. See discussion infra pp. 767-75.
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environmental laws provide a legal basis to prevent development that "goes
too far"5 and causes or contributes to an unacceptable environmental or other
public impact.6 Our entire system of environmental and land use laws is
based upon the premise that some environmental degradation must be al-
lowed in favor of property rights and population growth. Yet, each of those
laws sets standards, or thresholds, beyond which adverse impacts are not to
be allowed. Environmental permitting agencies should not issue permits that
could result in unsustainable individual or cumulative impacts. Planning
agencies should not approve land use plans that are not financially or envi-
ronmentally sustainable.
Land use plans now commonly restrict the timing of new development
to the availability of public facilities and services. As public service and
ecological capacity limits become more apparent, land use plans may increa-
singly need to restrict the overall number of approvals that can be granted, in
terms of annual or total amounts. Such planning efforts are controversial and
are likely subject to legal challenge by landowners and developers unen-
thused about the denial or strict limitation on whether, how much, or when
they can develop, and of course lend themselves to strong political debate.
The most stringent land use and environmental regulations-those
which facially preclude or severely limit development or intensive uses of
land, and those which, as applied, allow a landowner little or no such uses-
face acute property rights limitations. Yet, government regulations necessary
to ensure sustainability are not inherently invalid in the face of constitution-
ally protect private property rights, the right to travel, or other rights. Such
regulations raise those issues, as well as those related to "fair share" afforda-
ble housing responsibilities, basic substantive due process considerations,
and just plain uneasiness on the part of some judges and courts.7 But gov-
ernment's right to require full mitigation for public impacts, regulate to pre-
vent unacceptable impacts to human health and ecosystems, and limit devel-
opment stringently without violating private property rights is clear.8 The
most effective approach begins with large scale land use planning and eco-
system preservation, and implements permitting programs to prevent signifi-
cant adverse fiscal and ecological impacts resulting from planned develop-
ment.
5. This is the standard enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922), for determining when a regulation amounts to a taking of private property.
6. See id. at 415-16.
7. See generally Tom Pierce, A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of
No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability,
19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93 (1997).
8. Id. at 123.
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Rhetoric such as "We can't put up a gate; we have to put them some-
where," is inadequate to describe the reality of the government's options in
the face of population growth, or the importance of exercising those options.
There is no basic constitutional or human right for all who might want to live
in Florida to have their home in (a rapidly degraded or paved-over) paradise
subsidized by the government or the ecosystem. 9 At the same time, there
will be continued population growth, and important decisions need to be
made about where, when, and how that growth takes place, and government
can and must make those decisions. Constitutional and statutory law do not
render government helpless to sit back and allow land use impacts to reduce
the amount of ecosystem or farmlands beyond their essential thresholds and
overload its public facilities beyond acceptable limits. Environmental and
land use laws may validly preclude environmental impacts that are not sus-
tainable.
Section II of this article will provide a brief summary of the major land
use and environmental laws in Florida, including applicable federal law, and
how they authorize, and in most cases require, planning and permitting deci-
sions based upon the limits of ecosystems or public facilities to accommo-
date the expected impacts. Section HI will explore in more depth the details
of Florida's land use planning law-the Community Planning Act" as it ad-
dresses the role of population projections, environmental and other impacts,
and the provision of infrastructure and service demands of development.
Next, the article will discuss cases around the country and Florida that have
ruled upon the legality of limited growth and moratoria ordinances and dis-
cuss the property-rights-related implications of such ordinances. Finally, the
article will discuss the application of judicial standards of review to land use
and environmental permitting laws and individual actions that spring from or
require the application of scientific or technical professional judgment in
fields that are inherently subject to professional debate.
11. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN FLORIDA LAW FOR ECOLOGICAL AND FISCAL
SUSTAINABILITY
Florida's natural resources are severely threatened by development,
roads, mines, and other impacts. Florida's water resources are suffering sig-
nificant harm,1 water quality continues to degrade, 12 wetland loss has been
9. See id. at 132-35. See infra pp. 755-56, for a discussion of the constitutional "right
to travel."
10. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161, et. seq. (2011).
11. Christina A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 403, 405 (2009).
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dramatic, 13 and rare and endangered wildlife habitat continues to dwindle.
Its wildlife face dreary prospects in a long, narrow peninsula fragmented by
roads, development, mines, large-scale active agriculture, and other uses
inconducive to the movement patterns of large and small wildlife) 4 "As in
the rest of the world, the loss of habitat quality and quantity is the biggest
threat to listed species in Florida."1 5 "Florida has been identified as the state
at greatest risk of losing its native habitats." 6
Achieving sustainability requires the combined exercise of land use
planning authority by local governments and the state, and permitting deci-
sions by regional and state agencies, as well as the federal government. It
starts with land use decisions of local governments about potential maximum
use and intensity based on the inherent suitability of the land under Chapter
163 of the Florida Statutes. The most fundamental questions about sustaina-
bility must first be asked at the planning stage where the big picture is in
focus and where land use impacts can be evaluated in conjunction with the
broad array of issues that are relevant under Chapter 163. Planning decisions
determine the type and intensity of land use and development, and therefore
set the course for sustainability or not. Bad planning decisions which create
inappropriate development expectations and corresponding property values
can render the permitting process little more than window-dressing. Good
planning allows environmental laws to effectively protect the public interest
at the detailed development approval level, allowing permitting agencies,
based on the standards applicable to environmental permits, to ensure that
the end result of development that is potentially suitable to the natural cha-
racter of the land and other characteristics does not result in unacceptable
environmental impacts. As to fiscal sustainability, the law provides ample
12. See Div. OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.
INTEGRATED WATER QuALrTY ASSESSMENT FOR FLORIDA: 2010 305(B) REPORT AND 303(D)
LIST UPDATE 5, 19, 21-28, 127-138, 143-159 (2010).
13. See id. at 183, 189.
14. Jason Totoiu, Building a Better State Endangered Species Act: An Integrated Ap-
proach Toward Recovery, 40 ENvTL. L. REP. 10299, 10301 (2010). "In Florida alone, 114
species occur that are listed under the ESA." Id. (citing U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species
Reports: Listings and Occurrences for Each State (2011), available at http://ecos.fws.govl
tess-public/pub/stateListingAndOccurrence.jsp?state=FL. "The state's Endangered and
Threatened Species Act (ETSA) lists 118 species, significantly more than the 23 species that
were originally listed as endangered in 1976 when the ETSA was enacted." Id. (citing FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.01 1-.006 (2008)).
15. Id. (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Introduction, in MULTISPECIES RECOVERY
PLAN FOR SouTH FLORIDA 1: 1, 1: 16 (1999)).
16. Id. (citing REED Noss & ROBERT, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, A STATUS REPORT ON
AMERICA'S VANISHING HABITAT AND WILDLIFE 12- 13 (1995)).
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support, particularly for local governments, for requiring that the fiscal im-
pacts of new development are fully mitigated by the developer.'7
A. The Florida Constitution
"It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made for the abate-
ment of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise."18
B. Private Property Rights
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc., 9 held that a landowner does not possess an inherent property right to
substantially change the essential natural character of land and put it to a use
for which it is not inherently suitable: "An owner of land has no absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as
to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injuries [sic] the rights of others. 2°
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a local land-use ordin-
ance, which precluded the erection of fences around single-family lots,
enacted to allow the endangered Florida Key deer to roam freely around its
spatially-diminished natural habitats. 2' Reversing the Third District Court of
Appeal's ruling that a landowner's property rights always trump the rights of
the public in environmental protection, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled
that, under the Florida Constitution, one does not trump the other and that
private property rights and the public interest are to be balanced.22
The Court held, "Landowners do not have an untrammeled right to use
their property regardless of the legitimate environmental interests of the
State., 23 Citing Article H, Section 7 of the Florida Constitution-the natural
17. See discussion of the Community Planning Act's provisions concerning the provision
of adequate infrastructure, concurrency, and the efficient provision of public facilities and
services, infra p. 754.
18. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
19. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981). In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a
development order that required half of the owner's property (a large mangrove forest) to
remain in its natural state. Id. at 1382. Because the action served a legitimate governmental
purpose and allowed the landowner to enjoy an economically viable use, the court rejected the
takings claim. Id.
20. Id.
21. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 932, 934 (Fla. 1995).
22. Id. at 933.
23. Id.
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resource protection clause-the Court found that "the State has a legitimate
interest in protecting the natural habitat of the Keys and most especially of
the Key deer,"24 which the Court observed was "perilously close to extinc-
tion."25
Citing the natural resource provision of the Florida Constitution, 6 the
Court observed: "The clear policy underlying Florida environmental regula-
tion is that our society is to be the steward of the natural world, not its unrea-
soning overlord. 27
Citing Sarasota v. Barg,28 the Court remarked: "There is an obvious
public interest in such a policy, given the fact that environmental degradation
threatens not merely aesthetic concerns vital to the State's economy but also
the health, welfare, and safety of substantial numbers of Floridians. 29
C. Florida Law Protecting Wetlands and Water Quality and Quantity
Florida's Water Resources Development Act governs the use of Flori-
da's water resources. 30 "Under the Act, the Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP) supervises five 'water management districts' ...
[which] have the responsibility for entire watersheds, which enhances their
ability to address ecosystemwide problems. 31
1. Environmental Resource Permit Laws: Chapter 373 of the Florida Sta-
tutes
Florida's Environmental Resource Permitting laws-combined wetland
and storm water permitting-protect water resources from development im-
pacts by precluding permitting authorization for ecological harm, which goes
beyond a point of acceptability.
32
24. Id. at 932. The Court stated, "The fact the land in question sits in an area of critical
state concern is crucial to the result in this case, because it identifies an environmental concern
unique to Big Pine Key." Id. at 932 n. 1.
25. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 931.
26. "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made for the abatement of air and water pollution
and of excessive and unnecessary noise ...." FLA. CONST., art. II, § 7.
27. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
28. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
29. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
30. Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10307 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373 (2009)).
31. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 373.044 (2010)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 373.016.
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a. The Environmental Resource Permit Public Interest Standard
The statutory "Public Interest" criteria for the approval of an
Environmental Resource Permit, which emphasizes the protection of natural
systems, requires cumulative and secondary impact analysis and mitigation
for unavoidable impacts, and requires projects to be not contrary to or clearly
in the public interest, protecting the state against unaccepable impacts to
wetlands and other water resources.33 On their face, these criteria support a
determination that a proposed project is not in the public interest if, based on
a preponderance of the evidence, its adverse environmental impacts exceed
those which the affected ecosystem can handle.
Section 373.414, Additional Criteria for Activities in Surface Waters
and Wetlands, provides:
(1) As part of an applicant's demonstration that an activity regu-
lated under this part will not be harmful to the water resources or
will not be inconsistent with the overall objectives of the district,
the governing board or the department shall require the applicant
to provide reasonable assurance that state water quality standards
applicable to waters as defined in s. 403.031(13) will not be vi-
olated and reasonable assurance that such activity in, on, or over
surface waters or wetlands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), is not
contrary to the public interest. However, if such an activity sig-
nificantly degrades or is within an Outstanding Florida Water, as
provided by department rule, the applicant must provide reason-
able assurance that the proposed activity will be clearly in the
public interest.
(a) In determining whether an activity, which is in, on, or over
surface waters or wetlands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), and is
regulated under this part, is not contrary to the public interest or
is clearly in the public interest, the governing board or the de-
partment shall consider and balance the following criteria:
1. Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health,
safety, or welfare or the property of others;
33. Richard Grosso, Land Planning and Population Growth-People vs. Diminishing
Resources: A Legal Case for Sustainable Planning Decisions, FLA. B. ENV'T & LAND USE
SECT. LAW, Aug. 21, 2008, at 1, available at http://elc-web.org/app/download/4804757804/
land-planning.pdf.
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2. Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation
offish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species,
or their habitats;
3. Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the
flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling;
4. Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or re-
creational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the ac-
tivity;
5. Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent
nature;
6. Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance
significant historical and archaeological resources under the pro-
visions of s. 267.061; and
7. The current condition and relative value of functions being
performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
34
These criteria are to be considered and balanced. 35 While a negative af-
fect on any particular criteria does not necessarily render a project contrary
to the public interest, in any given case, one criterion may well be more criti-
cal than the other six. 36 An applicant must also prove compliance with the
public interest test on the whole.37
The law supports a denial of a wetland permit in cases of extreme dam-
age to environment that cannot be mitigated. 38 Florida's Department of En-
vironmental Protection Water Management Districts, when given authority
by the Legislature, can heighten permit requirements. 39 For example, the St.
Johns River Water Management District has authority to adopt proposed
rules defining areas within the district as hydrologic basins and establishing
more restrictive standards for issuing permits and development requirements
within those basins, where the Legislature provided "authority to identify
34. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1), (1)(a) (emphasis added).
35. Higgins et al. v. Roberts et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 5045, 5047-48 (1987).
36. Id. at 5048.
37. Id. (applying the test to a proposal that would adversely impact the habitat of endan-
gered and threatened wildlife species).
38. 1800 Atl. Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 552 So. 2d 946, 954 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
39. See id. at 955.
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geographic areas that require greater environmental protection and to impose
more restrictive permitting requirements in those areas. ' 4°
In Florida Power Corp. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,4'
the court upheld the Department's rejection of a hearing officer's recom-
mendation that a power company's project would have no adverse impact
and was not contrary to the public interest. 42 The court found competent,
substantial evidence to support the Department's emphasis on the lack of
type-for-type mitigation and the importance of ensuring actual offset for the
proposed destruction of six acres of forested wetlands for the benefit of the
plants and animals solely dependent on forested wetlands.43 One of the fac-
tors the court considered was the "edge effect," referring to the negative or
positive influences one ecosystem may have on adjacent ecosystems.44 The
court noted that the Department properly determined that the extent of the
impact on the environment from the destruction of the forest was a policy
matter and not a question of fact to be resolved by a hearing officer.45
b. Minimization and Avoidance
State ERP rules emphasize requiring a permit applicant to make all
practicable modifications to the development proposal that would avoid or
eliminate wetland impacts.46 These rule requirements that try to avoid wet-
land impacts altogether, and then require full mitigation to offset unavoidable
impacts are policy decisions to ensure the sustainability of wetland and water
resources.
47
40. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So. 2d 72,
81 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41. 638 So. 2d 545 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
42. Fla. Power Corp., 638 So. 2d at 561.
43. Id. at561-62.
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 561.
46. See Orlando Cent. Park, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 9 F.A.L.R. 1305, 1319-20,
1330 (DOAH 1987); Dibbs v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Case No. 94-509 (DOAH Apr. 4, 1995);
VQH Dev., Inc., DOAH Case No. 92-7456, 15 F.A.L.R. 3407, 3411 (Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
Final Order, Aug. 13, 1993) aff'd 642 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cnty. Line
Coal., Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., Case No. 98-2927 (DOAH 1999); see, e.g., FLA.
ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 62-312.060 (1998).
47. The Rules of the South Florida Water Management District state, "[P]rotection of
wetlands and other surface waters is preferred to destruction and mitigation due to the tempor-
al loss of ecological value and uncertainty regarding the ability to recreate certain functions
associated with these features." BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES PERMIT
APPLICATIONS, SFWMD § 4.3 (2010).
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c. Mitigation Requirements to "Offset" Wetland Impacts
Florida's statutory approach to wetland mitigation fosters the sustaina-
bility of wetlands and water resources. If an application does not meet the
public interest test, the Department must consider mitigation. 48 The Depart-
ment "shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to
mitigate adverse effects that may be caused by regulated activity. 49
"[M]itigation must offset the adverse effects caused by the regulated activi-
ty."5° The rules require that the mitigation offset the impacts to the specific
functions of the specific wetlands being impacted.51 The mitigation must
address the negative factors in the public interest test which tipped the bal-
ance against the public interest.
5 2
In Florida Power Corp. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regu-
lation,53 the Department held that, although there is no absolute "no net loss"
standard for mitigation, the avoidance or minimization of net loss is an im-
portant guiding principle of mitigation.54 Since mitigation by preservation
necessarily results in loss of jurisdictional wetlands, the Department general-
ly accepts preservation mitigation only after on-site wetland creation and/or
enhancement is shown to be not feasible or not sufficient to tip the public
interest balancing test "scales" in favor of permit issuance.55
Florida law recognizes that some wetlands cannot be mitigated because
they are particularly unique or provide functions that cannot be re-created.
56
As Section 4.3 of the South Florida Water Management District's Basis of
Review makes clear:
In certain cases, mitigation cannot offset impacts sufficiently to
yield a permittable project. Such cases often include activities
which significantly degrade Outstanding Florida Waters, adversely
impact habitat for listed species, or adversely impact those wet-
48. FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1)(b) (2010).
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte Cnty., 774 So. 2d 903, 909 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); VQH Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., DOAH Case. No. 92-7456, 15
F.A.L.R. 3407, at 3411 (Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Final Order Aug. 13, 1993) affd, 642 So. 2d
755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cnty. Line Coal., Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Mgmt. Dist., Case No. 98-
2927 (DOAH Mar. 18, 1999).
52. See generally McCormick v. City of Jacksonville, 12 F.A.L.R. 960 (Dep't of Envtl.
Prot. 1990).
53. 92 E.R. F.A.L.R. 56 (Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation Final Order Apr. I1, 1992).
54. Id. at 20 (remanding for determination on the adequacy of proposed mitigation).
55. Id. at 17.
56. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PERMIT APPLICATION § 4.3 (2010).
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lands or other surface waters not likely to be successfully re-
created.57
In these instances, water management districts and the DEP have the
discretion to reject a mitigation plan and deny a permit for any project that
otherwise does not eliminate or reduce harm to wetlands.58
d. Cumulative Impact Analysis
The cumulative impact analysis required for Florida wetland permitting
agencies is a sustainability threshold requirement for the wetland, water, and
related resources that would be impacted by proposed development
projects.59 Environmental Resource Permitting agencies must consider the
cumulative impacts of their permitting decisions.6 °
Section 373.414 (8)(a): Additional criteria for activities in surface wa-
ters and wetlands:
The governing board or the department, in deciding whether to
grant or deny a permit for an activity regulated under this part shall
consider the cumulative impacts upon surface water and wetlands,
as delineated in s. 373.421(1), within the same drainage basin as
defined in s. 373.403(9), of:
1. The activity for which the permit is sought.
2. Projects which are existing or activities regulated under this part
which are under construction or projects for which permits or de-
terminations pursuant to s. 373.421 or s. 403.914 have been
sought.
57. Id.
58. See Brown v. So. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., DOAH Case No. 04-000476 (Final Order
Sept. 13, 2004) (denying an ERP where it was determined that the proposed mitigation for a
dock project would not adequately offset impacts to a listed species of seagrass); Charlotte
Cnty. v. IMC-Phosphates Co., 4 E.R. F.A.L.R. 20 (Final Order Sept. 15, 2003) (denying an
application for an ERP where the applicant failed to provide reasonable assurances that its
mitigation proposal would maintain or improve the natural functions of the diverse types of
wetland systems present at the site prior to commencement of the project); Kramer v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 2 E.R. F.A.L.R. 225, 236 (Final Order Feb. 26, 2002) (denying an ERP where the
mitigation plan was found inadequate and "experimental").
59. Sierra Club v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt., 816 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
60. Id. at 689.
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3. Activities which are under review, approved, or vested pursuant
to s. 380.06, or other activities regulated under this part which may
reasonably be expected to be located within surface waters or wet-
lands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), in the same drainage basin as
defined in s. 373.403(9), based upon the comprehensive plans,
adopted pursuant to chapter 163, of the local governments having
jurisdiction over the activities, or applicable land use restrictions
and regulations.
61
Reported cases amply support the view that this consideration of cumu-
lative impacts is designed to prevent an end result for the impacted environ-
ment that exceeds its tolerance thresholds. In Florida Power Corp. v. De-
partment of Environmental Regulation,62 the First District rejected an as-
serted "de minimis exception" to the cumulative impact analysis requirement,
finding that such an exemption "would completely undercut the purpose of
the cumulative impact analysis required by section 403.919.:63
In McCormick v. City of Jacksonville,6 Florida's Governor and Cabinet,
sitting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC),
recognized that cumulative impact analysis is necessary to "prevent piece-
meal destruction of the environment. '65 FLWAC stated, "without the ability
to consider the long term impacts of a project in combination with past and
reasonably likely similar projects in the area, the [] permitting agency would
be helpless to prevent the gradual elimination of environmental resources
through [] permits. ' '66
Perhaps the most explicit "sustainability" discussion is found in the case
of Broward County v. Weiss & South Florida Water Management District,
67
which defined unacceptable cumulative impacts as those which would place
the fish and wildlife dependant on the functions to be lost in jeopardy of col-
lapse.68 "Collapse would occur when the population no longer is sustainable
... [and] could lead to extirpation of the population from the Basin. 69
61. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(8)(a) (2010).
62. 638 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 561.
64. 12 F.A.L.R. 960 (FLWAC Jan. 22, 1990).
65. Id.; Dione Carroll, Secondary Impacts in Environmental Resource Permitting: Yes-
terday, Today and Tomorrow, Mar. 1998 E.L.U.L.S. SEC. FLA. BAR http://www.eluls.
org/marl998_carroll.html.
66. Carroll, supra note 65.
67. DOAH Case No. 01-3373 (SFWMD Final Order No. 2002-184 FOF ERP, Nov. 14,
2002).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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2. Coastal Permitting
Florida also has a special dredge and fill permitting process for coastal
development. Among other things, it is the intent of Florida's coastal devel-
opment permitting process "to preserve and protect them from imprudent
construction which can jeopardize the stability of the beach-dune system,
accelerate erosion, . .. or interfere with public beach access."7 ° The statute
also expresses a legislative finding and intent that "[d]evelopment of coastal
areas should be both economically and environmentally sustainable, and
inappropriate growth in ecologically fragile or hazard-prone areas should be
discouraged., 71 The Legislature recognizes that the sand resources are an
"exhaustible resource.' 72
In order for a coastal permit to be issued, the application must meet the
Chapter 62B-33 design and siting requirements, which include a review of
the potential impacts to the beach dune system, adjacent properties, native
salt resistant vegetation, and marine turtles. 73 An applicant for a coastal per-
mit must "provide the Department with sufficient information . . . to show
that [any] adverse and other impacts associated with the construction have
been minimized and that the construction will not result in a significant ad-
verse impact.
74
Florida Administrative Code Rule 62B-41.003(2) prohibits coastal con-
struction resulting in a "significant adverse impact., 75 Florida Administra-
tive Code Rule 62B-41.005(2) provides that coastal construction shall be
"limited" and requires the applicant to state the necessity and justification for
coastal construction and the potential benefits or impacts to the coastal sys-
tem.
76
"Adverse Impacts" are impacts to the coastal system that may cause a
"measurable interference with the natural functioning of the coastal sys-
tem."77 "Significant Adverse Impacts" are impacts of such magnitude that
they may:
1. Alter the coastal system by:
a. Measurably affecting the existing shoreline change rate;
70. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(1 )(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
71. Id. § 161.72(m).
72. Id. § 161.144.
73. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.005(4)(a)-(h) (2010).
74. Id. r. 62B-33.005(2).
75. Id. r. 62B-41.003(2).
76. Id. r. 62B-41.005(2).
77. Id. r. 62B-41.002(19)(a).
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b. Significantly interfering with its ability to recover from a coastal
storm;
c. Disturbing topography or vegetation such that the dune system be-
comes unstable or suffers catastrophic failure.78
In Leto v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,79 construc-
tion permits were denied because, among other reasons, "the structure, as
designed, failed to adequately protect local marine turtles."8
In Surfrider Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,8' the Department
of Environmental Protection denied a coastal permit for a proposed beach
renourishment project based on several findings of adverse environmental
impact to the nearshore coastal resources.82 Among the findings supporting
the denial was that:
In the final revision of the Permit, Palm Beach and DEP re-
moved the monitoring requirements for the offshore reef. The un-
iqueness of this resource has been detailed above. Because of the
rare confluence of conditions required for its creation, the Florida
Reef Tract cannot be replaced in any timeframe short of geologic
time, so its protection, even from remote risks, must be a matter of
exceptional regulatory concern.
83
3. Water Quality
Florida Law states that "[e]xisting uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect the existing uses shall be fully maintained and
protected."'
Chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes-Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act-recognizes that water bodies serve multiple beneficial uses that
must be protected to promote the public welfare, and established a policy to
"conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain, and improve the
quality thereof for public water supplies, for the propagation of wildlife and
fish and other aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recrea-
tional, and other beneficial uses. '8' The Act empowers the Department of
78. Id r. 62B-33.002(33)(A)-(B).
79. 824 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Id. at 284.
81. Surfrider Found., Inc., v. Town of Palm Beach, Case no. 08-1511 (DOAH Mar. 2,
2009).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 231.
84. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.300(14) (2010).
85. FLA. STAT. § 403.021(2) (2010).
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Environmental Protection to "[dlevelop . . . a grouping of the waters into
classes . . . in accordance with the present and future most beneficial uses,"
and to "[e]stablish ... water quality standards for the state as a whole or for
any part thereof."
86
The administrative rule that identifies five classes of waterbodies is
Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-302.400.87 Most waters are listed as
Class Il on the basis of the designated uses "Recreation, Propagation and
Maintenance of a Healthy, Well-Balanced Population of Fish and Wild-
life. 88 Others are classified as either Class I Potable Water Supplies, Class
II Shellfish Propagation or Harvesting, Class IV Agricultural Water Supplies,
or Class V Navigation, Utility, and Industrial Use.8 9 Most water quality cri-
teria are set as quantitative concentration standards, established based on a
determination of the level of pollution that can be accommodated by such
water bodies while protecting their designated uses.90 One criteria-for nu-
trients-is stated qualitatively: "Nutrients-in no case shall nutrient concen-
trations of a body of water be altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural
populations of aquatic flora and fauna."9'
The rules identify a special category for waters of special recreational or
ecological significance, known as "Outstanding Florida Waters" (OFWs).
Under Rule 62-302.700(1), "No degradation of water quality, other than that
allowed in subsections 62-4.242(2) and (3)," is permitted. 93 The rules prohi-
bit permits from being issued "for any proposed activity or discharge within
an [OFW], or which significantly degrades" an OFW, unless the permit ap-
plicant can affirmatively demonstrate that the proposed discharge is "clearly
in the public interest" and that "existing ambient water quality. .. will not be
lowered." 94 "Existing ambient water quality" is defined as "the better...
quality of either (1) that which could reasonably be expected to have existed
for the baseline year of an [OFW] designation or (2) that which existed dur-
ing the year prior to the date of [the] permit application. 95
86. Id. § 403.061(10), (11).
87. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.400(1).
88. Id. r. 62-302.400(1), (14).
89. Id. r. 62-302.400(1).
90. See id. r. 62-302.300(3).
91. Id. r. 62-302.530 (47)(b).
92. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.700(9).
93. Id. r. 62-302.700(1).
94. Id. r. 62-4.242(2)(a), (2)(a)2, (2)(a)2b.
95. Id. r. 62-4.242(2)(c).
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Rule 62-302.300(14) provides, "Existing uses and the level of water
quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be fully maintained and
protected. 96
d. Consumptive Use Permit (CUP) Standards
The standard for the approval of a Consumptive (Water) Use Permit un-
ambiguously precludes the allowance of harm to the state's water resources:
The governing board or the department may require such permits
for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable
conditions as are necessary to assure that such use is consistent
with the overall objectives of the district or department and is not
harmful to the water resources of the area.9
7
"To obtain a permit pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the applicant
must establish that the proposed use of water: (a) [i]s a reasonable-beneficial
use as defined in [section] 373.019; (b) [w]ill not interfere with any presently
existing legal use of water; and (c) [i]s consistent with the public interest."98
According to section 373.019(16), "reasonable-beneficial use" is defined as
"the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient
utilization for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and con-
sistent with the public interest. ' '99
This standard implements the legislative "declaration of policy" set
forth in section 373.016 that:
(1) The waters in the state are among its basic resources. Such wa-
ters have not heretofore been conserved or fully controlled so as to
realize their full beneficial use.
(2) The department and the governing board shall take into ac-
count cumulative impacts on water resources and manage those re-
sources in a manner to ensure their sustainability. 
°°
In addition, it is state policy to "promote the conservation, replenish-
ment, recapture, enhancement, development, and proper utilization of surface
96. Id. r. 62-302.300(14).
97. FLA. STAT. § 373.219(1) (2010).
98. Id. § 373.223(1).
99. Id. § 373.019(16).
100. Id. § 373.016(l)-(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
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and groundwater"'0 1 and to "promote the availability of sufficient water for
all existing and future reasonable-beneficial uses and natural systems.' ' 2
These standards preclude the issuance of a CUP that would cause or
contribute to unacceptable environmental impacts. 10 3 The St. Johns River
Water Management District, for example, requires the applicant to reduce the
"environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use ... to an
acceptable amount."' ' The South Florida Water Management District re-
quires applicants to demonstrate the proposed water use will not cause signif-
icant saline water intrusion, adversely impact offsite land uses, cause pollu-
tion or cause adverse environmental impacts.0 5 Its rules also emphasize that
proposed withdrawals must not cause harm to environmental features such as
wetlands or other surface waters that are sensitive to the magnitude, seasonal
timing, and duration of inundation.' 0 6 In Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett
Pines,10 7 the court held that the statute requires the consideration of a pro-
posed well field's environmental effects beyond its impacts on the water
resource.1
0 8
Impacts to water quality resulting from the discharge after water has
been used, may provide a basis for denial of a consumptive use permit. 1°9
The adverse environmental effects of a land use supported by a proposed
consumptive use are also relevant. In In re South Dade Agro Homes, Inc.,' 0
a consumptive use permit was denied for an agricultural operation in undis-
turbed wetlands that were critical habitat for an endangered species because
significant harm to the habitat would result."' In Osceola County v. St.
Johns River Water Management District,1 2 a wellfield permit was denied
because of the likelihood of significant harm to wetlands." 13
101. Id. § 373.016(3)(b).
102. FLA. STAT. § 373.016(3)(d).
103. See Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1326-27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
104. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-2.301(4)(d) (2010).
105. Id. r. 40E-2.301(l)(a)-(e).
106. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR WATER USE PERMIT APPLICATION WITHIN THE SOUTH FLORIDA
WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, § 4.2.2.4 (2010).
107. 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
108. Id. at 479.
109. Richard Hamann, Consumptive Use Permitting Criteria, FLA. B. FLA. ENVTL. &LAND
USE L. (Aug. 2001).
110. 7 F.A.L.R. 3645 (Final Order S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. June 13, 1985).
111. Id. at 3647-48.
112. 92 E.R. F.A.L.R. 109 (Final Order June 10, 1992).
113. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of Florida's consumptive use permitting law and
cases, see generally Hamann, supra note 109; Hamann & Ankersen, Water, Wetlands and
Wildlife: The Coming Crisis in Consumptive Use, 67 FLA. BAR J. 41 (March 1993).
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a. Water Reservation Rules
In addition to the criteria that govern individual applications for con-
sumptive use permitting, the State's Department of Environmental Protection
and its five water management districts are authorized to affirmatively "re-
serve" water (make unavailable to consumptive users) to protect fish and
wildlife. 1 4 Section 373.223(4) of the Florida Statutes states: "The govern-
ing board or the department, by regulation, may reserve from use by permit
applicants, water in such locations and quantities, and for such seasons of
the year, as in its judgment may be required for the protection offish and
wildlife or the public health and safety."'" 5
This statute provides the agencies "with a broad grant of authority to re-
serve water in order to protect fish and wildlife or to protect the public health
and safety." ' 1 6 In this case, the District Court upheld an administrative order
finding a reservations administrative rule valid."7 The Order upheld by the
Court's opinion had specifically found that restoring an environmental condi-
tion required for the health and sustainability of existing fish and wildlife
communities was authorized by the statute." 8
In Marion County v. Greene,"9 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal
upheld the issuance of a Consumptive Use Permit, finding that the record
supported a determination that the permitting agency had complied with the
statutory conditions of approval in section 373.223(1) of the Florida Sta-
tutes, which the opinion appears to characterize as requiring the "sustainable
use" of water.' 20 The court rejected the permit challenger's claim that the
agency "has a duty to manage the water resources . . . to ensure their sus-
tainable use, including future increases in demand, and that the District vi-
olated that duty by granting [the permit]," by noting that the evidence dem-
onstrated that the proposed use "would have little or no impact on other wa-
114. FLA. STAT. § 373.223(4) (2010).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Ass'n of Fla. Cmty. Devs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 943 So. 2d 989, 992-93 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. 5 So. 3d 775 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
120. Id. at 779-80. The agency St. Johns River Water Management District's formally
adopted rules stated that "In determining the public interest in consumptive use permitting
proceedings, the Board will consider whether an existing or proposed use is beneficial or
detrimental to the overall collective well-being of the people or to the water resources in the
area, the District and the State." Id. at 778.
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ter users because of the [limited allowable] withdrawal, even taking into ac-
count increased future water demand. 121
b. SFWMD Regional Water Availability Rule
A recent example of a "sustainable" policy decision in the context of
Consumptive Use Permit decisions is the adoption by the South Florida Wa-
ter Management District of a "Regional Water Availability Rule" (RWA) in
April 2007. Based on a determination that it was not in the public interest to
allow the ecological impacts of additional water withdrawals from the Ever-
glades and the Biscayne Aquifer, the South Florida Water Management Dis-
trict adopted the RWA rule, capping withdrawals from the Biscayne Aquifer,
the Lower East Coast's primary drinking water source. 122 This cap requires
the development of alternative water supplies to accommodate growth in
water supply beyond 2006 levels. 23
c. Minimum Flows and Levels
The statutory requirement for the establishment of "minimum flows and
levels" for surface and ground waters in the state to prevent significant harm
resulting from additional withdrawals 24 seems clearly aimed at preventing
consumptive use demands that are unsustainable for the natural system. Wa-
ter management districts are required by the Florida Water Resources Act of
1972 to establish minimum flows and levels for surface waters and aquifers
within their respective jurisdictions.1 25 Section 373.042(1) states that:
Within each section, or the water management district as a whole,
the department or the governing board shall establish the follow-
ing:
(a) Minimum flow for all surface watercourses in the area. The
minimum flow for a given watercourse shall be the limit at which
further withdrawals would be significantly harmful to the water
resources or ecology of the area.
121. !d.at779.
122. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES PERMIT APPLICATIONS § 3.2.1
(2010).
123. Now codified in THE DISTRICT'S BASIS OF REVIEW SECTION 3.2.1 [RESTRICTED
ALLOCATION ARaAS]; Id. § 3.2.1E(3).
124. FLA. STAT. § 373.042 (2010).
125. Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, ch. 72-299, part 1, § 2(3), 1972 Fla. Laws
1082, 1084 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 373.042 (2010)).
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(b) Minimum water level. The minimum water level shall be the
level of groundwater in an aquifer and the level of surface water at
which further withdrawals would be significantly harmful to the
water resources of the area.126
Each water management district is required to adopt a priority list of
waters for the adoption of MFLs, and must address MFLs in their regional
water supply plans for any area where water sources are not sufficient over a
twenty year period "to supply water for all existing and projected reasonably
anticipated future needs and to sustain the water resources and related natural
systems."'' 2 7 These plans must include prevention or recovery strategies if
water levels are currently below MFLs or are projected to fall below MFLs
within twenty years.
1 28
Minimum flows and levels provide a tool for planning and al-
location of water resources by specifying the extent and limits of
the availability of the State's surface and ground water. Minimum
flows and levels are just a part of a comprehensive water resources
management approach geared toward assuring the sustainability of
the water resources. They must be considered in conjunction with
all other resource protection responsibilities granted to the water
management districts by law, including consumptive use permit-
ting, water shortage management, and water reservations. 1
29
D. Federal Clean Water Act-Water Quality Standards and Section 404
Permits
1. Water Quality Standards
The Clean Water Act (CWA) 30 is designed "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 31 It sets
a national goal, "wherever attainable," to achieve "water quality which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
126. FLA. STAT. § 373.042(1) (emphasis added).
127. Id. § 373.036(2)(b)(4)(b).
128. Id. § 373.0421(2).
129. John J. Fumero, Florida Water Law and Environmental Water Supply for Everglades
Restoration, 18 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 379, 384 (2003). For a more in depth discussion of
water reservations, minimum flows and levels, and other aspects of Florida's Consumptive
Use Permitting program, see Christine A. Klein et al., supra note 11, at 445-46.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
131. Id. § 1251(a).
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provides for recreation in and on the water."' 132 "[Tihe House Report on the
legislation states that '[tihe word 'integrity' as used is intended to convey a
concept that refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function
of ecosystems is maintained.' 133
The CWA requires states to establish water quality standards for all of
their waterbodies.' 34 A water quality standard consists of "the designated
uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses."'135 The term "designated use" is defined by
EPA's implementing regulations as "those uses specified in water quality
standards for each water body or segment whether or not they are being at-
tained." 136 The term "criteria" is defined as: "[E]lements of State water
quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative
statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use.'
137
In order to be approved under the CWA, state water quality standards
must include: (1) the designated uses for each body of water; (2) what me-
thods were used and analyses conducted to support the revisions to state wa-
ter quality standards; (3) water quality criteria, which constitutes specific
limits on pollutants that protect the designated uses for each water body and
which may be expressed as either a narrative standard or a numeric concen-
tration level; and (4) an anti-degradation policy to protect existing uses of
bodies of water and high-quality water. 38 A state may only implement a
water quality standard that creates a standard that is as stringent, or more
protective, than the federal guidelines. 3 9 EPA's duty under the Act "is to
ensure that the underlying criteria, which are used as the basis of a particular
state's water quality standard, are scientifically defensible and are protective
of designated uses." 4
Under EPA regulations, a state's water quality standards must include
an antidegradation policy to ensure that "[e]xisting instream water uses and
132. Id. § 1251 (a)(2).
133. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leaviti, 488 F.3d 904, 921 (11 th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
134. Id. § 1313(a)-(c).
135. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
136. 40 C.F.R. §131.3(f).
137. Id. § 131.3(b).
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2); Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.3, 131.6, 131.12
(2009).
139. Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1300 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[S]tates may
not set standards that are less stringent than the CWAs.").
140. Natural Res, Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 16 F.3d 1395, 1402 (4th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
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the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be main-
tained and protected.'
' 4
'
2. Total Maximum Daily Load Requirements (TMDLs)
The CWA requires states to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads for
all surface waters within their boundaries that do not meet specified water
quality standards, and prohibits the issuance of permits that would cause or
contribute to violations of water quality standards.1 42 This approach is in-
tended to keep pollution levels in impacted water bodies to sustainable le-
vels, but is not triggered until a waterbody is impaired.
43
3. Dredge and Fill Activities
Dredged or fill materials are pollutants under the CWA. 44 Section 404
of the CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits to discharge or place
"dredged or fill materials" into waters of the United States, including wet-
lands, only at specified sites and under prescribed circumstances and condi-
tions. 45
Under the Act, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is required to give
wetlands the highest possible level of protection. 46 "[W]etlands constitute a
productive and valuable public resource, the unnecessary alteration and de-
struction of which should be discouraged as contrary to the public inter-
est."
147
The EPA's "guidelines" for the issuance of dredge and fill permits arti-
culate a presumption against allowing any damage to wetlands: "From a
national perspective, the degradation or destruction of. . . wetlands is consi-
dered to be among the most severe environmental impacts." 148 "The guiding
141. Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2009); PUD No. I of Jefferson Cnty. v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(D)(2) (2006); EPA Administered Permit Programs: The
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. 122.4(d) (2010); Establishing
Limitations, Standards, & Other Permit Conditions, 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (2010); Water
Quality Planning & Management, 40 C.F.R. §130.7; Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 504 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007).
143. See Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025 (11 th Cir. 2002).
144. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (amended by Clean Boating Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-288, § 3, 122 Stat. 2650, 2650).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
146. General Regulatory Policies, 33 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010).
147. Id. § 320.4(b).
148. Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill
Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (2010).
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principle should be that degradation or destruction of [wetlands] may
represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources.'
' 49
The EPA guidelines provide that "dredged or fill material should not be
discharged into the aquatic ecosystem [wetlands], unless it can be demon-
strated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact
either individually or in combination with known and/or probable impacts of
other activities affecting the ecosystems of concern.' 150 The EPA guidelines
further provide that the Corps may not issue a dredge and fill permit "which
will cause or contribute to significant degradation of [wetlands]," and that
effects "contributing to significant degradation considered individually or
collectively, include.., loss of fish and wildlife habitat."'1
51
A permit may not be issued if: (i) there is a practicable alternative
which would have less adverse impact and does not have other significant
adverse environmental consequences; (ii) the "discharge will result in signif-
icant degradation;" (iii) the discharge does not include all appropriate and
practicable measures to minimize potential harm; or (iv) there does not exist
sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as to whether the pro-
posed discharge will comply with the Corps' Guidelines for permit is-
suance. 52 A permit may not be issued "unless appropriate and practicable
steps have been taken which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the
discharge on the aquatic ecosystem."'
' 53
The EPA's guidelines also strictly prohibit the Corps from issuing any
permit "if there is a practicable alternative.., which would have less adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem. ' 54 The EPA Guidelines also provide for
"advanced identification" by the EPA Administrator of areas not suitable for
the disposal of fill due to "unacceptable adverse affects on . . . water sup-
plies, shellfish beds and fishery areas .... wildlife or recreational areas." 155
While commentators and observers have been critical of the implemen-
tation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of the Clean Water Act and its
implementing regulations, 56 the Act and rules clearly authorize and require
149. Id.
150. Id. § 230.1(c).
151. Id. § 230.10(c)(3).
152. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(i-iv).
153. Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill
Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2010).
154. Id. § 230.10(a).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
156. The use of mitigation in Florida has resulted in substantial destruction of wildlife and
habitat and does not guarantee "no net loss" of wetlands. See Jason Totoiu, Building a Better
Stale Endangered Species Act: An Integrated Approach Toward Recovery, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
10299, 10307 (2010).
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the USACOE to deny permits that would authorize impacts on waters or
associated wetlands of the United States that are not sustainable.157
E. Federal Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 with the ex-
press purpose of "provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved"
through the development of a program to protect such endangered and
threatened species, and through the enforcement of various treaties and con-
ventions within the Act, which set forth national and international stan-
dards. 5 8 The overarching policy of the ESA is that "all Federal departments
and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened spe-
cies and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes [of the
ESA]."
The ESA "represent[s] the most comprehensive legislation for the pre-
servation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."' 60 "[T]he lan-
guage, history, and structure of the [Endangered Species Act showed]
beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities.,,16' The Court observed that "[t]he plain intent of Con-
gress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost. ' 162 The ESA reflects "an explicit congression-
al decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national
policy of saving endangered species" and "a conscious decision by Congress
to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal
agencies."' 163 The "benefit of the doubt" should be given to an endangered
species when deciding what course of action will best conserve such spe-
cies."6
157. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., is intended to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(emphasis added). The House of Representatives Report on the Act's initial adoption defined
"integrity" as "a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are]
maintained." BLATNIK, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP.
No. 92-911, 76 (1972).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
159. Id. § 1531(c)(1); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781,
785 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
160. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
161. Id. at 174.
162. Id. at 184.
163. Id. at 185.
164. See id. at 174.
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Two key provisions of the ESA seek to prevent impacts on listed spe-
cies which go too far. Under the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service cannot
issue an incidental take permit (ITP) for private land use activities if they
will "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild."' 65
Next, section 1536(a)(2) commands each federal agency to "insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threat-
ened species."' 6 If the Fish and Wildlife Service finds a federal agency ac-
tion will jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify or destroy that spe-
cies' critical habitat, the Service must suggest those reasonable and prudent
alternatives which it believes would avoid jeopardy or adverse modification
of critical habitat. 67 "In response to an opinion finding 'jeopardy or adverse
modification,' the acting agency must comply with the substantive mandate
of section 7(a)(2) and either 'terminate the action, implement the proposed
alternative, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species
Committee pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). '"1 68
The ESA requires government actions that promote sustainability. 69 In
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Services,70 the
Ninth Circuit invalidated a U.S. Forest Service regulation because, although
it protected species habitat necessary for "survival" of the spotted owl, it did
not provide the additional level of protection needed for "recovery" of the
species to the point where it would no longer be considered "endangered."''
In Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 7 2 the District Court stated that the purpose
of the ESA is to:
[P]romote populations that are self-sustaining without human in-
terference . . . . The protection of the ecosystems upon which en-
dangered and threatened species depend is explicitly recited as the
statute's purpose.... If the ESA did not require that species be re-
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2006).
166. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
167. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
168. Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1139 (11 th Cir. 2008) (citing Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (2007)).
169. 16U.S.C.§ 1531(b).
170. 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 387 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. See id. at 1069-70.
172. No. CV06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007).
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turned to a state in which they were naturally self-sustaining, pre-
servation of the habitat of the species would be unnecessary.'
73
The Habitat Conservation Planning process under the ESA is perhaps
the best example of a comprehensive regulatory approach to the sustainabili-
ty of ecosystems. A number of examples demonstrate how the HCP process,
when coordinated with the comprehensive land use planning authority of
local governments, can be an extremely effective tool for the preservation of
biodiversity and sustainability, consistent with the property rights of private
landowners. The best example may be the Sonoran Desert Conservation
Plan (Plan), an HCP that has been integrated into Pima County's comprehen-
sive land use plan. The Plan covers an expansive and biologically diverse
landscape of both public and private land, and prioritizes the biological re-
sources of the county, providing a guidepost for local government in both
short-term and long-term land use actions and decisions in the County.174 By
integrating natural resource protection and land use planning into one com-
prehensive plan, the Plan provides an innovative mechanism for the local
government to regulate the development and sustainability of the communi-
ty. 175
Unlike most HCPs that are created for the incidental take of a single
species, the Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan seeks to conserve biodiversi-
ty. 176 The Plan requires large areas of land to be dedicated to conservation-
including private land.177 Integrated HCPs, which affect private property
rights, raise Fifth Amendment regulatory takings issues.'78 However, a plan
that is based on science and community involvement, such as the Sonoran
Desert Conservation Plan, can avoid such issues. 7 9
173. Id.at*15.
174. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Home, PIMA.GOv, http://www.pima.gov/
CMO/SDCP/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
175. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Introduction, PIMA.GOV, http://www.pima.gov/
CMO/SDCP/intro.html (last visited Aug. 1,2011).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Regulations that prohibit development of undeveloped land "carry with them a high
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
(permit denial for house construction on undeveloped coastal property based on beach setback
line regulation was treated as a physical taking).
179. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Introduction, supra note 174. For a discussion of
why the ultimate impact of the ESA on the conservation and recovery of species remains
uncertain, see Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10308-10.
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F. Land Use Planning
Sustainability principles are perhaps most comprehensive and effective-
ly enacted and implemented by government at the comprehensive land use
planning stage, where development expectations are created and agencies act
with the greatest amount of discretion. "'Land Use planning in essence
chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core,
does not mandate particular uses of the land, but requires only that, however
the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed lim-
its."" 8  Comprehensive planning decisions are legislative, subject to the
most deferential standards of judicial review.18' They will only be over-
turned if not fairly debatable, and will be upheld when any valid planning
rationale supports the decision. 8 2 Environmental permitting decisions, in
contrast, are made pursuant to established legislative criteria, and the denial
of permits for land which has previously been designated for such uses in
comprehensive plans and or zoning codes can create a heightened potential
for private property rights claims.
"[I1n the 1970s and 1980s, several states enacted statutes that provided
states with a significant role in land use planning."'' 83 "Under these growth
management laws, states require local land use plans to be consistent with
larger statewide or regional land use plans. Thirteen states have adopted
growth management laws. These states are: California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.' 84
"Land use planning and the evolving body of American land use law
originates from the notion that cities, towns, and regions must look at the
'big picture' to plan adequately for the future.' 85 "[M]any states ... require
municipalities to prepare so-called comprehensive, master, or general
plans."' 8
6
180. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
191 (2001) (Stevens J, dissenting) (quoting Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572, 587 (1987)).
181. Martin Cnty v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997).
182. Id.
183. Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10305 (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. Jonathan Douglas Witten, Carrying Capacity and the Comprehensive Plan: Estab-
lishing and Defending Limits to Growth, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 583, 593 (2001).
186. Id. (citing Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., The Comprehensive Plan as Constitution: General
Lessons from Recent California Zoning Initiative Cases, in 1992 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW
HANDBOOK (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1992)); see generally DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN'S
CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW (Solano Press, 20th ed. 2000).
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City or town planning is a constitutional concept ... has in
view the physical development of the municipality 'to conserve
and promote the public health, safety, morals and general wel-
fare. ' 187 Municipal planning ... is the accommodation, through
unity in construction, of the variant interests seeking expression in
the local physical life to the interest of the community as a social
unit. Planning is a science and an art concerned with land eco-
nomics and land policies in terms of social and economic better-
ment. The control essential to planning is exercised through gov-
ernment ownership or regulation of the use of the locus. But the
governmental regulatory power has its limits.'8
1. Limited or Timed Growth and Carrying Capacity-Based Ordinances
Since the 1970s some local governments across the country have
adopted and implemented growth and development-limiting ordinances, typ-
ically to address concerns related to the loss or degradation of ecosystems or
farmland, the public and social costs of urban sprawl, and limitations on the
capacity of public facilities.189 Some were responding to patterns of "random
development" resulting from "unplanned growth," resulting in "unfettered
expansion," resulting in the "waste of valuable land resources."' 90 Legisla-
tion that enacts growth limits or caps come under constant scrutiny as lan-
downers argue that they are unconstitutional, on a variety of grounds.
One method for limiting growth to acceptable levels is to apply a carry-
ing capacity analysis.' 9' "A carrying capacity analysis assesses the ability of
a built resource (such as roadways, wastewater treatment plants, municipal
swimming pools) or natural resource (such as aquifers, surface water bodies,
or coastal estuaries) to absorb population growth and related physical devel-
opment without degradation.' 192 "Understanding the carrying capacity or
constraints of these resources can be an effective method for identifying the
areas of the community that are suitable for new or expanded develop-
ment."'193 By completing a carrying capacity analysis, the government, and
187. Grosso v. Bd. of Adjustment, 61 A.2d 167, 168 (N.J. 1948) (quoting Mansfield &
Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 198 A. 225, 229 (N.J. 1938)).
188. Id.
189. See generally Note, A Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo Township's
Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 723 (1972).
190. 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16:58 (citing A Zoning Program for Phased Growth:
Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, supra note 189, at 724).
191. See Witten, supra note 185, at 584-85.
192. See id. (citing DEVON SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE CARRYING CAPACITY CONCEPT AS A
PLANNING TOOL (Am. Planning Ass. 1978)).
193. Witten, supra note 185, at 586.
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local governments in particular, gain a powerful and legally defensible tool
with which to make decisions,' 94 and this analysis may also help local gov-
ernments to resolve conflicts between competing development and preserva-
tion goals. 95 One excellent example of environmental regulation based upon
the "carrying capacity" of natural resources is the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact and implementing ordinances, jointly administered by the States of
California and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities, and the United
States Forest Service. The Compact has developed regional "environmental
threshold carrying capacities," or "thresholds"-environmental standards
"necessary to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, educational, scien-
tific, or natural value of the region or to maintain public health and safety
within the region" and "'shall include but not be limited to standards for air
quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation, and
noise.' ' 196 The Compact is to regulate development in the region in order to
achieve these thresholds "while providing opportunities for orderly growth
and development consistent with such capacities."' 97
One of the earliest and leading cases on the subject of limited growth
ordinances is Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Peta-
luma,'98 which reviewed the City of Petaluma's strict cap on growth, which
had been enacted as a response to its rapid development and expansion in the
1970s.' 99 The ordinance limited yearly development to 500 housing units,
but exempted projects of four units or less, and was limited to a five-year
period.2°° Developers and landowners challenged the ordinance as an arbi-
trary and unreasonable action that was exclusionary, and lacked a legitimate
governmental interest. 20' Important to its ultimate validity, the quota was
based on a careful study which substantiated the city's restrictions.202 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the ordinance because "the concept of the public wel-
fare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small
town character, its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow at
an orderly and deliberate pace. 20 3
194. ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND
SOCIETY 20-21 (1998).
195. Id.
196. League to Save Lake Tahoe and Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 739 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1265 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
197. Id.
198. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
199. Id. at 900.
200. Id. at 901.
201. Id. at 905-06.
202. See id. at 900.
203. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma Cnty., 522 F.2d at 908-09.
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In reaching these conclusions, the court was persuaded by two previous
cases in which both it2°4 and the Supreme Court of the United States205 had
upheld municipal ordinances that, as a result of prohibitions on land uses
other than single-family homes, "had the purpose and effect of permanently
restricting growth." 2°6
In another case, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld, against state law
claims of inconsistency with the state's planning law, a citizen-initiated
county ordinance which limited the number of new dwelling units in the
county to 280 per year.207 The Court rejected a substantive due process claim
because the 2% annual growth rate limit was based on a master plan and
"reflects County residents' desire to protect and conserve their natural re-
sources." 20 8 The Court ruled that:
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and un-
healthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Protection
of a community's character is substantially related to legiti-
mate state interests.2°
2. Limited Growth Ordinances in Florida
Limited Growth Ordinances have been upheld by Florida courts. In
City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc.,21° the city had adopted an annual cap
on density based on its concerns for water and sewage capacities, fire and
police protection, hurricane evacuation, ecological and environmental protec-
tion, aesthetics, and public access to the ocean.2t' Under the cap, the specific
number of permits to be issued each year was based specifically and solely
on the calculations concerning traffic capacity, due to the fact that there was
204. Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 252 (9th Cir. 1974).
205. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
206. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma Cnty., 522 F.2d at 907.
207. Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v. Jumpers, LLC, 128 P.3d 452, 456 (Nev.
2006).
208. Id at 38. Every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been
included. We cannot say that just because the 280-unit per annum cap leaves some out that
might have been included, the 280-unit figure is arbitrary and capricious." Id. (citing Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,6, 9, (1974).
209. Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm., 128 P.3d at 466.
210. 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
211. Id. at 1334-35.
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no existing method that would yield a specific number to represent the limi-
tations that existed relative to the other factors. 1 2 Upon challenge, the court
upheld the density cap even though it found that the traffic study upon which
the overall density cap was based was flawed.1 3 The court found that the
number of permits chosen by the City to be allocated was a reasonable ap-
proximation of its actual, but un-quantified growth limits, including aesthet-
ics, and thus the growth cap, even given the flawed traffic numbers, was not
unreasonable or arbitrary.214 In addition, the court gave great weight to the
fact that the City Commission had held countless hearings and meetings on
the issue before adopting the ordinance. 25 Based on the reports, public
meetings, studies, and comprehensive plans, the cap was ruled to be a valid
"exercise of police power, which contributed substantially to the public
health, morals, safety, and welfare of [its] citizens" and therefore was not
arbitrary.1 6
In contrast, where the City of Boca Raton established a cap on permits
by referendum, which was not based on any analysis or even consultation
with the City Planning Department, it was invalidated by the court.2' 7 There
was no evidence presented by the City that public facilities and infrastructure
were insufficient to handle the impacts of future growth. 218 The court found
that no substantial competent evidence existed to support a finding that the
cap was rationally related to valid municipal purposes of "public health,
morals, safety, and welfare. ' '219 Thus, the cap was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. 2
20
The "sustainability" arguments raised by the City and rejected by the court
in City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp.,221 can be instructive. The City
had argued that its population should be limited by the budget of rain-water
falling within city limits. 222 The court found this theory valid as a matter of
regional planning, but rejected it as a rational basis for a growth limit in an
individual municipality when several governmental agencies were responsi-
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1334.
214. Id. at 1334-35.
215. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d at 1335.
216. Id. at 1336.
217. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 155, 159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (per curiam).
218. See generally id.
219. Id. at 157.
220. Id.
221- 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam).
222. Id. at 156.
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ble for providing sufficient water from other sources and were presently
doing so.113 The court explained that:
Water resources will not depend upon a 'budget' which Boca Ra-
ton or other cities may impose, but rather will depend upon hard
social choices involving agricultural priorities, environmental de-
mands, quantity of water used in various sectors, and the cost
which society is willing to pay .... A [c]ap predicated upon pre-
servation of water resources is a preliminary and unnecessarily
224drastic solution to an area-water resource issue.
Concerns for air quality and noise levels were raised by the City but al-
so rejected by the court, because the City's noise and air pollution levels
were "normal for a community of [Boca Raton's] size and are well within
state and federal standards and regulations. '225 The court found it "unneces-
sary," and insupportable for the City to enact growth caps based on a desire
to have noise and air pollution levels that were superior to averages across
the country.226
On each of these issues, the court's rejection of the ordinance and its
underlying justifications appears to have stemmed from its determination that
the greater the limitation on the use of property, the more specific-as op-
posed to conceptual or abstract-the supporting scientific, technical, or plan-
ning case needed to be to support the measure.227
The appellate court was clearly troubled by an ordinance that
limited growth before the city's facilities and resources were fully
maximized. And, despite twenty-one volumes of testimony taken
at trial, the court felt that Boca Raton depended upon justifications
that were "largely presented in [the] abstract and without [a] spe-
cific factual showing of real necessity.
228
The court's analysis has been criticized as a "simplistic" one, inappro-
priately applied to a "complex problem. 229 Surely, it can be seen as an ex-
ample of how the judicial system in general can be ill-equipped to resolve
complex scientific or technical disputes, and valid to surmise that the court
223. id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d at 158.
227. See id. at 159.
228. Pierce, supra note 7, at 114 (quoting City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371
So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam)).
229. Id. at 114.
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over-stepped its judicial role in second-guessing the technical and scientific
support for the City's ordinance.2 30 But it is also reasonable to read this case
as simply the result of a court's determination that there is a sliding scale of
support needed to support regulations and in that, on these facts, the City had
not shown even the basic rational basis for its specific growth caps. In
another situation, with more scientific and technical support for a determina-
tion that continued population growth in a certain community, at least cumu-
latively, had an important adverse impact on regional water supplies, the
outcome may well be different. For example, the current water shortage
situation in south Florida, with limitations on the regional water supply and
municipalities being limited in the amount of water the state will permit them
to withdraw from the Biscayne (surficial) Aquifer, which connects to the
Everglades, such scenarios are real, and not conceptual. For example, as
noted by Pierce, "conserving water would prove important to the public
health and safety if the city's own aquifer became contaminated in the fu-
ture."23 '
Another case that invalidated a land use density cap was Innkeepers
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach,232 where the Fifth District
found a "flat density cap" enacted by a citizens' referendum, supported by no
study or methodology, and allowing of no variances, to be arbitrary and
invalid.233 The density cap limited multifamily dwellings to twelve dwelling
units per acre and hotels/motels to twenty-four dwelling units per acre, which
figures, said the Court "apparently materialized 'out of the air."' 234 The den-
sity caps applied to the entire city, without regard to any specific planning
considerations in any particular regions of the city.23 They were invalidated,
not because they were too strict, but because they were arbitrarily adopted.236
3. Florida's Community Planning Act
Florida's modern comprehensive planning law, adopted in 1985, re-
quires each local government to adopt and maintain a comprehensive plan
that meets identified standards in state law and which governs all subsequent
zoning and development decisions subsequently taken by the local govern-
230. Id. at 117.
231. Id. at 114.
232. 460 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
233. Id. at 380.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. For a discussion of various judicial responses to "no growth" ordinances in gen-
eral, see generally Pierce, supra note 7.
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ment.237 The Act is controversial and constantly the subject of legislative
proposals to reduce state oversight of local planning decisions and/ or make
the applicable standards more flexible. In general, the Act authorizes and
requires local governments to plan for projected growth, ensures the ade-
quate provision of necessary infrastructure and services, and protects envi-
ronmental resources. 238 The Act's provisions related to the role of population
and growth projections vis a vis timing of allowable development are de-
bated and controversial. Its provisions concerning the provision of or pay-
ment for necessary infrastructure by developers, and its provisions concern-
ing the factors used to determine the appropriate amount, location and types
of development are important legislative requirements for the financial and
ecological sustainability of land use plans.
a. Future Land Use Plan Requirements
Under the Florida Act, how many people are expected to live and use
land in a community is a key issue. Where, and how, they will live and use
land are separate questions. At least until the 2011 Legislative session, the
law gives the government the ability to not accommodate the full projected
population if doing so would have unacceptable impacts on other required
planning factors.239 In 2011, the Legislature made a policy determination to
require, with an exception for Areas of Critical State Concern under section
380.05 that the "amount of land designated for future land uses should allow
the operation of real estate markets to provide adequate choices for perma-
nent and seasonal residents and business and may not be limited solely by the
projected population. The element shall accommodate at least the minimum
amount of land required to accommodate the medium projections of the
[state] for at least a 10-year planning period . ... "240
The Act requires that, whatever amount of the projected population is
accommodated by the plan, basic land use decisions about the type and in-
tensity or density of development to be allowed are determined by a variety
of factors, including, among other things, the character of undeveloped land,
the availability of water supplies, public facilities, and services, and the dis-
couragement of urban sprawl. 241 Comprehensive Plans must include a con-
servation element for the "conservation, use, and protection of natural re-
237. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167, 163.3177, 163.3194 (2011).
238' Id. § 163.3161(4).
239. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (2011).
240. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)4.
241. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2.
[Vol. 35
166
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/1
REGULATING FOR SUSTAINABILITY
sources.... including factors that affect energy conservation.242 A Conserva-
tion Element must protect air and water quality, water quantity, minerals,
soils, and native vegetation, fisheries, wildlife, wildlife habitat, and marine
habitat, and direct incompatible future land uses away from wetlands.243
Coastal local governments must include a Coastal Management Ele-
ment which "[m]aintain[s], restore[s], and enhance[s] the overall quality of
the coastal zone environment", "use[s] ecological planning principles and
assumptions in the determination of the suitability of permitted develop-
ment", "[l]imit[s] public expenditures that subsidize development in coastal
high-hazard areas", and "[p]rotect[s] human life against the effects of natural
disasters".2 4
G. The Florida Keys Example
Florida's land use planning laws, when applied in the early 1990s to the
local governments making up the Florida Keys, resulted in comprehensive
land use plans for Monroe County and its cities which imposed annual and
overall caps on new development approvals that are well below population
projections. A 1995 Order of the Administration Commission (Florida's
Governor and Cabinet) required and approved the "carrying capacity"-
based Monroe County Plan and found that comprehensive plans are not re-
quired to accommodate projected population regardless of the impacts to
other planning issues, and must be based on a full analysis of all growth limi-
tations.245
Originally, those growth caps were the result of hurricane evacuation
constraints, but in recent years, the growth rate was reduced in response to
ecosystem protection concerns.
This Order resulted from the application of the Act to Monroe County
(the Florida Keys) in the early 1990s. The original adopted plan adopted by
the county was greatly deficient and was disapproved by the state. The
County agreed to completely re-write the plan, based upon an overall "carry-
ing capacity" approach. The amended plan was still deficient, and a second
legal challenge resulted in dramatic findings by a state administrative law
judge that the carrying capacity of the Keys' near shore waters to assimilate
additional nutrient (wastewater and storm water) pollution had been ex-
ceeded. The Order ruled that the amount of development allowed in the ini-
242. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d)1 (2011).
243. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d)2.
244. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g)1, 5-7.
245. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Monroe Cnty., 95 E.R F.A.L.R. 148 (Admin. Comm. Dec.
12, 1996 (Final Order and Order of Partial Remand).
2011I]
167
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
tial Plan was "excessive because of the inability ... to evacuate people in the
event of a Category 3, 4, 5 hurricane and because the ability of the near shore
waters and sea grasses to sustain development had been exceeded. 246
The plan was again invalidated and the next re-write limited annual and
overall new permitting to that which could meet a "no net nutrient increase"
pollution standard, and be accommodated within a 24-hour evacuation time.
Because the health of the marine and terrestrial systems were also known
limitations on development-but not as easily quantified as hurricane evacu-
ation times-the amendments also conditioned each year's permit allocations
on "substantial progress" on tasks in an annual Work Program, making such
progress a condition precedent to maintaining the existing growth rate.247
The Order discussed how these provisions were required in order to bring the
plan into compliance with the Act. 8
The approved plan changes required that each year, the Commission
"shall determine ... whether substantial progress has been achieved toward
accomplishing the tasks of the work program."249 If "substantial progress has
not been made, the unit cap for new residential development shall be reduced
by at least 20 percent for the following year.
250
The Commission found a lack of "substantial progress" in 1999 and re-
duced the annual permit allocation by 20 percent and extended the five-year
Work Program to seven years.25' Key among the Work Program require-
ments was that an overall carrying capacity study be performed and that the
land use plan be amended by 2003 to implement the findings of that study.
252
The specific legal requirement for the study was as follows:
246. Abbott et al. v. Admin. Comm., 1997 WL 1052490, at *25 (DOAH Final Order
1997); Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Monroe Cnty., Admin. Comm. Case No. ACC95-024,
DOAH Case No. 91-1932GM (Final Order Dec. 12, 1995); Monroe Cnty. Chowder & March-
ing Society, Inc. v. Dep't. of Comm. Affairs, DOAH Case No. 93-4326RGM (Final Order
July 17, 1995); Monroe Cnty. Chowder & Marching Society, Inc. v. Admin. Comm., DOAH
Case No. 93-6028RGM (Final Order Aug. 7, 1995).
247. Abbot et al. v. Admin. Comm., 1997 WL 1052490 at 33-35 (DOAH Final Order
1997).
248. Id. at *10. Remedial amendments are required to bring a plan into compliance with
Chapter 163.
249. FLA. STAT. § 380.0552(4)(a) (2007) (amended 2010).
250. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-20.110 (2010). The 1997 Final Order interpreted this
provision: "The number of permits authorized [annually] is . . .conditional." Abbot, 1997
WL 1052490, at *26. "If the ... Commission determines that 'substantial progress' has not
been achieved, [it] is required to reduce the number of authorized residential permits ... by a
minimum of 20 [percent]." Id. (emphasis added). "Continued development.., is conditioned
upon 'substantial progress' being made in completing the Work Program." Id. at *33.
251. Id. at 35.
252. Id. at 37.
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The carrying capacity analysis shall be designed to determine the
ability of the Florida Keys Ecosystems, and the various segments
thereof to withstand all impacts of additional land development
activities .... The carrying capacity analysis shall consider aes-
thetic, socioeconomic (including sustainable tourism), quality of
life and community character issues, including the concentration of
population, the amount of open space, diversity of habitats, and
species richness. The analysis shall reflect the interconnected na-
ture of the Florida Keys' natural systems, but may consider and
analyze the carrying capacity of specific islands or groups of isl-
ands and specific habitats, including distinct parts of the Keys' ma-
rine system.
3
Upon completion of the study, Monroe County was, by July 2003, to:
Implement the carrying capacity study by, among other things, the
adoption of all necessary plan amendments to establish a rate of
growth and a set of development standards that ensure that any and
all new development does not exceed the capacity of the county's
environment and marine system to accommodate additional im-
pacts. Plan amendments will include a review of the County's Fu-
ture Land Use Map series and changes to the map series and the
"as of right" and "maximum" densities authorized for the plan's
future land use categories based upon the natural character of the
land and natural resources that would be impacted by the currently
authorized land uses, densities and intensities.
2 5 4
The Study was completed in late 2002. Among its chief findings were:
'Development in the Florida Keys has surpassed the carrying ca-
pacity of upland habitats to maintain [further development].'
'Secondary and indirect impacts of development further contribute
to habitat loss and fragmentation" and that "any further develop-
ment in the Florida Keys would exacerbate secondary and indirect
impacts to remaining habitat.'
253. Id.
254. RULE 28-20 WORK GRP., DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT OF THE FLORIDA
KEYS CARRYING CAPACITY STUDY IMPLEMENTATION 9 (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/dcp/acscfFiles/FinalReportRule28-20.pdf.
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'Any further encroachment into areas dominated by native vegeta-
tion would exacerbate habitat loss and fragmentation.'
255
'Development in the Florida Keys has surpassed the carrying ca-
pacity of [several protected species] to maintain [the effects of fur-
ther development activities].'
'[T]he Lower Keys marsh rabbit [and silver rice rat are highly re-
stricted and likely could not withstand further habitat loss without
facing extinction. It makes a similar finding relative to the Key
Deer, and finds that any further habitat loss would place the Stock
Island tree snail in jeopardy].'256
H. Property Rights Implications of the Monroe County Rate of Growth
Ordinance
Monroe County's annual growth caps were upheld against a property
rights challenge in Burnham v. Monroe County.2 5 7 Upholding a summary
judgment order granted in favor of the County, Florida's Third District
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, holding: (1) The county did not
affect a taking by denying the owners' request for building permit based on
their failure to incorporate design features that ordinance sought to encour-
age, and (2) The rate of growth ordinance was constitutional.2 58 The court
ruled that the "trial court correctly determined that the ROGO ordinance was
constitutional, as it substantially advances the legitimate state interests of
promoting water conservation, windstorm protection, energy efficiency,
growth control, and habitat protection.,
259
There are two key features of the County's ordinance that likely play an
important role in avoiding property rights violations. First, no properties are
255. Id. at 6-12.
256. See Grosso, supra note 33.
As of this writing, the County and the State remain in the process of implementing the Carry-
ing Capacity Study and the rest of the Comprehensive Plan. While the details of the remain-
ing issues and debates are beyond the scope of this article, the key point is that the compre-
hensive plans adopted in the Keys, an Area of Critical State Concern, limited the total amount
of, and strictly regulated the standards for, future development.
Id.
257. 738 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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facially precluded from receiving a permit allocation. 260 Instead, allocations
are based on a competitive scoring system under which the highest scoring
applications (based on a suite of planning considerations related to ecological
impacts, infrastructure availability, surrounding development, etc.), and thus,
all properties have the potential to receive an award.26 ' The Burnham opi-
nion stressed that the landowner had not availed himself of the opportunity to
increase the competitiveness of his application by incorporating available
design features.262 Next, the ordinance grants applicants who have been de-
nied an allocation for four years the right to either receive a permit allocation
or have their land acquired by the County.263
1. The Applicability of the Florida Keys Precedent to Other Communities
A subsequent case under Florida's Growth Management Act, and in-
volving Palm Beach County, interpreted the Monroe County Orders, making
the following observations:
According to expert planning testimony for DCA and the County,
the County is obligated to plan for growth in accordance with [the
statute and rule] up to its "sustainable carrying capacity," which
has not been reached. Whether or not they believe the County has
the option to plan to slow or stop growth before reaching "sustain-
able carrying capacity," it is clear from the evidence that the Coun-
ty is not doing so, but instead is planning for continued growth
within the framework of its Plan until reaching what it considers to
be "build-out" conditions.
The Monroe County orders recognize that the [statute and adminis-
trative rule] require a sustainable carrying capacity analysis in ap-
propriate situations. The experts cited in paragraph 63 testified
that Palm Beach County is not yet facing such a situation.
In any event, the [Act] accords a local government the flexibility
to make a variety of planning decisions regarding how its jurisdic-
tion should grow. Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, re-
cognizes that the future land use plan should be based on a num-
ber of factors, including not just population projections, but also
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
263. See id.; MONROE COUNTY, FLA., RATE OF GROWTH ORDINANCE 16-1992 (June 23,
1992).
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the character of undeveloped land, availability of public services
and other planning objectives.
264
The outcome in the Keys springs from the compelling nature of the
planning facts-the "surveys, studies and data" under Chapter 163-in the
Keys.265 The extreme ecological and infrastructure limits on growth in the
unique and fragile Florida Keys-as evidenced by their status as an Area of
Critical State Concern under Chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes were the
dominant factor in this outcome.264 Yet the basic legal principle would apply
anywhere in Florida. To the extent that the data and analysis reveals signifi-
cant natural or other constraints on development and land use impacts in
other local governments, a similar outcome-in the context typically of ei-
ther comprehensive plan updates or the denial of applications for Future
Land Use Map or policy amendments-is possible in other jurisdictions.
While the Act was amended in 2011 to require comprehensive plans in the
most of the state (those areas not designated as Areas of Critical State Con-
cern) to accommodate the minimum population projections for at least a 10-
year planning period,267 the balance of the Acts, provisions, many of which
are describe above, allow and require that population to be accommodated in
a sustainable manner. A 2003 letter from the Department of Community
Affairs (DCA) regarding Palm Beach County's population forecasts stated:
Local governments are not required to convert agricultural lands
based solely on population trends without consideration for other
planning objectives and needs.
[Liocal governments are not compelled to authorize unlimited or
unchecked urbanization simply to accommodate past growth
trends resulting from rapid urbanization. 268
In the clearest example of this principle, the comprehensive plans of
Monroe County and its cities impose annual caps on new development ap-
provals that are well below population projections.
264. 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 5 E.R. F.A.L.R. 91, (May 9,
2005) (DOAH Case No. 04-4492GM; Final Order DCA05-GM-082) (emphasis added).
265. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2 (2010).
266. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (2010).
267. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)4 (2011).
268. Letter from Charles Gauthier, Chief, Office of Comprehensive Planning, to Lorenzo
Aghemo, Planning Dir., Palm Beach Cnty. 3-4 (July 28, 2003), available at
http://www.evergladeslaw.org/pdf/attachment-gm3.pdf.
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In the Keys, the limits are the ability of its fabled marine system to han-
dle more nutrient pollution, its limited evacuation capacity (obviously a
compelling public safety issue) and the minimum spatial needs of several
endangered and other listed species. On mainland south Florida, there is a
minimum spatial extent of land needed to restore the Everglades and main-
tain a water supply. In other places the issue may be the necessary critical
mass of farmland to sustain an agricultural economy, the critical spatial
mass, quality or function of ecosystems and natural features, or agricultural
industries, the maximum allowable pollution loads in rivers, lakes or springs,
minimum flows and levels for water bodies, or habitat needs similar to those
in south Florida. Development can also be limited as a result of the inability
to provide critical public facilities or services such as evacuation capacity,
269
safe, efficient transportation, wastewater, potable water, flood protection,
solid waste, or other necessities. As Florida continues to grow, and forests,
swamps, watersheds, wildlife habitats, water bodies, and other natural fea-
tures grow more degraded or fragmented, as farming acreage falls below the
critical mass needed to support long-term investment, and as expansion of
key public facilities becomes increasingly constrained or precluded, such
circumstances are likely to appear farther up the state.
J. Adequate Public Facilities Requirements
Florida is among the states that statutorily require development be
served with "adequate" public facilities. Florida's "concurrency" law re-
quires all local governments to adopt minimum level of service standards,
consistent with state law, for solid waste, storm water, and wastewater, , and
precludes the approval of a development that will cause a "concurrency stan-
dard" to fail to be met.27 Local governments are authorized to make trans-
portation, parks and recreation, schools and other public facilities the subject
of concurrency requirements.27'
The Act requires that the future land uses allowed in local government
comprehensive plan be based upon, among other things, the "availability of
269. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(2)(d) (2011) (requiring a comprehensive plan's
coastal management element to include "principles for hazard mitigation and protection of
human life against the effects of natural disaster, including population evacuation, which take
into consideration the capability to safely evacuate the density of coastal population proposed
in the future land use plan element in the event of an impending natural disaster.").
270. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3180(1) and (2).
271. Id.
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water supply.".27 2 This requirement is key to coordinating land and water
planning.
Finally, the Act includes provisions that promote fiscally efficient
development. One of the factors to be considered when determining if a land
use change would inappropriately promote urban sprawl is whether it
"[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase
the cost in time, money, and energy of providing and maintaining facilities
and services, including roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, stormwater
management, law enforcement, education, health care, fire and emergency
273
response, and general government.
The Act requires the Capital Improvements Element of comprehensive
plans to "[1]imit public expenditures that subsidize development in high
hazard coastal areas. 274 Section 163.3178(1), concerning coastal manage-
ment, declares "the intent of the Legislature that local government compre-
hensive plans restrict development activities where such activities would
damage or destroy coastal resources, and that such plans protect human life
and limit public expenditures in areas that are subject to destruction by natu-
ral disaster.,
275
III. STRICT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS, GROWTH CAPS,
EXACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Private Property and the Takings Clause
Growth controls are potentially subject to claims that they deprive own-
ers of their property without just compensation.276 Land use or environmen-
tal regulations which "go too far" and require a private landowner to bear a
burden that should be bome by the public are a taking of private property. 77
A regulatory taking occurs when the legislation (1) does not advance a legi-
timate governmental interest or (2) denies the landowner all or virtually all
economically viable use of his or her land.278
272. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2.d (2011).
273. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (6)(a) 9.a.(VILI)
274. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (6)(g)6.
275. FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(1) (2011).
276. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause states: "[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
277. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
278. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monte-
[Vol. 35
174
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/1
REGULATING FOR SUSTAINABILITY
The most stringent land use and environmental regulations-those
which facially preclude or severely limit development or intensive uses of
land, and those which, as applied, allow a landowner little or no such uses-
face heightened property rights limitations:
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use-typically . . . by re-
quiring land to be left substantially in its natural state-carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.
2 79
A landowner who "has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, has suffered a taking.280
B. The Right to Travel
In addition to the private property rights implications, the so-called,
"right to travel" is arguably implicated by limited or no growth ordinances.281
The Privilege and Immunities Clause of the Constitution states: "The citi-
zens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states. 282 One of the Privileges recognized is the right to tra-
vel, held to be the "right of free ingress into other States, and egress from
them. 283 This clause protects the right to travel from state infringement.
2 4
The right to travel includes the right of foreign residents to be treated the
same as native-born residents,285 so as to preclude unequal licensing fees. A
rey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066,
1072 (11 th Cir. 1996).
279. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
280. Id. at 1019. Florida's statutory Property Rights Act establishes a standard for lan-
downer compensation that is intended to provide relief to landowners in a greater number of
cases that would be under the Constitution, but has not been interpreted by commentators and
cases as setting the standard for compensation significantly lower than the Constitutional line.
See Richard Grosso & Robert Hartsell, Old McDonald Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Prop-
erty Rights After the Veto of S.B. 1712, FLA. B.J. Mar. 2005, at 41, 43; see also Holmes v.
Marion Cnty., 960 So. 2d 828, 829-30 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Citrus Cnty. v. Halls
River Dev., Inc., 8 So. 3d 413, 415 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
281. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 378 (1978).
282. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
283. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
284. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
285. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390.
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state could not set a cap on growth which would prohibit non-residents from
purchasing land or moving to the state.286
Even if a Comprehensive Plan only allows enough growth for town res-
idents, it does not violate the right to travel so long as out-of-town residents
are not banned.287 In York, a District Court judge upheld a growth cap:
which does not on its face ban or direct reduction in sale or lease
of new housing to non-residents and does not impact sale or lease
of existing housing, is sharply distinguishable from legislation that
has been held to impose a penalty, such as durational residency re-
quirements that flatly deny eligibility for vital benefits or reduce
the quantum of benefits available until a person has resided in a
state for a certain period of time.... Even granting that such an
ordinance discourages migration, it does not penalize it in a consti-
tutional sense .... [The Court is] 'unable to find that a zoning or-
dinance creates a barrier to interstate migration merely by limiting
options and increasing costs for persons wishing to reside in a par-
ticular locality."'
288
In Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petalu-
ma,289 the Ninth Circuit upheld the City of Petaluma's strict cap on growth
against a right to travel argument, because "the concept of the public welfare
is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town
character, its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow at an
orderly and deliberate pace. ' ' 2 " The court noted that all land use regulation
can have potential exclusionary tendencies and impacts on citizens of sur-
rounding communities, but should be upheld so long as they bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.
291
C. Adequate Public Facility and Other Moratoria
Ordinances that limit development approvals based on the availability
of public services and facilities, or based on appropriately supported annual
286. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59, 759 n.16 (1966).
287. York v. Town of Limington, Maine, Civil No. 03-99-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 686
at *23 (D. Me. 2004).
288. Id. at *23-*25.
289. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
290. Id. at 908-09.
291. Id. at 906; see also York v. Town of Limington, Maine, No. Civ. 03-99-P-H, 2004
WL 114985, at *5 (D. Me. Jan. 22, 2004).
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growth caps, are temporary restrictions, or a form of moratoria.292 Courts
will uphold moratoria that are necessary to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare.293 Accordingly, courts have upheld moratoria based on the need
to plan to avoid problems caused by future growth, or to cure existing prob-
lems caused by prior development.294
Moratoria that are reasonably limited in scope and duration, and have a
firmly fixed termination point will be upheld.2 95 This is to be distinguished
from moratoria of excessive or unlimited duration, which are generally held
to be unreasonable.296 Government has a duty to expeditiously take steps to
rectify the problem upon which the moratorium is based.297
A transportation concurrency moratorium under Florida law was upheld
in WCI Communities, Inc. v. City of Coral Springs.298 The City of Coral
Springs enacted a nine month temporary moratorium on the processing of
site plan applications for townhouse and multi-family development. 299 WCI
filed suit claiming that the moratorium constituted procedural and substan-
tive due process, and property rights violations, and that it prevented WCI
from using its multi-family parcels for multi-family residential develop-
ment.30
The court held:
[T]he city's use of zoning in progress and its adoption of a tempo-
rary moratorium in the processing of multi-family development
applications did not deprive WCI of any substantive due process
rights or affect a temporary taking .... Under both substantive due
process and equal protection, when the legislation being chal-
lenged does not target a protected class, the rational basis test is
applied. The rational basis standard is highly deferential [and as
292. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d 291, 307-08 (N.Y. 1972).
293. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 159 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1979) (per curiam).
294. Golden, 285 N.E. 2d at 304-05.
295. See Franklin Cnty. v. Leisure Props., Ltd., 430 So. 2d 475, 481 (Ha. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (per curium) (upholding a three year moratorium on the issuance of building per-
mits for multi-family construction as a means of maintaining the status quo during the adop-
tion of a new comprehensive plan); Deal Gardens, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Loch Arbour, 226 A.2d
607,612 (N.J. 1967).
296. Richard J. Grosso & David J. Russ, Takings Law in Florida: Ramifications of Tak-
ings Clauses, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 431, 485 (1993).
297. See Smoke Rise Inc. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369,
1386-87 (D. Md. 1975).
298. 885 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
299. Id. at913.
300. Id. at913-14.
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such a] court should not set aside the determination of public of-
ficers in land use matters unless it is clear that their action has no
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper
sense. The question is only whether a rational relationship exists
between the ordinance and a conceivable legitimate governmental
objective. If the question is at least debatable, there is no substan-
tive due process violation.
30
'
The court found it to be "well-settled that permissible bases for land use
restrictions include concern about the effect of the proposed development on
traffic, on congestion, on surrounding property values, on demand for city
services, and on other aspects of the general welfare., 302  The moratoria
served the valid purpose of preventing development inconsistent with pend-
ing changes in development regulations, and thus was rationally related to
city's attempt to preserve status quo while it formulated regulatory land use
scheme and so did not violate due process.30 3
Cases in which development moratoria have been upheld include Brad-
fordville Phipps Ltd. Partnership v. Leon County,30 which observed that
moratoria are a vital, valid part of a Florida local government's zoning pow-
er.305 Bradforville rejected a claim that a court-ordered injunction requiring a
moratoria (and the subsequent moratoria enacted by the local government)
constituted a taking.3" The temporary nature of the restriction, and the fact
that the Plaintiff purchased its property with actual or constructive notice of
the highly restrictive land use environment that existed, were factors in the
court's decision.
The court noted that:
The widespread invalidation of temporary planning moratoria
would deprive state and local governments of an important land-
use planning tool with a well-established tradition. Land-use
planning is necessarily a complex, time-consuming undertaking
for a community, especially in a situation as unique as this. In
several ways, temporary development moratoria promote effective
planning. First, by preserving the status quo during the planning
301. Id. at 914 (citations omitted).
302. Id. at 915.
303. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 885 So. 2d at 915-916.
304. 804 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
305. Id. at 470.
306. Id. at471-72.
307. Id. at 468.
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process, temporary moratoria ensure that a community's problems
are not exacerbated during the time it takes to formulate a regula-
tory scheme. Relatedly temporary development moratoria prevent
developers and landowners from racing to carry out development
that is destructive of the community's interests before a new plan
goes into effect. Such a race-to-development would permit prop-
erty owners to evade the land-use plan and undermine its goals.
Finally, the breathing room provided by temporary moratoria helps
ensure that the planning process is responsive to the property own-
ers and citizens who will be affected by the resulting land-use reg-
ulations. 30
8
D. Strict Planning and Zoning Allowances in Florida
Local governments in Florida can maintain existing planning and zon-
ing designations and deny requested use, density, and intensity increases, as
a means of protecting the carrying capacity and sustainability of its natural
and public resources.
Decisions to deny requested land use amendments based on these con-
siderations are likely to be upheld if challenged .3° The Supreme Court of
Florida has upheld local government authority to decline requested plan
amendments to allow an increase in density.310 Such decisions are legislative
in character, and will only be overturned if not "fairly debatable," a highly
deferential standard for local governments. 31' A local government's decision
not to change its plan will be upheld when any valid planning rationale sup-
ports the decision.31
In determining whether a regulation denies a landowner all economical-
ly viable use, the focus is on the existence and value of permissible uses.3 13
There is no right to any level of development land use, such as residential,
commercial, or industrial, as long as the allowed uses are economically via-
ble.314 As long as agricultural or some other non-construction use is econom-
ically viable, regulations may preclude any substantial, or even all, develop-
ment.315 In Martin County v. Yusem, 3 16 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
308. Id. at 470 (quoting Keshbro, Inc. v. Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 874 (Fla. 2001)).
309. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla.
1993).
310. Id. at475.
311. Id. at 472.
312. Martin Cnty. v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997); Martin Cnty. v. Section
28 P'ship, 668 So. 2d 672, 677 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
313. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96(1981).
314. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1992).
315. See generally Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
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a county's decision to deny a request to "up-zone" agricultural lands, finding
that the county was not required to amend its comprehensive plan at the lan-
downer's request.317 The court held that landowners do not have a right to
density increases and ruled that decisions to deny requests for comprehensive
plan changes "are legislative decisions subject to the [deferential] fairly de-
batable standard of review.
318
In Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership,1 9 the Fourth District re-
jected a taking claim against Martin County's decision not to amend its com-
prehensive plan to change agricultural zoning. 320 The court held that such
decisions "will not be considered arbitrary and capricious if [they have] 'a
rational relationship with a legitimate general welfare concern.' ' 32' The
Court found that "The record contains sufficient evidence establishing that
the County's comprehensive plan policies are based on rational and sound
planning principles, designed to preserve agricultural lands, protect wetlands
and environmental resources, ensure the efficient use of public resources,
and discourage urban sprawl" and that because of the extent of the impact
from the proposed density increase, the refusal to amend the plan bore "a
substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.,
322
Thus, if agricultural or other non-intensive development uses are eco-
nonically viable, local governments will typically be well within their police
power and without takings liability if they decline to approve rezoning or
comprehensive plan amendments on agricultural lands. Beyond maintaining
existing planning and zoning designations, local governments may also re-
duce allowable uses, densities, and intensities so long as the reductions do
not "go too far." As a matter of constitutional takings law, landowners do
not have a vested right to the continuation of current zoning, which can be
reduced for valid reasons.323 Because an owner is not guaranteed the most
profitable use of his land but simply some use that can be economically car-
fied out, an action which "down-zones" land or increases legitimate restric-
tions is not invalid simply because it denies the highest and best use of the
property.34 Regulatory actions have been upheld against takings claims even
316. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
317. Id. at 1290.
318. Id. at 1295.
319. 772 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
320. Id. at 621.
321. Id. at 620 (quoting Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (1lth Cir.
1995)).
322. Id. at 621.
323. Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681, 688-89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
324. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
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where they dramatically diminished the value of the property, including im-
pacts potentially as great as 95 percent.325
In Florida, so long as the approved zoning allows some economically
viable use, a landowner is not entitled to more favorable or economically
valuable zoning.326 In Lee County v. Morales,327 the Second District rejected
a takings claim against a "down-zoning" because the resulting densities were
economically viable and the reductions were not made arbitrarily, but for
valid planning reasons based on a study.328 The court found that the county
acted within its discretion to revise the zoning allowances based upon the
new information presently available.3
29
Changes to local government comprehensive plans that reduce allowa-
ble densities have specifically been addressed as potential takings. In Glis-
son v. Alachua County,330 plan amendments that reduced density from one
unit per acre to one unit per five acres, were not held to be takings since the
change was not arbitrary, and the remaining uses were economically via-
ble.33' The validity of the amendments was strongly supported by the fact
that they were adopted pursuant to the authority of Florida's growth man-
agement laws. 3 2 "Down-zoning" or increasing land use restrictions are a
viable, legal option for ensuring that the impacts of development or other
land uses do exceed the capacity of natural or man-made systems to accom-
modate their impacts.333
Thus, local governments' hands are not tied when it comes to changing
existing planning and zoning provisions. If existing rules are no longer ap-
propriate, government is not precluded from making changes that reflect
current information.334 Planning and zoning is not a perfect science and is
325. Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Rights:
Harris Act and Inverse Condemnation Claims, FLA. B. J. July/August 2004, 61,61; see Hada-
check v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (reducing property value by over 90 percent); Gra-
ham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981) (75 percent reduction of value
not a taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (in some cases regulations may result
in a 95 percent loss without justifying compensation as a taking).
326. See Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App 1990).
327. 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
328. Id. at 655-56.
329. Id. at 656.
330. 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
331. Id. at 1037-38.
332. Id. at 1036.
333. See Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 309 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d
Dist. C. App. 1975).
334. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ruling that the denial
of a permit under the Endangered Species Act did not interfere with the landowner's reasona-
ble investment backed expectation, even though the landowner had purchased the land prior to
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often dependant on predicting the future and contingent on unknown factors.
Government has significant flexibility to reduce use or density or increase
restrictions, so long as the resulting rules allow some economically viable
use and are not arbitrary.
E. Transferrable Development Rights
Transferrable Development Rights are a potential mechanism that will
allow local governments to make substantial areas of ecological importance
off limits to development, while still retaining value in the impacted lands.335
If the enacted regulation permits most existing uses of the property, and pro-
vides a mechanism whereby individual landowners may transfer develop-
ment rights, the regulation does not deny individual landowners all economi-
cally viable uses of their property.336 In Glisson, the court acknowledged
that the county regulations diminished the economic value of the prop-
erty; however, diminution in value is not the test.337 Rather, a challenger
must demonstrate denial of all or a substantial portion of the beneficial uses
of the property.338
F. Growth Caps, Carrying Capacity Planning, and Property Rights
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,339 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a thirty-two month
moratorium that temporarily prohibited construction without compensating
affected landowners while studying the carrying capacity of the area and
formulating a regional plan for development. 340 The Court rejected the claim
that "a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a
comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring
the enactment of the ESA because, the owner could not have been "oblivious" to the rising
environmental awareness that occurred during the years between the purchase and the applica-
tion for a permit.).
335. A "TDR" program allows a private landowner to "sever his development rights in an
area where development is objectionable and transfer them to an area where development is
less objectionable." Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional
Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 465
(1999).
336. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104; see also Glisson v.
Alachua Cnty., 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App.1990).
337. Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1037.
338. Id. at 1035.
339. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
340. Id. at 342-43.
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compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. 34'
The Court held that so long as some future interest remained, the per se rule
under Lucas342 did not apply to temporary building restrictions. 3 3 The Court
refrained from adopting an absolute rule regarding moratorium and instead,
suggested that an ad hoc analysis must be conducted using the Penn Central
factors to determine whether a taking had occurred. 34
A number of observations from the reported cases can be made about
the property rights implications of growth caps.
First, the contrast between the Florida cases of Boca Raton and Innkee-
pers Motor Lodge cases and the City of Hollywood case makes clear that the
established caps-be they density or intensity-related, or building permit-
related-must have resulted from some valid analysis or methodology re-
lated to a facility capacity, scientific determination of acceptable impact lim-
its, or other non-arbitrary approach other than pulling numbers "out of the
air."
Next, as noted by Pierce,345 courts are likely to strike growth limits that
respond to regional concerns beyond the strict limits of local government
boundaries unless a demonstration is made as to the important connection of
local impacts to the regional issue.
Third, like the Rate of Growth Restrictions in the Florida Keys, the
analysis of building permit caps discussed in Currier Builders v. Town of
346 ta uYork, suggests that such annual caps on the number of permits may be
viewed as somewhat unlike moratoria (in that they are not temporary), and
upheld even if permanent if they are based on an articulated methodology,
and provide an owner with some potential to make a viable use of his or her
land at some reasonable time in the future. In Currier Builders, a local or-
dinance, enacted by citizen referendum, and limiting the monthly and annual
number of building permits (issued under a lottery system) was challenged,
among other basis, as a taking of private property.347 The case was ultimate-
341. Id. at 306.
342. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (A taking occurs as a
matter of law when the landowner is denied all economic beneficial uses in his land).
343. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 337.
344. Id. at 342.
345. Pierce, supra note 7, at 115. Pierce criticized the Court's analysis as "shallow,"
noting that "certain aspects of Florida's geography and environment might make it suffer
more under national air quality standards-possibly because poor air quality affects the pro-
duction of oranges, or because it deters tourist travel to the city." Id.
346. 146 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D. Me. 2001).
347. Id. at 72.
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ly dismissed on ripeness grounds, but its long history included a Magistrate
Judge's analysis that rejected the takings challenge. 4 8
Ultimately, a court will look at the overall validity of the growth ordin-
ance in conjunction with whether there is a taking of property from the lan-
downer in making its determination of whether the government entity can
limit growth and development. Growth limiting ordinances will remain an
important tool for local governments as demand for developable land in-
creases and encroachment on environmentally sensitive lands becomes im-
minent. Such ordinances should serve to promote infill development and
protect our natural resources.
G. Large Scale Rural Planning
Florida's Community Planning Act encourages large-scale rural devel-
opment planning, expressly providing for two types of projects-Sector
Plans349 and Rural Land Stewardship Projects35 -which authorize local land
use plan amendments for very large parcels which allow substantial urban
development in exchange for substantial set-asides of farmland or environ-
mentally sensitive lands.
These provisions are controversial from the standpoint of whether, by
its terms or in application, the public benefits in terms of long-term preserva-
tion of important resources are equal to the private benefits resulting from
substantial increases in development potential on lands typically far from
existing urban areas. Yet, they offer an exceptionally useful vehicle for the
large-scale preservation of ecosystem lands in locations, amounts and quality
that are adequate to ensure the sustainability of ecosystems. The ability to
essentially "site plan" a several thousand acre parcel in single ownership, in
terms of where development will happen and where preservation will occur,
at the development approval stage (a comprehensive land use plan amend-
ment) where government enjoys the greatest amount of discretion35' and lan-
downers have not already been granted substantial development rights, and
before land has been parceled off into small units owned by dozens, hun-
dreds or even thousands of owners, offers the most effective method for go-
vernmental decision-making that ensures the sustainability of ecological
functions. Surely, as described above, the ability of permitting agencies to
deny or limit permits based on ecosystem sustainability requirements exists
in the law. Yet, in many instances, the denial or the grant of a very limited
348. Id!
349. FLA. STAT. § 163.3245 (2010).
350. Id. § 163.3177.
351. See discussion at pp. 759-62.
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wetland or wildlife "incidental take" permit, for example, for land that is
entirely or nearly all wetlands or protected wildlife habitat-as a result, per-
haps, of subdivision and sales-and which has already been planned or
zoned for urban uses, can be very difficult or impossible as a result of per-
ceived or real property rights violations.
IV. IMPACT FEES AND EXACTIONS: MAXIMIZING THE PUBLIC'S ABILITY TO
RECOUP ITS COSTS IN THE FACE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Florida Laws and Programs Designed To Have Development Pay For
Itself
Neither constitutional nor statutory law requires Florida to subsidize fi-
nancially new development and population growth. Government (local,
county, municipal, or special district)-imposed impact fees equal to 100 per-
cent of development costs are not constitutionally (Federal or Florida) or
statutorily prohibited. Thus, while we may not be able to "build a fence at
the state line," we can build a toll plaza and charge the full amount that it
will cost to provide the full range of public facilities and services required to
meet the needs of all new population.
1. Impact Fees, the Constitution, and Florida Statutes
No Federal or Florida statute specifically caps, or sets a maximum mon-
etary limit, for impact fees imposed by a counties, municipalities, or special
districts. Section 163.31801, the "Florida Impact Fee Act," does not set a
cap on impact fees. Rather, under section 163.31801(3), impact fees are
subject to requirements regarding their form of adoption, advance notice,
method of calculation (based on the most recent and localized data); account-
ing and reporting; and other procedural and accountability requirements.
In Florida, the amount of allowable impact fees are governed primarily
by case law, rather than by statute. Impact fees are analyzed legally under
the Takings Clause as exactions.352 The Takings Clause, Amendment V of
the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states through amendment XIV
of the U.S. Constitution, provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. 3 53 The Florida Constitution, under
Article X, section 6(a), is essentially the same, but requires "full" compensa-
tion. 3 4 Analyzed together, the Supreme Court of the United States' opinions
352. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 404 (1994).
353. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
354. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
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in the Nollan v. California Coastal Commission355 and Dolan cases, require
that an exaction, such as a mandated developmental impact fee, must meet
two tests: 1) There must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and a
legitimate state interest that it serves; and 2) The exaction must be "roughly
proportional" to the nature and extent of the project's impact.356
In determining whether the imposition of an impact fee is constitution-
ally permissible, the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the "dual rational
nexus test," similar to the Supreme Court of the United States' "rough pro-
portionality" test, which requires the local government to demonstrate "a
reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the [develop-
ment]" and "a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the ex-
penditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the [develop-
ment]. 357
Thus, so long as the impact fee or exaction is in fact calculated to offset
no more than 100 percent of the development's public facility and service
requirements, government may charge that amount.358 Under Florida law, a
municipality, county, or special district does not violate constitutional re-
straints by levying impact fees equal to 100 percent of development costs.
359
The courts, however, must review each assessed impact fee on a case by case
basis by applying the "dual rational nexus test" to ensure that the fee charged
is proportional to the anticipated impact on jurisdictional resources and ser-
vices.3 °
V. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW SUPPORT PLANNING AND
REGULATION BASED ON ECOLOGICAL OR OTHER THRESHOLDS
At least one commentator has concluded that municipalities seeking to
implement no-growth controls "must create an irrefutable link between land
use management and the science of sustainability so that courts may see sus-
355. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
356. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (holding the city failed to
establish that in issuing a permit to petitioner, its property dedication requirement was roughly
proportionate to its land use plan and the impact of petitioner's proposed development).
357. Save Our Septic Sys. Comm., Inc. v. Sarasota Cnty., 957 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also St. Johns Cnty. v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637
(Fla. 1991) (citing Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 611-612 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983)).
358. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
359. See id.
360. Save Our Septic Sys. Comm., Inc., 957 So. 2d at 673.
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tainability concepts as rational and conclusive. '361 While that author's view
on this point may reflect his valid, realistic view of the judiciary's gut-level
reactions to such ordinances,362 an analysis of the standards for judicial re-
view of land use regulations demonstrates that a mere "rational basis" for
such regulations, and not an "irrefutable link," is necessary to uphold such
land use restrictions in the face of most facial constitutional challenges how-
ever. In determining whether regulations are arbitrary, or legitimate subjects
of regulations, courts give significant deference to the judgment of the regu-
lating body.363 Property rights claims, on the other hand, may be the greatest
obstacle to the adoption of "no growth" ordinances that truly and permanent-
ly prevent any reasonable use of individual parcels of land.
364
"The State is given wide range in exercising its lawful powers to regu-
late land use for environmental reasons, and any such land-use regulations
thus are valid if supported by a rational basis consistent with overall policies
of the State.""36
As long as an ordinance or regulation bears a substantial relationship to
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it is
constitutional.366 Local governments have a statutory right and responsibility
to enact comprehensive plans and such plans, like legislative acts, will be
presumed valid when challenged.367 Absent a showing that the comprehen-
sive plan is unreasonable and is an arbitrary exercise of police power without
any relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, the courts
will not overturn the plan.368 The burden is on the party challenging an or-
dinance to make this demonstration.369
To resolve this issue, courts utilize the "fairly debatable" test, under
which, if reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness or rationality
of an ordinance, the ordinance will be upheld.370 A plan will be deemed fair-
ly debatable if there is competent, substantial evidence to support the local
361. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 96.
362. Id.
363. Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 309 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
364. Dep't. of Cmty. Aff. v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995)
365. Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 473
(Fla. 1993).
366. Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214,217 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
367. Id.; City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per
curium).
368. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (per curiam).
369. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1957).
370. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 217.
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government's decision.37' If the plan is found to be fairly debatable, then its
application cannot be disturbed by the courts. 372 Only where a plan is not
supported by any substantial evidence and is not fairly debatable, will it be
deemed arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of due process.373 To show that a
land use restriction is unreasonable and arbitrary, the challenging party must
prove that the restriction has no rational relationship to the public health,
morals, safety or general welfare, and is not reasonably designed to correct
the adverse condition.374 Once the plan meets the fairly debatable test, the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local government.375
The essence of these cases is that as long as there is a good reason for
the regulation, it will not be struck by the Court because the challenger disa-
grees with that reason. In Capeletti Bros., the court upheld the denial of a
rezoning on the basis that it conflicted with existing land use plans and the
concern. 376 Differences of opinion on this matter did not invalidate the or-
dinance on the basis that conclusive proof of the need to deny the rezoning
did not exist. Instead, this demonstrated that the issue was fairly debatable
and thus within the Commission's discretion to decide.377 Importantly, the
court explained that, due to the sensitivity of decisions affecting land use,
those decisions should be made by local governments, and unless the deci-
sions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or unconstitutional, the court should let
those decisions stand.378 Similarly, the court in Morales stated that because
zoning is a legislative function, the courts should only intervene when the
action of the zoning body is so unreasonable and unjustified as to amount to
a taking.379 The Court further held that it is not for the judiciary to determine
what would be the proper zoning, but to ascertain whether the zoning body's
decision is fairly debatable.38°
A. Regulating in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific conclusions are, by their nature, subject to uncertainty and /
or controversy and debate among experts. Federal courts and Florida courts
371. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
372. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 217.
373. Broward Cnty. v. Capeletti Bros., 375 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
374. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
375. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 221.
376. 375 So. 2d at 316.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 315; see also City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 1957).
379. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
380. Id.
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give deference to the government on such matters.38' Deference to an agen-
cy's scientific expertise is mandated when the agency articulates a rational
connection between the facts and its conclusion.382 When an agency decision
involves a high level of technical and scientific expertise, a court will defer
to the agency's conclusions, so long as they are reasonable.383 Where the
"analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of technical exper-
tise,' [a court] must defer to the 'informed discretion of the responsible fed-
eral agencies."' 384  A reviewing court should be at its most deferential in
reviewing an agency's scientific determinations in an area within the agen-
385cy's expertise.
In a Florida case, Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department of
Natural Resources,38 6 the Florida Department of Natural Resources em-
ployed a new scientific methodology, which was allegedly unproven and
unaccepted in the scientific community, in reestablishing a coastal construc-
tion control line.387 The court held that "selection and use of new scientific
methodology was a matter of agency discretion that should not be set aside
absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the agency's action is
either arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not reasonably related
to the statutory purpose. 388 The court concluded by stating that the setting
of coastal construction control lines for the purpose of adequately protecting
the beaches and dunes of this state is not a matter of scientific certainty and
thus, the court was compelled to give great deference to DNR.389
381. See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 361 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir.
2004), amended by 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, U.S. 402, 416 (1971), overruled on other grounds by, Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).
382. Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1119.
383. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008).
384. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).(1989).
385. Bait. Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
386. 495 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
387. Id. at 223.
388. Id. at 217-18; see e.g., Bait. Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103 (stating that the uncertainty
of science only serves to emphasize the limitation of judicial review and the need for greater
deference to policy making entities).
389. Island Harbour Beach Club, Ltd., 495 So. 2d at 223; accord Davis v. Sails, 318 So.
2d 214, 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652,655
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (The rationality and reasonableness of a downzoning, which was
based upon an expert's study and the planning staffs assessments and recommendations that
the land be rezoned in consideration of environmental, archaeological, and historical protec-
tion/preservation, was fairly debatable); see also City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d
148, 152 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per curiam) (If any logical deduction supports the local gov-
ernment's contentions, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local govern-
2011]
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In Ecology Center v. Castaneda,39 ° the court upheld the U.S. Forest
Service's approval of timber sales and restoration projects in a National For-
est against a challenge from environmental interests.39' Upholding the agen-
cy action under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard,392 and the applicable "best available science" rule, the
court observed the rule that it should grant "considerable discretion to agen-
cies on matters 'requir[ing] a high level of technical expertise. ' 393 Address-
ing the issue of competing scientific positions head-on, the court found that
"Though a party may cite studies that support a conclusion different from the
one the Forest Service reached, it is not our role to weigh competing scientif-
ic analyses. 394
Short of proving that the agency's "analysis is outdated or flawed," the
Plaintiffs could not meet their burden, said the court, by relying on other
science that suggested a different scientific determination than was made by
the agency.395
The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Haire v. Florida Depart-
ment of Agriculture & Consumer Services,396 which upheld Florida's citrus
canker eradication statute and program against constitutional and scientific
challenges, contains an excellent discussion of these principles.397 The trial
court had invalidated the state's program of destroying all citrus trees within
1900 feet of a canker- infested citrus tree, disagreeing with the study from
which the 1900 foot destruction radius was derived.398 The trial court was
ment); see also Graham v. Estuary Props., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1981) (Agency deci-
sion to give great weight to environmental impact of proposed development was within the
realm of its responsibilities and the court would not substitute its judgment for the agency's
when it was backed by competent evidence.).
390. 574 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009).
391. Id. at 659-60.
392. Id. at 656. Described by the court, consistent with the prevailing precedent, as "nar-
row," under which it could "not substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency." Id.
393. Id. at 658-59 (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377, (1989)).
394. Ecology Ctr., 574 F.3d at 659 (citing Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting that it is not the proper role of the court to "act as a panel of scientists
that instructs the Forest Service how to validate its hypotheses regarding wildlife viability,
chooses among scientific studies in determining whether the Forest Service has complied
with the underlying Forest Plan, and orders the agency to explain every possible scientific
uncertainty"); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To set
aside the Service's determination in this case would require us to decide that the views of
Greenpeace's experts have more merit than those of the Service's experts, a position we are
unqualified to take.").
395. Castaneda, 574 F. 3d at 659-60.
396. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004).
397. Id. at 777.
398. Id. at 786.
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persuaded by the fact that the Legislature had not held fact-finding hearings
related to the underlying study.399 On appeal, the Fourth District, and then
the Supreme Court of Florida, reversed, ruling that the trial court "erred in
rejecting the legislative choice based on its own view of the scientific evi-
dence and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature,
which determined that the 1900-feet eradication zone was justified by the
best available science.4°° The Court noted that the legislation has a rational
basis and was not scientifically arbitrary, as it was supported by published,
peer-reviewed scientific studies, the recommendation of a technical advisory
board, and the state's practical experience with citrus canker. That this
science was disputed did not invalidate the resulting regulation:
The fact that the Legislature did not subject the []report to an ad-
versarial trial or the requirements of courtroom admissibility under
the Frye test does not make the Legislature's action in adopting the
1900-foot removal radius arbitrary or capricious, or not reasonably
related to the goal of citrus canker eradication. In addition, the fact
that the trial court heard testimony during a ten-day hearing, whe-
reas the Legislature did not, is not a significant consideration under
rational basis review. That there was conflicting evidence pre-
sented to the trial court regarding the appropriateness of [the
Study's] methods indicates that the issue of whether to adopt [the
Study's] conclusions was a matter of debate for the Legislature.401
Citing federal law, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion that
government could not regulate in the face of scientific debate or uncertainty:
"[L]egislatures are not limited to acting only where there is scientific certain-
ty."'40 2 "'To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power
would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our government ....
In a case decided under state law, a New Mexico appellate court upheld
the state's adoption of a numeric human health standard for uranium in
groundwater, rejecting a challenge to its scientific basis.4°4 The standard had
been the subject of extensive public hearings and debate, and reflected the
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 786.
402. Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F. 3d 484, 504 (6th Cir. 2002)).
403. Id. (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).
404. NMAC N.M. Mining Ass'n v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 150 P.3d 991,
1002 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (amending N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2).
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opinions of human health experts employed by the relevant state agency. 4
05
The Court rejected the challenge to the underlying science:
[The agency] is not required to support its finding that a significant
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty.... [The
statute] specifically allows the Secretary to regulate on the basis of
the 'best available evidence.' . . . [T]his provision requires a re-
viewing court to give [the agency] some leeway where its findings
must be made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Thus, so
long as they are supported by a body of reputable scientific
thought, the [a]gency is free to use conservative assumptions in in-
terpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the
side of overprotection rather than underprotection.
406
The precautionary principle suggested in the Haire and Amend Ground
Water Quality Standards4°7 cases was explicated at length by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in its rulings on challenges to a state agency's actions regu-
lating the consumptive use of water.40 8 The court upheld the Hawaii Com-
mission on Water Resources Management's limited grant of water use rights
based on its invocation of "precautionary principles," which was defined as
meaning that: "[W]here there are present or potential threats of serious dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis for postponing ef-
fective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 'Awaiting for cer-
tainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulatory ac-
tion."' 409
"Where uncertainty exists," wrote the Court, "a trustee's duty to protect
the resource mitigates in favor of choosing presumptions that also protect the
resource." 410 The "absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the Com-
mission's hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to further the
public interest. 4
1
'
In language of direct relevance to the setting of environmental standards
in several arenas, including water allocations, water quality standards and
others, the court found that:
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 141 N.M. 41 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
408. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 466 (Haw. 2000).
409. Id. at 466 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir.
1976)).
410. Id. at 466 (citing Lead Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130,
1152-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
411. Id. at 467.
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In requiring the Commission to establish instream flow standards
at an early planning stage, the Code contemplates the designation
of the standards based not only on scientifically proven facts, but
also on future predictions, generalized assumptions, and policy
judgments. Neither the constitution nor Code, therefore, con-
strains the Commission to wait for full scientific certainty in fulfil-
ling its duty towards the public interest in minimum instream
flows .... Uncertainty regarding the exact level of protection ne-
cessary justifies neither the least protection feasible nor the ab-
sence of protection.
4 12
The court noted that erring on the side of allowing additional environ-
mental impacts (in this case from additional water allocations) created the
potential for "unknown impairment and risk" and "could drain a stream dry
incrementally, or leave a diverted stream dry in perpetuity, without ever de-
termining the appropriate instream flows. Needless to say, we cannot accept
such a proposition."4"3
On the other hand, the court did not require the Commission to take an
overly-strict approach and allocate no water to private users for the several
year period it would take to complete the scientific review necessary to re-
solve the current uncertainty. Instead, the water commission must apply "a
methodology that recognizes the preliminary and incomplete nature of exist-
ing evidence, ... and, indeed, incorporates elements of uncertainty and risk
as part of its analysis. Such a methodology, by its nature, must rely as much
on policy considerations as on hard scientific 'facts.
'
'
41 4
In furtherance of its trust obligations, the Commission may make
reasonable precautionary presumptions or allowances in the public
interest.4t 5 The Commission may still act when public benefits
and risks are not capable of exact quantification. At all times,
however, the Commission should not hide behind scientific uncer-
tainty, but should confront it as systematically and judiciously as
possible-considering every offstream use in view of the cumulative
potential harm to instream uses and values and the need for mea-
ningful studies of stream flow requirements. We do not expect
412. Id.
413. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 470-71.
414. Id. at 471 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 29 (The Commission "must act, in part on
factual issues, but largely on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks, and on predictions
dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.") (brackets and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
415. Id. at 466.
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this to be an easy task. Yet it is nothing novel to the administrative
function or the legal process in general.416
The Supreme Court of Hawaii opinion quoted heavily from Ethyl Corp.
where the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency's authority under the Clean Air Act to
regulate in the face of scientific uncertainty.417 The Hawaii Court found the
Ethyl Corp.'s opinion's policy discussion, made in the context of human
health concerns, relevant to environmental issues:
Regulators . . . must be accorded flexibility, a flexibility that re-
cognizes the special judicial interest in favor of protection of the
health and welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does
not exist.
Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to un-
certainty .... Yet the statutes-and common sense-demand regu-
latory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than cer-
tain that harm is otherwise inevitable.
Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal-to the extent that
even science can be certain of its truth .... Awaiting certainty,
[however,] will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regu-
lation. Petitioners suggest that anything less than certainty, that
any speculation, is irresponsible. But when statutes seek to avoid
environmental catastrophe, can preventative, albeit uncertain, deci-
sions legitimately be so labeled? 4
In Florida, in the context of local government comprehensive planning
decisions, local governments are encouraged to use any data necessary so
long as methodologies are professionally applied, collected, and accepted.
Comprehensive plans should be based on whatever data a local government
does have, even if that data is not complete.41 9
416. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 n.58 (explaining how "assessment of risk is a normal
part of judicial and administrative fact-finding").
417. Id. at 28.
418. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For further discussion of the pre-
cautionary principle, see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1152-56
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992); see generally Gregory D. Ful-
lem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of Scien-
tific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 495 (1995).
419. Envtl. Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. Broward County, 586 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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"Protection of environmentally sensitive areas and pollution prevention
are legitimate concerns within the police power., 420 In Morales, the court
upheld a down-zoning, based on an expert study, of a barrier island which
was designed to preserve archaeological resources, protect the environment
and adjoining aquatic preserve, and to guard against the threat by hurricanes
and flooding to development.4 2' Florida courts also have recognized a local
government's legislation to protect their community's appearance as a legi-
timate exercise of police power.4 2 Likewise, the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States has ruled that preservation of open space and protection from urba-
nization and the consequences of urban sprawl, e.g., water pollution, destruc-
tion of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, are valid
public interests and legitimate governmental goals.
423
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida can only sustain itself and avoid economic and ecological crisis
if its policies and laws respect and reflect the realities of the laws of nature,
the finite (and shrinking) amount of land in this peninsula, and its ability to
pay for more growth. Growth management must become, in some places, a
growth limitation and where and when development can occur. Certainly,
the potential impact of sea-level rise alone constitutes "data and analysis"
relative to whether proposed land uses, densities, and locations would meet
the terms and intent of Florida's land use planning law.
We must have an honest and frank discussion about Florida's finite
amount of land, and financial and practical ability to sustain unlimited land
development. In a state whose natural environment, built communities, and
infrastructure are being overwhelmed by growth that is not paying for itself,
government can and must ensure that the public fiscal and welfare are not
harmed by the amount, type, and location of new development. Government
can require growth to truly pay for itself. It can also regulate land strictly;
even adopt annual growth caps, if important to ecosystem, farmland and
community protection. It can maintain a tax system and fiscal policies that
420. Morales, 557 So. 2d at 655.
421. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The court
found that "the Zoning Board was appropriately concerned with limiting the effects of future
commercial development . . . in view of legitimate environmental concerns, public safety
concerns, and concern for preserving the island's aesthetic, historical, and archeological cha-
racteristics." Id. at 655.
422. City of Sunrise v. D.C.A. Homes, Inc., 421 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (per curiam).
423. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.7-8 (1981).
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work in the same direction as the rules. We must be able to talk about carry-
ing capacity limits in polite company and government buildings.
Ultimately, while the law does not require government to watch hel-
plessly while population growth results in the more loss of the basic life
functions provided by the air, land, and water, protecting those necessities
will require changes in the individual footprint of development and individu-
als. Indeed, as population growth continues, more people will need more
drinkable water, fishing grounds, features like floodplains and dunes to pre-
vent storm damage, land for growing and raising food, and places to enjoy
their lives and the world recreating and relaxing in the great outdoors.
The federal and state laws governing planning and environmental per-
mitting decisions in Florida and elsewhere provide government ample au-
thority to ensure the sustainability of fiscal and ecological resources. Appli-
cable judicial standards of review recognize and defer to the need for legisla-
tive and executive branch agencies to regulate and act in response to valid
science and methodologies, and do not preclude such action in the face of
(almost always present) technical or scientific debate. The discretion granted
to agencies allows them to use their best judgment, and decisions that do not
zealously ensure the long-term public interest may well be upheld upon chal-
lenge because a reviewing court cannot conclude that they are "arbitrary or
capricious" or violative of a similarly deferential specific statutory review
standard. But decisions that do give the benefit of the doubt to environmen-
tal, human health, the protection of taxpayer dollars, and other public interest
considerations will just as surely be upheld, and property rights and other
constitutional limits would intervene only in rare situations to prevent their
implementation. The law allows and usually requires government to plan
and regulate to ensure sustainability. Judicial standards of review are much
more a limitation on the practical ability of environmental and taxpayers
interests to challenge individual action as unsustainable than an impediment
to aggressive governmental protection of the public interest. It is the election
and appointment of public servants unwilling or unable to act boldly to pro-
tect the future of the places over which they have jurisdiction, not the courts
and the Constitution, which is the critical impediment to sustainability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Clean water. What sort of image do these two words evoke? Drinking
a glass of tap water from the faucet in your kitchen? An impromptu swim in
* The author is a 2012 J.D. Candidate at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
Law Center. Ekateryna Drozd graduated from the University of Central Florida in 2005 with
a B.A. in Literature. The author wishes to thank her family for their continued support and
encouragement, recognize Louise R. Caro, Esq. for her mentorship in the development of this
article, and finally thank her colleagues on Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedica-
tion in editing this article.
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a nearby pond or a lake on a hot summer afternoon? For the majority of
people, such activities may only be a distant memory or even totally unfami-
liar. Bottled water rules the market and long gone are the days of diving into
a neighborhood spring or river because of their probable contamination.
On January 26, 2010, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) proposed a new rule requiring the establishment of 1) numer-
ic nutrient standards for Florida "to protect aquatic life in lakes and flowing
waters, including canals;" and 2) "regulations to establish a framework for
Florida to develop 'restoration standards' for impaired waters. ' The rule is
the product of environmental groups' dissatisfaction with the current nutrient
standards in Florida. 2 The January 2010 proposal "is part of a phased rule-
making process in which the EPA will propose and take final action in 2010
on numeric nutrient criteria for lakes and flowing waters and for estuarine
and coastal waters in 2011.,3
The purpose of this article is to show why adoption of numeric nutrient
water quality standards, while challenging and expensive, will most likely
prove to be beneficial and necessary for various water bodies and the popula-
tion of Florida. Section II of this article will explain the basics of water eu-
trophication, or nutrient pollution, taking into consideration the differences
between natural and cultural eutrophication, nature and sources of main nu-
trients, and the effects of eutrophication. Section III will focus on the events
leading up to the EPA's proposal. In particular, it will address how the pro-
posal developed; and explain the numeric and narrative nutrient standards,
the reasons and justifications for the proposed rule, and the reactions from
the state population. Finally, Section IV will conclude with a recap of the
history of and the effects of eutrophication in Florida's enormously signifi-
cant Everglades ecosystem. Most importantly, it will discuss why the devel-
opment of numeric nutrient criteria will be valuable in light of the unique-
ness of the Everglades and the continued efforts employed in its restoration.
1. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. 4174 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
2. See Meline MacCurdy, EPA Proposal for Numeric Nutrient Standards for Florida
Waters Has National Implications, MARTEN LAW (Feb. 3, 2010), www.martenlaw.com/
newsletter/20100203-numeric-nutrient-standards.
3. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 4175.
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II. THE ESSENTIALS OF EUTROPHICATION, OR NUTRIENT POLLUTION
Eutrophication is a term used to describe "[n]utrient over-enrichment of
freshwater and coastal ecosystems."'4 A waterbody (e.g., a lake, river, or a
canal) exhibiting an excess of nutrients may not present itself as an adverse
concept at first. For instance, in lakes, the "additional nutrients are food for
algae and fish, so the more eutrophic [the] lake is, the more living organisms
it sustains."5 Moreover, eutrophication is often a common natural phenome-
non, whereby nutrients accumulate over time and eventually fill the basin of
a body of water.6 However, cultural eutrophication, another form of nutrient
pollution that is human-induced beyond natural levels, 7 has potential for dis-
rupting ecosystem structure and function and further degrades the quality of
water.8
A. Main Culprits of Cultural Eutrophication: Nitrogen and Phosphorus
When referring to eutrophication caused by human activity, it is useful
to understand which nutrients are the main focus of concern. Two of the
nutrients which contribute to anthropogenic-human in nature-
eutrophication are nitrogen and phosphorus.9 Phosphorus is considered to be
the main catalyst for impairment of freshwater systems, while nitrogen is
associated with eutrophication of coastal systems.' ° It is important to note
4. MINDY SELMAN & SuzIE GREENHALGH, WORLD RES. INST., EUTROPHICATION:
SOURCES AND DRIVERS OF NUTRIENT POLLUTION 1 (2009), available at http://www.wri.org/
publication/eutrophication-sources-and-drivers.
5. Lake Eutrophication, RMB ENVTL. LABS., INC., http://www.rmbel.infolReports/
Static/Eutrophication.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2011); see also SELMAN & GREENHALGH,
supra note 4, at I (Nutrients "are critical to biological processes in aquatic ecosystems"); see
also THOMAS OBREZA ET AL., UNIV. OF FLA., A GUIDE TO EPA's PROPOSED NUMERIC
NUTRIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR FLORIDA 2 (Soil & Water Sci. Dep't et al., series no.
SL316, 2010), available at http:/edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/ss/ss52800.pdf ("All living things
need nutrients to survive and grow .... ).
6. See, e.g., Jeremy Mack, Eutrophication, LAKE SCIENTIST,
http://www.lakescientist.comlearn-about-lakes/water-quality/eutrophication.htmJ (last visited
Aug. 1, 2011) ("The process of eutrophication is natural."); see also Eutrophication, SCIENCE
CLARIFIED, http://www.scienceclarified.com/EI-Ex/Eutrophication.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2011) (Eutrophication is "a part of the normal aging process of many lakes and ponds.").
7. See Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T
PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.or.jpfietcfPublications/techpublicationsTechPub- 11/5-3-1 .asp
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
8. Walter K. Dodds et al., Eutrophication of U.S. Freshwaters: Analysis of Potential
Economic Damages, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 12, 12 (2009).
9. SELMAN & GREENHALGH, supra note 4, at I.
10. Id.
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that both nitrogen and especially phosphorus, help restrict the growth of aq-
uatic plants when present in low concentrations." However, excess loadings
of phosphorus and nitrogen in the water cause "rapid and extensive growth
of aquatic plants and algae,"' 2 an occurrence which at first glance may not
seem alarming. Nonetheless, oxygen depletion is often the result of such
unrestrained plant growth, 13 which can unfavorably influence animal and fish
populations and lead to a variety of other unwanted and harmful effects, dis-
cussed in further detail below.'
4
1. Nature and Sources of Nitrogen and Phosphorus
Both phosphorus and nitrogen are naturally occurring elements."'
Phosphorus, combined with other substances as a phosphate molecule, 16 is
extremely popular commercially, 7 as is nitrogen, whose concentrations-in
the form of nitrate in waters-"have increased significantly in many coun-
tries since the 1960s, primarily due to the use of synthetic nitrogen fertiliz-
ers." ' 8 To fully grasp the significance of nitrogen and phosphorus in cultural
eutrophication, one must consider the numerous sources of these nutrients-
the majority of which, not surprisingly, are based on a variety of human ac-
11. See Michael S. Hubbard, Phosphorus, AUDUBON SOC'Y OF THE EVERGLADES (Mar.
2010), http://www.auduboneverglades.org/?page-id=540 (discussing the presence of phospho-
rus in freshwater surface systems as the limiting factor); see also V. H. Smith et al., Eutrophi-
cation: Impacts of Excess Nutrient Inputs on Freshwater, Marine, and Terrestrial Ecosys-
tems, 100 ENVTL POLLUTION 179, 180 (1999).
Of the many mineral resources required for plant growth, inorganic [nitrogen] and [phospho-
rus] are the two principal nutrients that have been found to limit the growth of terrestrial
plants. This nutrient limitation of plant biomass is not restricted to terrestrial ecosystems
alone, however. The supply rate of [nitrogen] and [phosphorus] also strongly influences the
growth of algae and vascular plants in freshwater and marine ecosystems.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. Hubbard, supra note 11.
13. See id.
14. See infra Sec l1.B.
15. Smith et al., supra note 11, at 179 (discussing the global biogeochemical cycle of
carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus); see also Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication,
supra note 7 ("Natural sources of nitrogen and phosphorus are derived from background nu-
trient cycles and biogeochemical processes, where the primary sources include nutrients in the
soil and atmospheric input.").
16. Hubbard, supra note 11.
17. Id. ("The most important commercial use of phosphorus is the production of fertiliz-
ers," and phosphorus is also used in explosives, fireworks, pesticides, and water treatment.).
18. Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7.
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tivities-such as agriculture or industry and fossil fuel combustion. 9 They
can be classified into "point" and "non-point" sources.20
Point sources of nutrient pollution are those that are "localized and
more easily monitored and controlled."'21 Some of the examples of point
sources include runoff from municipal wastewater treatment plants-
considered the "largest point source of nutrient pollution" 22-and industrial
wastewater discharges from waste disposal sites and from mines, oil fields,
and unsewered industrial sites.23 Due to the ease with which point sources
are identified and regulated, many of them have been effectively reduced.24
Non-point sources of nutrient pollution, on the other hand, present a greater
challenge.25 They "are diffuse and much more difficult to monitor and regu-
late"26 because monitoring them involves dealing with a much larger number
of agents.27 Non-point sources are "excess run-off from development, silvi-
culture, and agriculture, 2 8 from pastures and rangelands, 29 or "atmospheric
deposition over a water surface" 3 -which does not include deposition of
19. See SELMAN & GREENHALGH, supra note 4, at 2.
20. Smith et al., supra note 11, at 181.
21. Id.; see e.g., Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7 ("Point
sources of pollution are easier to identify and it is easier to design policies to reduce pollution
from point sources than from non-point sources."); see also Stephen Carpenter et al., Nonpoint
Pollution of Surface Waters with Phosphorus and Nitrogen, ISSUES IN ECOLOGY, Summer
1998, at 1. Carpenter provides a good explanation about the ease of controlling point sources:
Pollutant discharges from such sources tend to be continuous, with little variability over time,
and often they can be monitored by measuring discharge and chemical concentrations periodi-
cally at a single place .... [P]oint sources are relatively simple to monitor and regulate, and
can often be controlled by treatment at the source.
Id. at3.
22. Hubbard, supra note 11.
23. Smith etal., supra note 11, at 181.
24. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21. Still, one must pay attention to point sources
because of likely future expansion of urban areas and agricultural and other industries. id.
25. See Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7.
26. Smith et al., supra note 11, at 181.
27. Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7; see also Carpenter et
al., supra note 21 ("Nonpoint inputs often arise from a varied suite of activities across exten-
sive stretches of the landscape, and materials enter receiving waters as overland flow, under-
ground seepage, or through the atmosphere.").
28. Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7. Most agricultural
practices involve heavy use of fertilizers containing nitrogen and phosphorus, which ends up
in the run-off. Id.; see also Carpenter et al., supra note 21, at 3.
29. Smith etal., supranote I l,at 181.
30. ld.
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phosphorus, but mainly nitrogen.31 Non-point sources are predominant caus-
es of nutrient pollution.32
B. Damaging Effects of Cultural Eutrophication, Generally
If one lives near a lake, a pond, or a river, they will have probably-
unless the water is perfectly safe from any of the above mentioned sources-
witnessed the impacts of nutrient pollution at least at some point while living
near that body of water. The most common manifestation of excess nutrient
loadings in the water is an objectionable odor33 and a bright green color coat-
ing the surface of the water caused by the "dominance of the phytoplankton
, ,34
by blue-green algae (cyanobacteria). In coastal areas, the red or brown
tides are well known-these are algae blooms in marine ecosystems, which
cause widespread problems by releasing toxins and by spurring oxygen dep-
letion as they die and decompose.35 Seemingly innocuous, the algae blooms
are in fact responsible for subjecting an ecosystem to a significant amount of
stress by potentially furthering the loss in aquatic biodiversity:
36
As overabundant nuisance plants die, bacterial decomposers proli-
ferate; as they work to break down this plant matter, the bacteria
consume more dissolved oxygen from the water. The result can be
oxygen shortages that cause fish kills. Eutrophication can lead to
loss of habitats such as aquatic plant beds in fresh and marine wa-
ters and coral reefs along tropical coasts.37
31. See Hubbard, supra note 11.
32. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21 ("Nonpoint inputs are the major source of water
pollution in the U.S. today. 72% to 80% of eutrophic lakes would require control of nonpoint
[phosphorus] inputs to meet water quality standards, even if point inputs were reduced to
zero."); see also Chapter 5: Economic Aspects of Eutrophication, supra note 7 ("In the U.S.
threatened or impaired uses of most lakes and reservoirs are associated with non-point
sources.").
33. Hubbard, supra note 11.
34. Smith et al., supra note 11, at 182. The cyanobacterial algae blooms are dangerous;
some of their compounds "are more toxic than cobra venom." Id.
35. Carpenter et al., supra note 21, at 4.
36. See id.; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. No. 09-
P-0223, EPA NEEDS TO ACCELERATE ADOPTION OF NUMERIC NUTRIENT WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS I '(2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/20090826-09-P-
0223.pdf ("[Algal] blooms contribute to the creation of hypoxia or 'dead zones' in water bo-
dies, where dissolved oxygen levels are so low that most aquatic life cannot survive.").
37. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21.
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The algal blooms also pose dangerous health risks, such as "rashes, eye
irritation, asthma attacks, or liver damage. 38  Other incredibly costly and
detrimental impacts of cultural eutrophication of water-especially from
health and economic standpoints-should not be underestimated and require
much attention, both on a local and national level. There is currently no
drinking water standard established for phosphorus as a phosphate in the
water because it does not have a directly harmful effect on humans.39 The
efforts to impose limitations on phosphorus have been derided by some in-
dustries.no Nutrient pollution which derives from nitrogen, however, presents
a more direct threat to the population's health.41 "Nitrate in water is toxic at
high concentrations and has been linked to toxic effects on livestock and also
to 'blue baby disease' (methemoglobinemia) in infants. 42 Human-induced
eutrophication is also estimated to contribute significantly to economic
losses, though "[d]ocumentation of economic harm from eutrophication is
limited. 43 Nonetheless, setting reliable estimates of such losses is impor-
tant.44
As of 2008, sources reported that the combined costs associated with
eutrophication in United States, freshwaters totaled $2.2 billion.45 It is help-
ful to outline some of the most pertinent economic areas at risk associated
with cultural eutrophication. For example, with regards to recreational water
usage in fourteen different eco-regions-particularly during the summer
months in 2008, as "cyanobacterial blooms are most common during the
summer"46--it was concluded that the "current level of use [did] not
represent the full potential of lakes to attract recreational users. 4 7 The value
38. See POLICY ALERT: SUPPORT EFFECTIVE NUTRIENT POLLUTION LIMITS, CONSERVANCY
OF SOUTHWEST FLA., http://www.conservancy.org/Document.Doc?id=303 (last visited Aug. 1,
2011); see also Carpenter et al., supra note 21, at 5 ("Water-soluble compounds toxic to the
nervous system and liver are released when cyanobacterial blooms die or are ingested.").
39. See OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 5; see also Hubbard, supra note 11.
40. See id. Apparently, sugarcane growers demonstrate their ridicule for phosphorus
limits by having a glass of water from their farm ditches and laughing about what they deem
to be non-existent dangers of run-off. Id.
41. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21, at 6.
42. Id.
43. Dodds et al., supra note 8, at 12.
44. See id. Economic loss estimates from "human-caused environmental impacts" such
as cultural eutrophication can "potentially define problems for policy makers and direct focus
to areas with the greatest potential societal costs." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Dodds et al., supra note 8, at 14. It was estimated that out of 450 to 465 and 305 to
315 million fishing and boating days respectively, 7.1 to 22.2 and 4.8 to 15 million days were
lost to eutrophication each year. Id. at 15.
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loss from nutrient pollution for recreational angling and boating could reach
48$1.16 billion in five eco-regions.
Concerning costs of treatment of water for drinking purposes, the re-
sults of studies are similarly not favorable. Because "[e]utrophic systems
have more taste and odor problems from eutrophication, 49 the amount of
money spent on purchasing bottled water-rather than drinking tap water-is
staggering.50 Moreover, eutrophic water is a cause for more costs associated
with "[d]isruption of flocculation and chlorination processes at water treat-
ment plants."51 The costs related to ensuring safe treatment of water in water
drinking systems was assessed to constitute around $150.9 billion.52 And
lastly, beautiful waterfront views usually attract many potential buyers of
waterfront property. Yet, if there are strange smells and colors emanating
from the water because of nutrient pollution, the value of such property
quickly falls.53
Overall, the trends of cultural eutrophication in the United States can be
thought to represent a "global phenomenon. 54  Across the globe, lakes,
streams, and other bodies of water are subject to dangerous effects of eutro-
phication.55 Nationally, "more than 80,000 miles of streams and rivers are
impaired due to nutrient pollution., 56 Energy consumption, world popula-
tion, and extensive agricultural methods are all considered to be "drivers of
eutrophication"57 and are expected to increase in the future.58
48. Id.
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id. at 15 (Estimates indicate that "$813 million is spent annually on bottled water
because of taste and odor problems potentially linked to eutrophication.").
51. Smith, et al., supra note 11, at 185; see also Carpenter, et al., supra note 21 (reporting
also that when water contaminated with cyanobacterial blooms is processed at water treatment
plants, "high load[s] of organic detritus reacts with chlorine to form carcinogens known as
trihalomethanes.").
52. Dodds et al., supra note 8, at 18.
53. Id. at 16 ("[L]akefront property has significantly greater value with increased clarity,
[and] a decrease in property value of 15.6% occurs with every I-in loss in Secchi depth"-the
level of water transparency).
54. Id.
55. See SELMAN& & GREENHALGH, supra note 4, at 1.
56. Hubbard, supra note 1I; see, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 1
(depicting, as an example, the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico, which is the result of
excess nutrients from the Mississippi River).
57. SELMAN & GREENHALGH, supra note 4, at 1.
58. Id. "It is likely that eutrophication will increase most rapidly in the developing
world, where population, meat consumption, and energy consumption are expected to increase
more rapidly than in developed countries." Id. at 6.
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HI. THE DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
The EPA made its initial determination regarding new water quality
standards for nutrients for Florida on January 14, 2009. 59 The EPA praised
Florida for its commitment to managing and maintaining expenditures for
purposes of researching and analyzing various factors related to nutrient pol-
lution.6° However, it ultimately found that "continued population growth and
environmental and land-use changes," which contributed to the persistent
problem of nutrient over-enrichment in Florida, deemed it necessary for the
agency to specify new nutrient criteria.61  The decision was immediately
hailed as one that could set in motion a change in the standards for nutrients
in other states.62
A. The Promulgation of Water Quality Standards: Statutes and Regula-
tions
The background of the EPA's decision is important to discuss, as it
presents an overarching legal issue affecting all the parties and regulations
involved. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA),63 each state in
the United States, along with authorized tribes,64 must develop new, or revise
existing, water quality standards, which shall:
[C]onsist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved
and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such
uses. Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health
or welfare, enhance the quality of water .... Such standards shall
59. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Michael Sole, Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. 1 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/wqssp/nutrients/docs/benjamin-grumbles-epa0I 142009.pd.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Lewis B. Jones, EPA to Promulgate Federal Nutrient Criteria for Florida
Waters, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1589, 1589 (2009) ("EPA's determination in Florida could be a
harbinger of things to come in other states."); see also Kenneth J. Warren, Clean Water Act
Developments, in PRACTISING LAW INST., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND COMMERCIAL
IMPLICATIONS 2010: How THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS HAVE
CHANGED THE RULES 179 (2010). "EPA's decision to promulgate numeric nutrient criteria for
Florida waters is likely to constitute the beginning of a national standard setting effort." Id. at
178.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2006). The purpose of the Act was to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id.
64. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 2.
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be established taking into consideration their use and value for
public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational
purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also
taking into consideration their use and value for navigation.
65
Accordingly, the standards established by the states typically "define
the goals for a waterbody by designating its uses, setting criteria to protect
those uses, and establishing provisions to protect water quality from pollu-
tants."66 The EPA is authorized under the CWA to review water quality
standards adopted by the states, which are then submitted to the EPA and are
either approved or disapproved.67 Lastly, echoing the language of the CWA,
under the Code of Federal Regulations, "States must adopt those water quali-
ty criteria that protect the designated use. Such criteria must be based on
sound scientific rationale and must contain sufficient parameters or constitu-
ents to protect the designated use."68 However, the Administrator of the EPA
shall also:
[Pjromptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth
a revised or new water quality standard for the navigable waters
involved-
(A) if a revised or new water quality standard submitted by such
State... for such waters is determined by the Administrator not to
be consistent with the applicable requirements of this chapter, or
(B) in any case where the Administrator determines that a revised
or new standard is necessary ....69
Thus, the Administrator has the power to determine that a particular
state's water quality standards are insufficient under the CWA, "even in the
absence of a state submission.' 7 The question then is whether the EPA had,
in fact, made such a determination in reference to promulgating new water
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
66. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 2.
67. Id. "The [Clean Water] Act, passed in 1972, gives EPA the authority to review and
approve State water quality standards ...." Id.
68. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (a)(l) (2010).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006). The Administrator must then promulgate the newly
adopted standard within ninety days of its publication, unless the state has revised its water
quality standards in a manner that would prompt the Administrator to find them to be in ac-
cordance with CWA. Id.
70. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 2; see also 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)(B).
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quality standards-and more specifically, numeric nutrient criteria-before
the actual letter in 2009 from Assistant Administrator Benjamin Grumbles.
Such determination would have triggered the EPA's non-discretionary duty
to "promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth a revised
or new water quality standard" and more precisely, "to set numeric nutrient
criteria for Florida"'" long before the events in 2008 and 2009. The reasons
for determining that Florida's current nutrient standards are inadequate and
why the EPA's duty to adopt new standards may have arisen prior to 2009
are addressed in the next sections.
I. The Initiatives of 1997 and 1998: Honoring the Clean Water Act
The late 1990s proved to be a distinctive period for reform in water reg-
ulations and directives. On the 25th Anniversary of the CWA in October
1997, former Vice President of the United States Albert Gore, Jr. announced
an initiative for "the relevant federal agencies to take a series of actions" as
part of stressing the importance of clean water in matters such as public
health, contamination of water due to polluted run-off, and a "comprehensive
approach to water quality. '7 2  Gore specifically mentioned nitrogen and
phosphorus as special risks facing the nation's waters and acknowledged the
need to establish water quality standards for those pollutants.
73
The Clean Water Action Plan, prepared by the EPA and the Department
of Agriculture, presents a culmination of efforts to develop a clean water
initiative as urged by Gore. 74 The two agencies also filed an administrative
notice in the Federal Register, which presents an overview of the Clean Wa-
ter Action Plan 5 and requires definition of nutrient reduction goals: "EPA
will establish by the year 2000 numeric criteria for nutrients (i.e., nitrogen
and phosphorus) that reflect the different types of water bodies (e.g., lakes,
rivers, and estuaries) and different ecoregions of the country and will assist
states and tribes in adopting numeric water quality standards based on these
71. Jones, supra note 62, at 2 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)).
72. Albert Gore, Jr., Vice President of United States, The 25th Anniversary of Clean
Water Act (Oct. 17, 1997) (transcript available at http:i/clinton4.nara.govIWHIEOP/OVPI
speeches/clean.html).
73. Id.
74. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN:
RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATERS 1-2 (1998) [hereinafter CLEAN WATER
ACTION PLAN].
75. See Clean Water Action Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 14109 (Mar. 24, 1998).
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criteria."" The states would then be "required to incorporate these criteria
into their own standards by 2003."'7
Finally, a few months after the notice in Federal Register, as part of the
intent to help states and tribes in developing numeric nutrient criteria, the
EPA published its description of the approach for working with the states
and tribes in their efforts to develop numeric concentration levels for nu-
trients.78 The National Strategy explicitly provided that by December 31,
2003, the EPA expected all states and tribes to adopt and implement numeri-
cal nutrient criteria into their water quality standards. 79 The National Strate-
gy expressed concern with numerous findings, such as those indicating the
states with primarily narrative water quality standards. 80 According to the
National Strategy, for those states utilizing the narrative nutrient standards-
aimed at controlling problems associated with nutrient overenrichment-
additional work was necessary in order to better understand and manage nu-
trient impacts.81 Such concern may be due in part to another section of the
Code of Federal Regulations, which states: "In establishing criteria, states
should: 1) Establish numerical values based on: (i) 304(a) Guidance; or (ii)
304(a) Guidance modified to reflect site-specific conditions; or (iii) Other
scientifically defensible methods; (2) Establish narrative criteria or criteria
based upon biomonitoring methods where numerical criteria cannot be estab-
lished or to supplement numerical criteria. 82 This language demonstrates
that EPA's preference lies with numerical values for nutrients and narrative
criteria should only be used where the numeric cannot be.83
The National Strategy was cited as a purported "determination" under
the CWA by five environmental groups who filed suit against the-then Ad-
ministrator of EPA, Stephen Johnson. 84 Citing the National Strategy report,
76. Id. at 1411!.
77. Jones, supra note 62, at 2.
78. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 822-R-98-002, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL NUTRIENT CRITERIA 1 (1998) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY],
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/criteria/nutrient/strategy/nutstra3.pdf. The
document was said to "implement national policy on the issues it addresses." Id. at vi.
79. Id. at9.
80. Id. at2.
81. Id.
82. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2010).
83. See, e.g., Shimshon Balanson, Note, Holding Nature Responsible: The Natural Con-
ditions Exception to Water Quality Standards of the Clean Water Act, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1057, 1065 (2008) ("Numeric water quality standards are preferred, but, in situations where a
quantitative standard is unavailable, surrogate qualitative and narrative standards may suf-
fice.").
84. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v.
Johnson, 2008 WL 4076436 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2008) (No. 408CV00324).
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the plaintiffs asserted that "Florida has failed to develop numeric nutrient
criteria for phosphorus and nitrogen" and that "Defendants have failed to
take action by promptly setting numeric nutrient criteria for Florida as man-
dated by the CWA." 5 The complaint shows the possibility of the EPA hav-
ing a duty to set new standards long before the actual determination letter
made in 2009.
B. Exploring Narrative vs. Numeric Nutrient Criteria
What is a numeric standard for nutrients? What signifies narrative cri-
teria, which is the standard used in Florida and considered to be unsatisfacto-
ry for purposes of water quality standards in the 2008 complaint against the
EPA? In general, the National Strategy report provides:
Nutrient criteria is intended to be interpreted in its broadest sense,
covering both legal and scientific interpretations. Legally, a nu-
trient criterion is the numeric value which supports a particular
beneficial designated use in defining a water quality standard.
Scientifically, a nutrient criterion is meant to encompass both
causal and response variables (e.g., nitrogen or phosphorus levels),
as well as aquatic community response parameters such as but not
limited to algal biomass, chlorophyll a, and secchi depth.
8 6
1. The Numeric Nutrient Standard: What's in a Number?
A numeric standard would "define[] the maximum nitrogen and/or
phosphorus concentration in a waterbody that will permit that waterbody to
maintain its designated use. ' 87 The main focus of advancing numeric nu-
trient criteria "has been on lakes and reservoirs, with efforts to reduce nu-
trient inputs into streams resulting in facility specific effluent limitations."8
The approaches to determining numeric nutrient criteria for a waterbody
differ based on the amount of data available. The most suitable approach is
considered to be one involving experiments or monitoring a waterbody or a
85. !d. at *5 n.1, 6.
86. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 78, at 1; see also STATE-EPA NUTRIENT
INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., AN URGENT CALL TO ACTION: REPORT OF THE STATE EPA NUTRIENT
INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP D-2 (2009), available at www.epa.gov/waterscience/
criterialnutrient/nitgreport.pdf ("Numeric nutrient criteria employ ecoregional or site-specific
water quality standards that utilize criteria for one or several key nutrient parameters to protect
aquatic and recreational designated uses from nutrient inputs.").
87. OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
88. STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 86, at D-2.
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group of water bodies in order to witness the amount of nutrients in the water
at which "an impact on the designated use is no longer acceptable. 89 Such
an approach tests the stressor-response relationship where "nutrient concen-
trations protective of designated uses can be derived from the estimated rela-
tionship" 90 and, therefore, can directly relate the "nutrient stressor" with the
undesirable biological response.91 The EPA utilizes a five-step process in
deriving numeric nutrient criteria: 92
First, data are assembled, and the nutrient and response variables
on which the analysis will focus are selected. Second, the strength
of the cause-effect relationship between the selected nutrient and
response variables is assessed. Third, data are analyzed to esti-
mate stressor-response relationships, and these stressor-response
relationships are used to derive candidate nutrient criteria. Fourth,
stressor-response relationships estimated by different statistical
approaches are compared and evaluated. Finally, candidate nu-
trient criteria are evaluated, and appropriate criterion values identi-
fied. 93
The selection of stressor and response variables is a detailed task be-
cause an "appropriate response variable ... can be used to measure whether
the designated use of [a] waterbody is supported" and "responds causally to
changes in nutrient concentration." 94 Should there be insufficient data for
ascertaining the stressor-response relationship, a reference (or a reference-
condition) approach is used.95 Here, the first task would be to identify a ref-
erence site, or a body of water which "represent[s] least disturbed and/or
89. OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 8; see also FLA. DEP'T ENVTL. PROT., NUENT
CRITERIA: HISTORY AND STATUS 3, available at http:lwww.dep.state.fl.us/waterlwqssp/
nutrients/docs/fl-nnc-summary-100109.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) ('The most comprehen-
sive and scientifically defensible approach ... is to establish criteria to protect against de-
pendably measured adverse biological responses."); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY ET AL.,
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES FOR NUTRIENT CRITERIA DERIVATION 2 (2009) [hereinafter
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
WebProjectsbyNameBOARD!OpenView (follow the "Nutrient Criteria for Water Quality-
Guidance for Numeric Approaches" hyperlink to access the PDF file) ("[T]he use of nutrient
stressor-response relationships to derive nutrient criteria is one of the recommended approach-
es in USEPA nutrient criteria guidance.").
90. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES, supra note 89, at 2.
91. OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 8.
92. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES, supra note 89, at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. See OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 ("When there is not enough information to
determine stressor-response, then a reference approach is used.").
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minimally disturbed conditions.. and share[s] similar characteristics to the
waterbodies for which criteria are being derived. 96 The EPA suggests using
percentiles developed from reference sites, since those percentiles are indica-
tive of a "biological integrity expected for a region." 97
2. Narrative Nutrient Criteria and an Explanation of Florida's
Present Water Quality Standards
The EPA's proposed rule regarding water quality standards for Florida
describes narrative nutrient criteria as "descriptions of conditions necessary
for the waterbody to attain its designated use."98 In many cases, a typical
statement of a narrative criterion includes "requirements that waters remain
'free from' certain characteristics. '99 The rule directly suggests that the narr-
ative criterion is not well suited for water quality standards.' °
Florida currently applies such a narrative nutrient criterion, which
states, "In no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body of water be altered
so as to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora or fau-
na."' 10 This language means that there is no defined concentration of nitro-
gen or phosphorus, but it is at that undefined concentration that the waterbo-
dy may become impaired." 2 Florida Administrative Code also provides that
"[t]he discharge of nutrients shall continue to be limited as needed to prevent
violations of other standards contained in this chapter."' 113 The Florida De-
partment of Environmental Protection (FDEP) previously explained that the
reason for the state's preference in using narrative criteria is that nutrients are
very different from other pollutants.' °4 Unlike other pollutants which may be
96. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES, supra note 89, at 2. The numeric criteria are then derived
from compiled "measurements of causal and response variables from reference waterbodies";
the value is then selected from the distribution. Id.
97. Id.; see also FLA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROT., supra note 89, at 3 ("Using the 'reference site
approach,' EPA recommends setting criteria at an upper percentile value to represent a level
of nutrient concentration that will inherently protect aquatic life.").
98. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. 4174, 4181 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 13 1).
99. Id.
100. Id. ("[N]arrative criteria can be the basis for controlling nuisance conditions such as
floating debris or objectionable deposits.").
101. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530(47)(b) (2010).
102. See OBREZA ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (explaining that reaching this undefined con-
centration is when the nutrients can be expected to be harmful to the body of water).
103. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530(47)(a).
104. Development of Numeric Nutrient Criteria for Florida's Waters, FLA. DEP'T OF
ENVTL. PROT., http:/flwww.dep.state.fl.us/water/wqssp/nutrients/ (last updated Apr. 10, 2011).
211
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
dealt with using a "toxicity threshold," nutrients are present naturally in eco-
systems and are essential for proper functioning.1
0 5
Florida implements the narrative nutrient criteria in two ways, depend-
ing on whether the source is point or non-point.' °6 For point sources, FDEP
"conducts a site-specific analysis to determine whether a proposed discharge
has the reasonable potential to cause or contribute to an exceedance of the
narrative water quality criterion in the receiving water or any other affected
water."' 7 This site-specific analysis is used to derive National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits and in the development of Total Max-
imum Daily Loads (TMDLs), which the Department defines as "[a] scientific
determination of the maximum amount of a given pollutant that a surface
water can absorb and still meet the water quality standards that protect hu-
man health and aquatic life."'0 8 In both instances, the state translates the
level of nutrients which would cause an imbalance in natural populations of
aquatic flora or fauna into numeric values for the affected waters.' °9 For
non-point source polluters, the state's revisions of its Impaired Waters
Rule 10 bring them under regulations and "require the implementation of Best
Management Practices (BMPs)."' ' A TMDL is still developed for that body
of water which is impaired and a Basin Management Action Plan (BMAP) is
derived, under which a "number of point and nonpoint sources of pollution
are regulated."' 1 2  Specifically, under BMAP, unpermitted nonpoint dis-
charges must show implementation of BMPs.
3. The 2009 Consent Decree: Rejection of Narrative Criteria
The Florida Wildlife Federation v. Johnson'"3 lawsuit resulted in the en-
try of a consent decree between the parties in August of 2009, which was
later approved by a court order'"' due to numerous objections from various
105. Id. Such variation contributes to the presence of very unique and different nutrient
requirements. Id.
106. Frequently Asked Questions Related to Development of Numeric Nutrient Criteria,
FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/wqssp/nutrients/faq.htm (last
updated Mar. 26, 2009).
107. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 3.
108. Total Maximum Daily Loads Program, FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.
state.fl.us/water/tmdl/index.htm (last updated June 30, 2010).
109. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 3.
110. See FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 62-303.100 (2001).
111. STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 86, at D-7.
112. Id.
113. No. 408CV00324, 2008 WL 4076436 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2008).
114. Order Approving Consent Decree at *1, Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, No.
4:08cv324-RH/WCS (N.D. Fla., Dec. 30, 2009).
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intervenors.115 The court stated that the National Strategy Report and the
Clean Water Action Plan-as distinct from the 2009 letter of determination
from EPA's Benjamin Grumbles-did not make it clear that they constituted
a "determination" under the CWA.' 16 The court also agreed with the plain-
tiffs in finding that Florida's narrative nutrient standard has not been helpful
in solving the problem of "substantial nutrient pollution." ' 7
What exactly is the problem with having narrative nutrient standards as
opposed to numeric? After all, narrative standards are not entirely obsolete
when dealing with water quality protection. 18  Yet, according to some
sources, the narrative criteria has been compared to having speed limit signs
with no number on them and which instead vaguely read "Drive At A Rea-
sonable Speed Considering Weather, Traffic and Lighting Conditions As
Well As Other Relevant Factors."'1 9 Other states have similarly conceded
that a narrative criterion assessment may be difficult because there is no con-
crete definition of a relationship between levels of nutrients and impairment
of designated uses.120 In Florida's case, performing site-specific analyses for
thousands of state waters is a "difficult, lengthy, and data-intensive undertak-
ing." 12' There are significant advantages in using numeric nutrient standards
115. See, e.g., Proposed Intervenors' Memorandum and Expert Declarations in Opposition
to Entry of Consent Decree at 1, Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 4:08cv324-RH/WCS
(N.D. Fla., Oct. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 5128283 at * 1 (listing Florida Water Environment Associ-
ation Utility Council, Florida Minerals and Chemistry council as intervenors, and arguing that
the consent decree is "contrary to the public good").
116. Order Approving Consent Decree, supra note 114, at *4. The court reasoned that no
determination was explicitly announced within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4). See
id.; see also NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 78, at vi (explaining that the report is not a
regulation and does not substitute for the Clean Water Act).
117. Order Approving Consent Decree, supra note 114, at *5.
118. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 2. The 2009 determination letter
from the EPA likewise states that: "in many circumstances, narrative criteria can be an effec-
tive tool for protecting designated uses, particularly when the scope and nature of the envi-
ronmental problem is easily and clearly defined and derivation of appropriate control meas-
ures can be effectively and expeditiously accomplished (e.g., toxic pollutants and bioassess-
ments)." Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 8.
119. It's Time to End the Slime, FLA. WATER COAL., http://floridawatercoalition.org (last
visited Aug. 1, 2011); see also STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 86,
at D-3 ("[N]arrative criteria [is] open to interpretation due to their vaguely descriptive na-
ture.").
120. See Nutrient Criteria Development, N.M. ENV'T DEP'T, http://www.nmenv.state.
nm.us/swqb/nutrients/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (addressing the challenge of nutrient crite-
ria).
121. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. 4174, 4182 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). Numeric
criteria for nutrients in Florida will enable the state to protect the designated uses of bodies of
water much faster. See id.
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promulgated by the EPA. For instance, instead of having an undefined
measure by which impairment caused by nutrients may be analyzed, numeric
nutrient criteria would, in fact, provide a definitive standard.'22
C. Reactions to the Proposed Rule: The Big Picture
The responses to the EPA's proposed criteria in Florida have not been
welcoming. 23 The rule itself has been criticized on multiple levels, and con-
cerns arose immediately after the entry of the consent decree.' 24 The main
problems identified by opponents consist of the following: 1) the possibility
of recurring costs stemming from the new standards125-which would in-
clude modification of current nutrient-reducing operations; 26 2) the allegedly
"unattainable time frame" within which the nutrient pollution is to be ad-
dressed; 27 3) the lack of well defined scientific guidelines for establishment
of water quality standards; 28 and 4) the risk of new criteria not taking into
attention Florida's "remarkable ecological diversity. '129 The costs associated
122. STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GRP., supra note 86, at D-3; see also Let-
ter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 5 ("Numeric nutrient crite-
ria will provide more precise, predetermined targets that will facilitate more effective imple-
mentation of [the state's] programs and provide greater certainty as to the level of water quali-
ty necessary to protect the state's designated uses.").
123. See, e.g., David Fleshier, Tight Pollution Limits Proposed for Canals, SUN SENTINEL
(June 13, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-06-13/news/fl-water-pollution-201006
14_1 hillsboro-canal-lakes-and-rivers-water-resource-manager ("Dozens of powerful oppo-
nents have lined up against the proposal [such as] paper, citrus and power companies ....");
see also David Fleshier, Editorial, New EPA Water Rules Worth Every Penny, MIAMI HERALD
(Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/01/20/1434649/new-epa-water-rules-
worth-every.htmi (listing city and county governments as other groups opposing the rule).
124. See generally Proposed Intervenors' Memorandum and Expert Declarations in Oppo-
sition to Entry of Consent Decree, supra note 124, at I (demonstrating opposition to the con-
sent decree from numerous groups).
125. Tom Brown, Florida Citrus Growers Reject EPA Water Rules, REUTERS, Apr. 23,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-florida-citrus-epa-idUSTRE63M5A520
100423.
126. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 2, Fla. Wildlife Fed'n,
Inc. v. Jackson, No. 4:08cv324-RH/WCS (N.D. Fla., Jan. 25, 2010).
127. Proposed Intervenors' Memorandum and Expert Declarations in Opposition to Entry
of Consent Decree, supra note 115, at 1.
128. Letter from John L. Hoblick, President, Fla. Farm Bureau Fed'n, to Lisa Jackson,
Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 5 (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://www.floridafarm
bureau.org/files/resources/issues/NNC.pdf.
129. Letter from Carol Ann Wehle, Exec. Dir., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., to Water Dock-
et, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2 (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://my.sfwmd.gov/
portal/page/portal/ievelthree/Water%20Conservation (follow "News Archive" hyperlink;
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with complying with numeric nutrient standards by implementing BMPs for
entities such as agricultural producers is estimated to range from $855 mil-
lion to $3.069 billion. 130 Row crops, silviculture, and citrus sectors will alle-
gedly incur the highest costs at the start of implementation. 3' Because not
all agriculture in Florida is in compliance with the FDEP's drafts of develop-
ing numeric nutrient criteria, 132 "virtually all of agriculture acreage statewide
will be subject to implementation of typical BMPs and additional on-farm
water treatment/retention practices."'133 Others argue that the site-specific
analysis currently in use by the state is less costly than the proposed stan-
dards. 134 Another attack on the rule is the lack of "scientifically defensible
waterbody specific numeric nutrient criteria."'13' For example, according to
some of the sources' experts, there was no established "relationship between
nutrient concentrations observed and any adverse ecological response ob-
served through measurement of response variables.' 36
The consent decree provided "that EPA issue a final rule by October 15,
2010 for lakes and flowing water and by October 15, 2011 for estuarine and
coastal waters.' ' 137 The period within which comments on the new rule must
have been received was supposed to end on March 29, 2010.38 Such dead-
lines were criticized as being made in "zeal to dispense with litigation.' ' 39 It
was also alleged that the deadlines were indicative of the fact that the EPA
"will not be swayed by any meritorious comments" regarding the establish-
ment of numeric nutrient criteria. 40 And lastly, the reactions concerned a
follow "Memorandum" hyperlink under "April 2010;" then follow "Written Comments from
the South Florida Water Management District" hyperlink).
130. Richard Budell, et al., Economic Impacts and Compliance Costs of Proposed EPA
Numeric Nutrient Criteria for Florida Agriculture 1 (2010), available at http://freemarket
florida.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Economic-impacts-of-EPA-Numeric-Criteria-
FDACS-Report.pdf.
131. See id. at 4.
132. See id. at 2.
133. Id. at 7; see also Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, supra
note 135, at 4 ("Operators of non-point sources, including many farmers, ranchers, and mem-
bers of the agricultural interests . . . would be required to reduce their nutrient discharges
through the implementation of the TMDL program.").
134. See Letter from John L. Hoblick to Lisa Jackson, supra note 128, at 14.
135. Proposed Intervenors' Memorandum and Expert Declarations in Opposition to Entry
of Consent Decree, supra note 115, at *3.
136. Id.
137. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. 4174, 4175 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
138. Id. at 4174.
139. Proposed Intervenors' Memorandum and Expert Declarations in Opposition to Entry
of Consent Decree, supra note 115, at *1.
140. Id. at *4.
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"one-size-fits-all" approach adopted by the EPA, meaning that the same nu-
meric standards will be used for a multitude of waters in Florida.
141
The reactions to the EPA's promulgation of numeric nutrient standards
fail to take into consideration the bigger picture of nutrient pollution, which
remains a significant environmental issue in Florida, and which still persists
despite the efforts undertaken to manage it.142 The EPA also reports that
over sixty percent of waters are impaired for nutrients in Florida. 143 Fur-
thermore, there is a danger that waters which are still not analyzed will be
impaired, thus making the actual number of waters impaired for nutrients
higher.'" The estimated high costs related to implementation of numeric
nutrient criteria in agricultural and other industries, though significant, may
be a necessary sacrifice which will help to save money spent on cleaning up
the eutrophic water at the water treatment plants, as just one example. Addi-
tionally, the BMPs program's success should be much easier to assess with
numeric standards. 45 Numeric nutrient standards may provide a stable me-
thod of controlling nutrient run-off. Other factors, such as rising population
and Florida's flat topography, which "causes water to move slowly over the
landscape," will contribute to increased wastewater and more time for devel-
opment of eutrophication.'46 The delays resulting from current use of narra-
tive nutrient standards, 147 along with the fact that the inadequacy of said
standards was identified more than eleven years ago, do not justify yet
another delay in addressing nutrient pollution. 48 Nor do the deadlines estab-
lished by the consent decree signify unwillingness on the part of the EPA to
respond to comments made about the rule from residents and other groups.
149
141. Warren, supra note 62, at 179.
142. See Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75
Fed. Reg. at 4180-81. EPA indicates that both phosphorus and nitrogen concentrations have
remained stable in Florida and threats to public health and recreation continue due to frequent
algae blooms. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 6; see
also It's Time to End the Slime, supra note 119 ("For example, almost the whole Caloosahat-
chee River in Southwest Florida recently suffered a massive blue-green algae outbreak. The
St. Lucie River and estuary also suffered a massive toxic algae outbreak which caused a per-
manent loss of a half billion dollars in waterfront property values.").
143. Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 6.
144. Id.
145. OBREZAETAL.,supra note 5, at7.
146. Water Quality Standards for the state of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters, 75 Fed.
Reg. 4174, 4180 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). "Florida is
currently the fourth most populous state in the nation . I..." d.
147. Id. at4182.
148. Order Approving Consent Decree, supra note 114, at *6.
149. Id. at *5-6.
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The EPA even extended the comment deadline by thirty days because of the
enormous number of responses received regarding the proposed rule.' °
Despite complaints of lack of recognition of Florida's diverse ecology,
the EPA did address the uniqueness of the state's environment in the 2009
determination letter.15' It is highly unlikely that a "one-size-fits-all" ap-
proach would work in Florida, and the EPA recognized this by not only dis-
tinguishing between the bodies of water for which the numeric standard will
be implemented, but also by categorizing the make-up of waters and re-
gions. 152 Perhaps the most important of reasons to have numeric nutrient
criteria for Florida is due to the crucially unique nature of the Florida's Ever-
glades.
IV. EUTROPHICATION AND THE EVERGLADES WETLANDS
The Everglades are considered to be "the defining component of the
South Florida ecosystem,"'' 5 3 the subject of one of the most significant resto-
ration projects in the United States, and famously "recognized as an ecosys-
tem of great ecological importance."' 154 In the past, it stretched vastly for 220
miles from the city of Orlando down to Florida Bay, acting as a natural filter
150. News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Extends Comment Period to Hear
More from Floridians on Proposed Water Quality Standards (Mar. 4, 2010), [hereinafter News
Release], available at http://www.epa.gov/ (follow "Read More Water News Releases" hyper-
link; then follow "Earlier Releases" hyperlink).
151. See Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles to Michael Sole, supra note 59, at 7 (men-
tioning Florida's climate, soils, and hydrology among some factors which contribute to the
special challenges).
152. It's Time to End the Slime, supra note 119.
Lakes are categorized into three groups (colored, clear & alkaline, clear & acidic) and specific
standards are proposed for each group. For streams, EPA is proposing four different wa-
tershed-based regions within Florida with different nitrogen and phosphorous criteria for each
region. EPA also took into account the need to protect downstream water bodies by proposing
equations that would be used to further limit nutrient levels when necessary to protect down-
stream lakes and estuaries. For springs and clear streams, EPA is proposing a nitrate-nitrite
criterion that would prevent nuisance algae.
Id.; see also Warren, supra note 62, at 179 (The "EPA would allow Florida to derive lake-
specific criteria within EPA-specified ranges by considering, among other things, shading and
temperature variations.").
153. PERVAZE A. SHEIKH & NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20702, SOUTH
FLORIDA ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION AND THE COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION
PLAN CRS-2 (2008), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS20702.pdf.
154. M. J. Chimney & G. Goforth, Environmental Impacts to the Everglades Ecosystem:
A Historical Perspective and Restoration Strategies, 44 WATER SCI. & TECH. 93, 93 (2001).
The Everglades National Park, for instance, is one of the three wetlands in the entire world to
be regarded as a "Wetland of International Importance under the 1987 Ramsar Convention."
Id.
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system for water overflowing from Lake Okeechobee. 55 The population of
Florida in mid-1800s, however, saw the Everglades as a mere "unproductive
swamp" and resolved to take advantage of the land by draining for agricul-
tural and development purposes. 156 These activities, which increased as the
years went by, 57 have contributed to reducing the Everglades to only fifty
percent of its original size.1 58 Currently, the Everglades region consists of
three primary areas: 1) Everglades Agricultural Area, which is used for pro-
duction of sugarcane and winter vegetables,' 59 2) Water Conservation Areas,
or 3500 km2 of "shallow, diked reservoirs,"' 60 and 3) the Everglades National
Park, or "5700 km2 preserved for wilderness and wildlife habitat."''
A. The Effects of Nutrient Pollution on the Everglades Ecosystem
Researchers agree that Everglades had been oligotrophic (i.e., nutrient-
limited), historically. 162  Excessive phosphorus presence in the Everglades
began in 1940s, when many acres of land were converted to agricultural pro-
duction. 163 Canals carrying water from the Everglades Agricultural Area was
recently reported to contain high concentrations of phosphorus, 64 and
"[e]xcessive [phosphorus] loading has caused eutrophication in parts of the
[Water Conservation Areas].,,' 165  Additionally, high amounts of nutrients
entering both Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades have significantly de-
155. SHEIKH & CARTER, supra note 153, at 2.
156. Id. at 2-3.
157. See PERVAZE SHEIKH & BARBARA JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32131,
PHOSPHORUS MITIGATION IN THE EVERGLADES 8 (2004), available at http://ncseonline.org/
NLE/CRSreports/04jan/RL32131.pdf (confirming that production intensified after 1959 and
increased four-fold by mid-1960s).
158. See Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 93 (noting how agricultural and urban
development reduced the present-day Everglades).
159. Thomas V. Belanger et al., Effects of Nutrient Enrichment on the Florida Everglades,
5 LAKE AND RESERVOIR MGMT. 101, 101 (1989).
160. Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 93.
161. Belanger et al., supra note 159, at 102.
162. See, e.g., Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 94 ("[T]he wetland is thought to
have been oligotrophic throughout its history."); see also Belanger et al., supra note 159, at
102 ("Historically, Everglades nutrient levels were low and controlled largely by nutrient
levels in rainfall.").
163. SHEIKH & JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 7; see also Chimney & Goforth, supra note
154, at 94 ("Changes in water quality and other environmental disturbances were detected in
[Everglades National Park] as early as 1938.").
164. See Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 94. The run-off (with elevated levels of
nutrients) from Everglades Agricultural Area today flows into the Water Conservation areas
through a system of canals. Id.
165. Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 95.
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graded water quality. 166 As a result of nutrients entering the Everglades,
there was a "decline in native vegetation and an overabundance of invasive
,,167
exotic species.
For example, excessive levels of phosphorus in the Everglades is
thought to be the primary factor behind the conversion of native
sawgrass marshes and sloughs to vegetation stands dominated by
cattails. This shift in vegetation has resulted in less habitat for
wading birds and other wildlife and reduced populations of several
native plant species. Further, the rapid growth of cattails is partly
responsible for clogging waterways and altering the hydrology in
parts of the Everglades. 1
68
Nutrient enrichment is a significant problem for the Everglades, because
''components of the Everglades ecosystem appear to be highly responsive to
small changes in [phosphorus] concentrations."
169
B. Why Numeric Nutrient Criteria May Be Beneficial for the Everglades
Restoration
As the "biotic integrity of the remaining [Everglades] ecosystem was
threatened,"'' 70 there was a growing concern over detrimental impacts of
phosphorus. 7' Commendably, under the Everglades Forever Act (EFA)," 2
enacted in 1994 in Florida, there is already a numeric phosphorus limit in
place at least for one of the Everglades areas. 173 However, there are two is-
166. William B. Perry, Everglades Restoration and Water Quality Challenges in South
Florida, 17 EcoToxIcoLoGy 569, 572 (2008).
167. Sheikh & Carter, supra note 153, at 3.
168. Sheikh & Johnson, supra note 153, at 7.
169. Noe et al., supra note 169, at 603.
170. Chimney & Goforth, supra note 154, at 95.
171. Id.
172. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(17) (2010). The Act was based on a 1992 consent decree
between the federal government and the South Florida Water Management District. Id. The
Act required the parties involved to comply with multiple guidelines in order to alleviate the
amount of urban and agricultural run-off entering the Everglades National Park and Loxahat-
chee National Wildlife Refuge. Id. The guidelines were designed to help limit the levels of
phosphorus in the run-off entering the wildlife areas. See United States. v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 847 F.Supp. 1567, 1570-71 (S.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by
United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 28 F.3d 1563 (11 th Cir. 1994) (outlining the re-
medial measures).
173. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(e)(2) ("The phosphorus criterion shall be 10 parts per bil-
lion (ppb) in the Everglades Protection Area in the event the department does not adopt by
rule such criterion by December 31, 2003.").
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sues concerning the phosphorus limit provision. First, under the 2003
amendments of EFA, the deadlines for phosphorus mitigation became very
flexible. 174 The amendments specify a Long-Term Plan 175 for the Ever-
glades, which: 1) would be implemented from 2003 to 2016, as opposed to
the December 2006 compliance deadline set by the 1994 Everglades Forever
Act and the consent decree; 17 6 and 2) did not explicitly require that a phos-
phorus criterion be met by 2006, despite referencing the December 2006
deadline.177 The amendments were criticized as an attempt to "postpone into
the distant future the deadline for cleaning up the polluted water flowing into
the Everglades."' 178 The second issue lies with the language used for the cur-
rent phosphorus criterion for the Everglades: "In no case shall such phos-
phorus criterion allow waters in the Everglades Protection Area to be altered
so as to cause an imbalance in the natural populations of aquatic flora or fau-
na.",179 This language is highly reminiscent of the same wording used to de-
scribe the current narrative nutrient criteria in Florida. 80 Consequently, a re-
working of the present numeric phosphorus criterion according to the EPA's
proposed rule may be necessary, considering that thus far, no storm water
treatment areas has produced effluent water with as little as ten parts per bil-
lion. 18 Also, some studies recommend using what seems to be suggestive of
stressor-response like methodologies to further understand the effects of
phosphorus enrichment:
Finally, more controlled experimental additions of [phosphorus]
should be done to separate the effects of concurrent [nitrogen] and
[phosphorus] additions .... This research will help to alleviate
174. Sheikh & Johnson, supra note 153, at 1.
175. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(3)(e)(3) (2003) (amended 2005).
176. Sheikh & Johnson, supra note 153, at 6.
177. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(3)(b) ("The pre-2006 projects identified in the Long-Term
Plan shall be implemented by the district without delay, and revised with the planning goal
and objective of achieving the phosphorus criterion .... ).
178. Op-Ed, Everglades in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com
/2003/04/21 /opinion/everglades-in-peril.html?scp= I &st=cse.
179. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(e)(2) (2010).
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530(47)(b) (2010).
181. Perry, supra note 166, at 572. "Storm water treatment areas use naturally-occurring
biological processes to reduce the levels of phosphorus in water that will enter the Everglades
to an interim goal of [fifty] parts per billion. The treatment objective is to achieve [ten parts
per billion], the established criterion for protection of Everglades biota." Id.; see also
AUDUBON OF FLA., NUMERIC WATER QUALITY STANDARDS (2010), available at
http://audubonoffloridanews.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Numeric-Water-Quality-
Standards.pdf ("After a billion dollars of investment in stormwater treatment areas, and im-
plementation best management practices, compliance with the Everglades 10 ppb phosphorus
standard still has not been consistently achieved.").
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controversy by identifying [total phosphorus] concentrations in
water entering the Everglades that can "prevent an imbalance in
the natural populations of aquatic flora or fauna."1
82
The other piece of historic legislation dealing with restoration of Ever-
glades is concerned with water "quantity, quality, timing, and distribu-
tion.' 83 That legislation is called Comprehensive Everglades Restoration
Plan (CERP), and it was approved in the Water Resources Development Act
of 2000.184 It proposes more than forty major civil works projects and sixty-
eight project components. 85 Yet, no CERP projects have been completed
since its enactment, 86 and CERP itself is not a comprehensive plan for eco-
system restoration linked to water quality restoration program.8 7 Therefore,
"restoration success will depend heavily on the success of ... pollution re-
duction programs, which are outside the scope of CERP."' 8 8 And, the suc-
cess of CERP and EFA will depend on the introduction of new methods-
such as the numeric nutrient criteria proposed by the EPA-in order to im-
prove the quality of water used to restore the Everglades.
While there are presently efforts related to improvement of water quali-
ty in terms of curbing phosphorus enrichment, CERP's technical team
RECOVER has stated that "water quality and ecological models capable of
predicting [nitrogen] loading, cycling, resultant concentrations, and transport
still need to be developed.' ' 189 Moreover, the team asserted that "[b]y quanti-
fying nutrient sources, flows, and transformations through monitoring and
assessment of freshwater marshes in the Greater Everglades, data will be
available to develop evaluation tools and to better understand downstream
effects of [nitrogen] export on estuaries,"' 90 and therefore, like the EPA, con-
firming a preference for numerical values for nitrogen water quality criteria.
Numeric nutrient standards may help prevent phosphorus and nitrogen
182. Noe et al., supra note 169, at 618.
183. Sheikh & Carter, supra note 153, at 3.
184. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat.
2572, 2680 (2000).
185. Perry, supra note 166, at 571.
186. Sheikh & Carter, supra note 153, at 5.
187. See Perry, supra note 166, at 576 (stating that at present there is no such linkage
between water quality restoration and comprehensive ecosystem restoration).
188. See id. CERP only focuses in improving the quality of water where feasible, suggest-
ing that it is not one of the priority issues in Everglades ecosystem restoration. Id. at 569.
189. GREATER EVERGLADES WETLANDS NUTRIENT TOTAL NITROGEN CONCENTRATIONS IN
SURFACE WATER 1 (2007), available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/recover/recover-
docs/ret/030807_getnconc_sw.pdf.
190. Id.
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enrichment, which "leads to a distinctly different ecosystem than the historic
oligotrophic Everglades."'1 91
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, developing adequate and scientifically sound criteria for
nutrients in Florida will be an incredibly challenging and costly task. In the
case of the Everglades wetlands, much research and studies will be needed in
order to understand the link between water quality and the restoration needs
of a badly damaged ecosystem and whether the numeric criteria proposed by
the EPA supports the "same level of science backing up the Everglades
[ten] part per billion standard." '192 All of the above would understandably
take a long time to accomplish. However, the EPA's rule regarding Flor-
ida's water quality standards is a great way to rectify many years of inac-
tion and delay in attempting to fix the nutrient pollution problem in Flori-
da and other states. As of August 2011, a federal appeals court for the Ele-
venth Circuit struck down an appeal filed by the intervenor groups such as
the South Florida Water Management District after the 2009 consent decree
was approved.19 3 The court reasoned that "a challenge to the consent decree
"does not ... create the alleged substantive injury and [the]decision to re-
verse its approval would not redress the [a]ppellants' alleged grievances. ' 94
Though this outcome is favorable for proponents of the rules, there are still
significant challenges facing the implementation of the standards. But
,nonetheless,like a speed limit, which does not specify the numerical value
of the speed at which everyone should be going, a narrative nutrient crite-
rion in Florida is very vague. The EPA's proposed rule, much like a real
numerical speed limit, will help minimize the impacts of nutrient pollu-
tion.
191. Noe et. al., supra note 169, at 620.
192. AUDUBONOFFLA. supra note 181.
193. Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 10-11121, 2011 WL
3298908, at *1 (11 th Cir., Aug. 2, 2011.)
194. Id. at *7.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, while drilling oil from the outer Continental Shelf,
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing eleven people and spilling
more than five million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.' Deepwater
Horizon held the record as the deepest oil rig in history, and the oil spill it
produced is one of the largest ever.2
Fortunately, catastrophic spills like the Deepwater Horizon are not the
rule.3 Offshore operators spill millions of gallons of oil, fuel, and other
chemicals into federal waters each year.4 According to the United States
Minerals Management Service, approximately forty spills were greater than
one thousand barrels since 1964, and thirteen within the last ten years.5 Off-
shore oil extraction operations have produced some of the largest oil spills in
the world's history.6 The numbers become higher when considering oil spills
from tankers, carriers, and barges.7 As estimated by the United States Coast
Guard, 1.3 million gallons of petroleum are spilled into United States waters
1. Sheila Pulham et al., BP Oil Spill: An Interactive Timeline, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,
2010, 11:09 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2010/jul/08/bp-oil-
spill-timeline-interactive.
2. BP Oil Spill Is Now the Largest Ever in Gulf, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2010, 11:53 AM),
http:l/www.cbsnews.comlstofies/2010/07101/national/main6636406.shtm; Dan Shapley, So
How Big Was the BP Oil Spill?, DAILYGREEN (Sept. 21, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latestbp-oil-spill-size-0528. "An inde-
pendent analysis ... puts the total spilled" at more than 180 million gallons. Id.
3. David Ivanovich & Kristen Hays, Offshore Drilling Safer, but Small Spills Routine:
Hurricanes Can Pose Particular Risks, Hous. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R.L. 33705, OIL SPILLS IN U.S.
COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 32 (2007), avail-
able at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33705-20070823.pdf. Before the Deepwater Hori-
zon, "[t]he largest accidental oil spill in world history-the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million
gallons-was due to an oil well blowout in Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979." Id. at 32-
33.
7. INT'L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED'N, OIL TANKER SPILL STATISTiCS: 2009, 5
(2009), available at http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/
documents/Statspack2009-FINAL.pdf.
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from vessels and pipelines in a typical year.8 In addition, spill statistics are
often misleading because some incidents are not reported in the Coast
Guard's database.9
Moreover, statistics are no better when considering the rest of the
world. For example, while the Deepwater Horizon spill was still ongoing,
China experienced its largest oil spill.' ° There are also many oil spills that go
largely unnoticed, and the numbers seem to be increasing." Even if the
United States and other countries suspended deepwater drilling as a result of
the spill, East Timor, Australia and others continue to pursue "ultra-deep"
exploration. 2 Despite the experience and the moratorium that followed the
spill, deep water drilling is resuming in other wells in the Gulf of Mexico. 3
Further, British Petroleum will start drilling soon in the Mediterranean 4 and
in the Arctic Ocean. 5 Finally, the worst has yet to come: Brazil is drilling
deeper than the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig and with fewer precautions. 6
8. Oil Spills, FUEL ECONOMY.GOV, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/oilspills.shtml (last
visited Oct. 1, 2011).
9. RAMSEUR, supra note 6, at 32.
10. Cara Anna, China Oil Spill Doubles in Size, Called 'Severe Threat,' ASSOCIATED
PRESS, (July 21, 2010,4:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/38337393/.
1I. See Joe Brock, Africa's Oil Spills are Far from U.S. Media Glare, REUTERS (May 18,
2010, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE64G12X. "[l]ntemational media
has largely ignored the latest incidents ... in Nigeria, where the public can only guess how
much oil might have been leaked." Id.
12. East Timor Considers Deep Oil Drilling, PERTHNOw (July 26, 2010, 9:09 AM),
http:I/www.perthnow.com.auusiness/east-timor-considers-deep-oi-drilling/story-e6frg2r3-
1225896947807.
13. US Clears More Deepwater Oil Drilling in Gulf, SEA'TLE TIMES, (Mar. 12, 2011,
9:24 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2014476834_apusgulf
drillingbhpbilliton.html.
14. Monica Ricci Sargentini, La Bp Trivellerct in Libia a 600 km dalla Sicilia, CORRIERE
DELLA SERA, July, 25, 2010 at 13 (It.), available at http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/
2010/luglio/25/trivelleraLibia_600 dalla_Sicilia co9100725006.shtml.
15. Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces Offshore Arctic Drilling,
N.Y. T)MES, Feb. 16, 201 t, at BI.
16. John Vidal, UK Backing Loans for 'Risky' Offshore Oil Drilling in Brazil, GUARDIAN
(June 30, 2010, 11:34 AM) http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/30/uk-loans-
brazil-offshore-drilling.
The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of Brazil in 1,798 metres (5,900 feet)
of water-deeper than BP's Deepwater rig that exploded in April and led to the disastrous oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico .... [Tjhe 14-page environment report prepared by the [bank financ-
ing the drilling operations] makes no mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent
them. Ministers have edited out all ECDG's comments assessing the risks involved in deep-sea
drilling in the Atlantic.
Id.; see also Editorial, Obama Underwrites Offshore Drilling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at
A16.
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In other words, the problem is more than compelling. The risk is that
the environmental damage will be irreversible. Oil has played, and still
plays, a fundamental role in the world's economy. 7 But times are chang-
ing. 8  Alternative feasible sources of energy exist' 9 -renewable, less dan-
gerous, and, most importantly, environment-friendly energy sources. 20 Still,
oil maintains its supremacy mainly because of its low cost.2' However, oil's
low cost depends on nobody being held accountable for the environmental
damages produced by oil drilling. Nowadays, different theories are raised
to support the petroleum companies' liability.2 3 Still, the United States sys-
tem owns in its arsenal one of the most powerful weapons to fight the oil
plague.24
This article will show that the common law doctrine of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities constitutes the best way to remedy and to
prevent further oil spills from occurring. Part H will analyze the issue of
whether federal preemption thwarts the application of state tort law. Part III
will generally describe the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities and
its application in Florida. Finally, Part IV will argue that offshore oil drilling
is an abnormally dangerous activity.
17. See John W. Schoen, BP Spill Clouds Future of U.S. Drilling, MSNBC.coM (May
28, 2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37389981/ns/business-oil-andCenergy/.
18. See id.
19. Sharon Begleymay, How Quickly We Forget, NEWSWEEK (May 7, 2010),
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/how-quickly-we-forget.html.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability:
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216
(2007) ("Under strict liability, firms price their products to include not only the costs of pro-
duction and reasonable care, as they would under the negligence rule, but also the cost of
accidents from unavoidable residual risk."); see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Deepwater
Horizon Disaster-Some Liability Issues, 5 TUL. MAR. L.J. 125, 127 (2010).
23. Abeyratne, supra note 22, at 127. "At the time of writing, questions continued to
emerge as to who was liable for the spill, and it was reported that the United States Depart-
ment of Justice opened both civil and criminal investigations into the occurrence." Id.
24. See id. at 128, 149 (starting the analysis on oil spill liability with the acknowledgment
that "[t]he United States is a common law jurisdiction," and then concluding that a defen-
dant's liability "could be determined on the basis of fault liability or strict liability.").
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1. A VALID COMMON LAW CLAIM
A. A Preliminary Issue: Why Common Law Should Not Be Preempted
An issue preliminary to the present discussion concerns federal preemp-
tion. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that federal law "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby. 25  Thus, pursuant to the Constitution, federal law could
preempt the application of the state common law, frustrating any chance to
establish tort liability.26 Historically, federal and state laws have supple-
mented the common law standards of liability in many instances.27 Congress
has regulated oil pollution through piecemeal legislation, 8 and entrusted
federal agencies have enacted a large body of regulations to supplement
those rules.29
However, even when federal law regulates harmful activity through ex-
tensive and comprehensive prohibitions, state common law can maintain its
fundamental role of "gap filler."3 In particular, there are compelling reasons
why the common law of torts should not be preempted.3 First, tort law pro-
vides an alternative basis to recover both compensatory and punitive damag-
es, even when relief would be unavailable under statutory law. 2 Moreover,
common tort law operates to protect different-but complementary-
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
26. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 917-21 (1st Sess. 1992).
Article VI states that the federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby." Id.
27. William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705,
1742 (1992). "For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides for strict liabil-
ity for clean-up costs . I..." ld  (footnote omitted).
28. See Ambrose 0. 0. Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative
Overview of the Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 55, 65 (1995). The author lists several federal statutes: the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabili-
ty Act (CERCA); Clean Water Act (CWA); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA); Oil
Pollution Act (OPA); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA); Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA); Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA); Deepwater Port Act (DPA);and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA). Id. at
65 n.51.
29. Id. At a federal level, a non-exclusive list includes the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Transportation (including the Coast Guard), the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Department of Interior, and the Minerals Management Service. Id. at 65 n.54.
30. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (2009).
31. See id.
32. Id.
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interests than public law, such as morality, reciprocity, and most importantly,
distributive justice.33
Finally, preserving common law remedies may promote economic effi-
ciency. 34 Tort liability forces the purveyors of risky activities to bear the cost
of harm caused by the activity.35  The companies engaged in abnormally
dangerous activities will spread such costs by raising the prices of their
products.36 That would make the consumers aware of the true costs of pro-
duction, including the environmental costs, and enable them to make in-
formed purchasing decisions.37 When damage awards make the existing
practice too expensive, the producer is motivated either to improve the prod-
uct or take the product off the market.38 Considering the importance of pe-
troleum in our society, it is unlikely that oil companies would choose the
latter option; it is more than fair, however, to force such companies to pay
for the harm caused while pursuing their profits.39
The foregoing was underlined in United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc.,n° where
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, upholding a penalty for an oil
spill, observed:
[T]he party engaged in the potentially polluting enterprise is in the
best position to estimate the risk of accidental pollution and plan
accordingly, as by raising its prices or purchasing insurance. Eco-
nomically, it makes sense to place the cost of pollution on the en-
terprise ... which statistically will cause pollution and in fact does
cause pollution.41
Accordingly, imposing common law strict liability has the collateral ef-
fect of requiring oil companies to account for the harm produced by their
33. Id. (stating that "[s]ocietal norms of reciprocity, distributive justice, morality, and
punishment for careless or malicious deeds undergird tort law") (footnote omitted).
34. Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 194 (1985).
35. Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1673.
36. See id.; see also David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 95, 101 (2005) (identifying the threat of liability as an important source of market discip-
line).
37. Glicksman, supra note 34, at 194; Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1673-74.
38. Zelimer, supra note 30, at 1674.
39. See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Alloca-
tion of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 718 (1965). "Activities are made more expensive, and
thereby less attractive, to the extent of the accidents they cause. In the extreme cases they are
priced out of the market." Id.
40. 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 1314-15 (footnotes omitted).
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activities, with the final, auspicious result of rendering the alternative energy
sources more feasible.42 Based on the foregoing, the applicability of the
common law should not be preempted.
B. The Rules for Preemption
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that "'any state
law . . . which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'
43
This principle makes no distinction between federal statutes and federal
regulation by a government agency; federal regulations have the same pre-
emptive effect as federal statutes when they are enacted according to the
congressional mandate.44 However, under preemption principles it appears
crystal clear that neither federal law nor federal regulation would preempt
Florida tort law in this case.
Federal pre-emption may be either expressed or implied.45  Express
preemption results when the federal legislation contains explicit pre-emptive
language.46 In the absence of such express language, the Supreme Court of
the United States has distinguished two types of implied preemption.47 Field
preemption-when the "federal regulation is 'so pervasive ... that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it,"' 4 and conflict preemption-
when compliance with both the federal and the state regulation would be
physically impossible, 9 or when application of the state law would interfere
with the realization of the full purpose and objectives of Congress. 0
The congressional purpose, then, is the "ultimate touchstone.' 5 Where
there is an overlap between federal and state law, however, the latter is pre-
sumed valid "'unless [preemption] was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.' 5 2 Thus, this presumption must be rebutted to preempt a state
42. See Calabresi, supra note 39, at 716 ("Treating the problems of accident law in terms
of activities rather than in terms of careless conduct is the first step toward a rational system of
resource allocation.").
43. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
44. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
45. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153).
49. Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
50. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
51. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
52. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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law. 53 Preempting a common law theory of recovery is usually more diffi-
cult.5 4 Finally, the result seems easier when the federal law contains an ex-
press savings clause, designed to leave to the states the power to regulate the
matter.55
Oil polluters invoked the foregoing principles as a protection from lia-
bility for oil spills in interstate waters; however, courts have correctly chosen
to preserve state law remedies.56
C. No Federal Statutes Overcome the Presumption Against Preemption
1. Clean Water Act
The first statute to consider is the Clean Water Act (CWA). Section
132 1(b)(3) of CWA prohibits any person from discharging into or upon wa-
ters of the United States any harmful quantity of oil.57 Violation of the pro-
hibition or failure to comply with the federal government's directives regard-
ing cleanup operations triggers liability for civil penalties.58 However, noth-
ing in the Act expressly preempts state law; in fact, the contrary is true.
CWA contains an explicit saving clause that prevents any interpretation prec-
luding state authority.59 As written, CWA is only an alternative channel to
seek recovery. 60 Express preemption, then, has to be excluded.
53. See id.
54. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). "In order to abrogate a com-
mon-law principle, the statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common
law." Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
55. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1660.
56. Id. at 1678.
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006).
58. Id. § 1321(b)(6)(A)(i)-(ii).
59. Id. § 1321(o)(2). This section specifically addresses oil spills; under the title "[L]ocal
authority not preempted" states:
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the obligations of any owner or
operator of any vessel ... onshore facility or offshore facility to any person or agency under
any provision of law for damages to any publicly owned or privately owned property resulting
from a discharge of any oil ... or from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State ... from imposing any
requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil . . . into any waters within such
State, or with respect to any removal activities related to such discharge.
Id.
60. In re Complaint of Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Va. 1979)
(concluding that nothing in CWA "conflicts with or otherwise preempts any state statute...
imposing liability" nor "limit the amount of that liability," but "merely provides the states
with an alternative federal remedy" assuring the preservation of "the natural resources of this
country"); accord Baker v. Hazelwood (In re Exxon Valdez), 270 F.3d 1215, 1231 (9th Cir.
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Any attempt to imply preemption will lead to a similar conclusion.
Congress did not intend CWA penalties for water pollution to occupy the
entire field of pollution remedies. 6' Through its saving clause, CWA was
designed to maintain the common law theories.6" Thus, there is no field
preemption. Moreover, the common law does not conflict with the federal
regulation, the former providing an easier way to punish the same harmful
conduct.' First, it is not physically impossible to comply with both.65 In
fact, strict liability under common law will enter into play only when the
statute is already violated by an unlawful oil spill. Second, applying the doc-
trine of abnormally dangerous activities to oil spills aims at the same purpose
that CWA tries to obtain.66 The principal purpose of this section is to deter
harmful oil spills. 67 Such a goal will be accomplished, rather than ob-
structed, by considering deepwater oil drilling an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity. 68 Finally, the legislative history indicates a lack of congressional in-
tent to preempt state law.69 Accordingly, CWA should not preempt the state
common law.
2001) ("[Tjhe Clean Water Act does not preempt a private right of action for punitive as well
as compensatory damages for damage to private rights.").
61. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008).
62. See id. (CWA is "expressly geared to protecting 'water,' 'shorelines,' and 'natural
resources' and was not intended to "eliminate sub silentio oil companies' common law duties
to refrain from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals.").
63. Id.
64. See In re Complaint of Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Va. 1979).
65. See id.
66. See infra Part III.
67. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1350 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd in
part and vacated in part by 628 F.2d 652 (1 st Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Atil. Richfield
Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977) aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573
F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1978)); At. Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. at 837 ("Congressional purpose...
was to impose a standard of conduct higher than that related just to economic efficiency"); see
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2006); see also United States v. Oswego Barge Corp. (in re Com-
plaint of Oswego Barge Corp.), 673 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (The "only purpose [of the oil
spill cleanup provisions of this section] is to create a precise remedy solely for the United
States to recover specified damages pursuant to a carefully devised formula.").
68. See Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Cae-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 758 (Md.
1993). "To the extent that the action does not otherwise thwart the goal of the [CWA], the
savings clause does preserve state law remedies." Id. at 756.
69. For instance, the Senate Report of the 1977 CWA amendments, in the relevant part,
contains the following comments:
The committee considered amendments to section 311 to establish liability for damages
occurring outside the jurisdiction of any State as a result [of] an oilspill, including compensa-
tion for income loss due to damages to property or natural resources. A related amendment
creating a new compensation fund.., was also considered. The committee deferred action on
these proposals and will consider them as part of the comprehensive oilspill liability legisla-
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This rationale was followed by the appellate court in the Exxon Valdez
oil spill.7" The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to fisher-
men and landowners injured by the oil spill under Alaskan law.7' Since OPA
does not retroactively apply to spills before 1990, Exxon argued that CWA
and federal admiralty law preempted common law damages awards.72 The
Ninth Circuit considered CWA savings clause and left the private tort claims
intact.73 The Supreme Court affirmed.74  Some of the same reasons apply
when considering the next statute.
2. Oil Pollution Act
As a response to the Exxon Valdez wreck in 1989, which caused an oil
spill of eleven million gallons into the coastal waters of Alaska, Congress
enacted the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990.71 OPA substantially expanded
the existing regulation concerning oil spills. 76 It also imposed strict liability
for parties responsible for oil spills.7 7 In enacting OPA, preemption was the
most discussed point.78 In the last version of the OPA, Congress included
two savings clauses almost identical to those contained in CWA.79 Thus,
Nothing in [the OPA] shall ... be construed ... as preempting
the authority of any State ... from imposing any additional liabili-
ty or requirements with respect to the discharge of oil or ... any
removal activities in connection with such a discharge,
80
tion. In that context, the provision of liability for damages and a compensation fund which
does not preempt [s]tate liability requirement would be appropriate.
S. REP. No. 95-370, at 65 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326.
70. See Zellmer, supra note 30, at 1679.
71. Baker v. Hazelwood (In re Exxon Valdez), 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001).
72. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1226, 1228.
73. See id. at 1231.
74. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633-34 (2008). The Court re-
manded the case to remit the award to the "punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1." Id. at
2634.
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (2006); Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
76. Michael D. Driscoll, Note, United States v. Massachusetts: Federal Preemption of
State Oil Spill Statutes, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 607, 611 (2008).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A); see Driscoll, supra note 76, at 611.
78. S. REP. No. 101-94, at 17 (1989). Preemption was discussed "more than any other
single issue" by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Id.; see also Russell
v. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVT. L.
REP. 10119, 10133 (1991).
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), (c).
80. Id. § 2718(a).
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And,
Nothing in this Act ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to
affect, the authority of the United States or any State ... to impose
additional liability or additional requirements; or to impose, or to
determine the amount of, any fine or penalty.., for any violation
of law; relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a dis-
charge, of oil.81
Since its enactment, federal courts have rejected OPA preemption of
common law tort claims for damages to natural resources. In United States
v. Locke,s3 the Supreme Court ultimately interpreted the scope of the savings
clauses. 84 The unanimous Court limited the state power to regulations im-
posing additional liability relating to oil spills. 85 The Court reasoned:
Placement of the saving clauses in Title I of OPA suggests that
Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the
matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state laws similar to the
matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole subject of
maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses
is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive
regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules
and financial requirements relating to oil spills.
86
Finally, the Court also acknowledged that it has "upheld state laws im-
posing liability for pollution caused by oil spills" and specified that the deci-
sion "preserves this important role for the States, which is unchallenged
here. 87 By coincidence, the cite was to a Florida case: Askew v. American
81. Id. § 2718(c).
82. See, e.g., Clausen v. MA' New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001);
Williams v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (D. Md. 2000); Dostie Dev.,
Inc. v. Arctic Peace Shipping Co., No. 95-808-CIV-J-MMP, 1996 WL 866119, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 14, 1996); Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F.
Supp. 1436, 1447-48 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the OPA allowed
recovery in excess of the statutory limit and concluding that the OPA preserves state law
claims for those damaged by the spill but not for other responsible parties seeking contribution
claims from third parties).
83. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
84. Id. at 105-06.
85. Id. at 106.
86. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 106 (citing Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332
(1973)).
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Waterways Operators, Inc.,88 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act did not preempt
state law, because of two similar saving clauses.89 The court explained that:
[T]here need be no collision between the Federal Act and the Flor-
ida Act because ... the Federal Act presupposes a coordinated ef-
fort with the States, and any federal limitation of liability runs to
'vessels,' not to shore 'facilities.' That is one of the reasons why
the Congress decided that the Federal Act does not pre-empt the
States from establishing either 'any requirement or liability' res-
pecting oil spills. 90
At the time of the Askew decision, OPA had not been enacted yet; how-
ever, the Court applied the same rationale in Locke and refused implied
preemption.9 In sum, the Court's view of OPA's saving clauses does allow
state law-including state common law-as a supplemental source of liabili-
ty for oil spills.92 Accordingly, although it is worth noting that British Petro-
leum is facing, among others, a lawsuit filed under CWA by three environ-
mental groups of citizens for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,93 neither CWA
nor OPA preempts state common law.94
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
A. Ultrahazardous Strict Liability in the United States
1. Rylands v. Fletcher: The Seminal Case
Strict liability for ultrahazardous activities was first established in the
English case Rylands v. Fletcher.95 The idea set forth in Rylands is simple:
Someone conducting an activity on his own property, "which he knows will
be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's," must pay for the damage
88. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
89. Id. at 328-29.
90. Id. at 336.
91. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105-06 (2000); Askew, 411 U.S. at 336.
92. Locke, 529 U.S. at 105.
93. Environmental Groups Sue BP Under Clean Water Act, CIRCLE OF BLUE (June 7,
2010), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/20 10/world/north-america/environmental-
groups-sue-bp-under-clean-water-act/.
94. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); see also Locke, 529 U.S.
at 105.
95. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng-
land).
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"which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. '96
In other words, some activities are so risky that those who engage in them
will be liable for the consequences of loss of control over the activities, re-
gardless of whether they were carried on without wrongful conduct.
97
Ironically, Rylands itself involved a spill; the defendant's reservoir
flooded on to the plaintiff's adjoining land.98 The defendant was not negli-
gent, but the Court found the defendant strictly liable, stating:
[T]he true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape. 99
After an initial hostility to the Rylands principle, American courts began
to adopt the doctrine, imposing strict liability even in absence of negli-
gence. 0° In the earliest cases applying Rylands, strict liability involved two
components: first, the abnormal danger of certain activities;'' and second,
the fairness of imposing the cost for the harm resulting from the activity on
the actor rather than on unrelated parties.1
0 2
Those components were still more evident in the first decision applying
strict liability for oil drilling." 3  In Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,'
0 4
96. Id. at 340.
97. See Kevin Case, Note, Tanks in the Streets: SUVS, Design Defects, and Ultraha-
zardous Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 177 (2006).
98. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 332.
99. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279. On appeal, the opinion was af-
firmed, with additional language referring to the defendant's "non-natural use" of his land.
See Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 339.
100. Compare Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873) (holding that no "legal principle
can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement"), with Green v.
Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 956 (Cal. 1928) (holding "in all fairness" that oil drilling
was an inherently hazardous activity). "Typical early cases involved the storing of nitroglyce-
rin, exploding oil wells, and blasting operations." Case, supra note 97, at 178.
101. See, e.g., Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528, 531
(Ohio 1899) (considering the dangerousness of storing nitroglycerine).
102. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931). In
Exner, the court stated:
When ... the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the perilous activity of storing..
. explosive[s] for use in his business.. . there is no justification for relieving it of liability, and
•.. the owner of the business, rather than a third person who has no relation to the explosion,
other than that of injury, should bear the loss.
Id.
103. See Case, supra note 97, at 179; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987) (sug-
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where the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's exploding oil well,
the Supreme Court of California imposed liability on the defendant, stating:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act ... and injury is done
to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act,
however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the
injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other
for the damage done.
105
Several years later, in Luthringer v. Moore,'06 the same court explained
its holding in Green stating, "The important factor is that certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of
such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict liability as
the best public policy.' 0 7
Accordingly, both components were present in the court's analysis, and
the court eventually held in favor of the plaintiff.10 8 The fairness component
was more explicit in Green than in the previous cases.' °9 However, the First
Restatement of Torts and the Second Restatement of Torts apparently re-
strained the breadth of the doctrine, making its application more unpredicta-
ble.'l°
2. The Restatement (First) of Torts: Common Activities
The First Restatement of Torts embraced strict liability for ultrahazard-
ous activity. " ' An activity was "ultrahazardous" when it "(a) necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
gesting a theory of enterprise liability: "[Sitrict liability properly applies to business enter-
prises that benefit from hazardous activities and can spread losses among the whole communi-
ty.").
104. 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
105. Green, 270 P. at 955.
106. 190 P.2d I(Cal. 1948).
107. Id. at8.
108. Green, 270 P. at 956.
109. See Case, supra note 97, at 179.
110. See id.; see also Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 265.
111. RESTATEMENr OFTORTS § 519 (1938). This section provided:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chat-
tels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the
activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although
the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
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cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a mat-
ter of common usage."
' 12
By excluding the activities of "common usage" from strict liability,
even when ultrahazardous, the Restatement limited the expansion of the doc-
trine to new areas, such as driving cars and operating railroads.' 13 The doc-
trine's practical significance was reduced to a minimum." 4 However, in the
decades after the promulgation of the Restatement, courts revitalized the
strict liability principle, circumventing the "common usage" restraint. 
1 5
The courts did so by narrowly defining the activity under adjudication
and considering the overall circumstances in such a way as to make it "un-
common.""11 6 An example of the former is Luthringer v. Moore,"7 where the
Supreme Court of California imposed strict liability on a defendant who en-
gaged in pest control. 1 8 The plaintiff was harmed during the fumigation
activities as a result of a gas leak."19 The court applied the First Restatement
in defining fumigation as a "specialized activity" and considered the fact that
professional fumigators were "few in number."'
2 0
Similarly, a "common usage" activity becomes abnormally dangerous
in particular circumstances.i2 ' For example, in Koos v. Roth, 22 the Supreme
Court of Oregon distinguished agricultural field burning from everyday
backyard burning.' 3 Both fire related activities involved "destruction of raw
material by oxidation," but the "scale" and the "location" made the basic act
of burning leaves ultrahazardous; field burning was found abnormally dan-
gerous because it created hazards "beyond the ordinary risks associated with
common uses of fire."' 24  Thus, an otherwise ordinary activity may be
deemed abnormally dangerous when it is carried out in an ultrahazardous
manner. 125 Thus, in In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 26 strict lia-
bility was proper even though service stations were considered a matter of
common usage; the District Court of the Virgin Islands stated:
112. Id.§ 520.
113. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 266.
114. See Case, supra note 97, at 180.
115. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 270.
116. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
117. 190 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
118. Id. at9.
119. Id. at3.
120. Id. at8.
121. Case, supra note 97, at 193.
122. 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982).
123. Id. at 1265.
124. Id.
125. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
126. 846 F. Supp. 1243 (D.V.1. 1993).
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It may well be, as Defendants contend, that operation and
ownership of service stations is a matter of common usage and that
it is not unusual today to find service stations in residential areas.
But where, as here, the risk of seepage is contamination of the
area's precious and limited water supply, locating the storage tanks
above the aquifer created an abnormally dangerous and inappro-
priate use of the land.
127
The court considered, but ultimately ignored, the commonality of the
activity in light of the surrounding circumstances. 28 The "common usage"
limitation, then, was emptied of its substantial significance.'2 9
3. The Restatement (Second) of Torts: Confusion with Negligence
Finally, the Second Restatement of Torts modified the doctrine at least
in its formal aspects. 3 ° First, it labeled the activities "abnormally danger-
ous," as opposed to the older "ultrahazardous.' 31 Second, under the refor-
mulation, strict liability must be imposed after considering six factors that
determine whether the activity is abnormally dangerous. 32 An activity is
abnormally dangerous when some of the following factors exist:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
127. Id. at 1269.
128. See id.
129. See Case, supra note 97, at 180; see also Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Ab-
normally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 615
(1999). "[T]aken literally, the provision rarely limits the range of activity qualifying as ultra-
hazardous." Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). See Boston, supra note 129,
at 616-24.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). According to the drafters, "A com-
bination of the factors ... is commonly expressed by saying that the activity is 'ultrahazard-
ous,' or 'extra-hazardous."' Id. § 520 cmt. h. The American Law Institute modified the name
of the doctrine, but the substance remained the same. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d
799, 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In this article, however, the three terms are used inter-
changeably.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
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(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.' 
33
The first four clauses are generally derived from the First Restatement;
only factors (e) and (f) seem to be new. 134 But while the restyling appears to
restrict the application of strict liability because of the two additional factors,
the test is substantially unchanged.135 The fulfillment of just a few of the
factors is still enough to find an activity abnormally dangerous. 136 Addition-
ally, the Second Restatement reduced the burden on the plaintiff to prove a
risky activity by using "reasonable care" in factor (c) instead of the previous
"utmost care" and requiring the courts to consider the "extent to which" the
activity is not a matter of common usage, "rather than categorically exclud-
ing common activities."
' 137
Moreover, as both courts and commentators have noted, the new factors
(e) and (f) suggest a theory more similar to negligence than to strict liabili-
ty. 138 While not expressly rejecting the Restatement, some courts and com-
mentators have shown hostility toward this approach ignoring those two fac-
tors when engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity analysis.
39
For instance, in Koos v. Roth,'40 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
a farmer burning his fields was strictly liable for the harm caused to a neigh-
bor by the fire. 14 1 Acknowledging the "appropriateness" of agricultural field
burning to its location, the court expressly declined to consider factor (e),
stating that "an activity is not otherwise immune from strict liability because
133. Id
134. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977), with RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § § 519-20 (1938).
135. See Case, supra note 97, at 180.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). The Restatement explains
that "the factors listed in Clauses (a) to (f) of this Section are all to be considered, and are all
of importance.... [l]t is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh
heavily." Id.
137. Case, supra note 97, at 181-82; see also Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 272.
138. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 103, at 272-73; Boston, supra note 129, at 624; Case,
supra note 97, at 182.
139. See, e.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982); Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978); see also Boston, supra note 129, at 662.
140. 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982).
141. Id. at 1261, 1263.
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it is 'appropriate' in its place."' 142 Likewise, the "value of the dangerous ac-
tivity to the community" was irrelevant to the court's decision. 143 The court
emphasized that the proper inquiry was "who shall pay for harm that has
been done""'4 and further noted that "the person conducting the activity can
choose whether or not to chance the potentially costly consequences... [but]
[t]he potential victim cannot make that choice."' 145 Accordingly, factor (f)
was ignored, and the touchstone was again the fairness of requiring a person
who engages in the risky activity to pay the costs.1
46
Further illustrating this approach, in Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schu-
chart,147 the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected the argument that the defen-
dant's blasting activity was "necessary" and stated, "A business should bear
its own costs, burdens, and expenses of operation, and these should be distri-
buted by means of the price of the resulting product and not shifted, particu-
larly, to small neighboring property owners for them to bear alone."'
48
In Siegler v. Kuhlman,"49 the Supreme Court of Washington considered
the transportation of gasoline abnormally dangerous. 5° The court focused on
the nature of risks created by the tanker, referring to its "uniquely hazardous
characteristics" and "extraordinary dangers deriving from sheer quantity,
bulk, and weight, which enormously multiply its hazardous properties.''
The court also considered fairness, "putting the burden where it should be-
long as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the one of the two innocent
parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possible."' 52 As it appears,
the two components of the original doctrine as established in Rylands were
present in each of these cases.
53
Further, the Supreme Court of Washington in Langan v. Valicopters,
Inc.,54 expressly criticized factor (f), writing:
As a criterion for determining strict liability, this factor has re-
ceived some criticism among legal writers .... § 520(f) is not a
142. Id. at 1263.
143. Id. at 1261.
144. Id.
145. Koos, 652 P.2d at 1262-63.
146. See id, at 1262.
147. 188 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1963).
148. Id. at 408.
149. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
150. Id. at 1184.
151. Id.
152. ld. at 1185.
153. See Case, supra note 97, at 184.
154. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
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true element of strict liability: "The justification for strict liability,
in other words, is that useful but dangerous activities must pay
their own way."
There is no doubt that pesticides are socially valuable in the
control of insects, weeds and other pests. They may benefit socie-
ty by increasing production. Whether strict liability or negligence
principles should be applied amounts to a balancing of conflicting
social interest [of] the risk of harm versus the utility of the activity.
In balancing these interests, we must ask who should bear the loss
caused by the pesticides.
In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the or-
ganic food market for 1973 through no fault of their own. If crop
dusting continues on the adjoining property, the Langans may nev-
er be able to sell their crops to organic food buyers. Appellants, on
the other hand, will all profit from the continued application of
pesticides. Under these circumstances, there can be an equitable
balancing of social interests only if appellants are made to pay for
the consequences of their acts.' 55
The Langan court declared that the test of the Restatement, as adopted
in Siegler, was met; it listed all six factors, but substantially disregarded
them. 5 6 Fairness, then, was still determinative.
Finally, before turning to the adoption of the doctrine in Florida, the
confusion created by the application of factor (c) of the Restatement deserves
some clarifying words. Factor (c) requires the "inability to eliminate the risk
of the activity by exercising reasonable care." '157 Apparently, following the
rationale set forth in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 5 8 some argued that factor (c) should be interpreted as depriving the
doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities of any significance. 59
155. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 222.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 (c) (1977). The Restatement requires
the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care," but this proposition is
doubtful. See id. Every activity creates at least some minimal risk. This is recognized in the
change from "utmost care" in the First Restatement to "reasonable care" in the Second Res-
tatement and by the stated rationale that "probably no activity, unless ... perhaps the use of
atomic energy, from which all risks of harm could not be eliminated by the taking of all con-
ceivable precautions" Id. cmt. h. Thus, as discussed below, the standard of care is immaterial.
The proper focus then is on the dangerousness of the activity carried on.
158. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
159. See generally Boston, supra note 129; Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability,
56 BUFFALO L. REV. 245 (2008).
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In Indiana Harbor Belt, a railroad tank car containing acrylonitrile
leaked and spilled the dangerous chemical.' 6° The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had to decide whether a spill of dangerous chemicals occur-
ring during transportation should be subject to strict liability. 161 Writing for
the court, Judge Posner reversed the district court's decision; finding strict
liability, 162 Posner stated the now famous principle: "The baseline common
law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a workable regime, be-
cause the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being ... nonnegligent,
there is no need to switch to strict liability.' 63 Then, Posner suggested that
the six factors be analyzed in the following order of importance: (c), (e), (f),
(a), (b), and finally (d).' 64 Ultimately, the Court concluded in favor of a find-
ing of negligence, because the plaintiff offered "no reason . . . for believing
that a negligence regime [was] not perfectly adequate to remedy and deter, at
reasonable cost, the accidental spillage of acrylonitrile from rail cars.
,1 65
Subsequent to this decision, at least one commentator argued that factor (c)
requires the impossibility of proving negligence.
66
However, considering as the first issue whether the defendant could
have eliminated the risk by using reasonable care should not automatically
end the analysis and preclude strict liability.1 67 On the contrary, as several
authors have pointed out, "the unavoidability of the danger may suggest that
those conducting the activities are better situated than victims to spread,
avoid, and internalize this type of lOSS.,,168 Explaining the importance of the
six factors, the Court in Indiana Harbor Belt also recognized that some acci-
dents could be avoided merely by using care and that these situations require
moving the activity to another location or reducing its scale:
By making the actor strictly liable-by denying him in other words
an excuse based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more
160. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1175 (7th Cir. 1990).
161. id. at 1177.
162. Id. at 1183.
163. Id. at 1179.
164. See id.
165. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1179.
166. See, e.g., Boston, supra note 129, at 632-33.
167. Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnor-
mally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 341, 366 (1996) ("The imposition of strict
liability should be driven by the central goals of this doctrine. If the defendant is a suitable
party from the standpoint of loss-spreading, loss reduction, and loss allocation, then strict
liability may be appropriate. Moreover, even when the materialization of a risk may have
been reasonably preventable, that fact may not be readily provable by the victim, especially in
violent occurrences or highly unusual activities.").
168. Id. at 366; see also Jones, supra note 27, at 1752; Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1216.
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careful-we give him an incentive, missing in a negligence regime,
to experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve
not greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relo-
cating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the
activity giving rise to the accident.
1 69
Thus, Judge Posner himself centered the analysis on the extent to which
an activity, even when undertaken with all reasonable care, maintains an
unavoidable residual risk requiring the recourse to strict liability. 170 Now, an
activity can be risky either because it is hard to control or because the effects
threatened by a loss of control are extremely dangerous.'7 ' Focusing on the
level of care the defendant might have used can be misleading and lead to
absurd outcomes. 172 How can an activity that is abnormally dangerous in the
absence of negligence become less dangerous when the defendant is negli-
gent? Thus, the emphasis must be on the magnitude of the damages that may
ensue if the activity goes wrong, which generally remains equal regardless of
the defendant's conduct.'73
Further, another deficiency of the negligence regime is that the proof is
generally unavailable to the injured party. 74 The Indiana Harbor Belt court
itself was unable to identify whose carelessness caused the spill. 75 Requir-
ing a casual plaintiff to wait for each defendant "to point a finger at the oth-
ers in an effort to shift the blame for an accident" would be profoundly un-
169. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 916 F.2d at 1177.
170. Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1213.
171. See Case, supra note 97, at 188.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 189. As characterized by the district court, the spill in Indiana Harbor Belt
"forced the temporary evacuation of about 3000 people" and "contaminated not only the
ground, but also the water beneath it, thus threatening the water supply" of several communi-
ties. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. II1. 1987),
rev'd, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
174. Jones, supra note 27, at 1752 (noting that "[i]f a bystander had been injured in Indi-
ana Harbor, she would have had to trace this carload of acrylonitrile from the supply of the
railroad car by North American Car Corporation, to the loading of the car in Louisiana by
American Cyanamid, to the movement of the car to Chicago by the Missouri Pacific Railroad,
to the handling of the car in the yard of the switching road, Indiana Harbor.").
175. Id. at 1752-53 ("The court was of the opinion that the leak of acrylonitrile 'was
caused by carelessness-whether that of the North American Car Corporation in failing to
maintain or inspect the car properly, or that of Cyanamid in failing to maintain or inspect it, or
that of the Missouri Pacific when it had custody of the car, or that of the switching line itself
in failing to notice the ruptured lid, or some combination of these possible failures of care."').
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fair. 176 Rather, strict liability provides incentives for reducing the risks at the
outset, resulting in more certain accountability in case of an accident.
177
Several courts have understood and applied this interpretation, properly
focusing the analysis on the dangers imposed by the activity, coupled with
the victim's lack of relation with such activity. 78 This also seems to be con-
sistent with the spirit of the Restatement, that explained with admittedly un-
clear language, "The essential question is whether the risk created is so un-
usual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances sur-
rounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that
results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care."'
179
In short, the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities-as reformu-
lated by the Restatement-can be, and was in fact construed by the great
majority of jurisdictions, as reduced to two basic themes. 80 First, the dan-
gers created to the community by engaging in the risky activity under partic-
ular circumstances; and second, the fairness of imposing liability on those
engaged in such risky activity for their own benefit.' 8' Florida courts have
followed this approach.
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities in Florida
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Rylands doctrine in the case
of Pensacola Gas Co. v. Pebley. 82 In Pebley, the defendant gas company
176. Id. at 1753.
177. As suggested by one author:
Cases might of course arise in which the negligence rule would eliminate all risk. But there is
no need to choose between strict liability and negligence in such cases because both would
produce identical deterrent effects: the defendant would invest in reasonable care to avoid all
risk of accident. At the other extreme, cases might arise in which the negligence rule would
not eliminate all risk, but the defendant lacks options to reduce activity level, even by raising
price. The two rules again produce the same deterrent effect: the defendant would invest in
reasonable care, leaving a residuary of unavoidable risk. In short, courts do not need to choose
between rule regimes because strict liability works in all cases: it will be effective when it is
needed and do no harm when it is not.
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1217.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 994 So. 2d 1062, 1066 (Fla. 2008) ("Strict liability
does not concern itself with whether the actor exercised reasonable care."); Laterra v. Treast-
er, 844 P.2d 724, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (considering suicide with gas an abnormally dan-
gerous activity even if the defendant-suicidal was negligent); Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d
1181, 1185 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) (disregarding anyone's negligence in light of the extreme
danger posed by hauling gas on the highway).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
180. See Case, supra note 97, at 187.
181. See id.
182. 5 So. 593 (Fla. 1889).
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polluted the plaintiffs water as a result of its operations.183 The court indi-
rectly applied the Rylands principles to solve the case, stating that:
The appellant gas company had the right to use the water in and
about the gas-works as they pleased, but they had no right to allow
the filthy water to escape from their premises, and to enter the land
of their neighbors. It was the duty of the company to confine the
refuse from their works so that it could not enter upon and injure
their neighbors, and if they did so it was done at their peril; the es-
cape of the refuse filthy water being in itself an evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the gas company.
184
Even if the court imposed a sort of strict liability, the negligence lan-
guage used by the court blurred the extent of the two components revealed in
the English case. 185 Eighty-six years later, however, in Cities Service Co. v.
State,186 the Florida's Second District Court of Appeal imposed strict liability
over a defendant that caused vast damages by accidentally discharging phos-
phate lime into the Peace River.187 The court held, "The doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher should be applied in Florida."' 188 Expressly adopting Rylands, the
court applied the doctrine as reformulated by the Restatement of Torts, sec-
tion 519 and 520.189 Before reaching the six factors analysis, the court stated:
[E]ven the non-negligent use of one's land can cause extensive
damages to a neighbor's property. Though there are still many ha-
zardous activities which are socially desirable, it now seems rea-
sonable that they pay their own way. It is too much to ask an in-
nocent neighbor to bear the burden thrust upon him as a conse-
quence of an abnormal use of the land next door.'
90
Thus, the court first perceived that an innocent person should not suffer
the consequences of the abnormally dangerous activity.' 9' After briefly ba-
lancing the six factors, the court further admitted its reliance on one factor in
particular: the great risk of harm. 92 In its words, the court was "impressed
183. Id. at 595.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
187. Id. at 800.
188. Id. at 801.
189. Id. at 802-03.
190. Id. at 801.
191. Cities Serv. Co., 312 So. 2d at 801.
192. Id. at 803.
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by the magnitude of the activity and the attendant risk of enormous dam-
age."' 193 Additionally, the Florida court reasoned that one who carries on the
risky activity should bear the loss, rather than the victim, who had no relation
to the activity other than being injured by it.194 Thus, the court seemed to
recognize the importance of the two elements: dangerousness of the activity
and fairness of accounting the carrier for the risks. 195
The fairness component was also considered in Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yan-
cey and Sons Dairy, Inc., 96 where the court applied the Restatement analy-
sis.' 97 In Bunyak, liquefied cow manure flowed from defendant's farm onto
plaintiff's land. 98 The trial court refused to impose strict liability, and the
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal reversed.' 99 Remarkably, after
discussing the six factors and finding strict liability proper, the court returned
to emphasize the fairness component, writing at the very end of its decision:
"The conclusion is inescapable that no matter what theory is invoked by a
plaintiff whose property is damaged by the lawful activities conducted upon
or conditions existing on the land of another, the key consideration will al-
ways be that useful but dangerous activities must pay their own way. ' 2°°
In Great Lakes Dredging and Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp.,°1
although rejecting plaintiffs contention that strict liability was proper, the
Florida court focused its analysis again on the magnitude of harm, consider-
ing that it was "[c]entral to [the abnormally dangerous activity] doctrine...
that the ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity poses some physical
... danger to persons or property in the area, which danger must be of a cer-
tain magnitude and nature. 20 2 Other decisions followed the same ratio-
nale.2°3 Further, in United States v. Stevens,2°4 the Supreme Court of Florida
recently reaffirmed the immateriality of the standard of reasonable care in the
abnormally dangerous activity analysis.205 The court expressly stated that
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
197. Id. at 894-95.
198. Id. at 893.
199. Id. at 893, 896.
200. id. at 896.
201. 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Id. at513.
203. See, e.g., Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee, 604 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (per curium) (holding that fumigation was an "ultrahazardous activity").
204. 994 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2008).
205. Id. at 1066 n.2.
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"[s]trict liability does not concern itself with whether the actor exercised
reasonable care. 206
C. Defenses
Finally, we have to direct some of our attention to an issue common to
each jurisdiction: defenses that might exclude strict liability.0 7 The modem
statutory trend is to set aside those defenses. 208 Even when imposing strict
liability, federal statutes limit the defenses available to the plaintiff.2°9 State
statutes are even more rigid and disallow all or most defenses. 20 According
to the Restatement, one who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity "is
subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the
unexpectable (a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person, or
(b) action of an animal, or (c) operation of a force of nature. ' 21' Following
this trend, in Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee,2 '2 Florida's Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated:
Any alleged negligence by a third party does not free the fu-
migation company from liability. In a case involving ... an ultra-
hazardous activity, this court held that "[u]nder Florida law, a de-
fendant is still liable for the consequences of his conduct even
though some other cause contributed to the same damage." 213
Still applying the Restatement, the court agreed that when the risk re-
sults in an injury, "it is immaterial that the harm occurs through the unex-
pectable action of a human being, an animal or a force of nature... irrespec-
tive of whether the action of the human being [who partakes in] the abnor-
mally dangerous activity harmful is innocent, negligent or even reckless. '1 4
The modern trend, and especially the Second Restatement approach, seems
correct.215 In the absence of some fault on the part of the victim, strict liabili-
206. Id.
207. See Jones, supra note 27, at 1743.
208. Id.
209. See Christopher B. Kende, Development And Presentation Of The Pollution Victims'
Claim, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 203, 210 (1993) ("The [contributory] negligence of the United
States... is no longer available under OPA.").
210. Jones, supra note 27, at 1743.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
212. 604 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curium).
213. Id. at 1248 (citations omitted).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 cmt. a (1977). However, the Restatement
expressed no opinion on deliberately harmful behavior by third parties. See id.
215. Jones, supra note 27, at 1744.
2o011]
247
: Nova Law Review 35, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ty justly requires anyone conducting an abnormally dangerous activity to
bear the burden of the resulting accident.
216
At this point, the groundwork has been laid to show that offshore oil
drilling is an abnormally dangerous activity, especially because it is per-
formed in circumstances that render it extremely dangerous, such as drilling
in deep water without sufficient technology.
IV. DEEPWATER OIL DRILLING Is ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
When considering oil related activities, jurisdictions are split. 217 On
one end of the spectrum, some courts have refused to consider mere transpor-
tation of petroleum an abnormally dangerous activity.2 8 However, at least
one jurisdiction deemed the danger created by an oil spill during such trans-
portation an "extraordinary" risk of harm.219
On the other end, strict liability was found appropriate in oil drilling sit-
uations similar to blasting activities. 20 As noted in Green v. General Petro-
leum Co., an oil well exploded during drilling operations, causing damages
to the plaintiff.22 The Supreme Court of California found strict liability "re-
gardless of any element of negligence either in the doing of the act or in the
construction, use, or maintenance of the object or instrumentality that may
have caused the injury. 222 Of course, accidents like the one in the Gulf of
Mexico are comparable to this kind of conduct.
In the middle category, very few courts have yet to decide whether oil
drilling-regardless of the location-is an abnormally dangerous activity.223
216. Seeid. at 1755.
217. See Smith v. Mid-Valley Pipeline Co., No. 3:07-CV-13-KKC, 2007 WL 1309612, at
*3 (E.D. Ky. May 4, 2007). "[N]o Kentucky case has extended strict liability to the transmis-
sion of oil through pipelines." Id. (quoting Cantrell v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, No.
03-298, 2005 WL 1570652, at *3 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2005)).
218. Smith, 2007 WL 1309612 at *3.
219. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 04-494, 2005 WL 2290283, at
*6 (D. N.J. Sep. 20, 2005). "The Court does not find that [plaintiff] has demonstrated that the
risk of harm imposed on the community by [operating a crane] is 'extraordinary,' in contrast,
for example, to the danger posed by oil spills or the transporting of hazardous substances." Id.
220. Green v. General Petroleum Co., 270 P. 952, 956 (Cal. 1928).
221. Id. at953.
222. Id. at 955.
223. See EOG Resources, Inc. v. Badlands Power Fuels, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 882, 900
n.3 (D. N.D. 2009). "Only the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely answered the
question of whether oil well drilling is an ultrahazardous activity." Id. (citing Hull v. Che-
vron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding "that oil well drilling is an
ultrahazardous activity")). Cf Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974)
("We decline to reach the issue of whether defendants' oil drilling operations constitute an
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It is time, then, to consider each of the six factors' applicability to deep water
oil drilling. At the end of the analysis-which will keep an eye on Florida
law-it will appear both logical and just to consider the petroleum compa-
nies accountable for such a remunerative, yet dangerous, activity. Under
Florida law, oil drilling performed in deepwater must be subject to strict lia-
bility as matter of law.224 And such conclusion is supported by those deci-
sions that have already considered oil drilling as an ultra hazardous activi-
ty-regardless the location. 5
A. It Is Likely to Produce Great Harm: Factors (a) and (b)
"The greater the risk of an accident ... the stronger is the case for strict
liability. /22 6 Factors (a) and (b) can be considered together. 2 7 In conjunc-
tion, these two factors represent the dangerousness of the activity-probably
the most relevant part.228 In Cities Service Company v. State,2 9 Florida's
Second District Court of Appeal dwarfed all the other factors, emphasizing
"the magnitude of the activity and the attendant risk" of harm and explained
why such magnitude was great:
The impounding of billions of gallons of phosphatic slimes behind
earthen walls which are subject to breaking even with the exercise
of the best of care strikes us as being both 'ultrahazardous' and
'abnormally dangerous,' as the case may be.
'ultrahazardous activity' and express no opinion as to the applicability of this doctrine to the
facts presently before us.").
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, cmt. f (1977). When the activity's
"dangers and inappropriateness for the locality" are great enough, "[the carrier] should be
required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of
negligence." Id. But see SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 ( Cal Ct. App.
1984) ("[B]y its very nature, the issue of whether an activity is ultrahazardous cannot be de-
cided on demurrer."); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. City of Redondo Beach, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
337, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("Given the peculiar facts.., the location of the drilling activi-
ty and the importance of the breakwater to the safety ... we cannot say, as a matter of law,
that respondents' drilling was not ultrahazardous.").
225. See, e.g., Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., 96 P.3d 484, 492 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963) (Wyoming law recognizes that
the drilling of an oil and gas well is an ultrahazardous activity, a dangerous agency); But see
Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that drilling
operations are not ultrahazardous).
226. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990).
227. See Boston, supra note 129, at 655.
228. See Case, supra note 97, at 186.
229. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
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This is not clear water which is being impounded. Here, Cities
Service introduced water into its mining operation which when
combined with phosphatic wastes produced a phosphatic slime
which had a high potential for damage to the environment. If a
break occurred, it was to be expected that extensive damage would
be visited upon property many miles away. In this case, the dam-
age, in fact, extended almost to the mouth of the Peace River,
which is far beyond the phosphate mining area described in the Ci-
ties Service affidavit. We conclude that the Cities Service slime
reservoir constituted a non-natural use of the land such as to in-
voke the doctrine of strict liability. 230
Considering the potential dangerousness of the activity as the main
point of the analysis, the court focused on the environmental damage.231 The
other factors appeared almost irrelevant once the risk of harm resulting from
the activity was on a large enough scale.232 However, strict liability is proper
either when there is little chance of great harm or when such a risk is high
but the magnitude of harm threatened is low.
233
In the case of oil drilling, both the risk that an oil spill will occur and
the magnitude of the harm that results once it occurs are gigantic. As to the
risk that some damage will result, as previously discussed, oil spills are more
than common. 234 As to the severity of harm, during an interview with the
Financial Times, Tony Hayward, British Petroleum's Chief Executive Offic-
er, acknowledged that the company considered the blowout a "low probabili-
ty, high impact event. 2 35 Thus, the magnitude of harm in the case of an oil
spill may be monumental, and often irreparable.236 Indeed, BP spilled more
than one hundred and forty million gallons into the Gulf waters and killed
eleven people as a result of the rig's explosion. 37
230. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
231. See id.
232. Boston, supra note 129, at 656.
233. See id.
234. See Ivanovich & Hays, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
235. Sean Alfano, BP CEO Tony Hayward Admits Company Didn't Have The Right Tools
to Stop Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 3, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/2010/06/03/2010-06-03_bpceojtony-hayward-admits company-didnthave_
theright-tools to stop-gulf oil s.html.
236. See generally Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Oil Spill Litigation: Private Party Lawsuits and
Limitations, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 363 (1992); Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61.
237. See Tracking the Oil Spill in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2010,
http:/www.nytimes.cominteractive/201 5 /01us/201 0501 -oil-spiII-tracker.htmi.
'The total amount spilled was estimated to be 140 million gallons... of crude oil." Id.
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In particular, deepwater oil drilling creates a risk upon the environment,
human health, and some economic activities that are water related.
I. Effect on Aquatic Life
Oil pollution affects the aquatic life in different ways. First, the conse-
quences of large oil spills are directly lethal to marine organisms like cor-
als, 238 shrimps, 239 and any other kind of animals including birds and mam-
mals. 240 Second, even when life forms are not killed immediately, the oil can
indirectly destroy the fauna by impairing fish "feeding efficiency, growth
and reproductive rates, survival of offspring, and resistance to diseases. 24'
Additional known effects are "disturbance of the food chain and 'direct
coating' which impedes the vital processes of respiration ... in animals, pre-
vents sunlight penetration to plants, and increases temperature by absorbing
solar radiation.2 42 In fact, oil itself can impact coastal plant species by the
mere effects of touching and smothering.2 43
Finally, the long-term effects of oil on the marine ecosystem are still
unknown. 244 In particular, the exact effects on the deep-sea life from the oil
that dissolved below the surface-like the way with which such a dissolution
takes place-are "still a mystery." 245 Nonetheless, when discussing the ex-
tent of the environmental damages, scientists concur that oil in water is
harmful .24
238. See John C. Rudolf, Deep Underwater, Threatened Reefs, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010
at A] 6. "Studies on the effects of oil and chemicals on coral are limited to the shallow-water
variety, however. Essentially no research has been conducted on their slow-growing deepwa-
ter cousins." Id.
239. Bob Anderson, Shrimpers Watch Winds; Crisis Persists *** Concerns Raised About
Oil Spreading into Three Lakes, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., June 15, 2010, at Al.
240. DISASTERS: OIL SPILLS, http://www.pollutionissues.con/Co-Ea/Disasters-Oil-
Spills.html#ixzz0uzKw6lko (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). "900 bald eagles, 250,000 seabirds,
2,800 sea otters, and 300 harbor seals were killed directly by the Exxon Valdez spill... [how-
ever,] population-level consequences are difficult to measure." Id.
241. Id.
242. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 63.
243. Rudolf, supra note 238, at A16.
244. Id.
245. Justin Gillis & Campbell Robertson, On the Surface, Gulf Oil Spill Is Vanishing Fast;
Concerns Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at Al. See also http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/201 0/08/24/24greenwire-undersea-oil-plume-vanishes-in-gulf-degraded-b-8739 I .html?
pagewanted=all.
246. See Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61-62. "There has not always been a consensus ... on
the exact effects of oil pollution on water.... [l]t is generally agreed that petroleum in water
is harmful, even though the extent of the harm may not be agreed upon." Id.
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2. Effect on Human Health
Likewise, there is some dispute about the potential effects of the spilled
oil on human health.247 However, some damages are evident.248 First, for
instance, a direct result of the spill: Eleven workers died on April 20, 2010,
when the Deepwater Horizon went up in flames. 249 Second, the effects aris-
ing from the exposure to the oil spilled: Many of the chemicals extracted
from crude oil are "carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic. 25° While brief
contact with small quantities of light crude oil is not harmful, ingesting a
minimal amount of oil will cause "upset stomach, vomiting, and diarrhea. 25'
Long-term exposures can affect the central nervous system.252 A 2007 study
following cleanup damages after the 2002 Prestige oil spill in Galicia, Spain,
showed that respiratory symptoms might arise years after the exposure. 3
Skin and respiratory disorders were also common symptoms after the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, in 1989.254 Other potential long-term risks include lung,
kidney, liver, and DNA damage. 255 Significant steps have been taken to in-
crease the knowledge about the longer-term effects of oil exposure. 256 Final-
ly, it is difficult to estimate the catastrophic impact-mental, physical, and
emotional-that the spill will have on the people currently living in the Gulf,
and on the generations to come. 7 Overall, few would disagree that the risks
posed on the human health by oil spills are abnormally dangerous.
247. See Shari Roan, Gulf Oil Spill: Human Health Effects Debated, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
2010, 5:09 PM) http://atimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/06/experts-speculate-on-
likely-human-health-effects-of-oil-spill.html.
248. See generally Walsh & THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY infra.
249. Brian Walsh, Assessing the Health Effects of the Oil Spill, TIME (June 25, 2010),
http:// www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1999479,00.html.
250. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 64 n.47. Benzene, toluene, and butylene are three of the most
dangerous.
251. Noaki Schwartz & Matthew Brown, Gulf Oil Spill Sickness: Cleanup Workers Expe-
rience Health Problems, Complain of Flulike Symptoms, HUFFINGTON POST, June 3, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com2010/06/03/gulf-oil-spill-sickness-c n_598816.html.
252. Id.
253. Melly Alazraki, The Oil Spill and Human Health: More Questions Than Answers,
DAILY FIN., June 26, 2010, http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/health-effects-of-oil-spills-on-
humans-more-questions-than-an/i19530364/?icid=spherecopyright.
254. See id. "[O]nly seven spills have been studied of the hundreds around the world." Id.
255. Id.
256. Alazraki, supra note 253. "[T]he Department of Health and Human Service has set
aside $10 million to track oil spill-related illnesses in states along the Gulf Coast and study
cleanup workers." Id.
257. Walsh, supra note 249. As a consequence of the catastrophe, "'[tihese are people in
a serious crisis."' Id. For instance, an Alabama fisherman with an oil-spill cleanup job for
BP, was recently found "dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound." Id.
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3. Economic Loss
Finally, oil spills result in the impairment of large zones of water that
were once used for recreation, navigation, or livelihood.25 8 Thus, depending
on its size, an oil spill may affect commercial fishermen, beach owners and
users,259 tourist booking agents, waterfowl guides and photographers,26 fish-
ing industry employees, and commercial fish processors.261 Water contami-
nation also impairs recreational activities like swimming or water surfing.262
And the list is absolutely non-exhaustive.
Such economic interests were traditionally unprotected: Strict liability
permitted only recovery for harm to persons, real property, or chattels. 263
Logically, these damages should have been included within the scope of
strict liability because they directly result from the abnormally dangerous
activity. 2 4 However, some courts limited the imposition of strict liability for
recovering economic loss.26'
In Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,2 66 the Supreme Court of Florida
solved the issue consistently with the letter of the Restatement. 267 In Curd,
the defendant spilled pollutants into Tampa Bay. 26 8 The plaintiffs-fishermen
sued for both negligence and strict liability, claiming loss of income or prof-
it.2 69 The court first explained the applicability of the economic loss rule,
stating:
[Tihe economic loss rule in Florida is applicable in only two situa-
tions: (1) where the parties are in contractual privity . . . or (2)
where the defendant is a manufacturer or distributor of a defective
258. See Ekpu, supra note 28, at 61.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Weyhrauch, supra note 236, at 372-75.
262. Id. at 372
263. David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability For Disaster Response Costs: Ac-
counting For The True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1001, 1030-32 (1987).
264. Id. The Restatement apparently supports this conclusion, distinguishing between
"harm" and "physical harm" and applying strict liability to "harm." Id. Therefore, liability
for economic loss should not excluded by the rule. See id.
265. In re TMI Litig. Gov'tl Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (M.D. Pa. 1982),
vacated sub nom. Pennsylvania. V. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that "purely economic losses" are not recoverable on a strict liability theory without a
showing that the losses flowed from harm to persons, land or chattel).
266. 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).
267. Id. at 1228.
268. Id. at 1218.
269. Id. at 1219.
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product which damages itself but does not cause personal injury or
damage to any other property.
Clearly neither the contractual nor products liability economic loss
rule is applicable to this situation .... Rather we have plaintiffs
who have brought traditional negligence and strict liability claims
against a defendant who has polluted Tampa Bay and allegedly
caused them injury .... [Tihe economic loss rule does not prevent
the plaintiffs from bringing this cause. The plaintiffs' causes of
action are controlled by traditional negligence law ... and by strict
liability principles.7 0
Then, the court went on to apply the principle to the plaintiffs' negli-
gence claim and found "a protectable economic expectation in the marine life
that qualifies as a property right. '271 Finally, the court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, concluding:
[D]ischarge of the pollutants constituted a tortious invasion that in-
terfered with the special interest of the commercial fishermen to
use those public waters to earn their livelihood. We find this
breach of duty has given rise to a cause of action sounding in neg-
ligence. We note, however, that in order to be entitled to compen-
sation for any loss of profits, the commercial fishermen must prove
all of the elements of their causes of action, including damages.
272
It must be noted that although the court avoided the issue of strict liabil-
ity, it cited to two oil spill cases in reaching its conclusion.273 The court's
holding, then, seems to be broader than it appears. Whether Curd would
protect the special interest of surfers and swimmers-in addition to that of
fisherman-is an issue beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, at this
point, it seems clear that economic losses must be taken into account when
considering the severity of the harm threatened by engaging in the activity.
Therefore, the magnitude of the risk that either an oil spill will occur or
that irreparable damages will result in the event of a spill is enormous and
sufficient to justify the enhanced protection provided by strict liability prin-
ciples.
270. Id. at 1223.
271. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1224.
272. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
273. See id. at 1223-24. Cf Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Bur-
gess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973).
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B. No Standard of Reasonable Care Can Be Exercised: Factor (c)
Another factor to consider is whether the risk of injury can be avoided
through the exercise of reasonable care.274 One may argue that using reason-
able care can eliminate the risks of oil drilling. However, as previously dis-
cussed, this is not the proper question because the defendant's conduct is
irrelevant in a strict liability analysis.275 The relevant inquiry is whether the
magnitude of the danger is the same regardless of one's fault.2 76 Oil drilling
is dangerous regardless of whether or not negligence accompanies it. First, it
is likely that an oil spill may occur; in fact, it is almost the rule.277 Second,
when such a spill does occur in the deep sea, the resulting harm to the envi-
ronment-and not only the environment-is intolerable, regardless of any
potential negligence. The difficulties in closing the spill increase with the
depth.27 8 Finally, even an accurate estimation of the real damage becomes
hard.279 Accordingly, the argument against strict liability will likely fail.
C. The Activity Is Not a Matter of Common Usage: Factor (d)
The more the activity is customary, the less it is abnormally dangerous.
An activity is a matter of common usage when it is habitually "carried on by
the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.' '280  Oil
drilling, even when conducted on land or in shallow waters, certainly does
not fit within this definition. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of strict
liability.
In any event, as we have seen before, the fact that an activity is a matter
of common usage is rarely outcome determinative.28' The significance of
factor (d) can be limited by narrowly defining the activity involved. 282 Simi-
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (1977).
275. Calabresi, supra note 39, at 716.
276. Case, supra note 97, at 188.
277. See Ivanovich & Hays, supra note 3.
278. See Peter N. Spotts, Gulf oil spill: Why Is It so Hard to Stop?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 8, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0608/Gulf-oil-spill-Why-is-it-
so-hard-to-stop. See also Kristen Hays, BP to Test New Cap to Stem Oil Flow, REUTERS, July
13, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6505TA20100713.
279. See John Collins Rudolf, On the Surface, Gulf Oil Spill Is Vanishing Fast; Concerns
Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, http:/lwww.nytimes.comi/2010/07/28/us/28spill.html?
_r=-2&pagewanted=2&hp.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977).
281. See Boston, supra note 129, at 659; Case, supra note 97, at 193.
282. To recall, in Koos v. Roth, the court distinguished agricultural field burning from
everyday backyard burning, applying strict liability to the latter. 652 P.2d 1255, 1265-66 (Or.
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larly, an otherwise ordinary activity can be found abnormally dangerous
when it is carried out in a dangerous manner.283 Accordingly, even assuming
that oil drilling could be considered an activity of common usage, deepwater
oil drilling is certainly not. In fact, while oil is commonly drilled in-land or
in coastal waters, offshore deepwater facilities have found their way only
recently. In the Gulf of Mexico there are approximately three thousand and
five hundred drilling wells and production platforms, yet few reach a depth
of one thousand feet.284 With a vertical depth of 35,050 feet (10,680 m) and
a measured depth of 35,055 feet (10,685 m), the Deepwater Horizon is the
deepest oil rig in history.285 Not only was the activity not common, it was
actually a world record of uncommonality. 286 This conclusion is completely
consistent with the Restatement approach, adopted in Florida: "[A]bnormal
dangers arise from activities that are in themselves unusual, or from unusual
risks created by more usual activities under particular circumstances. 287
It seems apparent that the overall risks produced by drilling in such
deeper water are much greater than normal.288
D. Off-Shore Oil Drilling Is Inappropriate for the Location
Conducting an activity in the wrong place can render such activity ab-
normally dangerous. 289 In Florida, the proper inquiry is whether the activity
is a "non-natural" use of the land.290 However, a different community may
turn a dangerous activity, such as oil drilling, into a natural use of the land;
this situation occurred, for example, in a few cases of properly conducted
operations of oil wells in Texas and Oklahoma.2 9' However, even such cases
1982). In Luthringer v. Moore, pest control was considered professional fumigation and
found abnormally dangerous. 190 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1948).
283. See Case, supra note 97, at 193.
284. lan Urbina, In Gulf It Was Unclear Who Was in Charge of Rig, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2010, http://www.nytimes.conV2010/06/06/us/06rig.html.
285. Press Release, Transocean Ltd, Deepwater Horizon Drills World's Deepest Oil &
Gas Well (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file with Nova Law Review).
286. See id.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
288. See Urbina, supra note 284.
289. See Boston, supra note 129, at 661; Case, supra note 97, at 193.
290. See Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.1975). "The
conclusion is, in short, that the American decisions, like the English ones, have applied the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher only to the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous con-
dition or activity which is not a 'natural' one where it is." Id. at 802 (quoting W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 510 (4th ed. 1971)).
291. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W. 2d 221 (Tex. 1936); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,
5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
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are distinguishable. In Turner v. Big Lake Oil CO., 2 9 2 the Supreme Court of
Texas held that oil drilling was a natural use of land in Texas and refused to
impose strict liability for harm caused by the escape of salt water wastes
from oil drilling operations. 93  Similarly, in Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease,294 the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found the location for oil drilling operations
appropriate.295 However, the court in Tidal stressed that the touchstone for
determining the appropriateness of the location is the possibility of injuring
others or the land of others.296 Although this possibility is reduced to a min-
imum in rural and isolated land areas, engaging in the very same conduct in
places where it may affect other people can transform such conduct into an
abnormally dangerous activity.297
If oil spills in the open sea the risk of harm to third parties is at its
greatest; as discussed, the injury would reach a large number of different
victims, from landowners to just users of the marine resources. 298  But the
reasons why offshore deepwater is inappropriate for oil drilling are more
compelling. 299 Not only is deepwater oil drilling more likely to cause acci-
dents,3" but also the depth of the sea makes solving problems that may arise
more difficult.0 1 Scientists have compared working in the deep sea to work-
ing in space: "It's a hard place to get to, a tricky space in which to maneuv-
er, and subject to daunting laws of physics. 30 2
292. 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
293. See id. at 226.
294. 5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931).
295. Id. at 392-93.
296. Id. at 391.
297. Compare Turner, 96 S.W.2d at 221 with Green v. General Petroleum Co., 270 P. 952
(Cal. 1928).
The intent and purpose of the act is to prevent persons in the operation of oil and gas wells to
deposit oil ... in streams used by others for watering stock, and ... from allowing salt water to
escape from their wells and flow over the surface of the land of others. To hold that operators
could not flow salt water over the surface of land owned by them. .. would result in depriving
the owner of land of the right to use it to his own advantage, where such use would in no way
harm or injure others.
Tidal, 5 P.2d at 392.
298. See Weyhrauch, supra note 236, at 372.
299. See generally Oil Spill Casts Doubts on Deep Water Exploration, EcON. TIMES, Jun
13, 2010, http:lleconomictimes.indiatimes.comlarticleshow/6042891 .cms
300. See id. "In the future, it is inevitable that technology and risk will increase, not dimi-
nish, as 'easy' sources of oil are depleted and as the exploration effort moves into new and ever
more challenging frontiers." Id.
301. See Spotts, supra note 278. Siphoning systems used to remedy to the spill have
'never been tested at such depths." Id.
302. Id.
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E. The Value of the Activity Does Not Outweigh its Risk: Factor (f)
How desperate are we for oil? It is undisputed that oil has been the
most important source of energy in the world. 3 3 The Restatement describes
this factor as the prosperity the activity provides to the community." How-
ever, as we have seen, a Florida court rejected the "value to the community"
factor in Cities Service Co., reasoning that one who carries on the risky activ-
ity should bear the loss, rather than the victim who had no relation to the
activity other than being injured by it. 305 The conclusion is supported by the
approach of other jurisdictions considering the issue; many recent cases sug-
gest that the utility to the community is largely irrelevant.3°
What seems clear is that even after weighing oil's utility to the commu-
nity, such utility is largely outweighed by the extraordinary dangers of
deepwater oil drilling. BP and other petroleum companies will continue to
profit by extracting oil in the deepwater; but the carriers of such risky oil
drilling must bear any costs that may result when their activity goes wrong.
As discussed, the Restatement does not require the presence of all six
factors; 30 7 the presence of three to four factors is generally sufficient for a
court to impose strict liability.308 Here, all six factors weigh in favor of con-
sidering deep water oil drilling an abnormally dangerous activity. In short, it
is an easy case for strict liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Both water contamination and oil pollution are among the worst threats
to the environment that man can produce. Oil spills are almost always within
the exclusive control of the companies that operate the wells, and victims can
do little to guard against oil pollution or avoid damages resulting from it.
When the oil drilling operations are conducted in deep water, the likelihood
of harm increases, the resulting damages become monumental, and repairing
such damage is arduous, when not impossible. The Deepwater Horizon
alone has leaked into the water more than one hundred and forty million gal-
303. Ekpu, supra note 28, at 55; see C. TUGENDGART & A. HAMILTON, OIL: THE BIG
BUSINESS 1 (1975) in OPEC BULLETIN 55 (1994).
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). For example, an oil well may
not be considered abnormally dangerous in Texas or Oklahoma because of the importance the
oil industry has to the local economy, whereas the same oil well in Indiana or California might
be found abnormally dangerous because it is a lesser industry in those areas. See id.
305. See id.
306. Boston, supra note 129, at 665.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977).
308. Case, supra note 97, at 194.
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Ions of oil, and scientists continue to discuss how many more similar spills
our planet can endure.
Strict liability provides an incentive for oil companies to take appropri-
ate precautions to avoid such catastrophic events; or, in the least, it requires
them to bear the burden of the unavoidable accidents. Further, the doctrine
of abnormally dangerous activites appears to be the easiest way to determine
oil companies' strict liability-not requiring any showing of the defendant's
negligence and disallowing almost every defense.
Consistently applied throughout the United States, the doctrine is appli-
cable regardless of federal statutes that may already impose some sort of
liability. Federal law is but one of the many tools that can be used to keep
our waters clean. Additionally, state law must coexist and supplement feder-
al law in order to effectively protect the rights of citizens of the United
States-and more generally, those who receive a benefit from the sea.
Accordingly, a plaintiff may freely choose to recover under a common
law strict liability theory as the simplest and safest way to redress the envi-
ronmental damage caused by petroleum companies. Pursuant to the doctrine
of abnormally dangerous activities, as first established in Rylands v. Fletcher
and developed by the Restatements of Torts, deep water oil drilling qualifies
as an activity that, because of its dangerousness, should be subject to a strict
liability regimen.
This is especially true in Florida and in such jurisdictions where courts
are willing to consider as primary factors the magnitude of the danger
created by the activity and the fairness of making the carrier of the activity
liable. In the event of litigation in Florida, the mission will be easier. The
risks imposed on society as a result of offshore oil drilling are extreme, and
the victims are powerless and faultless with respect to the control and pre-
vention of the damages.
Finally, such a conclusion is strongly supported by those decisions that
have already considered oil drilling-regardless of the location-an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. Courts that have decided otherwise did not take
into account the actual dangerousness of the enterprise, and they will likely
reconsider the issue when faced with the additional risks imposed by the
inappropriate location. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill may be the best
place to start.
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